A DEFENCE

OF THE

CATHOLIC FAITH

CONCERNING THE

SATISFACTION OF CHRIST,

AGAINST

FAUSTUS SOCINUS.

BY

HUGO GROTIUS.

TRANSLATED, WITH NOTES AND AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION,

BY

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TO

My Revered Teacher,

EDWARDS AMASA PARK,

THEOLOGIAN AND HISTORIAN,

WHO HAS MADE

THE CHRISTIAN THOUGHT OF ALL LANDS

CONTRIBUTE

TO THE

EXPOSITION AND PERFECTION

OF

NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THE translation of Grotius's "Defence" herewith offered to the Christian public is an attempt to present in pure and readable English this masterpiece among works upon the atonement. It has been the first endeavor to make the translation readable as well as exact, and the next to make it literal. Grotius's style was eminently sequacious. He delighted in linking his sentences together by innumerable connective particles, and availed himself freely of the resources of the Latin language to accomplish this. As far as was thought consistent with English idiom these connective particles have been retained. But it was thought necessary to break up some of the longer sentences into shorter ones, and to take the same liberty with the paragraphs. An occasional Greek phrase, which in our day would seem pedantic, has been silently translated, and the Greek put at the bottom of the page, along with the numerous notes which were incorporated by Grotius with the text. To these foot-notes some small additions have been made

by the translator, for self-evident reasons, and enclosed in brackets. The preface of Vossius has been omitted. Otherwise no change has been made; and it is hoped that the translation may enable the English reader to gain as true an idea of Grotius's work as the Latin itself would afford him.

The translation is made from the Amsterdam edition of Grotius's Theological Works and Letters, in four volumes, folio, 1679. Two other editions have also been employed in the work; one probably the first edition, Leyden, 1617, another the second edition of the same year and place. These texts differ somewhat, for the folio was printed from the author's private copy, upon the margin of which certain additions had been made, chiefly citations of authorities. The folio edition is a most careful and excellent one, and reflects great credit upon its editor. For ready reference the pages and columns of the folio are printed in the margin of the translation.

The only other English translation of the work ever made, was first published in London, 1692, and bears the translator's initials only — W. H. This translation is, of course, now unreadable, and often obscure. But it never was a perfect translation; for beside the fact that the English is Latin-English, such as never was spoken, and never could be, W. H. has not infrequently failed to gain precisely

the author's meaning. He is hardly ever felicitous, abounds with small errors of various kinds, and in some places positively blunders; while throughout he has permitted his work to be seriously marred by careless proof-reading. But he is literal, and is in general very faithful to his task.

This translation was first printed in the Bibliotheca Sacra in the year 1879. The notes which accompany the text were prepared at that time, and are reprinted without change. Reference is made to them by small superior letters in the text. The text itself has been modified in but two places. But the translator has added a brief Introduction, which attempts to show the place of the Grotian theory among theories of the atonement in the light of its history. This is the chief addition to the former edition, and will, with the Index,— for which I am indebted to my pupil, Mr. M. S. Freeman — increase the value and convenience of the book.

At this time, when amid the shifting opinions of a period of theological transition the merits of the governmental theory of the atonement have been often overlooked, and even the meaning of its principal idea lost sight of, it is hoped that a study of its history and earliest form in the treatise before us, may serve to secure a recognition of its value, and promote soundness of theological belief.

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A BRIEF INTRODUCTORY SKETCH

OF THE HISTORY OF THE

GROTIAN THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT.

To understand the place, character, and influence of the Grotian theory of the Atonement, we shall need first to pass in rapid review the previous history of the doctrine in those thinkers whose ideas have proved to be of decisive influence in its development.

The first attempt to explain the nature of the atonement which yielded a result worthy of the theme, or of any doctrinal value, was that which Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, embodied in his treatise entitled, "Cur Deus Homo?" It was an attempt as noteworthy for its spiritual as its intellectual qualities. Under the inspiration of profound reverence for the great Creator of all things, Anselm viewed sin principally as an impairment of the honor of God. The creature owes it to God that not only every act, but every thought, and even fleeting wish, should be subject to him. Not to render this is to impair the honor of God, and to incur a debt,— not

a commercial debt, it is true, but a real debt, since the honor of God has been impaired precisely as if the sinner had said in words that God had no claim to the absolute obedience of his creatures. Thus sin is fundamentally a denial of the sovereignty of God.

This debt may be paid by the punishment of the sinner, or by the rendering of a satisfaction. Punishment would annihilate the guilty race, but satisfaction may repair the honor of God and still admit of the salvation of man. The profundity of Anselm's thought is specially manifest at this point, since he treats the satisfaction in a way to relieve it from the cruder conceptions of those later writers who struggled to find a way of expressing the exact equivalency of the sufferings of Christ to the deserts of men. The satisfaction must render, says Anselm, a service fully equal to the service previously refused, but also something more than this. The thief has not made full reparation for his theft when he has returned the simple sum he had appropriated. The satisfaction, since it atones for infinite sin, must be of infinite worth, as well as voluntary, and one which the offerer is not bound to make. Now, when Jesus Christ dies, he has voluntarily rendered that which he was not bound to render. It is the most complete possible denial of self, and so the most emphatic possible acknowledgment of the claim of God upon man. It ascribes to God as clearly as possible that honor of which the sin of man had deprived him. And its

infinity adds the "something more," for which the nature of the case called.

The nature and necessity of the atonement, thus brought to the attention of the church by Anselm, were discussed repeatedly during the middle ages, but until the Reformation nothing was added to the development of the theory. Different writers among the scholastics now taught, and now denied, the objective necessity of an atonement, and finally left this point in great obscurity. The direct line of advancing thinkers, leading to the work of Grotius, is not resumed until we reach John Calvin.

Calvin occupies a position in some respects identical with that of Anselm, and in some respects different from it. Like Anselm, he teaches the objective necessity of the atonement, but he founds it upon a different principle. It is not the honor of God, impaired and needing to be restored, but the offended law and holiness of God, which Calvin presents as the ground of the atonement. There is "a perpetual and irreconcilable opposition between righteousness and iniquity," [1] so that the holy God cannot be propitious to guilty man. The guilt must be removed, and this is accomplished through the sacrificial death. This death is therefore a satisfaction to the offended holiness, law, or justice of God, and, by a mysterious relation of the cross to man, our entire guilt and punishment are transferred to Christ, and may, therefore, be no longer imputed to or exacted of us. Such are the main thoughts of Calvin;

[1] Institutes II. xvi. 3.

yet it is very noticeable that he does not pursue the abstract course of reasoning which has been so commonly used since his day to establish them. He does not begin with the justice of God "demanding punishment." He looks at the facts. He sees the sufferings of Christ, that he sustained the character of a malefactor, that the punishment of our sins was upon him, and that by his stripes we are healed, and he says, This is what justice demanded because it is what justice exacted. Thus his reasoning was wholly *à posteriori*, and it was left for later writers to start with abstract conceptions and principles and deduce the necessity of the satisfaction by an *à priori* process.[1]

With the increase of the scholastic tendency among the followers of Calvin, the logical formulation of his conception of the atonement was made much more rigid. Beza, Calvin's successor in the theological school at Geneva, defined God as "consummately and perfectly just, from which it follows that he approves no iniquity, nor leaves any unavenged."[2] And when Socinus arose, he found the Calvinistic theory represented by Covetus, a minister of the city of Paris, who derived from the immutability of God the idea that justice was inseparable from his perfections,[3] and that it was therefore necessary, with the necessity which exists in the na-

[1] In Note a, ch. i., the distinction between Calvin and his followers is not observed.

[2] "Confessio," Theol. Tract. II. p. 2.

[3] Socinus, "De Jesu Christo Servatore," I. 1.

ture of God, that justice should be satisfied, and that, since it could not be satisfied, if we were to be redeemed, by us, it must be by another. To these ideas and those logically involved in them, Socinus objected.[1] He occupied the same ground as his opponents in viewing God in the light of the party offended by the transgression of the sinner. This had been the common ground of Anselm and all subsequent writers. And here Socinus would seem to have the best of the argument. If God is the offended party, and deals with men in this capacity, then it follows, as Socinus says, that he can entirely forgive sin without any satisfaction whatever. For God thus to forgive sins, says Socinus, "is nothing but relinquishing his right, and any one may relinquish his own right at pleasure. . . . God, in punishing men, or in forgiving them, is not to be conceived of as a judge who administers the law of another from the letter of which he is not permitted to depart; but as a sovereign Lord and Prince, whose will alone, since he is dealing only with his own rights, is the law of all things and the most perfect norm." A private man can not only do this, but he is praised for doing it. We cannot deprive God of the same right without committing horrible sacrilege. A man can forgive a debt without payment: so can God.[2] These arguments are conclusive, and wholly overturn the fundamental assumption as to the office of satisfaction made by Socinus's opponents

[1] See more in detail in the notes.

[2] Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, Vol. II. p. 186, B.

from Anselm down. And yet the doctrine which is thus undermined is in substance correct, and that propounded in its place by Socinus is wrong. What adjustment shall be made in the church doctrine to remove from it the error which Socinus refutes?

It is Grotius's immortal service to have answered this question. He silently concedes all that Socinus has to say about imputation [1] and all that he hints as to the non-moral character of the attribute of justice as conceived by the Calvinists. He would perhaps have said, if Socinus had demanded it, that to press the necessity of a satisfaction to justice, as was done by Covetus, was to convert justice into a natural, instead of a moral attribute in God. But he objects to Socinus's destruction of the idea of satisfaction because, as he says, God does not act in the capacity of the offended party in the punishment of sin, but as a ruler. Punishment does not belong to the offended party as such, and it has nothing to do with the regaining of lost rights. It is the act of the sovereign as a sovereign. True, he is the offended party in this case, but he does not act in this capacity, but only in that of a sovereign, in exacting punishment. Hence there may be a necessity for a satisfaction, if sin is to be forgiven, and the fact that it is made shows that it is necessary. This is precisely the *à posteriori* method of reasoning which had been adopted by Calvin. Thus the truth Socinus had is acknowledged, but the doctrine of satisfaction is maintained in spite of his ob-

[1] See Note a, ch. i.

jection, by showing that the objection derives its force against the doctrine not from the idea of satisfaction, but from this false conception of the relation occupied by God, which corrected leaves the point in hand unaffected.

We need not dwell upon the theory of Grotius, since the reader has the treatise itself before him. We pass to the main object of the present essay, which is to describe the reception with which this theory met, and its influence upon various schools of thinkers down to the present day. In doing this, we shall for brevity's sake keep in view, for the most part, the fundamental ideas of the Grotian theory, viz. that God is to be considered as a ruler, and that the sufferings of Christ served as a penal example, rather than descend to its more minute elements. The history is not in all respects a pleasant one. It illustrates how theological thinkers, like other men, often decide from appearances, associations, and prejudices, rather than from the merits of the case. The Arminian theology was condemned at Dort, and everything Arminian fell into disrepute with it. Grotius suffered under the ban laid upon his fellow-Arminians. As a commentator, he received considerable attention from time to time, but was often met, even in this field, with prejudice and hostility. But his theory of the atonement never received from the orthodox theologians of his day an adequate consideration.

Of this we have an amusing example in the criticisms of Hermann Ravensperg, Professor at Gro-

ningen. His misunderstandings of Grotius are so ludicrous that it would not be worth while to consider him except that Vossius deemed him of sufficient importance to devote a small treatise to a reply.[1] The abundant quotations of Vossius show that he completely misunderstood both Socinus and Grotius. He thought that the former taught that Christ paid the penalty of our sins for us, and that this punishment was for a demonstration of the divine justice;[2] and that Grotius taught that nothing but faith and penitence was necessary to free men from sin, no other means intervening,[3] and denied that the justice of God was one of the causes of the punishment of Christ.[4]

Or if we turn to so eminent a representative of the orthodoxy of Dort as Francis Turretin (1623–1687), we find, to be sure, what may be traces of Grotius's influence, but if this be so, the result has only been an obscuration of Turretin's own thought, not a change in his theory of the doctrine. He introduces the term "Ruler of the Universe" as the appropriate designation of God when inflicting punishment. He says:[5] "God, indeed, occupies the position here not merely of a creditor who can relinquish his own right at pleasure, nor merely

[1] G. J. Vossii Responsio ad judicium Hermanni Ravenspergeri de Libro ab Hugone Grotio, etc., bound up with an English edition of Grotius's treatise: Oxford, 1636, pp. 136.

[2] Responsio, pp. 19, 34. [3] Ibid. p. 40. [4] Ibid. p. 46.

[5] Institutio Theologiæ elencticæ, Locus XIV., quaest. x., ix. and x., N. Y. edition, 1847, Tom. II. p. 370.

that of the offended party and lord, who can do as he will with his own without injuring any one, but of the judge and ruler of the universe, to whom alone pertains the infliction of punishment or liberation from punishment, because, as all jurists recognize, this is the part of the supreme magistrate and of 'the higher power' alone." But this ruler acts not as a ruler, but as the offended party, inasmuch as he conducts his government with exclusive reference to his offended justice. "So far as the punishment is concerned . . . the right [or law, *jus*] of God is plainly indispensable, inasmuch as it is founded in the justice of God. . . . The satisfaction of Christ, both as respects the justice of God and his will, is necessary." This is proved by the "vindicatory justice of God, for, since this is of the nature and essence of God, as was proved in part I., etc., where the law of God, the judge, was shown to be eternal and natural, from which God can no more dispense than he can deny himself, it is not possible that the exercise thereof should not be necessary." The word "ruler" is accordingly used in a sense altogether different from that of Grotius.

Heidegger (1633–1698) was glad to borrow from Grotius [1] the idea of ruler to defend the orthodox doctrine against the objections of Socinus. "The creditor is free," he says, "to remit a debt. Not so in the case of punishment, especially with him

[1] Corpus Theologiæ Christianæ: Zürich, 1700, Locus XIX. lxxx. Sentence after sentence is taken from the "Defence" (ch. ii.) entire or with the slightest modifications.

who is to be considered not merely as a creditor, but as the ruler of the universe." And yet, it is again a ruler who is guided by no governmental considerations, but acts solely with reference to his own nature, that is, conducts himself as the offended party; for "God was unwilling to save sinners except upon expiation, after the demonstration of the justice of him who punishes sin, nor could ever, indeed, save man otherwise because the justice that punishes sin belongs to his nature." [1] If there can be any doubt as to the meaning of this, the following passage from Heidegger's treatment of the attributes of God will remove it. He says: [2] "Punishment so follows upon committed sin by the fit behavior [*decentia*], holiness, and justice of God that it cannot be that it should not follow."

To note one more example, but from another school, Cocceius (1603–1669), who mitigated somewhat the severity of some portions of the Calvinistic system, though honoring Grotius with considerable attention, was generally opposed to him on questions of theology and interpretation, and accordingly did not modify the old theory of the atonement. "We say that Christ satisfied justice, that is truly redeemed us from the guilt of sin and the sentence of condemnation, by a worthy price." [3] Justice is so defined as to lead to the sentence: "But he is not able not to pun-

[1] Ibid. lxv. [2] Ibid., Locus III. xcviii.

[3] Opera omnia, Frankfort-on-the Main, 1689, Vol. VI., "Summa Theologiæ," p. 215.

ish," which is intended to convey the exact sense of the writers just quoted.[1] And finally he says: "It is therefore a manifest error to confound this dedication or ratification of the New Covenant [viz. in the Lord's Supper] with the threatening of destruction against him who should not abide by the covenant, by the effusion of the blood of a victim, under the analogy of the legal sanction which subjects the life of man to the law. Compare Hugo Grotius on Matt. xxvi. 28."[2] This passage, while not exactly touching upon the theory of the atonement, sufficiently shows that Cocceius rejected the analogy between human and divine law in application to this subject.

Hard as was the fate of the Grotian theory among the Orthodox for misunderstanding, confusion, or neglect, it was even harder among the Arminians of Holland, where it could at least hope to be met without prejudice, or even with some degree of sympathy. For one reason or another, it was rejected by all the great leaders of the school.

Episcopius (1583–1643), it is true, did not live to complete his system of doctrine. As it is presented to us in an imperfect treatise, his statement of the atonement lacks the theoretic element. But what is to be found, speaks against rather than for the Grotian theory. He says: "God could, if he would, through his absolute right and supreme power, being, as he is, a lord, under obligations and

[1] Ibid. p. 52. [2] Vol. VI., De Fœdere, § 87, p. 28.

oath to no one, have forgiven the human race all its sins, and so have plainly yielded his own right by which he could inflict upon it evil and the misery merited by its sins. . . Nor is there any reason for saying that the distributive justice of God necessarily demands that he should punish the sinner, otherwise divine justice could not consist with the supreme lordship of God," i. e. with his power of forgiving at his sovereign pleasure.[1] This is to agree entirely so far with Socinus, both in the point from which the divine person is viewed, viz. as the offended party, and in the recognition of the fact that, as the offended party, he can relax his demands. This is to reject the Grotian theory in its fundamental principle. But Episcopius does not follow the Socinian theory into its extreme antithesis to the Scriptures. He says again: "But the feeling of justice [*affectus justitiæ*] by which God hates the creature which has sinned, and is in misery of its own proper fault, i. e. lies under the dominion and rule of sin, prevented him from simply forgiving. . . . For if God, on account of his feeling of pity, had absolutely and simply remitted all sin, the feeling of justice, by which God hates sin and loves righteousness, would have in no way appeared; there would have appeared also no effect of the divine threatening or of the divine veracity by which he had designed or threatened death to sinners; and consequently a free opportunity for

[1] Institutiones Theologicæ, Works, The Hague, 1678, Vol. I. p. 407.

sinning would have always been afforded to man."[1] Hence, as a result, God would not forgive, "except upon the intervention of a propitiatory sacrifice." Thus the object of the atonement is to prevent men from sinning, in which Episcopius agrees with Grotius; and also to reveal the character of God, and in this respect he agrees with the Calvinists; but in the very act of agreeing, he disagrees with both Calvinists and Grotius, for he says that the necessity of an atonement lay in the will of God — "God willed that forgiveness should not be granted except through a sacrifice."[2]

It is at this point that the later Arminian theory — for all the great writers subsequent to this take substantially the same position — diverges from Grotius and approaches the Socinians. Vossius, indeed, says that the theory that the form of forgiving men through an atonement depended upon the mere will of God is an ancient opinion, and quotes among many others Calvin himself.[3] But the passage from Calvin does not support Vossius. It runs: "If any inquiry be made concerning the necessity of this, it was not indeed a simple, or, as we commonly say, an absolute necessity, but such as arose from the heavenly decree upon which the salvation of men depended."[4] That is to say, when God had decreed to save men, a propitiation was necessary; but conceivably he might not

[1] Ibid. p. 407. [2] Ibid. p. 432.
[3] Vossius's "Responsio," pp. 115–129.
[4] Institutes, II. xii. 1.

have thus decreed at all. In the same way, Grotius held that when man had sinned, the punishment of Christ was a governmental necessity.[1] But the later Arminians departed fundamentally from the Calvinistic view. Whatever expressions those agreeing with the Calvinists may adopt as to the sacrifice of Christ depending upon the will of God, they view God's will and his nature as so harmoniously operating, and so intimately connected, that the will always is as the nature. Indeed, this position is the only possible one upon their theory of the will, by which the will and the affections are confounded. Hence, whether they argue in the *à posteriori* way like Calvin, or in the *à priori* way, they always hold that the fact of the infliction of punishment on Christ is sufficient proof of its necessity. The Arminian theory of the will was different, and the meaning of the phrase that the propitiation depended upon the will of God fundamentally another. They held that God could relinquish his right; the Calvinists, always, that he could not. They held that his not relinquishing it depended upon his mere will; the Calvinists, that his will in this matter was as his nature, which demanded the maintenance of his right. Thus Vossius's defence of his theory is superficial, and his attempt to show that he is in the line of the orthodox theories fails.

[1] This point is developed in Note a, ch. iii. Vossius says that Grotius designedly left the point undecided, implying that he was privately of the same opinion as himself. Responsio, pp. 128, 129.

Curcellæus († 1659) follows the line of thought opened by Episcopius. He asks the question whether God was obliged by some necessity of his nature to exact from Christ the performance of the sacerdotal office. He replies, No; because any one can remit as much of his own right as he may wish without impairment of justice, and hence God may forgive without satisfaction.[1] There is a more express rejection of the Grotian theory in the words: "If there were anything which prevented God from remitting sins freely and without intervening satisfaction, this would have to be sought in his nature, not beyond it."[1] He then goes on to speak of essential mercy and essential justice, and the conflict between them, which renders the whole theory of the origin of the atonement in the nature of God absurd. And so he says that "it depends upon the mere will of God (*mero ejus arbitrio*) whether he shall punish or forgive."[2]

But against the Socinians he teaches that there was a satisfaction. "That God might show how much he hates sin and might hereafter more effectually deter us from it, he willed not to forgive us, (*noluit id facere*) except upon the intervention of that sacrifice by which Christ offered his own slain body to him."[3] The nature of the satisfaction he places in the performance of the will of the Father,

[1] Opera Theologica, Amsterdam, 1675, p. 291 ff.

[2] He presents some further arguments in favor of the Socinian position upon page 292.

[3] Ibid. p. 300. Comp. p. 825.

"For God required nothing else of Christ, and could require nothing else."[1]

Limborch (1633–1712), who holds perhaps the next place to Episcopius among the Arminians, but continues this style of thinking. After examining the views of Socinus as to the satisfaction of Christ[2] and then those of the "Contraremonstrants," in which he repeats Curcellæus's arguments without variation in their order, he presents his own view in the following terms: "Our own view is that the Lord Jesus Christ was a sacrifice for our sins, truly and properly so called; by sustaining the most grievous tortures and the cursed death of the cross, and afterwards, when raised from the dead, by entering with his own blood into the celestial sanctuary, and presenting himself there before the Father, he appeased him, angry with our sins, and reconciled us to him. Thus he bore for us and in our place the most grievous affliction, and so turned away from us deserved punishment."[3] The phrase most likely to strike the attentive student of the history of this doctrine will be "grievous affliction,"

[1] Ibid. p. 825. A number of arguments are also given upon p. 300 against the idea that Christ paid the exact penalty our sins had merited. (1) This does not belong to the nature of sacrifices. (2) Christ did not suffer eternal death. (3) Satisfaction is not necessary to produce love in God towards us. (4) This theory leaves no place for gratuitous forgiveness. (5) On this theory forgiveness would be due to us whether repentant or not.

[2] Theologia Christiana, Amsterdam, 1715, p. 256 ff.

[3] Ibid. p. 262.

which is substituted for our punishment. Limborch dwells somewhat upon this idea at a later point. Christ satisfied justice, he also says, "not as satisfying the rigor of the divine justice, but the will of God, which is both just and merciful," and he did all things "which were demanded by God for our reconciliation."[1] And, like the others, he refers all the plan of salvation to the will of God, saying that "God has the absolute right of declaring at what price he will be satisfied,"[2] and that "the supreme Lord may remit of his own right when he chooses."[3]

Such was the reception of his views among Grotius's own countrymen. The reason is not far to seek. Under the pressure of the intolerant measures which followed upon the Synod of Dort, the Remonstrants, driven in upon themselves, deprived of the corrective influences of free intercourse with their orthodox brethren, grew gradually more and more lax. Their movement lacked the vigorous flow of religious life, and their thinking partook of the same defect. Occupying a middle position between the Socinians and the Calvinists, they had the virtues of neither, and were only saved from entire agreement with the former by their convictions as to the meaning of the Scriptures.

There was at this time another movement, often supposed to be of a liberal character, which was represented by the school of Saumur in France. Schweizer, the learned historian of the Reformed

[1] Ibid. p. 263. [2] Ibid. p. 263. [3] Ibid. p. 87.

Theology, has selected the following sentence as comprising the whole peculiarity of this school: "God wills that all men be saved under the condition of faith, a condition which they are certainly able of themselves to perform, but which they without exception, in consequence of inherited depravity, despise, so that this general purpose of salvation brings no single individual actually to salvation. In addition to this, God wills particularly from all eternity to save a certain number of particular persons, but to pass over all other persons with this grace; these elect are as certainly saved as all others are certainly lost."[1] This is precisely the doctrine which is known in America as the doctrine of general atonement, and it is logically entirely inconsistent with the idea that the atonement of Christ is the payment of a debt, or the satisfaction of justice strictly so called, as in the Calvinistic scheme. If God wills in any way the salvation of all men, then the atonement of Christ must be sufficient for all men, and so he must have satisfied for all. But if Christ has satisfied for all men, and only a limited number are saved, he has, if satisfaction be the payment of a debt, paid an unnecessary price, which is inconceivable; or, in accordance with another valid objection to the theory, if he has suffered for all men, he has on this theory paid the debt of all men, and so all men not only can be, but are already saved, precisely as James Relly actually argued. Hence this "hypo-

[1] Herzog, Realencyclopædie, Vol. I. p. 358.

thetical universalism" is inconsistent with the theory which starts out with making God the offended party, and insists upon the satisfaction of distributive justice.

But it does not seem that this inconsistency was perceived, or that the Grotian theory, which is the natural ally of the doctrine of general atonement, was received with any favor at Saumur. The "Theses Salmurienses"[1] are so arranged that the treatise amounts to a standard of dogmatics for the whole school. It consists of disputations held under the presidency of different members of the faculty at Saumur, and probably all would agree with the opinions presented in it. It expresses itself with entire distinctness in agreement with the ordinary Calvinistic doctrine of the atonement.[2] La Place employs in one place the following language: "We confess that human salvation might have been provided for in many other manners and ways, if God had so willed . . . but nevertheless we think the divine virtues demanded such a sacrifice; and so we affirm that it was necessary."[3] If this is not a momentary confusion of thought, it must be explained in accordance with the principles suggested in the remarks made upon Vossius above.

Such was the reception of the theory upon the con-

[1] Published at Saumur, 1665.

[2] See, e. g., pp. 12, 16. *Pars sec.*, pp. 21–17.

[3] Placeus, Opera Omnia, Franeker, 1699, Vol. I. p. 475. See also Thesaurus Disputationum (Geneva, 1661) by various leading members of this school, which teaches the same doctrine.

tinent, amid friends at home and those abroad who would naturally have formed a more favorable opinion of, or actually adopted the ideas of Grotius, had they not been too much absorbed in the theological controversy in which they were engaged on their own account to be in a frame of mind hospitable and receptive to new ideas. Among the English Arminians, however, Grotius found a different atmosphere, and a kinder reception. The English theologian has never been so inaccessible to extra-theological influences as his continental neighbors, and, from the first, Grotius's work upon international law and his defence of the Christian religion[1] were highly prized in England, and undoubtedly led to a more favorable consideration of his dogmatic writings. The original editions of the "Defence" were read in England; it was reprinted at Oxford in 1636; and the first translation was made in 1692. The English Arminians read, and, as we shall see, largely adopted, the Grotian theory.

Archbishop Tillotson (1630–1694) stands first in ecclesiastical rank among this school, but his theological importance is not so great. There is little of theological definition in his discourses, or of sharp discrimination and cogent reasoning. He is evidently largely under the influence of such men as Episcopius, and reminds us of him and of the other writers of the same school by the use of their characteristic language. In a sermon upon "The

[1] Symon Patrick, Bishop of Ely, translated the "Truth of the Christian Religion."

Sacrifice and Satisfaction of Christ," he says: "Both of these [viz. forgiveness and satisfaction], if God had so pleased, might, for anything we certainly know to the contrary, have been effected by the abundant mercy and powerful grace of God without this wonderful method and dispensation of sending his Son in our nature to take away sin by the sacrifice of himself; but it seems the wisdom of God thought fit to pitch upon this way and method of salvation, and no doubt for good reasons, among which these three seem to be very obvious and very considerable: 1. To vindicate the honor of his laws, which, if sin had gone altogether unpunished, would have been in great danger of falling into contempt. . . . 2. That God might forgive sin in such a way as yet effectually to discountenance and discourage it, and to create in us the greatest horror and hatred of it. 3. A gracious condescension and compliance of Almighty God with a certain apprehension and persuasion which had very early and universally obtained among mankind concerning the expiation of sin, and appeasing the offended deity by sacrifices."[1]

The implication of the last phrases is elsewhere confirmed, and it seems that the archbishop thought it doubtful whether the Jewish sacrifices arose from a divine revelation. He speaks in another place of God's accepting Christ's "death as a meritorious sacrifice and propitiation for the sins of the whole world, that by this wise counsel and permission of

[1] Works, London edit. of 1820, Vol. III. p. 382 f.

his providence he might forever put an end to that barbarous and inhuman way of serving God, which had been so long in use and practice among them."[1]

The feebleness of Tillotson's grasp of theological principles is very evident in these remarks. They follow neither Calvin, Socinus, nor Grotius. Tillotson seems to view God as the offended party, as when he suggests that God's demands for punishment may be entirely relaxed, and then explains the actuality of the atonement by God's purpose to vindicate his laws and to deter men from sin. He even goes so far as to say: "God did not command his Son to be sacrificed, but in his providence permitted the wickedness and violence of men to put him to death. And then his goodness and wisdom did overrule this worst of actions to the best ends."[2] In the same line he remarks that the sufferings of Christ were "so highly acceptable and well pleasing to him, that he thereupon was pleased to enter into a covenant of grace and mercy with mankind."[3]

But Symon Patrick, Bishop of Ely (1626–1707),

[1] Ibid., pp. 366, 367. [2] Ibid. p. 402.

[3] Ibid. Vol. vi, p. 103. In his famous sermon (XXXV.), "Of the Eternity of Hell Torments," he fails to distinguish between the demands of government in fixing proper penalties for transgressions, and the governmental necessity of executing solemn threatenings. He says: "He that threatens, keeps the right of punishing in his own hand, and is not obliged to execute what he hath threatened any further than the reasons and ends of government do require; and he may, without any injury to the party threatened, remit and abate as much as he pleaseth of the punishment that he hath threatened."

was a more vigorous thinker. Like others of his school, he is not given to theological theorizing in his treatises or popular sermons. But in his published works the following passage occurs, which is distinctly Grotian in its theory, and even in its language. He says: "What do you mean . . . when you say that Jesus suffered for your sins? What was it . . . that he gave satisfaction unto? Was it not all those glorious attributes of God; his wisdom, his truth, his justice, his holiness; saving the honor of which he might not pass by the offences of returning sinners? Was it not that the credit of all these might be maintained, and yet the rebels not perish? That the sentence might not be executed, and yet the authority of the laws preserved? There is nothing plainer than that this death of Christ did do great honor to God in the face of the world: asserted his right; gave countenance to his authority; proclaimed his righteousness and purity; was a notable testimony on his behalf against sinners; and so there could be nothing more powerful to move God to grant a pardon to those rebels that would submit to him, since now he should lose nothing by it, but that which he had a mind to give away and not demand, viz. the penalties which they had incurred by the breach of his laws. But is it not manifest then that God cannot love sin, nor be friends with sinners until they amend? Did not the death of Christ show that his nature is such that he cannot indulge men in their trespasses? Is it not apparent that it was not fit to pardon even

penitent and returning offenders unless he showed his displeasure at their offences? Did he not take care to secure his authority when he issued out a pardon? . . . How should he maintain any government in the world if he himself should be the cherisher of traitors? If he should take care for their protection and set up a sanctuary to which they may boldly fly? . . . It cannot be that God should be so liberal as to give away all his own right. He cannot quit his title and claim unto our universal obedience. It is impossible that Christ by his death should repeal all the laws of God and absolve us from our duty. There is no question that he intended to strengthen them when he made a relaxation; and when he procured a dispensation, he did more establish and secure that which is not dispensed withal. It is a rule of reason, that all exceptions do confirm the law."[1]

In Daniel Whitby (1638–1726) we find a still clearer presentation of the Grotian theory. He entirely rejects the several ideas that "God could freely pardon the sins of the whole world without a satisfaction to his offended justice"; that "there be nothing in God as Rector of the Universe that requires that he should punish sin or show his displeasure against it"; and that "the punishment of sin . . . depends . . . purely upon his arbitrary will."[2] This is to leave the standpoint of the Dutch Arminians and come clearly back to the Grotian position.

[1] Works, Oxford edit. 1858, Vol. IV. pp. 383, 384.

[2] "Twelve Sermons," London, 1726, p. 182.

In his sermon on "The Satisfaction of Christ" he presents the Grotian theory in terms very largely drawn from Grotius's work. All his language is cast in the mould of the Grotian terminology, as when he says that God would not pardon sins "without a valuable consideration." A portion of his defence of the wisdom of God in making the atonement may be inserted here. He says: "Should God have issued out a general indemnity and given us a full remission of our sin without anything required by way of reparation for the violation of his law, he must have pardoned sinners without any demonstration of his holiness and justice, or of his hatred of sin and resolution not to let it go unpunished, and so without sufficient motive to deter us from it for the future; which seems not well consistent with his holiness and justice or that relation to us of our governor and great lawgiver which seemeth plainly to require the vindication of his honor, and the preservation of the laws he hath established, from contempt."[1] And he further says: "By the obedience of our Lord Christ to the death in our stead, all the great ends of punishment designed by wise governors were signally obtained," etc. These are: "Firstly, *παράδειγμα*, that they who suffer may be examples to others, etc. Secondly, *νουθεσία*, instruction, that the offender may learn wisdom. Thirdly, *τιμωρία*, the vindication of the prince's honor and the preservation of the laws he hath established, from con-

[1] Ibid. p. 175.

tempt." [1] The "ends of punishment designed by wise governors" are evidently Grotian in their origin, for not only is the idea entirely so, but the first two terms here employed are to be found associated in a similar definition in Grotius's work,[2] and the third is also not unfamiliar to him. So completely does Whitby stand upon the Grotian basis.

We come now to the last of this school of English Arminians we shall notice, Samuel Clarke (1675–1728). He unfolds his views in a sermon upon "The Nature of the Sufferings of Christ." [3] There is some degree of uncertainty in his conception of the relation which God sustains in the matter of punishment, and the sharp distinctions of the second chapter of Grotius's "Defence" are not always kept in mind. He says: "God, being the supreme and absolute lord of all things, has an absolute and unquestionable right to remit upon what conditions he pleases offences committed against himself; either without requiring any satisfaction at all, or upon whatever satisfaction he shall think fit to appoint in conjunction with the sincere repentance of the offender, for the vindication of the authority of his laws and government. For the obligation to punishment is . . . only a right in the lawgiver to inflict it; which right being entirely his own, he may remit as much of it as he pleases, and upon whatever terms or conditions he thinks

[1] Ibid p. 178. [2] "Defence," p. 301, a.
[3] Works, London edit. 1756, Vol. VI. p. 196.

fit."[1] In this passage Clarke either views God as the offended party in the matter of forgiveness, or else hopelessly confounds the two positions of offended party and ruler. However, he rights himself in the following passage, which is in juxtaposition with the other: "When the honor of God's laws had been diminished by sin, 'twas reasonable and necessary (notwithstanding God's power and absolute right of forgiving; yet in respect of his wisdom in governing the world) 'twas reasonable and necessary that there should be a vindication of the authority of his laws; and therefore it was necessary, in that sense of necessity, either that the sinner should perish, or that some other satisfaction should be made in his stead."[2] And again he says: "We cannot presume to say but God might consistently with mere justice have remitted as much of his own right as he pleased, by his own supreme and uncontrollable sovereignty, without requiring any satisfaction at all; but the death of Christ was necessary at least in this respect, to make the pardon of sin consistent with the wisdom of God in his good government of the world, and to be a proper attestation of his irreconcilable hatred against all unrighteousness."[3] It seems accordingly that he would have said, had he had the strict antithesis brought before him which we have in mind in these discussions, that if God be considered as the offended party, the position of Calvin must be abandoned for that of Socinus; but

[1] Ibid. p. 218. [2] Ibid. p. 219. [3] Ibid. p. 240.

that the true part performed by God in forgiving or punishing sin is that of a ruler, as Grotius said.

Upon this basis, Clarke summarizes his theory in the following terms: "1. That it was from the beginning infinitely reasonable that all possible honor and obedience should at all times be paid by all creatures to all the laws and commands of God. 2. That this honor due to the laws of God is diminished, as much as in us lies, by the sins and impieties of men. 3. That it is highly reasonable and necessary, after such presumptuous transgression, that God should make some proper vindication of his divine authority. 4. That the first and most obvious method of doing this is by the punishment or destruction of the offenders. 5. But because God hates not the persons of sinners and hath no pleasure in their destruction, but only a just zeal for the honor of his divine and righteous laws, therefore, when that is by any means vindicated, his wrath is appeased. Lastly, that our Saviour, by his obedience and humiliation even unto death, has in the most glorious manner vindicated the honor and authority of God: and, by establishing a covenant of grace upon the merits of his sufferings and obedience, has secured, to all that truly repent, pardon and remission of sin, consistent with the honor of the divine laws." [1]

In one important point Clarke makes an improvement upon the phraseology of Grotius by avoiding the designation of the sufferings of Christ as a punishment. He says: "God was pleased to accept the

[1] Ibid. pp. 200, 201.

vicarious *suffering* of his Son in the stead of the *punishment* that was due to the sinner in his own person;"[1] and speaks of the Messiah's *suffering*, of the effect of Christ's *suffering*,[2] but, unless some passage has been overlooked, nowhere of his being punished.

We have thus far followed the Grotian theory among men whose names will have a somewhat questionable sound among the generality of those (of whom the writer will confess himself one) in whose estimation the name of orthodoxy is venerable, and to whom the maintenance of a sound theology seems to be one of the principal duties of Christians. These English Arminians are essentially heterodox. If Tillotson and Patrick are not to be reckoned among the Arians, there can be no doubt that Clarke and particularly Whitby were the chief promoters of that movement which gave rise to Unitarianism in both England and America. A theory, like a man, is known by the company it keeps. The admirers of Grotius must confess that hitherto he has been found in questionable company; and they can only offset the prejudice which may be excited by this fact, by calling attention to the further fact that the Arminian school in Holland, which was soon to land in utter Rationalism, had already illustrated its downward tendency by the rejection of the Grotian view, and the adoption of a vacillating and untenable intermediate position between the Calvinists and the Socinians.

[1] Ibid. p. 214. [2] Ibid. pp. 240, 241.

We are soon to enter upon scenes altogether different, amid which whatever odium may have attached to the Grotian theory from its surroundings is, as we hope, to be entirely removed. But we pause at this point to anticipate the course of history for the sake of completing our consideration of English theology. The heterodox Arminians, whom we have just been reviewing, were succeeded after the lapse of almost exactly one hundred years by an evangelical Arminian school — the Wesleyans — among whom the Grotian theory reappeared.

Wesley left no System of Doctrine. The place of the systematic divine among his followers was filled by Richard Watson (1781–1833), whose "Theological Institutes" appeared in the year 1823–24. In his theory of the atonement he rests directly and confessedly upon Grotius.[1] He begins with a discussion of the "principles of God's moral government."[2] "The existence of a divine law, obligatory upon man, is not doubted by any who admit the existence and government of God." This law involves penalties which it is important to understand "both with reference to [God's] essential holiness and to his proceedings as governor of the

[1] He quotes Grotius frequently, translating long passages from him in many places in the "Institutes," as, for example, New York edit., 1826, Vol. II. pp. 281–326. Besides the substance of Doctrine, phrases occur which are derived from Grotius, as "king" and "prince" (p. 265), "relax" (pp. 265, 312), "meritorious cause" (p. 276). The illustration of Zaleucus is employed a number of times, pp. 301, 311, 321.

[2] Ibid. pp. 257 ff. More succinctly p. 271.

world." Hence certain definitions of holiness and justice follow, in which the distinction is made between commutative, distributive, and rectoral justice, of which the last, "by which [God] maintains his own rights and the rights of others, and gives to every one his due according to that legal constitution which he has himself established," is the underlying motive governing his acts. "The essential rectitude of God was concerned . . . to regard these rights in the creatures dependent upon him, and to adopt such a legal constitution and mode of government under which to place them as should respect the maintenance of his own rights of sovereignty and the righteous claims which his creatures, that is the general society of created beings, had upon him." This requires the infliction of penalty upon transgressors of God's laws and the provision of some mode of sustaining the authority of the law, if any such transgressor is to be forgiven.

It is thus clear that Watson accepted the position of Grotius that God was to be considered in the matter of forgiveness as a ruler and not as the offended party. He expressly rejects the latter idea when he says that there is "no relaxation of right in the divine administration and no forgiveness of sin by the exercise of mere prerogative." [1] He presents his own theory in antithesis to that which makes distributive justice "inflexibly require the punishment of those who are . . . objects of [God's wrath]" and in which the satisfaction con-

[1] Ibid. p. 267.

sists in Christ's "taking the place of the guilty," and to that of the looser Arminians described above, who taught that satisfaction was not absolutely necessary, and insisted upon the "wisdom and fitness of the measure."[1] He himself says: "We call the death of Christ a satisfaction offered to the divine justice for the transgressions of men with reference to its effect upon the mind of the supreme lawgiver. As a just God, he is satisfied and contented with the atonement offered by the vicarious death of his Son, and the conditions upon which it is to become available to the offenders; and their punishment, those conditions being accomplished, is no longer exacted. . . . The satisfaction of divine justice by the death of Christ consists, therefore, in this, that, this wise and gracious provision on the part of the Father having been voluntarily carried into effect by the Son, the just God has determined it to be as consistent with his own holy and righteous character and the ends of the law and government to forgive all those who have true faith in the blood of Christ, the appointed propitiation for sin, as though they had all been personally punished for their transgression." Thus the necessity of the atonement is founded upon the necessity of the government of God in the universe.[2]

[1] Ibid. p. 313.

[2] In conformity with his views as to the atonement, Watson rejected the imputation of Christ's righteousness in justification (II. p. 401), and the imputation of Adam's sin to the race (II. 418).

We return from this anticipation to take up the course of the history where we left it. We have meantime seen that the Grotian theory is not necessarily allied only with heterodoxy and with corrupt systems of theology, for the Evangelical Arminianism of the Methodists is not such. But we are now to see it handed on, possibly by its English latitudinarian and Arian supporters, and introduced into new surroundings. It shall find its home now among men who are possessed of an earnest and evangelical spirit, who are sending missionaries to the heathen on the one hand, and to the wilds of a new country, but just in the process of settlement, on the other. It shall be embosomed in churches which have passed through declension and revival, and for a hundred years are to prove an aggressive, converting, and saving influence in the midst of a nation developing under new conditions and in absolute freedom. The doctrinal errors which were condemned at Dort and which infected the Arminian body of Holland, and the doctrinal looseness and indifference which characterized the English Arminians, are to be replaced by earnest devotion to dogmatic truth and by a Calvinistic orthodoxy which in undergoing various internal modifications is to remain in substance Calvinistic to the last. To watch the development of the theory in surroundings so novel and at first glance so unfavorable, will be to see its genuine character tested and exhibited. And such surroundings the theory found in New England.

The line of connection between the treatise of Grotius and the New England theory of the atonement is direct though obscure. We know that the treatise itself was early read in New England. John Norton quotes it with approval in the year 1653.[1] A copy was in the library of Harvard College as early as 1723, and thus accessible to men who borrowed from that source. Nathaniel Mather, writing on justification, quotes Grotius's Commentary upon Rom. v. 21, in the year 1694. But, aside from the influence of Grotius's books themselves, his doctrine had a number of other ways of entering into the mind of the New England divines. They were men of catholic reading, though not engaged in such forms of literary work as would naturally lead them to be scrupulous to refer every idea to its known source. Richard Baxter was an author familiarly known and highly prized among them. He speaks in many places of his obligations to Grotius, from whom, in his own language, he had "learned more than from almost any other writer," expressly mentioning the treatise "De Satisfactione." But Baxter did more than merely quote Grotius. Although he did not entirely accept the theory that the relation sustained by God in the matter of forgiveness was that of a ruler alone, he says expressly: "Government and punishing justice *formally as such* belong to God only as rector, and satisfaction is made to him *emi-*

[1] "A Discussion of . . . the Sufferings of Christ, etc.," London, 1653, p. 133.

nently in that relation."[1] He generally explains the atonement from the Grotian standpoint, as in the following case: "The true reason for the satisfactoriness of Christ's sufferings was that they were a most apt means for the demonstration of the governing justice, holiness, wisdom, and mercy of God, by which God could attain the ends of the law and government better than by executing the law on the world in its destruction."[2] Thus Baxter introduced the person of Grotius, and the special work which he did upon the atonement, to the notice of the New England divines in that favorable manner in which one who is himself much trusted and admired always can.

There were also other modes in which the ideas of Grotius could be introduced, at first sight less favorable to them. Circumstances had made the New England divines particularly acquainted with the writings of the English Arminians, for they had been early spread throughout the country. Whitby's "Discourses on the Five Points" was the work which called out Edwards's Treatise on the Will, and John Taylor's "Original Sin," the provoking cause of his work upon that subject. Whitby and Clarke were read by Dr. Samuel Hopkins,[3] in whose writings the governmental theory of the

[1] Catholic Theology, London, 1675, "Of God's Government and Moral Works," p. 69.

[2] Ibid. pp. 40, 41. See also the Methodus Theologiæ Christianæ, London, 1681, Part III. ch. i. pp. 49–51.

[3] Works, Memoir, Vol. I. p. 53.

atonement makes its first appearance in New England. And at least Dr. Clarke was well known to Dr. Jonathan Edwards,[1] the chief formulator of the doctrine, who also had access, if he chose to avail himself of it, to Grotius's original text in the library of Yale College during his settlement in New Haven.[2] That he did read Grotius, the illustration of Zaleucus, introduced into his third sermon on the atonement, is some evidence.[3] From these Arminian writers the New England fathers, who rejected their fundamental principles, nevertheless learned much. John Taylor's doctrine of original sin was never accepted in New England, and yet many of his single objections to the prevailing theory were subsequently to be found word for word in New England divines. These early heroes read much Latin, and knew the meaning of the sentence "*Fas est ab hoste doceri.*" They were hospitable to good and useful thoughts wherever they might be found, and it is by no means incredible that to Samuel Clarke or Whitby may be due the credit for introducing that suggestion which, under the influence of the Edwardean theory of virtue, has led to the prevalence of the governmental theory of the atonement in the Congregational and a large portion of the Presbyterian denomination in America.

[1] Quoted by him on the will, Works, Vol. I. pp. 307, 317, 325, 339, 366.

[2] The Opera Omnia Theologica of Grotius were put in the library of Yale College by Bishop Berkeley, in 1733.

[3] Works, Vol. II. p. 46.

Prof. Park, in the elaborate essay prefixed to a collection of treatises on the atonement,[1] has drawn out in detail those modifications of the common method of stating the doctrine which are to be regarded as preliminary to the introduction of the Edwardean theory by the sermons of Jonathan Edwards in 1785. In the case of both Prest. Edwards and Bellamy, one cannot avoid the impression that various thoughts are stirring in their minds which do not start from any determinate principle, or tend to any definite end. Bellamy was a close friend of Hopkins, and in one passage seems to present clearly the governmental theory.[2] But this is an isolated case, the significance of which is much diminished by the inconsistencies of the writer. Samuel Hopkins (1721–1803) seems, however, to have adopted the governmental idea completely, and thus to have incorporated the first of those two ideas which in beautiful harmony were to form the logical frame and substance of the New England theory.

A brief examination of Hopkins's writings will show how complete is his adoption of the Grotian idea.

He begins with the law of God, of which, "in order to understand the work of the Redeemer, we must have right views."[3] This "points out the

[1] "The Atonement. Discourses and Treatises, etc., with an Introductory Essay by Edwards A. Park." Boston, 1863.

[2] "True Religion Delineated," Works, Vol. I. p. 267.

[3] Works, with Memoir, Boston, 1852, Vol. I. p. 320 ff.

duty of man and requires of him what is perfectly right, and no more or less. . . . It is, therefore, an eternal, unalterable rule of righteousness which cannot be abrogated or altered in the least iota by an infinitely perfect, unchangeable legislator and governor, consistent with his character, his perfect rectitude and righteousness. . . . Every creature under this law is under infinite obligations to obey it without any deviation from it in the least possible instance, . . . and every instance of rebellion tends to infinite evil — to break up the divine government and bring ruin and misery on all the moral world. . . . If man cannot be redeemed and saved consistent with maintaining this law and showing the highest regard to it, God cannot be true, just, wise, or good in saving man or showing him any favor. But to pardon man and restore him to favor and happiness in this situation . . . would be joining with the sinner to disregard and dishonor the law, and favor, justify, and encourage rebellion. This would be inconsistent with rectitude, righteousness, wisdom, and goodness . . . and would put an end to all perfect, moral government. It would dethrone the governor of the world, destroying his kingdom, and give full scope to the reign of rebellion, confusion, and misery forever. . . . Here [in Rom. iii. 25–26] the great design of the Redeemer is expressed, and the great thing he is to accomplish is to maintain and declare the righteousness, rectitude, and unchangeable truth and perfection of God in opening a way by his blood, his sufferings unto

death, for the free pardon of man consistent with rectoral justice and truth, and doing that which is right and just, both with respect to himself, his law and government, and all the subjects of his kingdom." This he did by "suffering the penalty of the law."

It will be noted that the whole tendency of this passage is to exalt the government of God. God establishes a moral government over moral creatures. He is the ruler who maintains and executes his law. He cannot dishonor it, but must maintain and execute it, though he forgives the sinner who transgresses it. All this is Grotian. But there is already a tendency to deepen the Grotian conception. The government of God rests upon his character. The law which establishes the rule of right for men is the reflection of God's own righteousness. He is worshipped by his creatures because he is and is known to be infinitely worthy of their worship. Hence the necessity of maintaining the law is made more evident, and grounded upon a deeper thought than Grotius reached, who neglected to state the relation existing between the government and the character of God.[1] Hopkins has thus taken his stand upon what is the characteristic feature of the Grotian theory, viz. the idea that in the matter of forgiveness God acts not as the offended party, but as a ruler. He is a ruler with a character, whose government depends upon his character,

[1] This idea is developed somewhat fully in Note a, ch. ii.

and he is a ruler engaged in maintaining his law through the satisfaction of Christ.

Like Grotius, Hopkins uses the word "penalty," but he means the same thing as was meant by Grotius, not the satisfaction of distributive justice, but an example. He may not use this word, but he uses such language as the following repeatedly. He says: "All the ends of the threatening and of a penalty are as fully answered by the sufferings of Christ as they could be by the execution of it upon the sinner. As much *respect* is paid to the divine law; government is as well *supported;* the rectitude and righteousness of God as much *declared;* and his displeasure with the sinner, and hatred of rebellion and determination to punish it, as much *manifested;* and in some respects much more, and to greater advantage."[1]

The underlying thought of Hopkins's entire system is the sovereignty of an infinitely good God. It is natural, then, that the idea of God's goodness in providing the atonement should have some place; and yet it is remarkable that, though Hopkins was the editor of Prest. Edwards's work upon the nature of virtue, he did not apply that theory to the subject of the atonement. One hint, only, repeated here and there, do we find in this direction. It is in the passage in which Hopkins is showing that the "redemption of man is the greatest exercise and manifestation of the benevolence or the love and goodness of God that ever took place or ever

[1] Works, Vol. I. p. 340.

will."[1] He says: "It was inconsistent with rectoral righteousness and infinite goodness to set aside and disregard this law. . . . It was of infinite importance that the law and moral government of God should be maintained."[2] But he has in mind the maintenance of the character of God as the ground of this "importance." Had he said that holy love for the creature himself and his well-being demanded that the law should be so administered as not to break down government or tempt man to sin, he would have crossed the little interval which separates him from a clear application of the theory of virtue to the atonement. This application it was left for another to make.

To this other, Dr. Jonathan Edwards (1745–1801), we now turn.

Like Hopkins, Edwards begins with the idea of moral government. "When moral creatures are brought into existence, there must be a moral government. . . . In order to a moral government, there must be a penalty. . . . If a penalty be denounced, indeed, but never inflicted, the law becomes no law. . . . As well might no law have been made or published, nay, in some respects it would have been better. . . . To enact a law and not execute it, implies a weakness of some kind or other; either an error in judgment, or a consciousness of a depraved design in making the law, or a want of power to carry it into effect, or some other defect. Therefore such a proceeding as this is dis-

[1] Ibid. p. 250 ff. [2] Ibid. p. 254.

honorable and contemptible; and by it both the law and the legislator not only appear in a contemptible light, but really are contemptible. . . . If God maintains the authority of his law by the infliction of penalty, it will appear that he acts consistently in the legislative and executive parts of his government. . . . If the authority of the divine law be supported by the punishment of transgressors, it will most powerfully tend to restrain all intelligent creatures from sin. But if the authority of the law be not supported, it will rather encourage and invite to sin than restrain from it." [1]

To this point there is no addition to Hopkins, and but little change. But an addition is soon made and is introduced in a discussion of the question, suggested by the Socinian objections of Dr. Priestley, whether the ideas of free grace and atonement are reconcilable. Edwards distinguishes between three kinds of justice, — commutative, "which respects property and matters of commerce solely, and secures to every man his own property;" distributive, which consists in properly rewarding virtue or punishing vice, "and has respect to a man's personal character or conduct;" and general or public justice, which, he says, "comprehends all moral goodness." [2] Speaking of the latter kind of justice, he says: "To practise justice in this sense is to practise agreeably to the dictates of *general benevolence*, or to seek *the glory of God and the*

[1] Works: Andover, 1842, Vol. II. pp. 14, 15.
[2] Ibid. p. 29.

good of the universe." [1] In respect to the relation of the atonement to these three kinds of justice, it has nothing to do with commutative justice, nor does it satisfy distributive justice, because the character of the sinner is the same whether the atonement be made or not; but it is in complete accord with general justice. It is out of the benevolence of God that the atonement is provided for men. This provision makes it consistent with the honor of his law and the good of his creatures to forgive the repentant sinner, and this is the greatest conceivable exhibition of the love of God. It is as important for the sinner as for any other member of the universe, that the authority of the law should be preserved; and thus it is out of the love of God that the atonement is made and forgiveness secured through it.[2]

It is not our purpose to trace the progress of this doctrine through the New England divines. The Grotian theory, fairly introduced,[3] soon found its

[1] Id., Ib.

[2] This idea is elaborated somewhat in Note a, ch. ii.

[3] How persistently much of the Grotian phraseology maintained itself among the later advocates of the theory may be seen from the following extract from Caleb Burge (Park's Collection of Essays, p. 443): "If sin be injurious to God in a private personal capacity only, and he be not an inexorable, but a compassionate being, he might certainly pardon, at least as many sinners as repent, without any atonement whatever. But sin should not be considered in this light. It is an offence against God in a public capacity, as the supreme governor of the universe. Hence, notwith-

home among them and justified itself by its perfect conformity to the system of modified Calvinism which their various studies had finally led them to adopt. The briefest summary of that system will exhibit the relations of the Grotian theory, when properly developed, to the fundamental ideas of evangelical theology better than can be done in any other way, and will serve as the best answer to the various unwarranted criticisms which orthodox theological writers have generally passed upon it.

The New England theology views the object for which the universe was created as the glory of God. When creatures exist, this glory includes their highest well-being. The decree of creation renders it certain, but not necessary, that man will fall. The race of man derives from its first parent a natural corruption, which produces the certainty but not the necessity of the complete sinfulness of every member of the race prior to regeneration. But God determines to save some of this sinful and guilty race. He has put them under a moral government and system which is the best possible, and he leaves them in general to the operation of its laws. Love to them which chooses their well-being must in and with the same act choose this system which has

standing God is infinite in benevolence and compassion, he cannot grant pardon to sinners unless it can be done under such circumstances and in such a way as render it consistent with the highest interest of the great community over which his government extends."

been formed for their good. Love to them involves also choice of their holiness and of everything which will tend to promote that holiness as well as the rejection of everything which will tend to prevent it. Since sin forgiven without the execution in any sense of the penalty of the law will promote disregard of the law, and hence ill-being and sin, this, as well as regard for the law and the system, compels God, in choosing to forgive repentant man, to provide a way for the maintenance of the authority of his law. This he does by substituting the sufferings of Christ for the punishment of sinners, which as an example has the effect of more highly honoring the law than even the punishment of sinners would do. Repentance and faith involve the element of absolute submission to the will of God. They are produced by the persuasive influences of the Holy Spirit. The general purpose of mercy is to send forth all the influences of the Holy Spirit in the case of each individual being which the whole system of divine operation in history permits. The decree of individual election is to send upon the elect such influences of the Spirit that they will, not must, freely yield themselves to these, repent and believe. Such a person is justified, i. e., forgiven; he begins a life of obedience, i. e., of love to God and man; he is adopted into God's family as his dear child; he is sanctified by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit; and at the day of judgment he is received into everlasting salvation, while the wicked, who could have repented in the exercise of their free will but

have not done so, are justly excluded forever from the presence of God.

It will be noted that the ethical root of this entire system is the idea of love to every creature according to its worth, and that the Grotian theory is the only theory of the atonement which fits this idea in combination with the idea of the freedom of the will.

We pause here. We might trace the influence of the theory upon denominations in America other than those already mentioned. This would form a delightful and fascinating theme, and would lead to a review of some of the most interesting passages in our ecclesiastical history. But the influence of the New England divines in extending the theory has not been confined to this country. England has been influenced by New England, and Andrew Fuller (1754–1815) may be mentioned as an example. The grand object of the atonement of Christ, he says, "is to express the divine displeasure against sin, and so to render the exercise of mercy, in all the ways wherein sovereign wisdom should determine to apply it, consistent with righteousness."[1] Again he says: "I conceive it to be that satisfaction to divine justice by virtue of which nothing pertaining to the moral government of God hinders any sinner from returning to him."[2] These, with other expressions, show him to be clearly a

[1] Works, Philadelphia edit., 1820, Vol. I. p. 89.
[2] Ibid. IV. p. 106.

follower in this respect [1] as he was also in others of the New England divines.[2]

We have thus followed the history of the Grotian theory of the atonement to the present day. Its orthodox affinities are exhibited by its survival and its final adoption in an orthodox Calvinistic system, and its firm establishment there, though not conclusive proof, is at least such evidence as history can give that it does afford, in spite of the frequent denials of the critics, the true mean between the old Calvinistic and the Socinian theories, rejecting the errors of both and combining their truths in a consistent form.

To the study of its original form the reader is now commended.

[1] In the Works, Vol. IV. pp. 93, 94, we find expressions consistent only with the Grotian theory and also some intimations of an acquaintance with Grotius himself. Comp. pp. 106, 107, and similar expressions in Vol. VIII. p. 80.

[2] Some of the ideas of Grotius appear in the German writers from 1750 on who sought in various ways to modify the standard Lutheran orthodoxy, particularly Töllner, "Der thätige Gehorsam Christi."

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GROTIUS'S DEFENCE.

CHAPTER I.

THE STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY IS EXHIBITED, AND THE TRUE DOCTRINE EXPLAINED IN THE WORDS OF SCRIPTURE.

Before we engage in this discussion, we [297 a will first state that doctrine which the church of Christ has hitherto defended with unshaken faith, as derived from the sacred Scriptures, that thence the difference between it and the view of Socinus[a] may clearly appear. We will next explain the same doctrine by producing certain testimonies of Scripture, whose true interpretation, since Socinus has wrested them to another sense, will be vindicated in passing.

THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE, therefore, is as follows:[b] God was moved by his own goodness to bestow distinguished blessings upon us. But since our sins, which deserved punishment, were an obstacle to this, he determined that Christ, being willing of his own love toward men, should, by

bearing the most severe tortures, and a bloody and ignominious death, pay the penalty[c] for our sins, in order that without prejudice to the exhibition of the divine justice, we might be liberated, upon the intervention of a true faith, from the punishment of eternal death.

THE FIRST EFFICIENT CAUSE of that of which we treat is God. "God gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish."[1] "God spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all."[2] "The Lord hath laid on Christ the iniquity of us all."[3] "God made Christ sin."[4]

The first cause which moved God is mercy or love to men.[5] "God so loved the world that he gave his Son."[1] "God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us."[6]

The other cause which moved God is our sins, fully deserving punishment. "Christ was delivered for our offences."[7] We have here διὰ with the accusative, which in sacred and profane authors in the Greek language is the most common mark of the impulsive cause. For example: "διὰ ταῦτα, because of these things, cometh the wrath of God upon the children of disobedience."[8] But

[1] John iii. 16. [2] Rom. viii. 32. [3] Isa. liii. 6.
[4] 2 Cor. v. 21. [5] φιλανθρωπία. [6] Rom. v. 8.
[7] Rom. iv. 25. [8] Eph. v. 6.

however often this phrase, *on account of sins*, is connected with suffering, it never receives a signification other than the impulsive cause. "I will chastise you seven times for your sins."[1] "Because of these abominations the Lord thy God doth drive them out from before thee."[2] And frequently elsewhere in the sacred writings, and nowhere otherwise.

Another phrase, *for sins*, whenever it also is connected with sufferings, has plainly the same force. Here belong the well-known pas- [297 b
sages: "Christ died for our sins."[3] "Christ also hath once suffered for sins."[4] "Christ gave himself for our sins."[5] Christ "offered sacrifice for sins."[6]

Nevertheless, Socinus supposes[7] that in these passages the final, and not the impulsive, cause is denoted. He even goes so far as to add that by the word *pro*, and the Greek ὑπέρ, the impulsive cause is never designated, but always the final. Many passages show that this latter, upon which Socinus relies, is not true. For ὑπὲρ and περὶ are used to designate the impulsive as well as the final cause. The Gentiles are said to "glorify God for his mercy."[8] "Let thanks be given on

[1] Lev. xxvi. 28. [2] Deut. xviii. 12. [3] ὑπέρ, 1 Cor. xv. 3.
[4] περί, 1 Pet. iii. 18. [5] περί, Gal. i. 4. [6] ὑπέρ, Heb. x. 12.
[7] Book ii. chap. vii.; iii. 7; ii. 25, and more clearly, iv. 13.
[8] ὑπέρ, Rom. xv. 9.

our behalf," says Paul;[1] "for you,"[2] and "for all."[3] "We pray you in Christ's stead."[4] "Great is my glorying of you."[5] "Distresses for Christ's sake."[6] "I thank my God always on your behalf."[7] "God will convince the ungodly of all their ungodly deeds."[8] So also the Latins say: *pro beneficiis gratias agere*, or *reddere*, as Cicero frequently does. The same writer employs the expression *ulcisci pro injuriis*, *pro magnitudine sceleris poenas persolvere*, *supplicia pro maleficiis metuere*. Plautus: *castigare pro commerita noxia*. Terence: *pro dictis et factis ulcisci*. In all these passages *pro* signifies not the final, but the impulsive cause. So also when Christ is said to have suffered or died for sins, the nature of the case forbids us to understand, as Socinus would, the final cause. For, although an end may be twofold, that for which, or that for sake of which,[9] (as the end for which the medicine is prepared is the sick man, the end for sake of which, his health), neither is appropriate to sin. For even if you say with Socinus that the end of the death of Christ is that we may be recovered from sin, or even that we may obtain the remission of our sins (I will not dwell upon the fact that this end, ac-

[1] ὑπέρ, 2 Cor. i. 11.
[2] ὑπέρ, Eph. i. 16.
[3] ὑπέρ, Eph. v. 20.
[4] ὑπέρ, 2 Cor. v. 20.
[5] ὑπέρ, 2 Cor. vii. 4; ix. 2; xii. 5.
[6] ὑπέρ, 2 Cor. xii. 10.
[7] περί, 1 Cor. i. 4.
[8] Jude 15.
[9] τέλος ᾧ καὶ τέλος οὗ.

cording to his opinion, could not be attributed to death, except very remotely), neither of them can be expressed by the words, *on account of sins*, or *for sins*. The end for which will be the man; but the end for sake of which is not the sins, but the very opposite of sins, the destruction [298 a or remission of sins. Who ever said that a drug was taken on account of death when meaning to say, to avert death? But it is said to be taken on account of disease in this sense, that disease drives us to it. It follows, therefore, that in these passages the impulsive cause should be understood. Wherefore, as the Hebrew particle מִן denotes the antecedent or impulsive cause,[1] the passage from Isaiah[2] cannot be translated better or more in accordance with Scripture than thus: "He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities." What else can be the meaning of Rom. vi. 10, "Christ died *τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ*," than that he died on account of sin?

But though the impulsive cause may be of many kinds, in this place it must be taken as meritorious. For we are considering the subject of punishment, as we shall presently show. Sins are a cause of punishment only by way of desert. No one can show that the words, *on account of*

[1] Ps. xxxviii. 9, et passim.

[2] Isa. liii. 5 [Grot. — Dolore afficitur ob defectiones nostras, atteritur ob iniquitates nostras.] Rom. vi. 10 [ὃ γὰρ ἀπέθανε τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφάπαξ.]

sins, especially when they are connected with sufferings, are employed in the sacred writings in any other sense than this of desert. The contrary is not proved by the passage, "God shall give Israel up because of the sins of Jeroboam";[1] for "the sins of Jeroboam" signify, in that place, the very genus of sin, viz. idolatry, which Jeroboam had originated[2] among the people; and this is shown by the explanation which follows: "With which he sinned, and with which he made Israel to sin."[3] This interpretation is more correct than that adduced by Socinus: "Who did sin, and made Israel to sin." These sins, therefore, in which Jeroboam was author, the people imitators, deserved this punishment of giving up. I will not now dwell upon the testimony of the sacred writings that the imitators of another's sin suffer punishment deservedly, not only on account of their own, but also others' sins. This is so plain that Socinus[4] is himself compelled to confess that one man may be punished on account of another man's sins provided he is a participator in the other's fault. But the passage[5] which Socinus quotes clearly makes against him. "When thou with rebukes dost correct man for iniquity, thou

[1] 1 Kings xiv. 16.

[2] [Auctor fuerat.]

[3] [Heb. וַיִּתֵּן אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּגָלַל חַטֹּאוֹת יָרָבְעָם אֲשֶׁר חָטָא וַאֲשֶׁר הֶחֱטִיא אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל. Our version as Soc.].

[4] ii. 7; iii. 10.

[5] Ps. xxxix. 11.

makest his beauty to consume away like a moth." That is, if thou shouldest determine to punish any one as much as his sin deserves, truly that man's life would be a living death.[1] For he wishes by this reason to excite God's pity. So elsewhere:[2] "If thou shouldest mark iniquities (that is, rigidly exact their punishment) who shall stand (or sustain it)?"

It remains, therefore, unshaken that the phrase *on account of sins*, denotes the impulsive, and that too, the meritorious cause. For, as to Socinus's endeavor to escape by saying that it is sufficient for the integrity of the phrase that an occasion of any kind should be indicated; this, in the first place, is opposed to his own position. For he has said that the word *for* is never referred to the impulsive, but always to the final cause. An occasion cannot be a final cause. If it deserves to be called a cause at all, it should be referred to the impulsive cause. And again, such an exposition of the words *for sins* and *on account of sins* is directly contrary to the usage of Scripture, and common speech as well.

We see from this how incorrect it is for Socinus to say that beyond the will of God and of Christ, no antecedent cause of the death of Christ can be found. This is evidently opposed to the words of Paul: "If righteousness come by the law, [298 b

[1] [ipsa vita vitalis non erit.]

[2] Ps. cxxx. 3.

then Christ is dead in vain."[1] Here the word δωρεάν, as Socinus condedes,[2] signifies *without cause*, but it should be added, *without antecedent cause*, which is the original and most frequent sense of this word. It is derived from the word δωρεά, which signifies *gift*, that is, such a giving as has an antecedent cause of right. Hence, it has been gradually transferred to other matters also in which there is no antecedent cause. So David speaking of his enemies, says:[3] "They hate me without a cause;"[4] that is, though I have given them no cause of hate. Applying this passage to himself our Saviour says:[5] "They hated me without a cause,"[6] evidently in the same sense.[7]

The very passage of Paul which we are considering, does not permit us to understand any other than an antecedent cause. For the cause which Socinus invents, viz. that those who amend their lives may be assured of the remission of their sins, — this as a final cause, relates to the preaching, and to the resurrection, but not to death. Socinus saw this,[8] and maintained that by the word death here Christ is referred to, and that preaching and the resurrection are also included. But

[1] δωρεάν, Gal. ii. 21. [2] ii. 24. [3] Ps. xxxv. 19.
[4] חִנָּם. [5] John xv. 25. [6] δωρεάν.
[7] חִנָּם is always explained in Scripture like חֵן; *Kimchi. Pagninus:* a particle excluding price, cause, or merit.
[8] ii. 24.

this is a distortion of the meaning of Paul. For in maintaining that Christ did not die without cause, Paul means to say that there was some peculiar cause for the death of Christ. Otherwise he could have preached for a certain cause, and for a certain cause have been rewarded (for according to Socinus this is the only object of the resurrection), and yet not have died. We may also see that Paul has exclusive reference to the death of Christ from the preceding context: "Who gave himself for me." For this giving everywhere in Scripture designates death. Calling this the grace of God, Paul declares that he neither spurns it nor rejects it, and immediately assigns as the cause: "For if righteousness came by the law, then Christ is dead in vain;" pointing out, on the contrary, that the peculiar reason why Christ gave himself up and died was this, that we were not just by the law, but sentenced to punishment. Therefore, our transgression of the law,[1] is the antecedent cause of the death of Christ.

A SECOND EFFICIENT CAUSE, and that too a willing cause, is Christ himself. "I lay down my life," says Christ, "no man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself."[2] "Christ gave himself for me," "for the church."[3]

The cause which moved Christ was his own love

[1] ἀνομία. [2] John x. 17, 18.

[3] Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 2, 25.

for man."[1] "This is my commandment," he says, "that ye love one another, as I have loved you. Greater love hath no man than this that a man lay down his life for his friends. Ye are my friends."[2] "By the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me."[3] "That loved us and washed us from our sins in his own blood."[4] "Christ hath loved us, and hath given himself for us an offering."[5] "Christ loved the church, and gave himself for it."[6]

THE MATTER is the tortures antecedent to death, and especially the death itself.

Isaiah[7] employed the powerful word חַבּוּרָה[8] to **299 a**] designate the tortures, and Peter[9] the word *μώλωψ*.[8] So, also, we find mention of the cross where this argument is discussed: "That he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross."[10] "Having made peace through the blood of his cross."[11] But we must not understand by the word "tortures" pains of body only, but rather principally the sufferings of the mind,[12] with especial reference to which Christ exclaims that he is forsaken of God.

[1] *φιλανθρωπία.* [2] John xv. 12–14 [3] Gal. ii. 20.
[4] Rev. i. 5. [5] Eph. v. 2. [6] Eph. v. 25.
[7] Isa. liii. 5. [8] discolored stripe. [9] 1 Pet. ii. 24.
[10] Eph. ii. 16. [11] Col. i. 20.
[12] The Evangelists designate these by the words *λυπεῖσθαι* [Matt. xxvi. 37], *ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι* [Mark xiv. 33], *ἀδημονεῖν* [Matt. xxvi. 37 and Mark xiv. 33].

As another part of the matter, death is presented in many passages. "I lay down my life."[1] "Reconciled through death."[2] "By means of death for the redemption of the transgressions."[3]

This death is considered in the sacred writings with especial reference to two qualities, as bloody and as ignominious. The quality of bloody death is denoted by the word *blood.* "This my blood of the New Testament which is shed for many for the remission of sins."[4] "God purchased the church with his own blood."[5] God set forth Christ "to be a propitiation through faith in his blood."[6] "Justified by his blood."[7] "We have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins."[8] "Ye who sometimes were far off are made nigh by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace."[9] "We have redemption through his blood."[10] "Having made peace through the blood of his cross."[11] "Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us."[12] "Without shedding of blood is no remission."[13] "Ye are come to the blood of sprinkling, that speaketh better things

[1] John x. 18. [2] Col. i. 21, 22. [3] Heb. ix. 15.
[4] Matt. xxvi. 28; Luke xxii. 20. [5] Acts xx. 28.
[6] Rom. iii. 25. [7] Rom. v. 9. [8] Eph. i. 7.
[9] Eph. ii. 13, 14. [10] Col. i. 14. [11] Col. i. 20.
[12] Heb. ix. 12. [13] Heb. ix. 22.

than that of Abel."[1] "Unto sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ."[2] "The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin."[3] "Christ washed us from our sins in his own blood."[4]

But the second quality, of ignominy, is denoted by the very word *cross* (for in that punishment there is the greatest ignominy; whence it is said: "He endured the cross, despising the shame"[5]), and by the word *despised*, which Isaiah[6] employs.

At this point we may observe, in passing, not only that death and the cross and blood are mentioned in the passages now produced, and others of similar character, treating solely or chiefly of the remission of sins, but that in many others the apostles declare that they know nothing, teach nothing, except Jesus Christ and him crucified.[7] Therefore the gospel itself is called by them the preaching of the cross.[8]

Note also that Christ instituted the most holy rite of his supper not specially as a memorial of his life or resurrection, but of his death and shed blood.[9] These things, so often repeated, show that some peculiar and extraordinary effect must be ascribed to this death and blood. But Socinus cannot do this. For an example of holiness was exhibited by the whole life of Christ, rather than

[1] Heb. xii. 24. [2] 1 Pet. i. 2. [3] 1 John i. 7.
[4] Rev. i. 5. [5] Heb. xii. 2. [6] Isa. liii. 3.
[7] 1 Cor. i. 23; ii. 2. [8] 1 Cor. i. 18. [9] 1 Cor. xi. 26.

his death, which was completed in a brief moment. The confirmation of the promise of a heavenly life consisted peculiarly in the resurrection of Christ, to which death bears only the relation of a means. So that with reference to this the Scripture ought to speak of the resurrection, and not of death, or, at least, not so often, and with the addition of marks of emphasis. Socinus himself,[1] la- [299 b
boring to show that the way of salvation was confirmed by the shedding of blood, when he had rejected the true cause, which we defend, could substitute no other probable cause of that confirmation; nor bring any true distinction upon which it should be ascribed to the death of Christ alone, and not also to that of other martyrs. But he will never be able to explain how Christ by shedding his blood put God under obligation to us (which he concedes to be true in some sense[2]), if God has promised nothing on account of the shedding of blood.

THE FORM is a perfect suffering of the penalty of our sins. This Socinus stiffly denies.[3] We will, therefore, give a brief proof of it.

The Hebrews have no phrase in more frequent use to express that which is expressed in Latin by *poenas pendere*, than *to bear sin*. This is like the Latin expression *luere delicta*, that is, suffer the punishment of crimes.[4] If any one neglects

[1] i. 3. [2] i. 3. [3] iii. 9; ii. 4.
[4] חַטָּאתִי. Gen. xliii. 9: xliv. 32.

to point out a blasphemer, "then he shall bear his iniquity."[1] "He hath uncovered his sister's nakedness; he shall bear his iniquity."[2] So expiatory victims are said to bear the iniquities of those who offer them,[3] because their blood is for a human life.[4] These words are found separately, as well as in connection, in the same sense. Thus we have "to bear the judgment";[5] "to bear iniquity";[6] "some mischief will come upon us," that is, punishment for mischief.[7] In the same sense, evidently, Peter said that Christ bore up our sins in his own body upon the tree.[8] He might have employed the word *ἤνεγκε*; but because he wished to indicate at the same time that he ascended upon the cross, he said *ἀνήνεγκε*, that is, *bore by going up*. The phrase employed is not weakened, but rather intensified, by this addition. The Syriac has it: "bore and made to ascend." Socinus, in order to weaken the force of this passage says, first, that *ἀνήνεγκε* signifies *bore away*. This, however, is contrary to the nature and use of the word. For the particle *ἀνὰ* does not allow

[1] Lev. v. 1. [2] Lev. xx. 17. [3] Lev. x. 17.

[4] Lev. xvii. 11. [5] *βαστάζειν τὸ κρίμα*, Gal. v. 10.

[6] Ezek. xviii. 20. [Grotius's Latin is: ferre ob peccata. The Heb. נָשָׂא בַעֲוֹן.]

[7] 2 Kings vii. 9. [Heb. מְצָאנוּ עָוֹן.]

[8] 1 Pet. ii. 24. [Gr. *ὃς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον, ἵνα ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἀπογενόμενοι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ζήσωμεν· οὗ τῷ μώλωπι ἰάθητε.*]

this interpretation, nor has any Greek writer so employed the word. In the New Testament also, it nowhere occurs in that sense, but signifies either *to bear up*[1] or *to lead up*.[2] And because they used to bear up the victims upon a high place, that is, upon an altar, so the victims are said to be borne up.[3] From this fact Christ is said to have borne himself up,[4] and we are said to bear up praises or spiritual sacrifices.[5]

One passage only does Socinus quote:[6] "So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many; and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation."[7] In this passage he supposes that *to bear (up) sins*[8] is the same as *to bear away*, but improperly, and without example, and when the sense of the passage does not demand it. For the two comings of Christ are contrasted with one another; the first when he bore our sins, the other when he is to come without sin,[9] that is, not weighed down, not burdened by any sins, but free and secure from them. The contrasted members are not *to be without* sin, and *to bear away* sins; but *to be without* sin, and *to be burdened with* sins. [**300 a** Hence it appears that in the passage from Hebrews

[1] Luke xxiv. 51 ["carry."] [2] Matt. xvii. 1; Mark ix. 2.
[3] ἀναφέρεσθαι, Heb. vii. 27; James ii. 21.
[4] ἀνενέγκας, Heb. vii. 27. [προσενέγκας, Tf. and Treg.].
[5] ἀναφέρειν, Heb. xiii. 15; 1 Pet. ii. 24. [6] ii. 6.
[7] Heb. ix. 28. [8] ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας. [9] χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας.

ἀνενεγκεῖν is either *to bear up*, that is to say, upon the cross, as in the passage from Peter,[1] or simply to endure.[2] ἀναφέρειν, therefore, means *to bear*, not *to bear away*. This is shown by the context. Peter is speaking not of any benefit of Christ, but of his perfect patience. This is exhibited not in bearing away, but in bearing. Socinus's remark that the following words, "that we being dead to sins should live to righteousness," are not sufficiently consistent with this sense in which Christ is said to have borne our sins, is not well founded. For, manifestly, Peter shows that Christ has borne our sins in such a way as to liberate us thereby from punishment. Accordingly, he adds immediately: "by whose stripes ye were healed." But these things are perfectly consistent. If Christ suffered such severities that ye might obtain the pardon of your sins, having indeed obtained it by faith, ye ought to beware of sinning in the future. "That he would grant unto us that we, being delivered out of the hands of our enemies, might serve him without fear in holiness and righteousness."[3] "Behold, thou art made whole; sin no

[1] This is an appropriate sense, because here also allusion is made to the sacrifices. But the cross was, so to speak, an altar. תְּרוּמָה in Moses's writings is the same as ἀναφορά, in which is involved the force of ἄνω. Kimchi explains זָקַף, *to suspend* (whence Syr. ܙܩܝܦܐ, σταυρός) by רוּם, *to lift up*. See his notes on John iii. 14, and xii. 32.

[2] Thus, κινδύνους ἀναφέρειν.

[3] Luke i. 74, 75.

more, lest a worse thing come unto thee."[1] "For ye are bought with a price; therefore glorify God in your body."[2] Nor has Paul any other object in the seventh of Romans and following than to show that we ought to be aroused by the great benefits of God and Christ to live holily.[d]

Akin to the passage from Peter (indeed, without doubt, Peter had reference to it, as appears from the following words: "by whose stripes were ye healed") is this from Isaiah:[3] "My righteous servant shall justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities."[4] The Hebrew word עָוֹן signifies *iniquity*, and sometimes *the punishment of iniquity*.[5] The word סָבַל is *to sustain*, *to bear;* but whenever it is connected with the word *sin* or *iniquity*, in every language, and especially in Hebraism, it signifies *to bear punishment*. For נָשָׂא, to be sure, sometimes signifies *to bear away*, but סָבַל, never. The meaning of this passage is, therefore, evidently this, — that Christ will bear the punishment of those who are justified. The phrase admits of no other interpretation.

It is no objection that this bearing of iniquity seems to be put by the prophet after the resurrection. For to the glory of Christ the prophet in a kind of parallelism opposes his antecedent

[1] John v. 14. [2] 1 Cor. vi. 20. [3] Isa. liii. 11.

[4] On this whole passage of Isaiah see Origen, I. against Celsus.

[5] Heb. וַעֲוֹנֹתָם הוּא יִסְבֹּל.

sufferings, now in natural, now in inverted order, as when we proceed from effect to cause. Thus, after speaking of eternal duration, he goes on to speak of cutting off and being stricken.[1] Then,[2] after bruising and grief and offering, seed, days prolonged, and prosperity are mentioned. With these are connected[3] liberation from suffering and the justifying of many. Again the prophet returns to punishment borne for sins, and adds: "He shall divide the spoil," that is, because he surrendered himself to death, and was numbered with the transgressors. He who bore the sins of many ought to have the right of interceding for them.[4]

Socinus remarks that even this word סֵבֶל, though connected with sin, does not always include imputation, but that it is sufficient if it designates the affliction of one person for any reason connected with another's act, no matter what. But **300 b**] he proves this by no other example, neither does Holy Scripture ever speak in this way. Moreover, even the Greek and Latin authors, when they use this phrase, always include imputation.

To strengthen this exception, Socinus cites a passage of Jeremiah,[5] which runs thus: "Our fathers have sinned and are not, and we have borne their iniquities." He will not admit that any imputation is here taught. But with what argument does he prove that the phrase means

[1] vs. 8. [2] vs. 10. [3] vs. 11. [4] vs. 12. [5] Lam. v. 7.

something else here than in all the other passages in which it is found? Socinus himself is compelled to confess that when the sons follow in the footsteps of their fathers, not only their own, but their fathers' sins are imputed to them. For this is the plain word of God.[1] Moreover, that those of whom Jeremiah is speaking were like their parents, is shown by the following context: "Woe unto us that we have sinned."[2] Nor is this foreign to the design of Jeremiah. For to magnify the misery of those who were then living, he says that the punishment of their own sins and the sins of their ancestors redounded to them; and that on this account their lot was much harder than that of their parents, who, equally guilty, had yet departed from life before those exceedingly bitter punishments, heaped together, as it were, in the treasury of divine wrath, were at length simultaneously poured forth.

But even if the signification of the words *to bear sins* in the sacred writings were doubtful, yet in this passage of Isaiah, and that of Peter also, the joint mention of the sufferings of Christ and of our liberation, would make the interpretation certain. For to bear sins by suffering, and in such a way as to liberate others thereby, can only mean to receive another's punishment. In the same

[1] Ex. xx. 5.

[2] Lam. v. 16.

passage[1] we have: "God cast upon him, or smote him with, the punishment of us all. It is exacted, and he is himself afflicted."[2] Here Socinus leaves no stone unturned[3] to wrest away from the words their genuine sense,[4] and invents a new interpretation: "God met through him (or with him[5]) the iniquity of us all." But the Hebrew word הִפְגִּיעַ, of that conjugation which denotes not single but double action, openly contradicts it. Wherefore, since פָּגַע properly signifies *to meet*, it follows that הִפְגִּיעַ is *to make to meet*, and metaphorically *to intercede*, for an intercessor, as it were, interposes his prayers. *To intercede* is not the meaning here; for then God would be said to have interceded for Christ, for that is the signification of the word when followed by the particle בְּ.[6] *Caused to intercede* is not appropriate here, because of בּוֹ, *upon him*, since otherwise we ought to have *made him to intercede*, and because the immediate context, preceding and following, relates to affliction, and not intercession. Therefore the only admissible sense of these words is the following: "God

[1] Isa. liii. 6, 7 [Heb. וַיהוָה הִפְגִּיעַ בּוֹ אֶת עֲוֹן כֻּלָּנוּ: נִגַּשׂ וְהוּא נַעֲנָה].

[2] [E.V. "The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all. He was oppressed and he was afflicted."]

[3] ii. 5.

[4] [*Lat.* nullum non lapidem movet Socinus, ut sensum genuinum verbis extorqueat].

[5] [*Lat.* cum ipso].

[6] Jer. xv. 11.

made him to meet, i.e. cast upon, caused to smite, upon him the sin of us all. Sin is exacted (i.e. according to Scripture phrase, the punishment of sin), and he himself is afflicted."[e]

At this point Socinus brings up against us the passage[1] where sins are said to be laid upon the expiatory goat, and the goat himself is said to bear the sins of the people into the desert solitude. He thinks that nothing can be plainer than that this goat cannot be said in any way to have borne punishment for the sins of the people; but with what warrant he assumes this I do not see. For punishment, taken generally, certainly falls even upon brutes. "Your blood of your lives will I require: at the hand of every beast will I require [301 a it."[2] "If an ox gore a man or a woman that they die, then the ox shall be surely stoned."[3] "If a man lie with a beast, he shall surely be put to death, and ye shall slay the beast."[4] "I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake."[5]

Nor is the objection of Socinus true, that the scapegoat[6] was not customarily killed; but for the remission of sins the shedding of blood, or death, was required. For, although the Scriptures do not clearly teach, the Hebrew interpreters agree, that this very goat was thrown down from a high

[1] Lev. xvi. 21, 22. [2] Gen. ix. 5. [3] Ex. xxi. 28.
[4] Lev. xx. 15. [5] Gen. viii. 21. [6] ἀποπομπαῖον.

place in the desert, and so done to death. But if it were not so, what other end was threatened by that driving away to desert solitudes than a death by no means natural, but either by hunger, or the rending of wild beasts?

We ought also to notice Isaiah's word נִגַּשׂ. It is perfectly certain that נָגַשׂ[1] properly signifies *to exact*.[2] But metaphorically it is employed for *to oppress*. The passive is, accordingly, either *to be oppressed* or *to be exacted*. *To be oppressed* is not appropriate here, because וְהוּא follows in the same comma; "and he himself is afflicted." From this it appears that the verb is referred to another noun than that with which *afflicted* agrees. It would make no sense if one should say of the same person, He is oppressed and he is afflicted. Consequently this word is properly taken in the sense *it is exacted*, and refers to the noun next antecedent, which is sin. But to exact sin is the same, and must be the same, as to exact the punishment of sin. Therefore the exaction of punishment is connected with the affliction of Christ.[f]

In the same prophet had preceded:[3] "The chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed." In Hebrew the word for chastisement is מוּסַר. This word signifies not an affliction of any sort whatsoever, but that

[1] Sin, not Shin. [2] Cf. 2 Kings xxiii. 35 and Zech. ix. 8.
[3] Isa. liii. 5.

which has the character of a penalty, whether of the nature of an example or of a warning.[1] Hence it came to pass that by a bold figure[2] every kind of warning was denoted by מוּסָר. But since the meaning *warning* is out of place in connection with Christ, — especially since Isaiah is treating of afflictions, including death, — we must understand such an affliction as bears with it an example.[3] For it is not possible to find a case where the Hebrew word has no reference to fault. True, among the Hebrews any kind of good may be meant by the word *peace*. But in this case, if we understand from the subject-matter the good of impunity, the punishment of Christ and our impunity will appear to form the best antithesis. Nothing, however, prevents us from understanding reconciliation by the word peace, even when no mention has been made of enmity, since both the nature of the case and the following words of the prophet indicate that this had preceded. The angels did not mention enmity when they proclaimed that peace was to come upon earth,[4] nor the apostle when he said that we had peace with God.[5] But as the Hebrews employ *sin* for *punishment*,[6] so they also call him who suffered [**301 b**

[1] παραδειγματικὴ or νουθετική. By these words Taurus the philosopher once aptly distinguished the classes of punishment.

[2] κατάχρησις. [3] παράδειγμα. [4] Luke ii. 14. [5] Rom. v. 1.

[6] In addition to the passage already adduced, see Zech. xiv. 19; Gen. iv. 13.

the punishment, sin; as also the Latins take *piaculum* now for the crime, now for him who pays the penalty of the crime. Hence the Scripture calls the expiatory victim for sin, sin.[1] Therefore, following this form of speech, Isaiah said of Christ:[2] "He made his soul sin," i.e. He exposed his soul to the punishment of sins. In the same way, Paul:[3] "For he hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." In both members in Paul the adjunct appears to be taken for the subject.[g]

Socinus,[4] to escape the authority of the Pauline passage, supposes that by the word *sin* should be understood a man regarded by men as a sinner; in the first place without warrant, for there is no example of such a use of either the Greek or the Hebrew word; again, Paul attributes to God the act of making Christ sin. But certainly though the Jews and others regarded Christ as a criminal and a malefactor, God was not in any way the author thereof. On the contrary, by the voice from heaven, and by producing miracles, he testified to all men of the innocence of Christ. Again, this new interpretation of Socinus cannot be adapted to the words of Isaiah which contain

[1] Lev. iv. 3, 29; v. 6; Ps. xl. 6.
[2] Isa. liii. 10, Heb. תָּשִׂים אָשָׁם נַפְשׁוֹ
[3] 2 Cor. v. 21.
[4] i. 8.

a similar phrase. For what Paul says God did, Isaiah ascribes to Christ, that doubtless he made his soul sin, or that he made himself sin. Besides, Paul contrasts sin and righteousness. "We have been made the righteousness of God, i.e. we have been justified or liberated from divine punishment. But that this might be done, Christ was made sin, i.e. suffered the divine punishment. Another antithesis is to be observed in the words of Paul: "Him who knew no sin," i.e. who did not deserve punishment, "God made sin," i.e. would have him bear punishment. Christ was innocent not only before human, but also divine law. Therefore the force of the antithesis requires that he should also bear the punishment of the divine law. Furthermore, that the innocent are evilly esteemed by evil men is an every-day matter. But the apostle is here noting something exceptional. Can it be anything else than that God has inflicted punishment upon the undeserving?

Not much different from the preceding is the well-known passage of Paul:[1] "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth upon a tree; that the blessing of Abraham might come upon the Gentiles through Jesus Christ." There is the less need here of being in perplexity as to Paul's meaning when he

[1] Gal. iii. 13.

says that Christ is made a curse or execration, since he interprets himself, and by alleging Moses as the author of his remark, shows that by *κατάρα* he understands *ἐπικατάρατος*. For the *ἐπικατάρατος*, according to the interpretation of Paul himself, is one who is under a curse.[1] "Curse," says Socinus, "signifies in this place the punishment of a curse," which is true. In many places curse signifies a punishment proceeding from the sanction of the law.[2] And in this place the mention of the law which is added forbids us to understand curse otherwise. Moreover, even Socinus confesses that this curse in the case of Christ was the cross.[3] Therefore the cross of Christ had the character of a punishment. This is what we said. Perhaps Socinus will admit that the cross was **302 a**] punishment because it was imposed upon Christ by Pilate, the judge, by way of punishment. But this does not give the complete meaning of Paul. For to prove that Christ was made liable to punishment he quotes Moses, who plainly says that those who are lifted up (of course in accordance with the divine law) are cursed by God.[4] Wherefore, also, when Paul quotes Moses, and applies these expressions to Christ, the same word must be supplied, as if he had said that Christ was made cursed by God;[5] i.e. liable to a punishment

[1] *ὑπὸ κατάραν.* [2] 2 Pet. ii. 14; Matt. xxv. 41. [3] ii. 1.

[4] *ἐπικατάρατοι τῷ Θεῷ.* See upon this passage of Moses, Masius on Josh. ch. 8. [5] *τῷ θεῷ ἐπικατάρατος.*

imposed by God, and ignominious in the extreme. For when the apostles say that the passion of Christ was to benefit us, they do not by this refer to the acts of men, but to the act of God himself, as is evident from many of the passages already adduced.[h]

To all these things we may add[1] also this; that death, i.e. the destruction of that person which the body and soul constitute, since it is inflicted by God, always has some reference to punishment. As the Hebrews say,[2] without sin there is no death. Not that it is not right for God to inflict it upon a man otherwise (for he is Lord of the creature), but that it has seemed best to his goodness to do differently.

That the state of this particular controversy may be rightly understood: we do not deny that man when he was formed was earthy,[3] since he possessed a certain vital force, but not a quickening force;[4] and especially not that the condition of his body was such that, if God did not sustain it, it would perish. But we maintain that by divine decree he would not have died if he had remained in innocence.[5] This is proved by the very nobility and eminence of this creature, so

[1] Against Soc. iii. 7, 8, and 9.
[2] בְּלֹא חֵטְא אֵין מִיתָא
[3] χοϊχόν.
[4] So Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 45, 46.
[5] *vid.* Theophilus ad Autol., Book 2. — Arnob. adv. gentes. — Justin. Respons. ad Orthod. Quaest. 32.

that it alone is said to be formed in the image of God, i.e. possessed of a mind and free-will, which is the foundation of its empire over other creatures. That cannot be lord of other things which is not lord of its own actions. This superiority to other things is an argument that something more than temporary advantage was contemplated in the creation of man. Athenagoras says:[1] "God did not create us like sheep and oxen, incidentally, and that we might perish and be destroyed." God created us "that when created we might individually live and be preserved."[2] A little further:[3] "That when created we might ourselves live; yet not with such a life as should be kindled for a short time, and then soon be extinguished forever." But what is clearer than the word of God,[4] "If thou eatest thou shalt die"? This refers to the act of death whether violent or without violence. Therefore the death of man would not have come to pass unless the condition of sin had been fulfilled. Equally clear and general is the following passage of Paul's:[5] "The wages," i.e. the punishment, "of sin is

[1] *οὐ γὰρ ἡμᾶς ὡς πρόβατα ἢ ὑποζύγια, πάρεργον, καὶ ἵνα ἀπολοίμεθα καὶ ἀφανισθείημεν ἔπλασεν ὁ Θεός.*

[2] *διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ζωήν τε καὶ διαμονήν.*

[3] *διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ζωήν, οὐκ ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἐξαπτομένην, εἶτα παντελῶς συνεισβεννυμένην.*

[4] Gen. ii. 17.

[5] Rom. vi. 23.

death." He had said before,[1] "Death by sin, and so death passed upon all men." "All men," he says. He is therefore speaking of the common end of the whole human race. "By man" therefore, i.e. by the act of man, "came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. [302 b For as in Adam all die (as many as do die), even so in Christ shall all be made alive" (as many as shall be made alive).[2] Who that looks at the mere words does not see that this sentence in Corinthians corresponds exactly to that in Romans? He is therefore speaking of death which is common to the posterity of Adam, and from which they rise who do rise. Wherefore also we say, when this passage is compared with that in Romans, that Paul is here treating of Adam as a sinner. For as he says here "by man," he says there "by sin." The animal condition of Adam is touched upon by the apostle in twenty or more verses below, plainly for another purpose; for in this passage death is opposed to resurrection, but in that the qualities of the originally created and then of the resuscitated body are compared with one another. Of these the former had, by the gift of God, in conjunction with the natural possibility of dying, the possibility also of living; but the latter will have life in itself in such a way that there will be for it no natural possibility of dying.

[1] Rom. v. 12. [2] 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22.

I cannot forbear to add here a remarkable passage of the distinguished writer of the Book of Wisdom, which, though not in the Hebrew canon, has notwithstanding a venerable antiquity, and has always been highly prized by Christians. It is as follows:[1] "God made not death; neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living. For he created all things, that they might have their being; and the generations of the world were healthful; and there is no poison of destruction in them, nor the kingdom of death upon the earth. (For righteousness is immortal.) But ungodly men, with their works and words, called it to them; for when they thought to have it their friend, they consumed to nought, and made a covenant with it, because they are worthy to take part with it." A little way on:[2] "God created man to be immortal, and made him to be an image of his peculiar nature. Nevertheless, through envy of the devil, came death into the world; and they that do hold of his side do find it." Here death,

[1] i. 13–16. Ὁ Θεὸς θάνατον οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τέρπεται ἐπ' ἀπωλείᾳ ζώντων. ἔκτισε γὰρ εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα, καὶ σωτήριοι αἱ γενέσεις τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐταῖς φάρμακον ὀλέθρου, οὐδὲ ᾅδου βασίλειον ἐπὶ γῆς. δικαιοσύνη δὲ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν. ἀσεβεῖς δὲ ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ τοῖς λόγοις παρεκαλέσαντο αὐτόν, φίλον ἡγησάμενοι αὐτὸν ἐτάκησαν, καὶ συνθήκην ἔθεντο πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσι τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος εἶναι.

[2] ii. 23, 24. Ὁ Θεὸς ἔκτισε ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ ἀφθαρσίᾳ, καὶ εἰκόνα τῆς ἰδίας ἰδιότητος ἐποίησεν αὐτόν. Φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον. Πειράζουσι δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος ὄντες.

which is said not to have been created nor chosen by God, that is, with a choice preceding the sin, means every kind of death. This is shown by the contrast with "immortality," in the hope of which man is said to have been formed, and this hope is not obscurely shown to have been a part of that divine image, or, at least, a consequence of it. But immortality excludes all death, whether violent or not violent. As the apostle said that death entered by man and by sin, this writer had said no less truly that death entered by the envy of the devil. All these expressions point to this fact, that the first sin of man was committed at the suggestion of the devil. It is not a valid objection that this author is here speaking of a certain special effect of death upon the wicked. For death having entered by the first sin, and obtained rule over all men, acquires a certain peculiar power by the grave and continued sins of individual [303 a
men. In this sense sin is said to be the sting of death.[1] In this way those to whom after death all approach to a better life is precluded, are deservedly styled the allies of death, or the captives and property of death.

It would be very easy to show, if it were pertinent, that this has been the constant opinion of ancient Jews and Christians, that the death of man, of any kind whatever, is the punishment of

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 56.

sin. Not improperly, therefore, did the Christian emperors disapprove most of all of that dogma of Pelagius and Celestius in which they said that death did not arise from the ensnarements of sin, but that an inward law of our immutable constitution demanded it.

To sum up what has been already said: since the Scripture says that Christ was chastised by God, i.e. punished; that Christ bore our sins, i.e. the punishment of sins; was made sin, i.e. was subjected to the penalty of sins; was made a curse with God, or was exposed to the curse, that is, the penalty of the law; since, moreover, the very suffering of Christ, full of tortures, bloody, ignominious, is most appropriate matter of punishment; since, again, the Scripture says that these were inflicted on him by God on account of our sins, i.e. our sins so deserving; since death itself is said to be the wages, i.e. the punishment of sin; certainly it can by no means be doubted that with reference to God the suffering and death of Christ had the character of a punishment. Nor can we listen to the interpretations of Socinus, which depart from the perpetual use of the words without authority, especially when no reason prevents us from retaining the received meaning of the words, as will be made plain below. There is, therefore, a punishment, in God actively, in Christ passively. Yet in the passion of Christ there is also a certain

action, viz. the voluntary endurance of penal suffering.

THE END of the transaction of which we treat, in the intention of God and Christ, which, proposed in the act, may also be said to have been effected, is two-fold; namely, the exhibition of the divine justice, and the remission of sins with respect to us, i.e. our exemption from punishment. For if you take the exaction of punishment impersonally, its end is the exhibition of the divine justice; but if personally, i.e. why was Christ punished, the end is that we might be freed from punishment.

The former end is indicated by Paul when he says of Christ,[1] "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation in his blood to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God." Then he adds, repeating almost the same words: "To declare, I say, at this time his righteousness, that he might be just and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." Here, in close connection with the blood, i.e. the bloody death, stands the end, "to declare his righteousness."[2]

By the expression "righteousness of God" is not to be understood that righteousness which God works in us, or which he imputes to us, but that which is in God.[1] For he proceeds: "That he

[1] Rom. iii. 25, 26.

[2] εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ.

might be just," i.e. appear to be just. This justice of God, i.e. rectitude, for different objects has different effects.[1] With reference to the good or evil deeds of a creature its effect, among other things, is retribution,[2] with reference to which Paul said;[3] "It is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you." In another place: "Every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward."[4] **303 b**] And the following: "Whose damnation is just."[5] The Syriac has it: "Whose condemnation is reserved for justice." So also, "day of wrath,"[6] and "day of just judgment"[7] are the same.[8] It is said that the final judgment will be "in equity."[9] Elsewhere, "to judge in equity"[10] is to take severe vengeance, which is shown by the additional words "make war," and much more by those that follow a little after: "And out of his mouth goeth a sharp sword, that with it he should smite the nations; and he shall rule them with a rod of iron; and he treadeth the wine-press of the fierceness and wrath of Almighty God."[11] So both God is said to be just, and his punishments

[1] Contr. Socinus i. 1, parg. "Dico igitur." [2] ἀνταπόδοσις.
[3] 2 Thess. i. 6, δίκαιον παρὰ Θεῷ ἀνταποδοῦναι τοῖς θλίβουσι θλίψιν.
[4] Heb. ii. 2. ἔνδικον μισθαποδοσίαν.
[5] Rom. iii. 8. ὧν τὸ κρῖμα ἔνδικόν ἐστι.
[6] ἡμέρα ὀργῆς. [7] ἡμέρα δικαιοκρισίας.
[8] Rom. ii. 5. [9] Acts xvii. 31. ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ.
[10] ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ κρίνειν. [11] Rev. xix. 11, 15.

to be just, because he severely punishes sin.[1] Vengeance[2] is accordingly the name given now to the punitive justice of God,[3] and now to the punishment inflicted by it.[4] The judgment of God[5] is explained by Paul[6] to be this: that they who commit, or approve evil things, are worthy of death. Conjugate to these are "revenger"[7] and "vengeance,"[8] the force of which is explained by the word "repay."[9]

It is true that by the word *justice* is frequently meant *veracity*, frequently also *equity*.[10] But since by this word, as has already been shown by many examples, that attribute of God is indicated which moves him to punish sin, and which is exhibited in this punishment of sin, we say that this is the proper signification of our passage. Different ages are set in opposition; e.g. the ages before Christ and that of Christ. To the former is attributed the passing[11] over of sins, which is also explained by the word "forbearance."[12] *πάρεσις* does not mean *remission*, but *passing over*, to which *ἀνοχή*, *forbearance*, is rightly added. By this word the Greeks designate a truce, because by it war was for a time kept in check. To this passing over

[1] Rev. xvi. 5, 7.
[2] *Δίκη.*
[3] Acts xxviii. 4.
[4] 2 Thess. i. 9; Jude 7.
[5] *δικαίωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ.*
[6] Rom. i. 32.
[7] *ἔκδικος*, Rom. xiii. 4; 1 Thess. iv. 6.
[8] *ἐκδίκησις*, Luke xxi. 22; 2 Thess. i. 8; 1 Pet. ii. 14.
[9] *ἀνταποδοῦναι*, Rom. xii. 19; Heb. x. 30.
[10] *ἐπιείκεια.*
[11] *πάρεσις.*
[12] *ἀνοχή.*

and checking is opposed such a demonstration of justice that by it God may be, i.e. may appear, just. Once, when God passed over very many sins unpunished, his retributive justice did not sufficiently appear. At length, therefore, he showed how he was a just retributor when he determined that his own Son for this cause should shed his blood to become a propitiation for the human race, and to redeem all those who had ever believed, or should ever believe, in God. So the apostle has put the open demonstration in close connection with the grace, i.e. the divine goodness which is bestowed upon creatures, and with the justice of him who is the guardian of right order and also of retribution. Certainly the very word *blood*, the word *propitiation*, and even *redemption*, show that he is not engaged here with the simple testimony to goodness. He has also connected impetration with application. The impetration is through the blood; the application through faith. Rightly is that justice, of which we are treating, said to be made manifest through faith; that faith, namely, by which the blood of Christ is believed to have been shed to propitiate God; which faith entirely excludes all glory in works, all trust in the law.[j]

This end, viz. the exhibition of the divine justice, is also rightly inferred from the form of the
304 a] transaction of which we treat. For the end of punishment is the exhibition of retributive

justice concerning sins, also upon antecedent cause, which we have above shown to be meritorious. But the impelling cause of an action cannot be meritorious except also the end be to make retribution.

The second end, as we have said, is our exemption from punishment. Of this Paul has significantly said:[1] "Being justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath." "The wrath of God"[2] sometimes signifies, as Socinus also recognizes,[3] a desire (if one should so speak) of punishing;[4] but frequently the punishment itself.[5] For this reason it is explained by the word *destruction*.[6] Hence the law is said "to work wrath," i.e. to prepare punishment.[7] "To bring wrath upon" is *to punish*.[8] The magistrate is said to be a revenger appointed against evil doers "unto wrath," i.e. to inflict punishment;[9] and it is said that he must be obeyed, not only "on account of wrath," i.e. through fear of punishment, but also for conscience's sake. But impunity is the opposite of punishment. Punishment is eternal death, or detention under death, whose minister is the devil. Who, moreover, having the power of death,

[1] Rom. v. 9. *δικαιωθέντες ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ σωθησόμεθα ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς.*

[2] *ὀργή.* [3] i. 1. [4] John iii. 36; Rom. i. 18.

[5] Mic. vii. 9. [6] *ἀπώλεια*, Rom. ix. 22. [7] Rom. iv. 15.

[8] *ἐπιφέρειν ὀργήν* [E. V. to take vengeance], Rom. iii. 5.

[9] *εἰς ὀργήν*, Rom. xiii. 4.

is said to have been destroyed by death; that of Christ.[1] For the mention of liberation from fear of death, which follows, shows that the passage relates to the impetration of pardon, rather than to the mortification of sin. Christ is called he "which delivered us from the wrath to come."[2]

This impunity, in the most common phrase of Scripture, is called remission of sins, which properly follows the death of Christ, as many passages show. For example:[3] "This is my blood of the New Testament which is shed for many for the remission of sins." "In whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins."[4] "Without shedding of blood is no remission."[5] These passages explain that above quoted from Paul: "Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness, that he might be just and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus."[6] Here, with many words of the same signification, he has set forth the same things.

[1] Heb. ii. 14.

[2] 1 Thess. i. 10. *ὁ ῥυόμενος ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης.*

[3] Matt. xxvi. 28.

[4] Col. i. 14.

[5] Heb. ix. 22.

[6] Rom. iii. 24-26.

For as he has expressed the exhibition of his justice twice, and the third time added "that God might be just," that is, appear just, which pertain to the former end; so he has indicated the second end also, both by repeating the word *justification*, and by the word *redemption*. Justification, as has been remarked, frequently in the sacred writings, but especially in the Pauline epistles, signifies acquittal, which, presupposing sin, consists in the remission of sins according to the clear explanation of Paul himself.[1] Wherefore with these passages ascribing the remission of sins to the blood of Jesus we must connect that which we just cited: "justified by his blood."[2] Also those which ascribe the washing away of sins to blood or death. "The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin."[3] "Unto sprinkling of the blood of [304 b
Jesus Christ."[4] "Christ washed us from our sins in his own blood."[5] For although to wash away, to cleanse, and similar words, may signify to prevent sins either from being committed in the future, or from appearing, though committed, yet the latter interpretation is more harmonious with the expressions of Scripture. So *to blot out iniquities* is explained *not to remember sins*,[6] and *to cleanse from iniquity* is shown to be the same

[1] Especially in Rom. iv. 2, 6.
[2] Rom. v. 9.
[3] 1 John i. 7.
[4] 1 Pet. i. 2.
[5] Rev. i. 5.
[6] Isa. xliii. 25.

as *to forgive*.[1] *To remit sins* is used in the same sense as *to cleanse from all iniquity*.[2] In another passage *to be cleansed* and *to obtain remission* are given as synonymous.[3] Wherefore even Socinus is compelled to confess,[4] when commenting upon the Revelation[5] where cleansing[6] is attributed to the blood, that it is more correct to understand liberation from punishment than the cleansing of the soul. With these connect that passage of Isaiah just quoted:[7] "The chastisement of our peace was upon him," that is, his punishment procures for us peace with God. Of which peace the angels spake.[8] Note also the following passage from Isaiah:[9] "By his stripes we are healed," that is, through his punishment is our exemption from punishment.

From these testimonies it is evident that exemption from the punishment of our sins is the end of the death of Christ, and the effect of that death.

Socinus, who is not willing to admit this connection of death with the remission of sins granted to us, brings forward other modes of connecting them. How wonderfully different are they from

[1] Jer. xxxiii. 8. ἐξαλειφθῆναι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, Acts iii. 19, in the same sense.

[2] 1 John i. 9.

[3] τὸ καθαρίζεσθαι and γίνεσθαι ἄφεσιν, Heb. ix. 22. [4] ii. 17.

[5] i. 5. [6] τὸ καθαρίζειν. [7] Isa. liii. 5.

[8] Luke ii. 14. [9] Isa. liii. 5.

the words and scope of the Scriptures! But I think all of them, scattered as they are over his whole book, may be reduced to these four heads.

I. That Christ, when he had preached that the remission of sins was attainable by the penitent, that he might furnish an attestation of that preaching, did not refuse death.[1]

But this sense makes the death of Christ the effect of remission, rather than remission the effect of death. The existence of a thing is the cause of the attestation, not *vice versa*. But the Scripture says that we obtain remission through blood,[2] and that blood cleanses our sins.[3] Also that the shedding of blood is something antecedent, without which there is no remission.[4]

Again, if this interpretation were correct, the martyrs also might be said to have shed their blood for the remission of sins, and we to obtain remission through their blood. The Scriptures, on the contrary, attribute this privilege to Christ alone.[k]

Again, the cause of Christ's execution, so far as men were concerned, was not peculiarly the preaching of repentance and the remission of sins, but that he had said that God was his Father, making himself equal with God,[5] and consequently professed that he was God.[6] Wherefore his death

[1] Socinus, i. 2. 3. [2] Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14. [3] 1 John i. 7.
[4] Heb. ix. 22. [5] John v. 18. [6] John x. 33.

furnished attestation particularly to this profession, not to the preaching of pardon.

Finally, attestation to doctrine was secured not less, but rather, even more, by the miracles of Christ than by his death. But this effect, that we have through them remission of sins, is never ascribed to miracles.[1]

II. The second thing which Socinus brings forward is that Christ obtained by his death the right of bestowing remission.[1]

305 a] But Socinus himself overthrows this position, when he shows[2] that Christ when on earth had and exercised this right. But what is mine cannot be made more mine. We must note, lest any one should think that this power of Christ had respect to penalties temporal only, and of the present life (a thing which Socinus hints, rather than affirms),[m] that when Christ is said to have had the right of remitting sins upon the earth, the effect is not restricted by that addition, *upon the earth*, but the place of the action is emphasized. For it is also said to the apostles:[3] "Whatsoever ye shall loose on earth." *To loose*, here, is *to declare loosed.* Yet the phrase *on earth* designates only the place of action; for the following words are: "shall be loosed in heaven." This, therefore, was the meaning of Christ — that though acting upon the earth, yet this so exalted and heavenly

[1] i. 6. [2] ii. 4. [3] Matt. xviii. 18.

right belonged to him. What excited the wonder of the apostles was that the right was given to men, that is (by enallage), to one of the number of men. So Christ himself remits the sins of the paralytic before he removes the paralysis, — the temporal punishment, — and, openly distinguishing the two rights, proves the one by the other, the invisible by the visible. Therefore, finally, Christ did not obtain by his death the right of remitting sins; and, accordingly, those passages which ascribe this effect to death are not to be applied to such a purpose. Moreover the Scripture explains the connection between death and remission by the word "propitiation," and by other similar words, which cannot be applied to the right of giving pardon.

III. The third is that in the death of Christ is proposed to us an example of patience and obedience.[1]

In reply: This example pertains to sanctification and to the eternal glory which follows it, in some way, but evidently not to the remission of sins. Christ by his obedience and patience obtained no pardon for himself, for he had no sin. When Christ, therefore, is set before us to be imitated, that all persevering in the way in which he trod may come to the same goal, nothing would be more foreign to the meaning than to refer to

[1] i. 4.

the remission of sins. The phrases of Scripture "blood cleanses us," "through his blood we have remission" set aside this explanation.

With the remaining explanation Socinus was best pleased, and often insists[1] upon it as the mainstay of his cause. It is this:

IV. That the death of Christ persuades us to exercise that which is requisite to obtaining remission of sins; viz. faith, or, as Socinus himself explains it, the hope of obtaining eternal life.[n]

But, indeed, what can be more widely removed from the truth, we ask, than that the death of a perfectly innocent man, so bloody, should of itself have power to persuade us that the greatest joys are prepared by God for those who live holily? Wherefore Socinus, seeing the absurdity of this invention, says that, to be sure, the death of Christ did not effect this, but the resurrection of Christ and those events which immediately followed his resurrection, but that death must necessarily precede.

But if the Scriptures had meant this, they would, when referring to the remission of sins, have constantly spoken of his rising, or rather his ascending, and his sitting at the right hand of God, not 305 b] of death and of blood, — at least, not so often and with such significant words. So frequent and so customary connection of blood with

[1] i. 5, and frequently.

remission indicates an effect not ordinary, but peculiar; not far remote, but near. For what are these circumlocutions of his? Remission of sins is granted only to those who live holily.[1] Faith and the sure hope of a reward makes for holiness of life. This faith is produced by the example of Christ, who was raised from the dead on account of the holiness of his life,[2] and glorified. This raising was preceded by death. Therefore rightly and fitly is remission said to be obtained through the death of Christ!

Is not this really that which he finds fault with in others:[3] "'Utinam ne in nemore Pelio'"—? For he brings in as a cause not something in close connection, or at least removed by only a moderate interval, but something very far removed from the effect. If this were done in one passage of Scripture, it would be much less remarkable. But that in so many places the Scriptures speak as obscurely, nay, as frigidly, as this, what sane man will believe? Very different is the saying of Paul: "Christ was raised from the dead for our justification."[4] To explain this there is no need of the long circuit of Socinus. The resurrection of Christ produces within us faith and confidence in God and Christ, to which faith is promised the forgiveness of sins. This is a series plainly shown in the

[1] So says Socinus, iii. 11.
[2] Socinus, ii. 2.
[3] iii. 8.
[4] Rom. iv. 25.

Scriptures.[1] But death is so far from producing faith, that, on the contrary, for the most part it deters men from that faith. So in preaching the gospel the apostles always set over against the ignominy of the cross and the misery of death, the resurrection. But if in speaking of death and the shedding of blood (which is commonly employed in this argument in the Scriptures, and which is not properly the cause of the resurrection, but only its antecedent) they meant the resurrection, it would be like speaking of night that men might understand day.°

Besides, if death pertained to the remission of sins only on account of the resurrection which followed, how could it happen that this remission should be referred only occasionally to the resurrection, but in innumerable places to death? Add that Paul ascribes the effect of obtaining redemption to death, and that, too, separately, that is, abstracted from the resurrection and glory of Christ. For he says:[2] "If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more being reconciled we shall be saved by his life." He contrasts death with a glorious life, and as to the former reconciliation, so to the latter preservation, is distinctly ascribed. Reconciliation is obtained for enemies through death as a sacerdotal act; the reconciled are

[1] Acts xiii. 33, 38; Rom. i. 4; x. 9. [2] Rom. v. 10.

guarded by the kingly power[1] to which the resurrection was the path. So also the apostle has elsewhere placed reconciliation before that preaching which produces faith.[2] "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them, and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation. Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." Here a twofold reconciliation is spoken of; the former announced by [306 a preaching, the latter caused by the preaching; the former is of impetration, the latter of application; the former previous to the preaching, the latter subsequent to the preaching. We are speaking of the former, and rightly do we deny that it can be referred to the production of faith, which is brought about by preaching.

Again, that which is believed unto salvation cannot in itself[3] be an argument by which we are led to saving faith. For it is necessary that an argument should be different from the thing to which you wish to persuade. But this very thing, that Christ died for our sins, is put by Paul[4] as the substance of the gospel which is believed, and by which we obtain salvation. See also the passage of John[4] where Christ is said "to have been

[1] [*Lat.* Regia virtute].
[2] 2 Cor. v. 19, 20.
[3] [*Lat.* nudum argumentum].
[4] 1 Cor. xv. 1–3.
[5] John iii. 16.

given," that is, to death, "that whosoever believeth should not perish." Its power is exerted in producing something else than belief.

If one will carefully observe, the same is not obscurely taught in the very passage of Paul which Socinus cites for the sake of strengthening his own opinion; viz. that of which we have already spoken:[1] "Who was delivered (viz. to death) for our offences, and raised again for our justification" (or on account of justification already obtained). Since sins are an evil, but justification a good,[2] it appears that the word *for* is not to be taken alike in both members. In the latter, the final cause is appropriately introduced; and that in the former the impulsive cause is meant we have, unless I am deceived, clearly shown; just as if I should say that a medicine was taken for disease and for health.

Justification, therefore, is designed as the result of the resurrection, that is, through the production of faith, as Socinus confesses. Although, for my own part, I do not know whether the resurrection is considered as an argument to persuade to faith, or whether it rather designates the whole glorious state of Christ, which has this end in view, among others, that the preachers of the gospel should be sent forth and their work promoted by the very plentiful influence of the Spirit, and, faith being

[1] Rom. iv. 25. [2] Rom. vii. 7.

produced in this manner, men should obtain the pardon of their sins. For Christ himself says:[1] "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations. And lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." Previously to this, as John says,[2] "the Holy Ghost was not given," that is, with such power and fulness. The cause is subjoined: "Because that Jesus was not yet glorified." Paul also says of Christ:[3] "When he ascended up on high he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men. And he gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers for the perfecting of the saints." But in whichever way you take it, it appears that some peculiar end is ascribed to the resurrection when it is distinguished from death. On the contrary, what he obtained for sins is ascribed separately to death, or to delivery to death. But it is nowhere ascribed to resurrection, and in this passage is plainly separated from the same.

Therefore, in this matter, the death of Christ must be separated both from the resurrection and from the production of faith. In those passages which derive the remission of sins from the death of Christ a certain distinct effect must be understood, which is indicated by the simplicity of the words, agreeing, as they do, with other words of

[1] Matt. xxviii. 18–20. [2] John vii. 39. [3] Eph. iv. 8–12.

Scripture which declare that Christ died a bloody death for our sins, and that the punishment of our **306 b**] crimes was exacted of him. Of these things we have already treated, and, in connection with them, of those which declare not obscurely that God is appeased and reconciled to us by the blood of Christ, that his blood was given for us as a price, that Christ died in our stead, and was our expiation; of which we shall take the opportunity of treating below.

CHAPTER II.

HOW GOD SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THIS MATTER: AND IT IS SHOWN THAT HE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A RULER.

THE state of the controversy being known, and that doctrine upon which the faith of the church rests being established from the Scriptures, we need, in the first place, in order to dispel the objections which his reason, or, to speak more properly, his abuse of reason, has dictated to Socinus, to understand what part, or what office, God occupies in the matter of which we treat.

Socinus confesses that we are treating of liberation from punishment. We add that we also are speaking of the infliction of punishment. From this it follows that in all this subject God must be treated as a Ruler. For to inflict punishment, or to liberate any one from punishment whom you can punish (which the Scripture calls justifying), is only the prerogative of the ruler as such, primarily and *per se;* as, for example, of a father in a family, of a king in a state, of God in the universe.[a] Although this is manifest to all, yet it can

easily be proved from the consideration that punishment is the last thing in compulsion. But compulsion is competent only to the superior.[1] Accordingly Seneca has defined clemency as the lenity of a superior towards an inferior in appointing punishment. It is no objection that the vindication of one's right seems sometimes to be committed to private persons, and those possessed of no superior power. For this vindication is either a matter of fact, not of right, and is opposed to natural equity itself, or it signifies a right not pertaining to its possessor primarily and *per se*, but by the concession of another. Thus a father slays the ravisher of his daughter, or any one an outlaw. Or, finally, it does not signify the act itself of punishing, but only the demand for the infliction of punishment by God, or by some other ruler. To these methods of punishment correspond as many methods of remission or forgiveness, which both Scripture and common speech often attribute to private persons.

But our assertion needs the less proof, because Socinus himself somewhere[2] confesses that God in punishing and acquitting men must be regarded as a prince, than which no remark could be more true. James had the same thing in mind when he said:[3] "There is one Lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy."

[1] τῇ ὑπερεχούσῃ ἐξουσίᾳ. [2] iii. 1. [3] James iv. 12.

We have, therefore, the true relation of God in this matter, and having found it, it is easy to set aside all others. First, therefore, we concede to the demand of Socinus that God is not here to be looked at as a judge placed under the law. Such a judge as that could not liberate the guilty from punishment, even by transferring the punishment to another. Not that this is unjust in itself, but it is not congruous with the law of which he is chosen a minister. This is expressed by Lactantius in the following words:[1] "A judge cannot pardon sins, because he is the servant of another's will; but God can, because he is himself the arbitrator and judge of his own law, and when he established it, undoubtedly he did not take away all power from himself, but has the power of forgiving." Rightly says Seneca: "Clem- [307 a
ency has free-will. It judges not by rule, but in accordance with the just and good." For equity is the action of a judge who is bound to a form of law; but clemency cannot be properly so called, unless it is the action of the highest ruler in any community. The same Seneca bids a prince to think of this: "Every one can kill against the law: none can save but myself." Augustine recognized this distinction: "It is unlawful for judges to revoke a sentence pronounced upon the guilty. Shall the emperor himself be under this law? No; for

[1] De ira Dei, chap. 19.

he alone has the power to revoke the sentence, free the man under sentence of death, and himself pardon him." And Symmachus: "The condition of magistrates, whose sentences seem to be corrupt, if they are milder than the law, is one thing; another thing the power of the divine princes, in whom it is becoming to turn aside the harshness of a severe law." It was with reference to this, also, that Cicero said, in behalf of Ligarius, to Caesar: "'I did not do it, I never thought of it.' So one is accustomed to speak to a judge. But I speak to a parent; I have erred, I have done rashly, I repent; I fly to your clemency, I seek pardon for my fault, I beg you to forgive me." Quintilian; "Plea for pardon is rare, and before those judges only who are bound by no certain rule of sentencing."

But Socinus, although in the place above quoted he looked upon God as the highest Ruler, yet frequently in all this act he ascribes to him a far different relation, viz. that of an offended party. But he supposes every offended party to be a creditor of the punishment, and in this to have the same right as other creditors in things due to them, which right Socinus even calls by the name *ownership*. And therefore he repeats very frequently that God must be regarded as an offended party, as a creditor, as a lord, putting these three as if they amounted to the same thing. Since this error

is diffused very widely through his whole treatise, and may almost be said in this matter to be his fundamental error,[1] it ought to be carefully refuted.[b]

I. To do this, the first assertion may be that to punish is not an act properly belonging to the offended party as such.[c] This is proved, because otherwise to every offended party would belong *per se* the right of punishing. This is seen not to be so, from our proof that punishing is the act of the superior power;[2] also from the confession of Socinus when he says that God must be looked at, in this matter, as a prince. From the latter a strong argument is derived. If God punishes and remits punishment as a prince, he does not do it as the offended party. For the same cannot be referred to two diverse things, as such.

Meanwhile, we do not deny that God, who punishes sins or lets them go unpunished, may rightly be called the offended party. But we do deny that to punish or let go unpunished is attributed to him as the offended party. For it is well known that a thing may be said of a man which is not appropriate to him as such. Thus the lawyer sings, not as a lawyer, but as a musician. Lactantius has noted this correctly: "We rise to punishment not because we are injured, but that order may be preserved, manners corrected, license

[1] τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος.

[2] τῆς ὑπεροχῆς.

repressed. This is just wrath, which, as it is necessary in men, certainly is so in God, from whom example has come to men." It is a received maxim that no one is a fit judge in his own cause. But this is a maxim not of natural, but of positive law, and so is not universal. For plainly it is not true of chief rulers, under which name I comprehend also parents, as far as the care of their families is concerned. The lawyers remark[1] **307 b**] that emperors judge in their own cause. The same may occur in cases of crime, as in judgment for high treason, and in wars which because of an injury done to the king are declared by the king.[2] Princes, therefore, when injured, yet not as injured, punish crimes or let them go unpunished. For if they did it as injured, others also when injured would have the same right, who yet are neither able to punish him who injures them nor free him from punishment.

Again, if to punish or dismiss without punishment belonged to princes as injured, they would have no right to punish crimes in which they were not injured. But this is contrary to reason and experience. It may be supposed that criminals are punished by the prince because they injure the state, of which he is the head. But we see that even subjects who have committed grave crimes

[1] On L. *Et hoc Tiberius.* D. de haered. instit.

[2] A notable example, 2 Sam. x.

beyond their domains, and against a foreigner, are rightly and laudably punished. From this it appears that the right of inflicting punishment does not belong to the injured party as injured, since it is neither immediately conferred when the injury is done nor removed when the injury is removed. On the contrary, this right belongs to the ruler as ruler. As soon as you establish supreme power,[1] you establish the right of punishing. Take away the one, and you take away the other.

Whatever is said of the right of punishing must necessarily be understood of the right of forgiving. These things are connected with each other by a natural bond. Socinus has apparently made the mistake of supposing that sometimes in the sacred writings, and among other places in the Lord's prayer, the example of God in forgiving sins is set before us, that we also, when injured by others, may forgive their sins. But he should reflect that examples are drawn not only from things which are the same in the proximate genus, but also from those which have some likeness, especially when the same name is put, on account of this likeness, upon things similar, although different in proximate genus. Thus Christ forbids us to judge, that is, without mercy, lest we be ourselves judged.[2] He adds: "With what measure ye mete it shall be measured to you again." In this passage the first

[1] ὑπεροχήν.

[2] Matt. vii. 1, 2.

judging is not entirely different from the second. The first is the judgment of liberty; the second, of power. In the same way, it is one thing in God and other rulers to remit sins, but a far different thing in private persons when injured by others. The opposite of the one is punishing, but of the other, demanding punishment, or desiring it, or making complaint.[1] Intrinsically they are different, but extrinsically they are somewhat alike. The cause impelling to either is benevolence.[2] The effect, too, is that he who has sinned is relieved of some disadvantage, either his very burden, or, at least, so far as is in the power of the remitting party. This agreement is enough, by its own force, to constitute an example.

II. The second assertion may be this: In the nature of things, the offended party, as such, has no right in punishment. This is an advance upon the first proposition. There we denied that the act of punishing belonged to the offended party. Here we deny that he has any right not merely to perform the act, but even to oblige another to perform it. That is, the offended party is not really a creditor in the punishment. Yet Socinus holds this opinion, and often repeats it as a thing perfectly well established.

308 a] I do not mean here by creditor, in the strict signification of the word according to its

[1] Col. iii. 13.

[2] φιλανθρωπία.

derivation, him who has reposed faith in another; but more generally, according to the definition of law, creditors are those to whom, from any cause whatever, something is due.

Let us now prove our proposition. It is well known that right is twofold, natural or positive. Every debt must therefore arise from one or the other of these sources. Natural right consists in the making of things equal to each other. Such, therefore, is also natural debt. Positive right is that which springs from the free act of the will. This is twofold, contract and law. Contract is the product of that power which any one has over himself and his own things. Law is the product of that power which he has over another and another's things. Of positive debt we are not now treating. Thus we add the word "naturally," the reason for which we shall explain below. By nature nothing else is due me from your act, and nothing else can be *due*, than equality according to fact, that is, that as much as is lacking to me on your account, so much should be returned. In one word, natural debt may be called indemnity or restitution. Hence Aristotle rightly defines creditor:[1] "He who has the less." This takes place both in voluntary acceptances and in involuntary, as Aristotle also notes.[2] As you are bound to return a loan or deposit, so also a thing taken

[1] τὸν ἔλαττον ἔχοντα.

[2] ἑκούσια, ἀκούσια.

by theft. So far, in the natural sense, we may be made creditors by crime. This is not merely true in those crimes where the receiving of a material thing occurs, but also in other injuries done to one. He who has wounded another owes him for both the consequent pay of the physician, and the expenses incurred in the cure, and the loss of labor.[1]

Some have wondered that Aristotle placed homicide also among contracts,[2] among which is numbered the right of correcting and amending.[3] But Eustathius has well observed that this is done for the same reason that some compensation is ordinarily given to the wife, children, or relatives of a murdered man.[4] So he who injures the fair fame of another by a lie, ought by a profession of the truth to restore that which has been taken from his credit.

From all these considerations it appears that that which is due for crimes in a natural sense differs from punishment. The cause of that natural debt is, first and *per se*, not the viciosity of the act, but that I lack something. Even when it is lacking without fault, as in case of a deposit, none the less is restitution due me. But the cause of punishment is the viciosity of the act, not that

[1] L. ult. D. de his qui effuder.

[2] *συναλλάγματα.*

[3] *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον* [Lat. editor as above].

[4] On which vid. L. iv. § 1, ad L. Corn.

anything is lacking to me. Even if nothing is lacking to any one, an act may rightly be punished, as in grave crimes which are only begun and not consummated.

There is also another distinction, not less important, that the very nature of the thing determines the method and amount of restitution. Although punishment has a natural cause in its own class, yet in a certain way, as we shall show below, it cannot be determined except by a free act of the will. And further, before condemnation, punishment, so far as it consists in receiving or inflicting, is not due in the ordinary sense; but restitution is due in every sense. The debt of restitution descends to the heir; but punishment does not descend.

I have thought fit to refer to these things only for this purpose, that no one may rashly confound with punishment that which is properly owing to the injured party. Meantime it is true that by positive law, and by contract as well, some claim to punishment might be given to the cred- [308 b
itor. But in that case the laws clearly distinguish it from the pursuit of a thing or of a loss.[1] This is frequently the case in pecuniary punishments, which, of course, bring not only loss to him who has done the injury, but also profit to the injured.

[1] L. *Si pignore*, § *cum furti*. D. de furtis. Instit. de lege Aquilia. § *his autem verbis*.

But in corporal punishments, in which there is no true profit to the injured party, it is not commonly done. So we see kings and other supreme rulers remitting punishment to the guilty, even when the injured party is unwilling, restitution alone being enjoined upon them. No one thinks this unjust. But it would be unjust if punishment were due to the injured, especially when no necessity of the state demanded remission.[1] Wherefore the fact that inferior magistrates are unable to remit corporal punishments does not arise from any right of the injured party in the punishment (for when the injured one consents they are no more able than before), but from the fact that the law of the supreme ruler has not conceded to them that power, but, on the contrary, has expressly refused it. We must have a similar understanding with respect to kings when compared with God, in case of those crimes which the divine law commands them always to punish.

This argument goes to show that God, also, when injured by us, is not properly a creditor in punishment. He who affirms it relies on that right which arises from the circumstances of the case, or upon constituted right. We have sufficiently shown, as I think, that the injured party is not a creditor in punishment by that right which arises from the circumstances of the case. But it

[1] L. 2. C. de in jus vocando.

is not alleged that there is a constituted right by which, not punishment, but such a debt of punishment, has been introduced, and, if it were alleged, it could not be proved. No reason can be given why it should be constituted.

Perhaps some one may make the objection that that God in remitting the punishment of sins is sometimes compared with a creditor yielding his own right.[1] But, as we have shown above, comparison does not demand that the things agree in proximate genus, but is contented with any similitude whatever. Christ washing the disciples' feet gave them an example that they should do as he had done, that is, serve one another. But the resemblance between God remitting sins and a creditor yielding his own right is closer than that between God remitting sins and an injured person forgiving offences, of which resemblance we have just now treated. The act of God and of the creditor agree not only in the moving cause, which is benevolence, and the effect, which is liberation from misery or harm, but still more in this: that in both some right precedes; in God the right of punishment, in the creditor of demanding payment. In both cases the result is the dissolution of a certain obligation before existing, although in the obligation, as also in the dissolution, there is something dissimilar, which, since this example

[1] Matt. xviii. 35.

does not properly pertain to that to which it is applied, cannot vitiate the comparison.

III. Let the third assertion be this: That the right of punishing in the ruler is neither the right of absolute ownership, nor the right over a thing loaned.

This is proved, in the first place, from the final cause, which ordinarily best distinguishes the powers. The right of absolute ownership, as well as the right over the thing loaned, is secured for the sake of him who has that right; but the right of punishing does not exist for the sake of him who punishes, but for the sake of the community. **309 a**] For all punishment has as its object the common good, viz. the preservation of order, and giving an example; so that desirable punishment has no justification except this cause, while the right of property and debt are desirable in themselves. In this sense God himself says that he is not delighted with the punishment of those who are punished.

Again, it is never repugnant to justice to waive the right of ownership, or the right over the thing loaned. It is the nature of proprietorship that one may use it or not use it. But to let certain sins go unpunished (as, for example, of those who do not repent), would be unjust in a ruler, even in God, as Socinus confesses.[1] The right of punish-

[1] i. 1.

ing is therefore not the same with the right over one's property or a loan.

Moreovér, no one is said to be just, and no one is praised for his justice, because he employs his right of property, or exacts a debt. But any and every ruler, and God himself, is called just, and is praised for his justice, because he does not remit punishment, but severely exacts it. "Thou art righteous, O Lord, because thou hast judged thus."[1] This has been proved often above.

Again, diversity of virtues arises from diversity of objects. The virtue by which we waive our right of property, or right of creditor, is called liberality, not clemency. But that by which impunity is secured is called, not liberality, but clemency.

Perhaps some one may ask, since punishment is said to be due, who is the creditor? It seems scarcely possible to use the term debtor where there is no creditor.

It should be observed that the words "to owe" do not always denote a relation between two persons. Frequently, that I *ought* to do this is no more than that it is *proper* that I should do it, without respect to another person. So "I owe punishment" is the same as "I am deserving of punishment," and "to suffer it I am held absolutely, but not relatively, to this one or that one."

[1] Rev. xvi. 5.

The same is true in any state and under any ruler, when any man suffers the penalty of his crime, for he will be discharged equally among all. This would not proceed thus if of punishment, as of other things, there were a certain creditor; for then payment made to him alone, but not to others, except at his direction, would liberate the debtor.

The same contrast appears in case of rewards. It is right to say that a reward is due to a man, but the particular person who owes it (apart from positive law) does not appear. If one says that a certain state owes a reward because it has received a benefit, he makes no distinction between reward and a favor. Experience shows that rulers honor with rewards those who have not profited their own state particularly, but the human race, as discoverers of facts to the common advantage. Yea, even when success has not crowned plans well devised, and when, consequently, advantage has resulted to no one, we see rewards conferred. Here, therefore, there is no relation between definite persons, as in that kind of debt which arises from contracts.

Yet if any one must have in punishment something which shall be an analogue to the creditor, not inaptly, perhaps, may it be said that the order of things and the public good perform the office of creditor, the dispensation of which order and good

has been committed to the ruler. For this is apparently the signification of that trite maxim: It is for the public advantage that crimes be punished.[1] And hence it comes to pass that while in other causes a judge gives a hearing to two parties, in criminal causes the defendant appears, but frequently no plaintiff; for order, or the public good, is, as it were, in the place of the plaintiff. Scripture seems also to intimate this when it says that sin cries out against the sinner. In actions for punishment the prosecutor is either any [309 b one who chooses to take that position (as in those places where accusations are open to all promiscuously), or some one appointed by the law to this office. This is the case in those places which have accusers publicly appointed. Either example is a complete proof that in the nature of things there is here no definite adversary, and, as it were, demander of punishment.

There is another question as to the force of the word when the ruler is said to let pass,[2] or remit[3] sins, or, the same thing, punishment. Deceived by this word, many think that some property or debt precedes here; in which they are greatly mistaken.

The Greek word *ἀφιέναι* properly signifies *to remove from one's self;*[4] whence metaphorically it

[1] [*Lat.* Delecta puniri publice interest]. [2] *ἀφιέναι.*
[3] *χαρίζεσθαι.* [4] So used in Matt. iv. 20, et passim.

means *to desert*, *to dismiss*, *to permit*, but most frequently, *to pay no attention to*, as the Latins say, by a similar figure of speech, *missum aliquid facere;* and accordingly the Greek scholiasts frequently explain ἀφιέναι by ἀμελεῖν, *to neglect.*[1] Ἁμαρτήματα ἀφιέναι is *to remit sins.* Elsewhere, carrying this figure out further, the Scripture speaks of casting sins into the sea.[2] The Latin poets, also, when they mean that things are put out of our care, say that they are delivered to the winds to be thrown into the sea. Wherefore, as *to remit* and *to retain* anything are opposites, so ἀφιέναι τὰς ἁμαρτίας and κρατεῖν are opposed to one another.[3] *To remit* sins, *to blot out* sins, and *to cover* them is the same as is expressed more plainly elsewhere, *not to remember* them.[4] *Not to remember*, like the Latin *ignoscere*, signifies to be unwilling to punish. Wherefore, as in the expressions, *not to remember*, *to cover*, *to blot out*, *to be unwilling to retain*, neither the right of property or of debt is meant, so also are they not in the word ἀφιέναι. But because the word which signifies *to remit* is general, it may be with equal propriety applied to those things which we have by ownership, and to names, and to other things.

So also the word χαρίζεσθαι pertains to every

[1] The word is used in this sense in Matt. xv. 14; xviii. 12; xxiii. 23; Mark vii. 8.

[2] Mic. vii. 19. [3] John xx. 23. [4] Jer. xxxi. 34.

kind of favor. Christ *bestowed* sight upon the blind.[1] "To you it is *given*[2] to suffer for Christ's sake."[3] The judge, also, who, out of favor to any one, releases or condemns a man, is said to *grant*[4] him to the other.[5] These things unite in declaring that by this word neither property nor debt is necessarily signified.

About the Latin words[6] which are ordinarily employed in this argument it is less necessary that we should be solicitous, since they are not found in the sacred writings. Yet for these, also, it is easy to give a reason. The same befalls these as many other words; yea, almost all other words, that they are extended from one signification to another similar one. *Dono*, *to give*, properly, is to make freely another man's that which is one's own by ownership. Punishment is therefore not properly *given;* for that which is given exists before, and remains afterwards; but punishment does not exist before it is given, and by giving it is made to pass out of existence. The similitude is in this: that as the giver has a right in the thing, so the ruler in the punishment; yet not the same right, or equally free. The right of property, as we have said before, is for the sake of the owner. The right of punishment is for the common [310 a

[1] τὸ βλέπειν ἐχαρίσατο, Luke vii. 21.
[2] ἐχαρίσθη.
[3] Phil. i. 29.
[4] χαρίσασθαι.
[5] Acts iii. 14; xxv. 11, 16.
[6] Dono, condono, remitto.

good, the dispensation of which, as of other common things, belongs to the ruler. A second point of agreement is, that in a gift the right of the giver, and in granting forgiveness the right of punishing, which had belonged to the ruler, are both taken away. A third, that the act of giving and the act of granting forgiveness both arise from the same fountain of benevolence, and are of advantage to another.

Nor here only, but also in other places, the word denoting *to give* is frequently transferred to those things in which the right of property has no place. Thus a man is said to be presented[1] by the magistrate with citizenship, immunity, honor, reward. Thus Seneca says, *to give*[2] *delay*, for *to take away delay*[3] *for another's sake*. So we are said *to give* our time to others. But *to remit* is, in its primary signification, like the Greek ἀφιέναι, *to remove from one's self*. So a tree *puts off*[4] its bark; a horseman *lets go* the bridle. So attention is *relaxed*,[5] and, metaphorically, watch, discipline, spirit. Often *to be relaxed* and *to be taut*[6] are opposites. Hence a debt is said to be remitted when there is no account made of it. So also punishment. This word is not applied to punishment on account of debt, nor to debt on account of punishment, but to each on account of something in which they agree.

[1] [donor.] [2] [dono.] [3] [aufero.] [4] [remitto.]
[5] [aures remittuntur.] [6] [intendor.]

We may add that in a certain way punishment may be said to be owing to a man; not properly, because no one is here truly a creditor, but because of a certain similarity. For as a creditor has the right of exacting that which is due to him, so the ruler has the right of punishing and the accuser of demanding punishment. Again, by a bold figure, we are sometimes said to owe punishment either to a ruler, as God, or to an accuser, as the devil. Yet if punishment is not inflicted on the man no injury is done to the devil. On the other hand, it is not consistent with the justice of God that he should remit all punishment forever. Of these considerations neither can have place in true creditors.

CHAPTER III.

OF WHAT SORT THE ACTION OF GOD IN THE MATTER WAS, AND IT IS SHOWN TO BE A RELAXATION OR DISPENSATION OF THE LAW.

HAVING examined the part which God performs in this matter, we shall easily find a name for the act itself. And, first, since God, as we have proved, is to be considered here as a ruler, it follows that his act is an act of the administration of justice, generally so called. From this it follows that we are not treating here of acceptilation,[a] as Socinus thinks, for that is not an act of the administration of justice. To designate the class of this act more particularly it may be considered either in relation to the divine sanction (or, as more recent jurists say, the penal law), or without regard to that relation. We add this specification because, even if the law had made no reference to punishment, yet, in the nature of things, man's act, either as having an intrinsic depravity from the immutable nature of the case, or also an extrinsic depravity on account of the contrary precept of God, deserved, on that very account, some punishment, and that, too,

a grave one. That is, it was equitable to punish man as a sinner. If we take our stand here, the act of God of which we treat will be the punishment of one to obtain the impunity of another. Of the justice of this we shall soon treat. But if further we have regard to the sanction, or penal law, the act will be a method of relaxing or moderating the same law, which relaxation we call, in these days, dispensation. It may be de- [310 b
fined: The act of a superior by which the obligation of an unabrogated law upon certain persons or things is removed. This is the sanction: the man that eateth of the forbidden tree shall surely die.[1] In this passage by one species of sin every class of sin is indicated, as is expressed by the same law more clearly brought out, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all the precepts of the law."[2] By the words *death* and *curse*, in these passages, we understand especially eternal death. For this reason it is as if the law had been expressed in this manner: Every man that sinneth shall bear the punishment of eternal death.

There is, therefore, here no *execution* of that law; for if God always executed the law no sinner could be saved from the penalty of eternal death. But now we know that for believers there is no condemnation,[3] because they are liberated from death[4] and redeemed from the curse.[5]

[1] Gen. ii. 17. [2] Deut. xxvii. 26; Gal. iii. 10.
[3] κατάκριμα. [4] Rom. viii. 1, 2. [5] Gal. iii. 13.

Again, this act is not an *abrogation* of the law; for abrogated law has no binding force. But unbelievers are still exposed to the penalty of the same law. Thus we find written that the wrath of God abideth upon them that believe not,[1] and that the wrath of God is come upon them to the uttermost.[2]

Again, it is not an *interpretation of the law according to equity;* for that interpretation shows that some person or act never was comprehended under the obligation of the law. Works of religion and mercy, for example, were never comprehended under the interdiction of working upon the Sabbath.[3] But indeed all men (assuredly concluded under sin),[4] even those who are liberated, are, by nature or by act, children of wrath,[5] that is, bound by the sanction of the law. It is therefore not declared that there is no obligation; but this is done that what was may be removed; that is, that a relaxation or dispensation of the law may be made.

It may be asked here whether the penal law is relaxable? There are certain irrelaxable laws, either absolutely or by hypothesis.[6] Those are absolutely irrelaxable whose opposite involves, from the nature of the case, immutable wickedness;

[1] ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀπειθοῦντας, John iii. 36.
[2] 1 Thess. ii. 16.
[3] Matt. xii. 5, 7.
[4] Rom. xi. 32; Gal. iii. 22.
[5] Eph. ii. 3.
[6] ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.

as, for example, the law which forbids perjury, or bearing false witness against one's neighbor. For, as we say that God cannot lie,[1] or deny himself,[2] so, no less rightly, do we say that God cannot perform actions in themselves wicked, or approve them, or grant the right to do them.

Those laws are irrelaxable of hypothesis which arise from a definite decree;[3] such as the law of condemning those who will not believe in Jesus Christ.[4]

But all positive laws are absolutely relaxable; and we are not compelled to resort to hypothetical necessity, of a definite decree, where no mark of such decree exists.

It is a great error to be afraid, as some are, lest in making such a concession we do injury to God, as if we made him mutable. The law is not something internal within God, or the will of [311 a
God itself, but only an effect of that will.[b] It is perfectly certain that the effects of the divine will are mutable. By promulgating a positive law which at some time he may wish to relax God does not signify that he wills anything but what he really does will. God shows that he seriously wills that the law should be valid and obligatory,

[1] Heb. vi. 18. [2] 2 Tim. ii. 13.

[3] *τῆς βουλῆς ἀμετάθετον* or *ἀμετανόητον*, in the Scriptures. [Cf. Rom. xi. 29, *ἀμεταμέλητα*].

[4] Heb. iii. 18.

yet with the reserved right of relaxing it. This inheres in positive law, of its own nature, nor by any sign can it be understood to have been abdicated by God. More than that, God does not deprive himself of the right even of abrogating the law, as appears from the example of the ceremonial law. To be sure it is a different thing, if with the positive law be connected an oath, or a promise;[1] for an oath is a sign of the immutability of that with which it is joined.[2] Moreover, a promise gives a right to the party which cannot be taken away from it without injury. Wherefore, although it is optional to promise, yet to break promises is not optional. This is one of the cases, therefore, in which is involved immutable wickedness. God cannot break his promises, who is called faithful especially because he keeps them.[3]

Let us therefore inquire whether there is anything in the said penal law when promulgated which plainly repudiates relaxation.

First, it may be objected that it is just, in the nature of things, that the wicked should themselves be punished with such a punishment as shall correspond to their crime, and that this is, consequently, not subject to free-will, and so not relaxable.

[1] Each of these is mentioned in Heb. vi. 18.

[2] Ps. xcv. 11; cx. 4; Heb. iii. 11, 18; vi. 17; vii. 21.

[3] 1 Thess. v. 24.

To answer this objection we must know that injustice does not result from every negation of justice, even under the same circumstances. For as it does not follow that if a king ought to be called liberal because he has given a thousand talents to a certain man, he would therefore be illiberal if he should not do so, so it is not a general rule that what may be done justly cannot be omitted without injustice. Anything may be called natural in morals as well as in physics, properly or less properly. That is properly natural in physics which necessarily coheres in the essence of anything, as feeling in a living object; but less properly that which is convenient to the nature of anything, and, as it were, accommodated to it, as for a man to use his right arm. So in morals there are certain things properly natural which necessarily follow from the relation of things to rational natures, as that perjury is unlawful; and certain things improperly natural, as that a son should succeed a father. According to this, that he who has committed a crime, deserves punishment, and is on that account liable to punishment, necessarily follows, from the very relation of sin and the sinner to the superior, and is properly natural. But that all sinners should be punished with a punishment corresponding to the crime is not simply and universally necessary, nor properly natural, but only harmonious with nature. Hence it

follows that nothing prevents the law which demands this from being relaxable.

The mark of definite decree, or of irrevocability, does not appear in the law of which we are treating. Neither is the law a promise. Therefore nothing prevents the relaxation of these things. For we should not admit that a threat is equivalent to a promise. For from a promise a certain right is gained by him to whom the promise is made; but by a threat there is merely a more open declaration made of the desert of punishment in the sinner and the right of punishing in the threatener. Nor should we fear lest the veracity of God is impaired in any respect if he does not **311 b**] fulfil all his threats. For all threats which have not the sign of irrevocability must be understood, from their own nature, to diminish in no degree the right of the threatener to relax, as has been explained above. The example of the divine clemency towards the Ninevites proves this.

We must not omit here to show that the ancient philosophers judged by the light of nature that there was nothing more relaxable than a penal law. Aristotle says that the just man[1] is inclined to forgive.[2] Sopater, in his Epistle to Demetrius, says: "The right which is called equity, modifying the stern voice of the law, seems to me to be an irreprehensible class of genuine and liberal

[1] τὸν ἐπιεικῆ. [2] συγγνωμονικόν.

favors. That part of justice which reduces contracts to equity, entirely rejects every kind of favors. But that part which is engaged upon crimes does not disdain the mild and humane countenance of grace."[1]

From what has already been said it appears that the positive and penal law of God was dispensable. But this does not prove that there were no reasons which (to stammer, as man must) might oppose their relaxation. These may be sought either in the nature of universal laws, or in the peculiar matter of the law. It is common to all laws that in relaxing, the authority of the law seems to be diminished in some respects. It is peculiar to this law that, although, as we have said, it is not of inflexible rectitude, yet it is entirely in harmony with the nature and order of things. Hence it follows, not that the law could not be relaxed at all, but that it could not be relaxed easily, or upon slight cause. And this has been followed by that sole all-wise Lawgiver.[2] For he had a most weighty reason, when the whole human race had fallen into sin, for relaxing the law. If all sinners had been delivered over to eternal death,

[1] Τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον τὴν αὐστηρὰν τῶν νόμων φωνὴν παραμυθούμενον ἀμεμφὴς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ χαρίτων ἀληθινῶν καὶ ἐλευθέρων πρόφασις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα τῆς δίκης ἐπανορθωτικὸν ἐκφεύγει παντελῶς τὸ τῶν χαρίτων γένος· τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐγκλήμασι οὐκ ἀναίνεται τὸ πρᾷον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον τῶν χαρίτων πρόσωπον.

[2] πάνσοφος νομοθέτης.

from the nature of the case, two most beautiful things would have entirely perished: on the part of men religion toward God, and on the part of God the declaration of especial favor toward men. God has not only followed reasons, and those most weighty, in relaxing the law, but he has also made use of a singular method of relaxation. For speaking of this a more suitable place will be found below.

CHAPTER IV.

WHETHER IT WAS UNJUST THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR OUR SINS; AND IT IS SHOWN THAT IT WAS NOT.

THE arguments with which Socinus attempts to overthrow this doctrine are very poorly arranged by him. It seems best, therefore, for us to arrange them in the following classes: first, that what we defend, if done, was unjust; secondly, that there was no reason for doing it; thirdly, that what we assert was not done by God.

If the transaction was unjust, it is useless to look for its cause, since there can be no rational cause for that which is unjust; useless, [312 a also, to dispute whether it was done, as no injustice can be done by God. Again, the examination of the cause, since it naturally precedes the question of fact, must be treated before it.

To begin, therefore, with the question of justice or injustice, we must first make a distinction between the two following inquiries: whether it were just that Christ should be punished on account of our sins; and whether this could effect anything

in obtaining pardon for us. The latter must be referred to the second class, which discusses the cause of the deed, but does not properly belong to the first. For even if there had been no such cause for punishment, it would not follow that injustice was involved in the punishment itself. But it would seem that there might be injustice either in the matter, that is, in the very severe sufferings and death, when compared with the innocency of him who suffered these things, or in the form, that is, in the punishment when compared with the sins of others, as a meritorious cause. We shall therefore show that there is no injustice in either of these.

First, therefore, Socinus confesses[1] that it was not unjust that Christ, though perfectly innocent, should suffer from God the severest tortures, and death itself; so that no aid to his cause can come from this quarter. The simple occurrence manifestly proves the same thing. For sacred history shows that Christ suffered the severest things, and also died. Scripture says, no less clearly, that this was done by God. But we cannot say, without insult to the divine majesty, that God can act unjustly.

Passing, therefore, to the second part, I affirm[2] that it is not unjust simply, or contrary to the nature of punishment, that one should be punished

[1] iii. 9, 10. [2] Contra Soc., iii. 3.

for another's sins. When I say *unjust* it is manifest that I speak of that injustice which springs from the nature of things, not that which is founded upon positive law; so that the divine liberty cannot be abridged by it. In proof of this remark:[1] "God visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children." "Our fathers have sinned, and we have borne their iniquities."[2] For the act of Ham, Canaan is subjected to a curse.[3] For the act of Saul, his sons and grandsons are hung with the approval of God.[4] For the act of David, seventy thousand perish, and David exclaims, "Lo, I have sinned, and I have done wickedly; but these sheep, what have they done?"[5] So for the act of Achan his sons were punished,[6] and for the act of Jeroboam his posterity.[7] These passages manifestly show that some are punished by God for others' sins.[8]

Socinus brings up in opposition that passage of Ezekiel,[9] where we read, "The soul that sinneth it shall die, and the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son." By these words, we

[1] Ex. xx. 5; xxxiv. 7. [2] Lam. v. 7. [3] Gen. ix. 25.
[4] 2 Sam. xxi. 8, 14. [5] 2 Sam. xxiv. 15,17.
[6] Josh. vii. 24. [7] 1 Kings xiv. 10.
[8] See at your leisure Chrysostom, Hom. 9, upon Gen. iv., and Tertullian against Marcion. [9] xviii. 20.

reply, God teaches not what he must do of necessity, but what he has freely decreed to do. It no more follows from this that it is unjust for a son to bear any punishment of his father's crime than that it is unjust that the sinner should not die. The passage itself proves that God is not speaking here of perpetual and immutable right, but of the ordinary course of his providence, which he declares he will hereafter so conduct toward the Jews as to take away all occasion of false accusation.

It is of no more assistance to him that it is **312 b**] written in Deuteronomy,[1] "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin."[2] This law is, in part, positive, being imposed upon men by God; but God is not bound by it, since he has never imposed it upon himself, nor indeed can he be bound by any law. The difference of reason is seen in the fact that the power of man is more restricted than that of God. This will be more fully explained below; so that I will say nothing at present of the fact that in men there is reason to fear abuse of power, but not in God.

Socinus makes the exception that in the Scriptures the innocent can nowhere be found punished for the sins of the guilty. But this exception does

[1] Deut xxiv. 16. [2] See also 2 Kings xiv. 6.

not help him. For when we say that certain ones are punished not merely on account of their own sins, by reason of which they were guilty, but, in addition, on account of the sins of others, it follows that they are punished when they were not guilty. If one can be punished *in part* when he is not guilty, in the nature of things he may be punished so *on the whole*. The right of parts and the whole is the same. Note, further, that the posterity of Saul were entirely innocent as to that sin for which they were punished. If one may be punished for that *in respect to which* he is innocent, he may be punished also *though* innocent.

The truth is that innocence does not prevent punishment any more than it does affliction. Indeed, it offers no objection to the former except on account of the latter. Wherefore the distinction of innocent and guilty pertains to the following question: Whether a man may be justly afflicted? but not to this: Whether his affliction could perform the part of punishment? For, granted that relation to a particular sin is not of the essence of punishment, granted also that the innocent may be afflicted, as Socinus confesses may be done by God for a time, evidently nothing can be brought to prove from the nature of things (and we are not treating here of positive law) that it is unjust that an innocent man should be punished with such affliction for the guilt of another.[a]

Especially is this true if he has submitted to such punishment of his own will, and had the power of taking it upon himself. Of this we shall speak later.

Socinus urges that there ought to be at least some connection between the guilty man and him who is punished. Such a connection he recognizes between a father and his son, but does not recognize between Christ and us. We might reply that no man is unconnected with another; that there is a certain natural union among men by birth and blood; that our flesh was assumed by Christ. But another and a greater connection between us and Christ was designed by God. For Christ was designated by God himself as the head of the body of which we are members.

We must observe here that the connection which is sufficient to call for the punishment of one for the sins of another is incorrectly restricted by Socinus to the flesh alone, although the mystic connection ought in this case to have a place of no less importance, as very clearly appears in the case of a king and his people. The story of the people of Israel, punished on account of David's crime, has been cited above. The ancient author of *Quaestiones ad Orthodoxos* (which is circulated under the name of Justin), wisely discoursing upon this topic, says:[1] "As man is composed of

[1] Ὡς σύγκειται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὕτως καὶ ἡ βασιλεία σύγκειται ἐκ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν βασιλευομένων καὶ ὥσπερ

soul and body, so a kingdom is composed of the king and his subjects. And as, if a man committing sin with his hands receives punishment on his back he who punishes him does not act unjustly, so God acts not unjustly when he avenges the sins of the rulers upon the people."

At length Socinus gets so far as to say that at least one cannot find in the Scriptures [313 a that an innocent man should be punished for those faults for which the guilty one receives impunity. But this also is of no service to him. For since it is not unjust *per se* and universally to grant impunity to a guilty person, as Socinus confesses, nor unjust to punish one for the sins of another, there can be no injustice in the union of the two. Indeed, the Scripture makes plain by the example of Ahab that this is not unjust; for he himself receives impunity for his sins, which are punished in the persons of his son and posterity.[1] But this will be more carefully examined when we come to the question whether there was any cause to move God to punish Christ for our sins.

In no respect, then, do the sacred writings support Socinus, since they show that God has done

ἁμαρτήσας ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἁμάρτημα διὰ χειρός, κἂν τυπτηθῇ εἰς τὸν νῶτον οὐκ ἀδικεῖ ὁ τυπτήσας αὐτὸν, οὕτως οὐκ ἀδικεῖ Θεὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν βασιλέων πταίσμασι τὸν λαὸν τιμωρούμενος.

[1] 1 Kings xxi. 29; 2 Kings viii., ix., and x.

that which he undeservedly accuses of injustice. He has no greater support in right reason, which he boasts of a wonderful number of times, but which he never displays. But that every error may be removed from this discussion, we must note that though it is essential to punishment that it should be inflicted on account of sin, it is not essential that it should be inflicted upon the sinner himself.[b] This is evident from a comparison of reward, thanks, and vengeance. For a reward is often conferred upon the children or the relatives of him who has deserved much, thanks upon the friends of him who has conferred a benefit, and vengeance is visited upon the friends of the offender. But on this account they do not cease to be what they are — reward, thanks, vengeance.

Furthermore, if it were contrary to the nature of punishment that it should be inflicted upon him who has not sinned, we ought to call this not unjust, but impossible. But God forbids men to punish a son for the crime of his father, and impossibilities are not forbidden.

Again, injustice does not properly attach to a relation, such as punishing, but to an act, such as the matter of punishment. At this point we ought to investigate the distinction according to which it is not just as free to all to punish one man for another man's fault as it is to reward or thank the one for the other's service or benefit.

The act of conferring a reward or benefit is a beneficial act, which by its own nature is possible for all. The act of punishing is an injurious act, which is not granted to all nor for all. That the punishment may be just, it is therefore required that the infliction of penalty be within the power of the punisher. This may occur in three ways, — either by the previous right of the punisher, or by the just and valid consent of the one to be punished, or by the crime of the same. When an act is made lawful in these ways, nothing prevents that it should be ordained as punishment for another's sin, provided there is a certain connection between the one who has sinned and the one who is to be punished. Such a connection must be either natural, as between father and son; or mystic, as between king and people; or voluntary, as between the guilty person and the surety.

Socinus appeals to the opinions of all [**313 b** nations. But first, in relation to God, philosophers have never doubted that the sins of parents were punished by him in their children. Says Plutarch:[1] "The same opinion is to be conceived of a race of men, depending upon one and the

[1] "*Concerning those whom God is slow to punish*": *Ἔστι δήπου καὶ γένος ἐξηρτημένον ἀρχῆς μίας καὶ δύναμίν τινα καὶ κοινωνίαν διαπεφυκυῖαν ἀναφερούσης· καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν οὐχ ὥς τι δημιούργημα πεποιημένον ἀπήλλακται τοῦ γεννήσαντος· ἐξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γέγονεν, ὡς ἔχει τι καὶ φέρεται τῶν ἐκείνου μέρος ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ καλαζόμενον προσηκόντως καὶ τιμωρούμενον.*

same beginning and carrying along with it a certain power and communion of qualities. What is begotten, also, cannot be thought to be severed from that which begets it, like a piece of workmanship from the artificer; the one being begotten of the person, the other framed by him. So that what is engendered is a part of the original from whence it sprung, either in meriting honor or deserving punishment." And further:[1] "It is neither strange nor wonderful, if, being of them, they share theirs." Then he adds something not dissimilar from that which we have just now cited from a Christian writer:[2] "It would be ridiculous to say that it is unjust that the thumbs should burn while the thighs are in danger." Again, Valerius Maximus, writing of Dionysius of Sicily, says:[3] "Although he did not suffer the tortures due for so many acts of sacrilege, yet in the disgrace of his son he dead pays the penalty which living he escaped." There are countless similar passages in the historians and poets. So it has been the received opinion that a people are punished by God for the sin of their king, even from the time of Hesiod, who said that Justice[4] was the daughter of Jove, who besought him:

[1] Οὐδὲν δεινὸν οὐδ' ἄτοπον ἂν ἐκείνων ὄντες ἔχωσι τὰ ἐκείνων.

[2] Γελοῖος ὁ φάσκων ἄδικον εἶναι ἰσχίων πονοῦντων καίειν τὰ ἀντίχειρα.

[3] Tametsi debita tot sacrilegiis supplicia non exsolvit, dedecore tamen filii mortuus poenas rependit quas vivus effugerat.

[4] Δίκη.

ὄφρ' ἀποτίσῃ
Δῆμος ἀτασθαλίας βασιλέων.

That some are punished for the crimes of others Socinus does not dare to deny. For in pecuniary punishments this is evidently the case. Ulpian says[1] that in pecuniary punishments the surety is punished for the guilty person. Caius says[2] that the surety is rightly made partner in the punishment of theft, because the reason why punishment should be inflicted for crimes is a great one. And this suffices to show that it is not of the nature of punishment that he who has done wrong should both pay and of necessity be punished. Socinus adduces[3] the following reason why the same right is not allowed in corporal punishments, — because money can be made over by one to another, and so, being paid for another, by a natural legal fiction, seems to be given to the delinquent, and afterwards paid by him;[4] but corporal distress cannot be made over to another. But this is a subtile, rather than a true, reason. For such a reason effects something towards procuring liberation for the culprit, but nothing towards securing the infliction of a punishment which one has

[1] L. *Si quis reum.* D. de cust. et exhib. reorum.

[2] L. *Si a reo.* D. de fidejuss.

[3] iii. 3.

[4] [The Latin text of the passage is: "Atque ideo pro alio saluta *brevis* manus fictione videatur donata delinquenti," etc. W. H. translates incorrectly, as though the text read *brevi.* — Tr.]

deserved upon another. If that were the true reason, it would frequently occur that even a reward to a meritorious man could not be paid to a relative; for the thing in which the reward consisted could not be made over to him who had deserved well, either because he was dead or because it was incorporeal. The Athenians educated at the public expense the children of those who had deserved well. The Romans gave to the sons of veterans the privileges of decurions. They **314 a**] would not subject the grandsons or great-grandsons of the so-called most perfect to examination by torture. We read in the Greek and Roman histories that the remembrance of parents was the cause of children's escape from punishment. But the education, privilege, impunity of children cannot be made the education, privilege, impunity of the dead parents! Indeed, if Socinus's observation were true, punishment could not be exacted even from a surety if he were unwilling that the guilty person, happening to be absent, should be liberated from the obligation of pecuniary punishment. This, therefore, so far as it relates to our question, is not the true difference between pecuniary and corporal punishment. We shall soon point out one nearer the truth.

But I am most surprised at this remark of Socinus, viz. that it is proved by the laws and customs of all nations and ages that corporal punish-

ment, owed by one, cannot be paid by another. For frequently, among the Persians, in ancient times, a man's relatives perished for his crimes, on the testimony of Marcellinus. Curtius relates that among the Macedonians those who were connected by blood with public enemies were capitally punished. In the states of Greece it was the custom that with the tyrants the tyrants' children should be slain, as the Halicarnassaean and Cicero remark. These things certainly are not commendable, but they show, nevertheless, that Socinus's remark about the consent of all nations is not in all respects true.

In these examples the mere connection of persons seemed sufficient for punishment without consent, which, the Halicarnassaean remarks, was deservedly repudiated by the Romans. But where consent did precede, I would almost dare to say that there was not one of those whom we call pagans, who would regard it unjust that one should be punished for the crime of another. This is shown by the right of slaying hostages exercised even by the most humane nations. The Thessalians once slew two hundred and fifty hostages, as Plutarch relates. The Romans beheaded three hundred Volscii; they threw down the Tarentines from the Tarpeian rock, as Livy says. Similar examples are known of the Goths, Dacians, and Angli. And, as very learned men have remarked, it

was believed that this was right. So, also, in capital punishments the sureties were punished if the criminal did not appear, whence they were called by the Greeks ἀντίψυχοι. This is shown by many considerations, and also by the noble history of Damon and Pythias. Neither, indeed, is it wonderful that they so judged. For since they believed that every man had no less power over his own life than over other matters (as is shown by suicide, so frequent and so often commented upon among the Greeks, Romans, and other nations, whence also that well-known passage of Tragedy: *Jus vitae ac necis meae penes me est*); it clearly followed that they should believe that life, no less than other things, could be validly pledged. Assume the former, and the latter must be granted. And, indeed, if any one will examine this whole matter with the diligence he ought, he will find that the true reason why a man is not as closely held by his consent to corporal punishment as to pecuniary is this, that he who consents has not equal power over his money and his life.

Yet I cannot agree with the more recent jurists who prove this from a reply of Ulpian's, who said that no one seems to be master of his own members.[1] For he takes the word *master* strictly in accordance with its usage in civil law, where it is opposed to *slave*. For, because the lex Aquilia is

[1] L. *liber homo.* D. ad legem Aquil.

speaking strictly of a slave, it affirms that the direct action which corresponds to the [314 b terms of the law cannot be accommodated to a free man wounded. Yet the case is such that according to the law, by parity of reasoning an *actio utilis* ought to be granted. And to express my real opinion, although I greatly admire the equity of the Romans in moderating this extension of punishment, yet I cannot be induced to believe that the matter was thought by them plainly and *per se* unjust that one should be corporally punished for the crime of another. Nor am I influenced by this, that they forbade the giving of surety under capital punishment. They are accustomed to forbid many things, not because they think them entirely unjust, but because they think them perilous, as all sureties of women, and of others also, for dowry.

This, therefore, is the decision of the civil law. But since it is void among other nations, so the Romans in the case of hostages followed another course. But why so long afterwards did the Christian emperors decree that when a criminal had escaped through the fault of his keeper's household, the keeper should bear his punishment?[1] And how is it that to-day, or not so very long ago, noble masters of law have taught that the rule that no one shall be able to bind

[1] L. *ad commentariensem.* C. de custod. reor.

himself to capital punishment, is invalid, if law or custom have established that precept?

But so far as those punishments are concerned which require no consent, but a simple connection of persons, although the Roman law forbade making a son successor of his father's punishment, or marking him with any disgrace for his father's crime; yet the Halicarnassaean declares that this custom obtained, not from the beginning, but from that time when Spurius Cassius was condemned for tyranny. Not even the Romans, then, thought this right to descend from some perpetual and immutable rule of justice. So Arcadius and Honorius, the emperors, would seem to bestow life upon the sons of those who had committed treason, not of legal necessity, but by royal clemency; for otherwise, as they say themselves, such persons should have perished in the punishment of their fathers.[1] It might be proved from the historians that death was inflicted upon the children of public enemies not only by Tiberius and Severus, but also by Theodosius. It ought farther to be noted in the same law of Arcadius and Honorius, that all right of heirship without a will, or with a will, is taken away from the sons of public enemies; that they are branded with infamy, that they are forbidden to hold public offices, or to come to the Sacraments. Finally, it is added: "Let them be

[1] L *quisquis*. C. ad L. Jul. Majest.

so miserable by reason of perpetual want that death shall be a solace, and life a punishment to them." Exclusion from public offices had been practised against the children of those who had committed offences against the republic, even so long before as the time of Sulla. Cicero says that it was a custom both ancient and common to *all* nations that sons should atone for the crimes of their parents by their own poverty. He particularly adds that the children of Themistocles were poor. These things make it appear that there was not that consent of nations which Socinus adduces, and that indeed the Romans, whose equity was most conspicuous among all people, did not respect this distinction in punishment, that money can be transferred to another, but not corporal punishment. For neither the poverty of the sons nor their infamy, nor exclusion from public offices could be made the poverty, infamy, or exclusion from public offices of their parents, except, perhaps, by a certain fiction which regards [315 a
the father and his children as one and the same man.

One may well wonder at the statement which Socinus makes in reference to the act of Zaleucus, whose history is found in Diodorus Siculus and Aelianus. He says that Zaleucus gained a very bad name, and that his name is numbered among impotent and rash princes, and judges of the

people. Certainly all antiquity praised Zaleucus, not only on account of his very wise laws, but most of all for this deed, as appears from those writers whom I have named, from Plutarch, and from others. Nor do I think that any ancient writer judged differently of that deed.

All have seen the following passage of Valerius Maximus: "Nothing is more influential with men than examples of justice. Zaleucus, when he had fortified the city of the Locrians with most wholesome and useful laws, and when his son, condemned for the crime of adultery, according to the established law should have lost both eyes, and the whole city, in honor of the father, remitted in favor of the youth the necessity of punishment, for a while resisted. At last conquered by the prayers of the people, he plucked out first his own eye, and then that of his son, but left to each the power of sight. Thus he conceded to the law the due measure of punishment, having by an admirable tempering of equity, acted the part both of a pitiful father and a just lawgiver." And, indeed, if it were as completely in a man's power to destroy his own eye as to go into exile, nothing could be found more worthy of renown than that act of Zaleucus, especially since the precise obligation of the law was void either because of his kingship, or because of the consent of the people. The error of Zaleucus, therefore, as of almost all the pagans,

was in assuming over his own body a power greater than was proper. But that deed, so greatly celebrated, testifies against the conception of which Socinus thinks impressed upon the minds of men, that no one can receive upon himself the punishment of another's crime.

To conclude this inquiry, the question is not whether it is lawful for any judge to inflict upon any man any punishment of another's crime. The law of superior judges takes this power away from the inferior. Nor is it this: whether this is lawful for the highest power among men in every case, and towards every man. For sometimes the divine law, or natural reason opposes it. But this question may properly be asked, whether an act which is in the power of a superior, even without considering another's crime, may not be appointed by that superior for the punishment of another's crime. That this is unjust the Scripture denies, in that it shows that it has been done very often by God; nature denies, because she is not proved to forbid; the consent of the nations openly denies.

To place the thing more clearly before our eyes, who thinks that the decimation employed in Roman legions was unjust where he who had sinned, and might have been forgiven as well as another, is punished not only for his own crime, but for the crime of all? Who thinks it unjust if, when the

Supreme power relaxes the laws, some man useful to the state, but deserving of exile for a fault, is retained in the state, while another freely condemns himself to exile, to furnish the required example? Who thinks it unjust if the Supreme ruler of the state refuses public offices, for which others equally competent are to be found, to the children of public enemies though they are not otherwise unworthy? Certainly there is nothing unequal is this! For in the first case the personal offence of the punished, in the second, the valid consent of him who is most concerned, in the 315 b] third, the privilege of the ruler, permitted that to be done which the ruler employed as punishment. In the case we are considering, God had by his divine right the power of afflicting Christ, though innocent, even unto temporary death, as Socinus confesses. Christ had also by the divine permission, nay, as himself God, the power, which we have not, over his own life and body.

"I have power,"[1] says Christ, "to lay down my life." There is, therefore, no unfairness in this, that God, whose is the supreme power in respect to all things not unjust *per se*, and who is bound by no law, determined to employ the tortures and death of Christ to set forth a weighty example against the great crimes of all of us with whom Christ was very closely connected by his

[1] John x. 18. ἐξουσία, i.e. *power, authority.*

nature and kingdom and suretyship. That this was done not only justly, but also wisely, by a God most wise and most just, will appear more clearly in the following chapter, when we shall trace out the cause of this divine plan.

CHAPTER V.

WHETHER THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT CAUSE TO INDUCE GOD TO PUNISH CHRIST IN OUR STEAD, AND IT IS SHOWN THAT THERE WAS.

SOCINUS,[1] to prove that God did not intend that Christ should pay the penalty for us, frequently employs this argument, that there is no apparent cause for so intending. We will not employ here the artifice of the jurists who say that it is impossible to give a reason for everything which has been established by our forefathers, although such a refuge is much more properly open to us than to them, since it is not so difficult for men to trace out the causes of human action, on account of community of nature. But the causes of the divine will, by their very sublimity, often escape us. "Who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counselor?"[2] And so his ways are often "past finding out."[3] It might be added that frequently the mere will of God is its own sufficient cause. For, excepting those things which

[1] iii. 1. [2] Rom. xi. 34.

[3] Rom. xi. 33. ἀνεξιχνίαστοι αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ.

are of an intrinsic rectitude, fixed and determined to one thing, and which God wills because they are just, that is, because they agree with his nature; in all other things which he wills he makes them just by willing. So, "He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth."[1]

But it is not necessary for us to fly to those refuges, since God has himself made the cause of his plan very plain to us. It becomes us only to make this preliminary remark that Socinus is not right in postulating that we must assign a cause which shall prove that God could not have acted otherwise. For such a cause is not required in those things which God does freely. But he who will maintain that this was a free action, may refer to Augustine,[2] who declares not that God had no other possible way of liberating us, but that there was no other more appropriate way for healing our misery, neither could be. But also, before Augustine, Athanasius had said:[3] "God was able, by a mere utterance to annul the curse without coming himself at all. But it is necessary to con-

[1] Rom. ix. 18.

[2] xiii. de Trinitate, cap. x.

[3] Serm. iii. Against the Arians. *ἠδύνατο καὶ μηδ' ὅλως ἐπιδημήσαντος αὐτοῦ μόνον εἰπεῖν ὁ Θεὸς καὶ λύσαι τὴν κατάραν· ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν δεῖ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις λυσιτελοῦν, καὶ μὴ ἐν πάσι τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λογίζεσθαι.* [The Folio translates this passage into Latin thus: Poterat Deus, *illo* nequaquam presente, loqui solum, etc.]

sider what is useful to men, and not always what 316 a] is possible to God." Nazarius[1] says: "It was possible for God even without the incarnation (of Christ) to save us by his mere volition." Bernard:[2] "Who does not know that the Almighty had at hand various methods for our redemption, justification, liberation? but this does not detract from the efficacy of that method which he has selected out of many."

The postulation of Socinus is even the more unfair that he does not himself give any reason for the tortures and death of Christ, which implies necessity. For, to exhibit to us the way of holiness, discourses and miracles were enough. So, also, was Christ without death, and death without Christ. The affliction and death of prophets also, and apostles, and the life of Christ as well, could have served this purpose abundantly. Christ after a life passed here in innocence, could have been, like Enoch or Elijah, translated to heaven without pain, and have shown thence his majesty to the earth. These are the causes to which Socinus ascribes the death of Christ, although connected with that effect, as every one can see, by no necessity. But if he is content with alleging causes which do not compel, so to speak, but invite and

[1] Epistola ad Trident. [Nazarius is put by conjecture for Grotius's simple "Naz."]

[2] Epist. exc. contra Pel. et Basl.

persuade, fairness does not permit him to apply a more severe law to those who dispute with him.

But it will not be difficult to assign from the Scriptures a sufficient cause, and, indeed, a most weighty cause, whether we inquire why God chose to remit to us eternal punishment, or why he did not choose to remit the same otherwise than by the punishment of Christ. The former has its cause in benevolence, which is, of all the attributes of God, most truly peculiar to him. For everywhere God describes himself chiefly by this attribute, that he is benignant and clement.[1] Therefore, God is inclined to aid and bless men, but he cannot do this while that dreadful and eternal punishment remains. Besides, if eternal death should fall upon all, religion had totally perished through despair of felicity. There were, therefore, great reasons for sparing man.

On the other hand, those passages of Scripture already adduced by us, which declare that Christ was delivered, suffered, died for our sins, show the reason why God imposed punishment upon Christ. This manner of speaking, as we have shown, points to the impulsive cause. It may be seen from what we have said of the end not only that there was a cause, but what it was, viz. that

[1] Ex. xxxiv. 7; 2 Chron. xxx. 9; Ps. lxxxvi. 5, 15; ciii. 8; cxi; 4, 5; cxlv. 8; Isa. lv. 7; Jer. xxxi. 20; Joel ii. 13; John iv. 2; Luke vi. 36; Rom. ii. 4.

God was unwilling to pass over so many sins, and so great sins, without a distinguished example. This is so because every sin is seriously displeasing to God, and the more displeasing the more grave it is.[1] Since God is active, and has created rational creatures in order to give more abundant testimony to his attributes, it is proper for him also to testify by some act how greatly he is displeased with sin. The act most suitable for this is punishment. Hence, arises that in God which the Sacred Writings, because there is no other more **316 b**] significant word, call wrath.[2] God declares he is prevented by this wrath from blessing men.[3a]

Again, all neglect to punish sin leads *per se* to a lower estimation of sin, as, on the other hand, the most ready means of preventing sin is the fear of punishment. Hence, the well-known saying: "By bearing an old injury you invite a new." Therefore prudence also, on this account, invites the ruler to inflict punishment.

Moreover, the reasons for punishing are increased when a law has been published threatening punishment, for then the omission of punishment almost always detracts from the authority of

[1] Prov. xi. 20; Ps. v. 5; xlv. 8; Isa. lxvi. 4; Zech. viii. 17; Rom. i. 18; Heb. xi. 2.

[2] Ex. xxxii. 10, 11; Num. xi. 1; xvi. 22; xxv. 3 sq.; Ps. ii. 5; vi. 2; John iii. 36; Rom. i. 18; ii. 8; Eph. v. 6; Col. iii. 6; Rev. vi. 16.

[3] Gen. vi. 7; Deut. xxxii. 29, 30; Jer. v. 24; Isa. lix. 2.

the law among the subjects. Hence, the precept of politics: "Guard the established laws with the greatest care."[1]

God has, therefore, most weighty reasons for punishing, especially if we are permitted to estimate the magnitude and multitude of sins. But because among all his attributes love of the human race is pre-eminent, God was willing, though he could have justly punished the sins of all men with deserved and legitimate punishment, that is, with eternal death, and had reasons for so doing, to spare those who believe in Christ. But since we must be spared either by setting forth, or not setting forth, some example against so many great sins, in his most perfect wisdom he chose that way by which he could manifest more of his attributes at once, viz. both clemency and severity, or his hate of sin and care for the preservation of his law.

So Aelianus, in commending the deed of Zaleucus, mentions two reasons for it, that the youth might not be made entirely blind,[2] and that what had been once established should not become invalid.[3] Of these reasons, the former operated to bring about some change in the law through clemency, the latter prevented too great a change.

[1] τοῦς κειμένους νόμους ἰσχυρῶς διαφυλάττειν.

[2] ἵνα μὴ ὁ νεανίσκος τυφλωθῇ τελέως.

[3] ἵνα μὴ διαφθειρῇ τὸ ἅπαξ κεκουρωμένον.

Those who have written on the relaxation of laws, observe that those are the best relaxations, which are accompanied by a commutation, or compensation. In this way the least injury is done to the law, and the particular precept is executed in some accordance with the reason upon which the law was founded. It is as if a man held to deliver a certain article should be excused upon paying the price. For the same thing and the same value are very nearly related.

Such commutation is admissible not only among things, but sometimes also among persons, provided that it can be done without injury to another. Thus sons are permitted to go into prison in place of their fathers, as Cimon for Miltiades. And not to go beyond penal judgments, and that too the divine, there exist in the Sacred Scriptures traces of a similar fact. To David, the homicide and adulterer, is pronounced at the command of God by Nathan:[1] "The Lord hath put away thy sin (that is, the punishment of thy sin); thou shalt not die (which otherwise the law demanded); Howbeit because by this deed thou hast given great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, the child also that is born to thee (evidently since it is very closely connected with thee, and the substitute in thy punishment) shall surely die." Ahab had defiled himself with both murder

[1] 2 Sam. xii. 13–14.

and rapine. God announces to him through Elijah that the dogs will lick his blood. Yet immediately when his fear, and a certain reverence for the divine majesty was manifest, the same God said:[1] "I will not bring the evil (viz. what both he had merited, and I threatened) in his days; but in his son's days (who shall bear not only his own, but also his father's punishment) will I bring the evil upon his house." In both cases God re- [317 a
laxes the law, or the threat of punishment, but not without some compensation, by transferring the punishment upon another. Thus at the same time he exhibits both his clemency and severity or hatred of sin. So, therefore, God, wishing to spare those who should believe in Christ, had sufficient, just, and great reasons for exacting of the willing Christ the punishment of our sins, viz. to use the words of Aelianus, "that what had been once established should not become invalid;" and that sin should not be thought of less importance, if so many great sins should be remitted without an example.

Further, God not only testified his own hatred of sin by this act, and so deterred us from sin (for it is an easy inference that if God would not remit the sins even of those who repented except Christ took their punishment, much less will he permit the contumacious to go unvisited); but more than

[1] 1 Kings xxi. 29.

that, he also declared in a marked way his great love for us in that we were spared by one to whom it was not a matter of indifference to punish sins, but who regarded it of so much importance that rather than dismiss them altogether unpunished, he delivered his only-begotten son to punishment for them! The ancients said of forgiveness that it wsa neither *according to* law, nor *against* law, but *above* law, and *for* law. So may we say with emphasis of this divine grace. It is *above* law, because we are not punished; *for* law, because punishment is not omitted; and remission is granted that we may live hereafter *to* the divine law.[b]

If these things are rightly understood, all those objections which Socinus makes about the lack of reason fall together, so that it is unnecessary to consider them one by one. Yet not a few errors might be noted, as in the first chapter of the first book, and also the first chapter of the third book, he says that punitive justice does not reside in God, but that it is an effect of his will. Certainly the act of punishing is an effect of the will; but the justice or rectitude from which other things as well as the execution of punishment spring, is an attribute residing in God. For the Scripture concludes that God is just because he punishes sins, inferring the cause from the effect. Socinus seems to be led into this error, because he believes that all effects of the attributes of God are in all

respects necessary, though many are free, since the act of free-will intervenes between the attribute and its effect. Thus it is an effect of the goodness of God to confer favors; but he did not do this before creation. It is characteristic of the same goodness to spare the guilty; but one would scarcely say that God spares those whom he punishes with eternal punishment. There are, therefore, certain attributes of God, the exercise of which, both as regards the act and as regards the time and mode of the act, nay, even as regards the determination of the object, depends upon the free-will of him over whose action wisdom yet always presides. Nor because God has the free use of those attributes, can it therefore be said, when he exercises them, that he does what he does without reason. It is not true that because it was possible for God not to create the world, he has created it in vain. Nor is it true, because it was possible for God not to punish (which Socinus confesses to be true in the case especially of them whose repentance God does not expect), that when he does punish them he has no reason for punishing. Many things are done freely, and yet for sufficient reason.

Another error has also been indicated above, that Socinus thinks that God in remitting sins plainly intends to do exactly the same as men who depart from their laws We have shown that pun-

ishment is not in the sphere of ownership, or debt, and that it cannot be compared with them in all respects. To give ones own, to remit a debt, is always honorable *per se*. When we say *per se* we exclude accidental, accessory circumstances, such as the poverty of the donor. This can, moreover, have no place in God. But to remit punishment would not be honorable at all times, not even in God, as Socinus admits. Therefore a distinction has been made at this point. The origin of the distinction is in this, that the ultimate foundation of the law of ownership and debt is a certain relation of a thing to a person, but of punishment, relation of a thing to a thing, especially equality between a crime and some affliction promotive of order and the public good. From this arises the falsity of that which Socinus lays down[1] as established, that a state will commit no injustice in absolving a guilty man except it transgresses at the same time the peculiar right of some individual, or infringes the law of God. By the word "state" he means either the body which rules, or that which is ruled. The body which is ruled has no more power of modifying the law than of making it; and the body which rules, as the senate in an aristocracy, or the majority of the assembly in a popular state, has no more power than other supreme rulers, as for example, free kings in a

[1] iii. 1.

kingdom, or fathers in their families. But it is a part of rectoral justice to preserve the laws even when positive and of the ruler's own making, which is proved to be true by the jurists in case of a free community as well as a supreme king. Consequently, a ruler has no right to relax such a law except for some antecedent reason, if not necessary, at least sufficient. This opinion also is the received opinion among jurists. The reason of both is that the act of making or relaxing a law is not an act of absolute ownership, but an act of government, which ought to tend toward the preservation of good order.

We must disapprove also of the remark of Socinus,[1] that except the free-will of God and of Christ, no legitimate cause can be given for the death of Christ, unless we say that he deserved to die. There is in an antecedent cause an inherent desert, as we have shown above,[2] but impersonally. For our sins deserved the exaction of punishment. But that the punishment was laid upon Christ we refer to the volition of God and Christ in this sense, that that volition has its cause not in the desert of Christ (who though he knew no sin, was made sin by God), but in the consummate fitness of Christ for displaying a distinguished example. This consisted in his intimate union with us, and in the incomparable dignity of his

[1] iii. 10. [2] Chap. ii.

person [d] This inference of Socinus is, moreover, refuted by the plain testimony of Scripture. The antecedent cause of the death of David's child is plain. It was because David by a most grave sin had given occasion to the impious for heaping insult and contumely upon the divine name. There is, therefore, demerit here, but not the demerit **318 a**] of the infant. In punishing the posterity of Ahab beyond their own desert God had respect to the demerit of the sins of Ahab. Whence it appears that the antecedent cause of punishment is indeed demerit, but not always the demerit of the persons who are punished.

CHAPTER VI.

WHETHER GOD INTENDED TO PUNISH CHRIST; AND IT IS SHOWN THAT HE DID; AND AT THE SAME TIME THE NATURE OF SATISFACTION IS EXPLAINED.

HAVING answered the two questions: Whether God could justly punish the willing Christ for our sins; and: Whether there was a sufficient reason for God's doing this; we come now to the third: Whether in very truth he did so, or, what amounts to the same thing, intended to do so. Socinus denies this both in many other places, and especially in Book iii. chap. 2. We maintain with the Scriptures that God intended to do this, and did it. For Christ is said to have been delivered, to have suffered, to have died for our sins.[1] The chastisement of our peace was laid upon Christ. God cast upon Christ our sins, that is, the punishment of our sins, which were so exacted that he was punished for that cause. Christ bore our sins, that is again, the punishment of our sins.[2] Christ made himself sin, and God made Christ

[1] Rom. iv. 25; 1 Cor. xv. 3; 1 Pet. iii. 18; Isa. liii. 5.
[2] Isa. liii. 5, 6, 7, 11; 1 Pet. ii. 24.

sin and a curse, that is, exposed to the punishment of sins.[1] The blood of Christ was shed for the remission of sins, so that that remission was not obtained without shedding of blood, but by it.[2]

Socinus makes many objections at this point: certain examples and promises before Christ; certain passages concerning those things which God said he gave through Christ; the word *remit*, and *forgive*, and the very nature of liberality, from which he thinks it follows that God is willing to bestow impunity upon us when we reform, without exacting punishment of any one for that cause.

I. So far as examples of forgiveness are concerned (especially because nothing of universal application can be inferred from them), we must note that they pertain either to temporary punishment, or to eternal. If to temporary only, as in the case of Ahab, there is a plain distinction, for, as we commonly say, what is put off is not put away. And further, in the case of Ahab, as in the case of David, the contrary appears of that which Socinus wishes to infer, when he brings up these very cases in his own behalf. For the temporary punishment is removed from David and Ahab, in order to be transferred to others.

[1] Isa. liii. 10; 2 Cor. v. 21; Gal. iii. 13.

[2] Matt. xxvi. 28; Heb. ix. 22, and elsewhere in many places.

Under the law sins are not remitted except by the shed blood of victims, as will be explained below. But when we turn to the remission of eternal punishment, Socinus offers no argument to prove that this has ever been granted except God looked upon Christ.

Concerning promises the same must be affirmed as concerning examples. Let us observe in passing that when God promises release from temporal punishments to those that reform, this is not always to be understood of all punishments, but only of so many. For God frequently punishes even those who reform, but paternally and gently. So God restored his penitent people from the Babylonian captivity into their native [318 b country, but he did not restore the pristine liberty and glory of their kingdom. But in respect to eternal punishment there is no promise of remission which excludes reference to Christ. Here belong those statements of Scripture which, without any distinction of time, show that Christ tasted death for all, that he gave himself a ransom [1] for all,[2] and especially those which repudiate by the addition of a comparison all restriction of time, as when all are said to have sinned, and to be justified through the redemption in Christ,[3] and when it is said that by one, Christ, justification came to all men (viz. as many as are justi-

[1] ἀντίλυτρον. [2] Heb. ii. 9; 1 Tim. ii. 6. [3] Rom. iii. 23.

fied), just as by one, Adam, condemnation came upon all.[1] Hence it is that Christ is called the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.[2] This passage is vindicated from the interpretation of Socinus[3] both by the connection of the words, and the corresponding passage of Peter,[4] where redemption is said to have been made by the blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish, and without spot, foreknown before the foundation of the world, but made manifest in these last days. Elsewhere the death of Christ is said to have intervened for the redemption of those transgressions which were under the first covenant,[5] and through blood the justice of God is said to have been declared for the concealing[6] of sins that are past, which God is shown to have tolerated meantime, and to have borne deferring the exhibition of his justice till the time of Christ.[7]

There is, besides, the famous passage: "Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the high-priest entereth into the holy place every year with the blood of others; for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world,—but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.

[1] Rom. iii. 12; v. 17, 18; vid. on this passage in Rom. Cyril adv. Anthrop. cap. 9.

[2] Rev. xiii. 8. [3] ii. 26. [4] 1 Pet. i. 19, 20.

[5] Heb. ix. 15. [6] [*Lat.* dissimulatio.] [7] Rom. iii. 25.

And as it is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the judgment, so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many."[1] If the entire connection of this passage is rightly attended to, and especially if the passage of Peter[2] where the same subject is treated, and almost in the same words, is compared with it, the sacrifice of Christ will appear to differ from the Levitical in that the power of the latter was limited by the space of a year; but the power of the former extended itself through all ages, since his passion was regarded by God as completed before all ages, though in fact completed at a fixed time, and so the decree of God has thus been openly revealed to us. Unless this were so, Christ ought frequently to suffer, not after he began to preach, but from the very beginning of the world. These words have evidently no force except the power of the death of Christ extends itself to all sins which have ever been remitted to men from the beginning of the world, just as judgment after death extends to all those sins which the man has committed during life. The contrary interpretation of Socinus not only makes the words meaningless, but also weakens the argument of the writer. For when you affirm that Christ must have been offered more frequently, it does not follow that he [319 a ought to have suffered not only more frequently,

[1] Heb. ix. 25–28. [2] 1 Pet. i. 19.

but also more frequently from the foundation of the world, unless you affirm along with the rest that he ought to have been offered more frequently from the foundation of the world. These two things are mutually connected, because the effect of the oblation does not extend further than the dignity of the immolation. But, granting that which the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews is combating, viz. the equality of the Levitical sacrifice, and the sacrifice of Christ, it would follow that Christ ought to have been offered more frequently from the foundation of the world, only because the effect of the oblation of Christ was extended to all the sins which have been committed and remitted from the foundation of the world. For if it were on the same level with the Levitical sacrifice (which has a virtue limited to a certain time), certainly the efficacy of Christ's sacrifice could not reach from the time in which he died to most distant times, but there would evidently have been need that between both points of time many actions of that sort should intervene.

II. To come now to those testimonies which Socinus thinks properly pertain to the time of Christ and the new covenant,—Jeremiah indeed says[1] that God will be propitious to sins. But he does not deny what Paul says,[2] that this propitiation is made in the blood of Christ; or that God

[1] Jer. xxxi. 34. [2] Rom. iii. 25.

has regard to Christ. Indeed, all the prophets (among whom is Jeremiah also), give testimony that remission of sins is received through the name, that is, through the power and virtue of Christ.[1] It is said that we have obtained liberation through Christ according to that covenant which God had made with the fathers, and according to those things which he had announced previously through the prophets.[2] The Baptist also by divine command promises remission to penitents, and that through the tender mercy of God.[3] But the same man said that Christ was the Lamb which takes away the sins of the world, that is, by sacrifice, as the Apocalypse expresses it, or by blood, as Peter says. The mention made in these passages of the Lamb shows clearly what the Baptist had in mind.

III. The word *to remit*, which Socinus presses, is in Greek *ἀφιέναι*, which an ancient interpreter has nominally translated[4] *dimittere*. But we have shown above that neither the Greek nor the Latin word has that force, which necessarily includes every kind of yielding of proper right, as the origin, and primitive signification of the word is opposed to *κρατεῖν*, which is to retain, or bring into. Whence, further, by a certain figure of speech it began to be transferred to punishment,

[1] Acts x. 43. [2] Luke i. 68, 70–74. [3] Luke i. 77.
[4] *κατὰ πόδας.*

and then to death, nor to these things only but also to others. The Greeks call even the discharge of a guiltless defendant ἄφεσις.

We have also shown above how much difference there is between a remission of a debt, and a remission of punishment. And we have shown that in the remission of punishment which is granted by a ruler, there is no relinquishment of such a peculiar and private right as Socinus indicates, viz. of absolute ownership or debt. For these things the reader may therefore turn back. We have only to add now, that it is not true, as Socinus thinks, that a remission is inconsistent with every antecedent payment.[a]

That this may be understood let us give some description of the remission of debt, which contains under it the two species, viz. remission of the thing loaned, and of punishment. This is 319 b] according to the usage of the word both in civil law and in common speech. To remit a debt is an act either of a creditor, or a ruler, setting the guilty person free from the obligation of punishment or debt.

For the sake of those who are less familiar with legal terms we will undertake a more extended explanation. In law destruction of obligation is called liberation. Payment may precede this, it cannot follow it, for no act can be occupied with that which no longer exists. Libera-

tion, therefore, takes place sometimes with preceding payment and sometimes without any payment. Of payments one kind liberates *ipso facto*, another not *ipso facto*. Payment of exactly the same thing that was in the obligation liberates *ipso facto*. Whoever makes the payment, whether it be the guilty person himself, or some one else for him with the intention of liberating him, he pays as if he were the guilty person. This is to be noted, because if another person makes the same payment with a different intention, it does not liberate him.[1] When, therefore, the same thing is paid either by a debtor, or by another in the name of a debtor, there is no remission, for the creditor, or ruler, does nothing about the debt. Wherefore, if any one has completely paid the penalty due, what takes place is liberation, not remission. The declaration of such liberation in the law of debt the jurists properly and strictly call quittance.[2] No other payment liberates *ipso facto*, as, for example, if anything is paid otherwise than is required by the obligation.[3] But it is necessary to add the act of creditor or ruler, which act is properly and usually called remission. Such a payment as can be either admitted

[1] L. *Si poenae.* L. *in summa.* D. de cond. indeb. L. *Cassius.* D. de solut.

[2] ἀποχή. L. *Si accepto.* § 1. D. de Acceptil.

[3] L. 1, § 2. D. de reb. cred.

or refused, has, when admitted in law, the special name of satisfaction, which is sometimes opposed to payment strictly so called.[1]

Here we must look for the reason why a substitute in corporal punishment cannot liberate a guilty person *ipso facto* by enduring the punishment. This is true primarily and *per se*, not because another pays (for this does not prevent liberation, so long as it is the will of the one who pays), but because he pays something else than what is in the obligation. In the obligation is prescribed the affliction of the guilty party himself. Hence, the common remark: Punishment attaches to the person.[2] We may see this in other merely personal obligations to an act, as in a contract of marriage, and in an obligation to official duties.[3] In all these things, if another pays, liberation *ipso facto* will not follow, because it is not only payment by another, but payment of another thing. Some act of the ruler must intervene that liberation may come to one from the punishment of another; for the law demands that the delinquent shall himself be punished. This act with respect to the law is a relaxation or dispensation, with respect to the debtor a remission.

Liberation without payment is effected either by a substitution of a new obligation, or by an en-

[1] L. *satisfactio*. D. de solut. [2] [*Lat.* noxam caput sequi.]
[3] L. *operae*. D. de operis libert.

tire destruction of the old. The liberation which is effected by a substitution of a new obligation is called a novation, and if the person of the debtor is changed, a delegation. That liberation which without any payment entirely destroys the debt, if it is performed concerning the thing loaned with certain solemn words, is called in civil law acceptilation. But in regard to the punishment it has no proper name (inasmuch as it necessarily excludes payment of any kind and amount), but is called by the common name grace, pardon, [320 a indulgence, abolition.

Socinus, therefore, makes a twofold mistake when he applies to that remission which God concedes to us, a word taken from the civil law, viz. acceptilation. For, in the first place, this word may be applied, even when no payment precedes, to the right over a thing loaned, but is not, and cannot be, applied to punishment. We nowhere read that indulgence of crimes was called by the ancients acceptilation. For that is said to be accepted which can be accepted. The ruler properly exacts corporal punishment, but does not accept it, because from punishment nothing properly comes to him.

But, in the next place, acceptilation is opposed to some sort of payment. Hence it is figuratively defined an imaginary payment. But Christ

gave his life a ransom[1] for us.[2] We were bought with a price, that is, we were liberated by some payment.[3] This is, therefore, no case of acceptilation. Neither is there a payment of the exact debt so as to liberate *ipso facto*, for our death, even our eternal death, was in the obligation. Nor is there a novation, nor a delegation, for after we are liberated there follows neither a similar debt nor another debtor. But this is a remission with an antecedent satisfaction. Socinus is mistaken in thinking that these conflict with one another, since on the contrary, all satisfaction (that is, refusable payment), is admitted in such a way that there is place for remission.

When we say that there is an antecedent satisfaction, it must be understood either in reference to the act itself, as in the case of the sins of Christians, or to a certain and irrevocable decree, as in the case of sins committed and remitted under the law. For what God decrees to do is regarded as already done, and when a debt is truly paid it makes no difference at what time this is done, especially with him who has most clear knowledge of what will certainly take place, and sees it by intuition as always present.[4]

The arguments therefore, which Socinus adduces to prove that satisfaction cannot follow remis-

[1] λύτρον. [2] Matt. xx. 28. [3] 1 Cor. vi. 20; vii. 23, vid. infra.
[4] Socinus admits this intuitional view of God's, ii. 27.

sion, or that it must take place exactly at the same time, and that there is indeed no novation or delegation, nor can there be any liberation when there is no remission are adduced in vain, and are not pertinent to the question. But when he says that the debt is entirely and immediately removed by satisfaction, this is certainly pertinent to the subject, but is not true, unless satisfaction be taken contrary to the usage of law, for the payment of the very thing which was due by the debtor. Of the latter we are not treating; but when another man pays for a debtor, and pays another thing than what was due, a double act of the will is required to liberate. For he who pays must intend that the debtor be liberated or there is no liberation, as we have shown above, and the creditor or ruler must be willing to accept the payment of one thing for another. Now, as any one may impose upon an act depending upon his own free-will, a law; so what is due without condition may be brought by novation under a condition. So, also, he who pays for another, and he who admits the payment of one thing for another, may jointly permit that remission follow either immediately or upon a fixed day, and also either without condition or with a condition. But this was the mind, and this the will both of Christ in making the satisfaction, and of God in admitting the satisfaction; this finally the treaty and

320 b] covenant, not that God should immediately remit the punishment at the very time of Christ's suffering, but when man, converted to God by true faith in Christ, should suppliantly pray for forgiveness, then, and not till then, should he be forgiven upon the advocacy and intercession of Christ with the Father. At this point, then, the satisfaction does not prevent remission from following. For satisfaction had not already removed the debt, but it had effected this, that at some time the debt should be removed on its account.

The word *remission*, powerless in itself, Socinus supplies with a support from the parable of Matt. xviii. 22 sq., and that by a twofold argument. First, that God is compared with a king remitting a debt to his servant, though no mention is added of satisfaction. Secondly, that we are tacitly commanded to do the same as God. But we ought by no means to forgive those who sin against us in such a way as to demand punishment from their friends.

The answer is easy. The comparison is stretched farther than that to which it has reference. Such extension in every argument derived from a similitude is a fault. Christ compares himself to a thief, and us to a steward giving away another's property, not that he steals, or that we ought to steal. But he compares himself to a thief because

he comes unexpectedly, and us to the steward because we ought to do with our own what he did with that which was not his own. So, in this parable of Matthew, kindness toward our neighbor is commended to us, because God is kind to us. The king in the parable and God correspond in this particular, that they are kind to those who are placed far below them. God exhibits this kindness by remitting punishment, the king by remitting a debt. Should there be another kind of debt, then there would be another kind of remission. But in this the king and God do not correspond, that the king remits without satisfaction, but God does not remit without satisfaction. But this is not intended to be the point of comparison.

There is also another reason. For with regard to the debt, the law of which has been prepared for the advantage of the creditor, a man has the freest power of decision. The less he demands, the more liberal he is. But in making a demand he exercises no act of virtue. But in regard to punishment, which pertains to the common good and to order, a ruler has, to be sure, power, but not boundless power. And when he exacts punishment he exercises a certain virtue, which is called retributive justice, as we have shown above.

So far as the second comparison which is instituted between God and us in the application of

the parable is concerned, nothing can be inferred from it except that it is not equitable in us to be more severe towards an equal than God, so much our superior, is towards us, miserable pygmies. Hence it follows that we ought not to demand vengeance more than God does punishment. But God has liberated us from punishment, therefore we ought to have no desire for vengeance. How God has effected that liberation the passage does not tell us, neither did it intend to tell us. At this point there is no similitude, but a dissimilitude. God is a judge, and we are private persons. It belongs to a judge to be solicitious of example; that care does not belong to private persons. The power of punishment is involved in the office of a judge; that power is taken away from private persons. But if the comparison were pressed too far, as is done by Socinus, it would follow that even judges ought not to demand punishment from criminals.

321 a] Dimly perceiving that the word *remission* is not strong enough to exclude every kind of payment, or satisfaction, Socinus hopes for more help in some way from another word, χαρίζεσθαι, which Paul uses thrice in this argument.[1] We have shown above that this word must point out some benefit, especially something not due. Socinus affirms, as if an established fact, that to

[1] Col. ii. 13; iii. 13; Eph. iv. 32.

complete the meaning of this word it is required that some one should take something from himself, deprive himself of some possession. This is plainly untrue. I will not dwell upon those references made everywhere in the Scriptures to the gifts[1] of God, as for example, among other things, when it is said to be given[2] to us to believe in Christ, and to suffer for Christ. When Jesus bestowed sight[3] upon the blind man did he deprive himself of any advantage? He who condemns an innocent man for the sake of another is said to deliver[4] that man to another though he was not the possession of the one condemning. Paul had exercised the severity of the apostolic condemnation upon the man guilty of incest, though he was not himself injured, and for no advantage to himself; remitting this, he says that he forgives.[5] Also when admonishing the Corinthians to admit the same man to the enjoyment of his former fellowship, he calls this also forgiving.[6] From these and many other passages of the New Testament, and of other writers as well, it clearly appears that to complete the signification of the word *χαρίζεσθαι* it is enough that the recipient obtain something not due to him, even if he who gives parts with nothing.

[1] *χαρίσματα.*
[2] *χαρισθῆναι.*
[3] *ἐχαρίσατο τὸ βλέπειν.*
[4] *χαρίζεσθαι*, Acts xxv. 11, 16.
[5] *χαρίζεσθαι*, 2 Cor. ii. 10.
[6] *χαρίζεσθαι*, ib. 7, and 10.

Moreover, as we have seen above, the ruler in punishment gives up nothing peculiar or personal. This is the more plain in this argument from the fact that forgiving is not only attributed to God but also to Christ.[1] The injury of sin is properly done to God, so that if on that account in remitting sins God must be said to take something from himself, yet the same cannot be said of Christ as mediator. There is no more truth in what Socinus adduces from his previous proposition, viz. that forgiving[2] is entirely inconsistent with any satisfaction, for it is not inconsistent with that which is admitted when it might be rejected, and to which he who is benefited has contributed nothing. But both of these things are true of Christ's satisfaction for us. The Latin word *condonare*, since the Holy Spirit has not seen fit to employ it in this discussion, would occupy our attention to no purpose. But if this word were also in the Sacred Writings, since in punishment giving, properly so called, has no place, and the tropical use of the word is not uncommon, nothing could be inferred from this quarter against satisfaction, since anything may rightly be said to be forgiven as well as remitted, even when a payment has been made, if it be such a payment as would not have the power of liberation without an act of free-will. When

[1] Eph. iv. 32.

[2] τὸ χαρίζεσθαι.

princes pardon those accused of capital crimes, they are accustomed to impose upon them some fine, and some public deprecation of their fault. Yet this does not prevent us from saying that they forgive crimes. How much more justly, therefore, may this word be used when [321 b the required satisfaction does not proceed from us, but liberation comes entirely gratuitously, so far as we are concerned, although not absolutely gratuitously. This is the meaning of Scripture when it says that we are justified freely, and immediately adds, "through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus."[1] Certainly when the Scripture says, and not in one place merely, that we are redeemed, and even with a price, and that Christ gave himself, or his flesh, to liberate us, we cannot in any fairness overturn all the force of these expressions by insisting upon the word *forgiveness*, above what usage demands.

To another argument of Socinus's which is derived from the imitation of God and Christ in freely giving commanded us, there is no need of making further response than has been already made to the parable of Matthew. The thing is proposed for our imitation, not every mode of the thing. The thing is kindness, even after sin; and out of this a consequent remission, or (if you prefer to say) forgiveness. The mode is differ-

[1] Rom. iii. 24.

ent, — in God, upon antecedent satisfaction; in our case without it. This is nothing wonderful when God is a judge, we private persons.

But if one contemplates the matter more subtilely he will find perhaps, that not even from that forgiveness which is prescribed to us is all satisfaction removed, but only that which in consideration of the person, viz. that of an equal, and not a superior, surpasses the proper limit. For that confession of fault, and prayer for forgiveness (which Christ does not forbid us to demand),[1] is not so entirely diverse from satisfaction but that the Latins, with a high degree of elegance called it by an appropriate term, *satisfacere*. So, also, Paul employs the word *forgive* of the Corinthians, when notwithstanding "the punishment inflicted of many" had preceded.[2] And in the ages next after the apostles we know that the peace of the church (as they called it), was not granted to those who had fallen publicly, except after certain public acts of humiliation, which they also called satisfaction.

The argument derived from liberality rests upon a fragile foundation. As we have shown before, that virtue which God exercises in remitting sins is not liberality, but clemency, which Seneca rightly defines as the lenity of a superior towards an inferior in fixing punishment. Cicero, em-

[1] Luke xvii. 4. [2] 2 Cor. ii. 6.

ploying the name of the genus for the species, called this very clemency lenity, and defined it, — justice residing in the moderation of the punisher, — the word justice being taken in so broad a sense as to include pity, faith, and friendship. This clemency pertains to that virtue which Aristotle in his Ethics calls πραότης. Clemency is τοῦ ἄρχοντος πραότης. But there is a great distinction between πραότης and ἐλευθεριότης. The Scriptures call this clemency of God by a somewhat more general term χρηστότης,[1] but never ἐλευθεριότης. And what is more to the point, the word ἐλευθεριότης is applied to God not even in other things which are commonly given and received. But this virtue is rather called the love[2] of God, for liberality is properly to give something in such a way that the giver has less. But as Socinus with great intemperance of speech condemns the perpetual doctrine of the [322 a church as impious and sacrilegious, so he, in recognizing as he does a twofold liberality of God (but we a single only), does great injury to the truth. For our doctrine recognizes not a twofold liberality (for that word is foreign to the argument, and is not employed in Scripture), but a twofold beneficence of God, and, indeed, a much greater beneficence than the newly arisen doctrine of Socinus. It is beneficence, in the first place,

[1] Rom. ii. 4; xi. 22; Tit. iii. 4. [2] [*Lat.* charitas.]

because when God was moved with great hatred of sin, and could no more choose to spare us than he could the angels that sinned, yet that he might spare us he not only admitted such a payment as he was not bound to admit, but further, he himself devised it. This benefit, certainly, is much greater and more illustrious than if God, plainly judging that it made no difference whether he set up an example or not, had left our sins unpunished, as Socinus says. Therefore the clemency of God is not overturned by the payment of the penalty, since the admission of such payment, and much more the devising of it, proceeded from clemency alone. It is beneficence, again, because God surrendered his dearly beloved Son, the image of himself, and (if it is proper so to speak) another self, to death, not only that he might testify to the truth of his doctrine, and so come to the resurrection (which are the two opinions between which Socinus hesitates), but even chiefly that he might perfect the payment of which I have spoken, or satisfaction, by bearing the punishment of our sins. In that case, Socinus ought certainly to confess that he would owe less to Christ than we owe. Nay, even the love of God is declared greater by us, as appears because justice requires us to estimate benefits not by their expense alone, but especially by the advantage which is derived from the expense for

the benefited party. But beside the advantage which Socinus confesses as well as we, we gratefully acknowledge one pre-eminent benefit which he denies.

We do not, however, say that God devoted his Son that he might receive his own, and so make God sordid, as Socinus reproaches us with doing; but we say that God did this that he might openly testify of the desert of sin and his own hatred of sin, and at the same time, so far as it could be done in sparing us, consult for the order of things and for the authority of his own law. Socinus's view is as unjust and (to use his own word, for he says that we make God monstrous [1]) as monstrous as ours. For the superadded end of making satisfaction renders the sufferings of Christ no more severe. Socinus himself is compelled to confess that they were inflicted by God without cruelty. Nay, because they have more objects to accomplish they are the more removed from the appearance of cruelty. For the cruel one is he who tortures another without cause, or for slight cause. And further, this object of making satisfaction or bearing punishment is connected with the death of Christ much more openly and much more closely than those objects which Socinus recognizes. Testimony of doctrine might be sufficiently and abundantly supplied by the

[1] [*Lat.* immanis.]

miracles; even celestial glory might easily be conferred upon Christ without the intervention of death; but death, and especially such a death, is a proper means of averting punishment, and the punishment itself of procuring liberation.[b]

322 b] But although up to this point we have shown that satisfaction was made to God by the punishment of Christ, we have not intended to deny that the efficacy of the satisfaction lay also in the action of Christ. For frequently a pleasing act is accepted, as it were, in compensation for punishment. "By adding a benefit," says Seneca, "the injury is prevented from appearing."[1] But although God, who needs nothing,[2] cannot receive a benefit, yet the supreme goodness accepts any kind of service as if it were a benefit. So Ahab averted temporal punishment by suppliantly venerating God. Not only a man's own action may procure impunity for him, but also that of some other one with whom he is connected. So David's posterity were saved from punishment on account of David himself,[3] and not only on account of the promises made to him, but also because his acts had pleased God, who estimated them accord-

[1] De benef. lib. vi. ch. v, where he shows that to return is to give one thing for another, and that by a payment not the same thing is paid, but its equivalent.

[2] ἀνενδεής.

[3] 2 Kings viii. 19.

ing to his own goodness.[1] Aelianus tells us that Aeschylus was liberated from punishment because his father Amyntas had bravely saved his native country. Among the Romans, when Titus Quinctius was accused he profited by the memory of his father Cincinnatus. Livy says of Appius: "He related the good deeds of his fathers towards the republic, that he might deprecate punishment." "Plautius Lateranus," says Tacitus, "was saved from execution for the distinguished merit of his uncle." And generally[2] Sallust: "If they have done wrong, ancient nobility, the brave deeds of their forefathers, protect them." Cicero: "The services of his ancestors, if any shall still be known, ought to help him who prays that he may be pardoned." Quintilian: "The merits of ancestors commend a man in peril." Josephus: "The services of ancestors ought to be a defence against the punishment due to posterity." But as deeds temporally good secure temporal impunity, the work of Christ, perfectly and spiritually good, has availed to secure our liberation from eternal punishment. This is the thought of the passage:[3] "By the obedience of one shall many be made righteous," that is, shall be justified, shall be regarded as innocent. And again: "For his name's sake" (viz. Christ's, for Christ alone,

[1] 1 Kings xi. 13; 2 Kings viii. 19; xx. 6.

[2] [*Lat.* Et in universum Sall.]

[3] Rom. v. 19.

and not God, had just been mentioned, as Socinus confesses [1]) are our sins forgiven.[2] Certainly by this phrase, "for any one's name's sake," is denoted the impulsive cause. Socinus has not proved the contrary by any other passage of Scripture.

But what we have now said of satisfaction, that it should be referred first to the punishment, and then to the act of submission, should be understood also of the propitiation of God, of our redemption, and of expiation. We will now gird ourselves for the explanation of these things.

[1] This is besides proved by a similar passage, Acts x. 43.

[2] 1 John ii. 12.

CHAPTER VII.

ON THE PROPITIATION AND RECONCILIATION MADE BY THE DEATH OF CHRIST.

LEST some one should suppose a dispute to have been instituted over a single word, Socinus has himself taken sufficient care to prevent it. Since he says in many places that he does not object to the mere word *satisfaction*, but to the thing expressed by that word. And so he repudiates all such expressions as these: Christ recon- [323 a
ciled God to us by his death; Christ liberated us from the hands of divine justice by giving it his blood as the price of our redemption; Christ made compensation for our sins by his own obedience; Christ richly merited that God should bestow upon us the remission of our sins; Christ by laying down his life appeased the wrath of God toward us;—and repudiates them no less than the word *satisfaction*. And yet if the dispute had been instituted over the word, it would not be just to deprive the church of the right of interpreting the Scriptures. In this is involved

the right of transferring those things which either the prophets have said in Hebrew or the apostles in Greek, and which are frequently redolent of Hebraisms and Syriasms, to other words, as may be most convenient, or of reducing to a summary, in a clear, abridged expression, what the Scripture has given in different places upon the same topic. So, as the Scripture has said that Christ was delivered to death on account of our sins, that he bore our sins, — that is, the punishment of our sins, — and that his blood was poured out for the remission of sins, we may express the thought by the significant Latin word *satisfaction*. For in law and common usage that word signifies the exhibition of some deed or thing, from which not indeed *ipso facto*, but by a succeeding act of the will, liberation follows; and it is commonly employed in this sense not only of pecuniary debts, but also of crimes. This is called in languages corrupted from the Roman "contenting any one."

But that it may appear that words having the same force, and even the very phrases which Socinus rejects, are found in the sacred writings, in addition to those which in the first explanation of this view above were adduced from the sacred volume, we will add also certain other testimonies, and refer them to four classes. The first class will contain words which designate the

averting of wrath; the second, those which indicate a liberation made by redemption, or the giving of a price; the third, those which carry an intimation of surrogation; the fourth, those which ascribe to the death of Christ the efficacy of an expiatory sacrifice.[1]

I. To turn to the first class: It is very well known that to turn away the wrath of any one is signified in Greek by the words *ἱλάσκεσθαι*, *εἰρηνοποιεῖν*, *καταλλάσσειν*, *ἀποκαταλλάσσειν*; in Latin, *placare*, *pacare*, *conciliare* or *reconciliare*, also *propitiare*. The act itself, and that by which the act is properly effected, is called by the Greeks *ἱλασμός*, and by the Latins *placamen*. Wrath in God is so called, as we have seen above, anthropopathically, as if it were a love of punishing. The apostle says it is disclosed or revealed from heaven upon all impiety and unrighteousness of men, since they hold back[2] the truth in unrighteousness, that is, rebel against the known commands of God. No one is excepted, since we are all by nature sons of wrath, that is, exposed to the divine wrath. This wrath abides over[3] certain ones. It is averted from those over whom

[1] [The remaining four chapters of the work are each occupied with one of these classes.]

[2] [E.V. "hold the truth"; Grotius: "detineo." Gr. "*κατέχω*." Rom. i. 18.]

[3] John iii. 36 [E.V. "abideth on." Grot. "super manet." Gr. "*μένει ἐπ' αὐτόν*."]

it does not remain. This aversion Christ obtains by his death, which is rightly called propitiation. The apostle John twice calls it this, when he says:[1] "If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation[2] for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." Also:[3] "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his 323 b] Son to be the propitiation[2] for our sins." With this passage we must compare that of Paul's: "God commendeth his love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us."[4] Both Paul and John prove by the same argument that we did not first love, but were loved by God. And when Paul says that Christ died, John says that he was made a propitiation. We should add also the following passage of Paul's:[5] "We are justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation[6] through faith in his blood."

Christ was therefore made ἱλασμός or ἱλαστήριον in his blood. Is this anything else than that which Socinus denies, that God was propitiated by Christ? For when ἱλασμός, in John, is interpreted expiation,[7] and when, further, Socinus

[1] 1 John ii. 1, 2. [2] ἱλασμός. [3] 1 John iv. 10.
[4] Rom. v. 8. [5] Rom. iii. 24, 25. [6] ἱλαστήριον. [7] ii. 20.

understands by this word "expiation" the destruction of sin, he does this without cause, and without authority. ἱλάσκειν among all Greek writers, poets, historians, and others, is *to propitiate*, and is ordinarily construed with the accusative designating the person whose wrath is turned away. The same is true in the Septuagint, and in Luke.[1] In one place only[2] is Christ said to be constituted high-priest to expiate the sins of the people. In this passage the phrase "to expiate sins" is an enallage, by Hebraism, where according to usage we should say, *to propitiate God concerning sins*.[3] So the Hebrews employ סָלַח. The phrase "to expiate sins"[4] is found in Ecclesiasticus. In the Psalms:[5] "Who forgiveth all thine iniquities." The meaning there is consequently expiation, but such an expiation as is made by propitiation. Otherwise this use of the word would have nothing in common with the nature of the word, or with its perpetual signification. Wherefore such expiation as Socinus speaks of,[6] that is, the destruction of sin, which may take place without propitiation, the word ἱλάσκεσθαι, and ἱλασμός, derived from it, cannot denote.

[1] xviii. 13 [passive.]

[2] Heb. ii. 17. εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ.

[3] ἱλάσκεσθαι Θεὸν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν.

[4] ἐξιλάσκεται ἁμαρτίας.

[5] τὸν εὐιλατεύοντα πάσαις ταῖς ἀνομίαις [Grot. ἁμαρτίαις.]

[6] ii. 16.

But ἱλαστήριον in Paul is interpreted by Socinus as that in which God shows himself propitiated. We do not deny that this signification can be made to agree with the word, and that for some such reason the writer to the Hebrews calls the cover of the ark ἱλαστήριον.[1] But since words of this termination properly indicate a certain effective power, but a declarative improperly, there is no sufficient reason for departing from the proper use. For Christ appears to be called by Paul ἱλαστήριον in the same sense as he is called ἱλασμός by John. But ἱλασμός everywhere means propitiation, and not the testimony of propitiation. Wherefore, Scripture interpreting Scripture, the word ἱλαστήριον must be expounded in reference to Christ actively, not declaratively. The additional word *blood*, to which the power of propitiation is ascribed, shows this. For "without shedding of blood there is no remission."[2] Trite is the passage:

"Sanguine *placastis* ventos et virgine caesa."

There are also similar passages from the poets, of which there will be an opportunity of speaking below.

324 a] II. The words καταλλάσσειν and ἀποκαταλλάσσειν, *to reconcile*, which Paul uses in this argument,[3] correspond to the word *propitiate*. So-

[1] Contra Soc., ii. 2. [2] Heb. ix. 22.

[3] Rom. v. 10, 11; 2 Cor. v. 18; Eph. ii. 16; Col. i. 20.

cinus says in reply that it is not written that God is reconciled to us, but we to God. This is because God is not angry with us, and so in need of propitiation, but we have ourselves turned away from him. But it is not true, as he assumes, that he who is of a hostile mind is reconciled, but not the other to him. For the word for reconciling, as well as the word for propitiating, employs promiscuously now the dative, and now the accusative of either party, both the hostile, and that which is not at all, or less, hostile. To reconcile us to God, therefore, and God to us, amount to the same thing. Sophocles, in the Ajax, says:

> Ἀλλ' οἴχεταί τοι πρὸς τὸ κέρδιστον τραπεὶς
> Γνώμης, θεοῖσιν ὡς καταλλαχθῇ χόλου.

The chorus thus expressed what Ajax had before said:

> Ἀλλ' εἶμι πρός τε λουτρὰ καὶ παρακτίους
> Λειμῶνας, ὡς ἂν λύμαθ' ἁγνίσας ἐμά,
> Μῆνιν βαρεῖαν ἐξαλεύσωμαι θεᾶς.[1]

We see plainly here that to be reconciled to the gods is the same as to escape their wrath. And

[1] [Plumtre gives the following translation of these two passages:

> "But he is gone, to best of tempers turned,
> That he may soothe the anger of the Gods."

> "But now I go to bathe
> Where the fair meadows slope along the shore,
> That having washed away my stains of guilt,
> I may avert the wrath the Goddess feels."]

surely no one who has examined with some degree of care the passages above quoted will deny that the apostle is speaking of this reconciliation, that is, the turning away of God's wrath, or at least of the latter.

III. For in Romans, chapter fifth, Paul, twice expressing, after his custom, the same thing as he had said before, that Christ died for the ungodly and for sinners,[1] immediately declares[2] that "when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son." But that this benefit is prior to conversion appears from the opposite member. "If these things are so," he says, "'much more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath,'"[3] "'much more being reconciled we shall be saved by his life.'"[4] The argument of the apostle proceeds from the greater to the less. If God was so good to us not yet converted, what will he be towards us converted? In this case, the word *reconciliation* in the former member cannot denote conversion. The apostle is pointing out something singular in Christ. But to convert sinners is not of this kind, for they are never converted except as sinners. But to die for sinners, and to reconcile sinners by death, is rare, and evidently singular, for they have always been very few who would

[1] vv. 6 and 8. [2] v. 10. [3] v. 9. [4] v. 10.

submit to death for the sake of good men though they were their friends.[1]

Again, it is more proper to say that we receive conversion to the glorious life of Christ than conversion to his death. But reconciliation is attributed to the death distinguished and discriminated from the glorious life of Christ, as the antithesis of the passage shows.

Besides this, we may understand from the later benefit what the earlier is. The later, which pertains to the unconverted, is to have peace with God,[2] to be saved from wrath.[3] This is what the apostle calls receiving reconciliation.[4] What is this receiving reconciliation but receiving remission of sins, as the Scripture says?[5] But [324 b to speak of receiving conversion is an unknown use of language. If, therefore, in the latter member to receive reconciliation is to receive reconciliation of sins, and by the effect to be liberated from wrath or from punishment, in the former member also to be reconciled ought to have an analogous meaning. The former benefit is the right to a thing; the latter is the exhibition of the same thing.

In addition to all this, one cannot say, except improperly or awkwardly, that the love of God is to be inferred from our being relieved of the hate

[1] v. 7. [2] v. 1. [3] vv. 9 and 10. [4] v. 11.
[5] Acts x. 43; xxvi. 18.

of God. If the apostle had wished to treat of the benefit of our conversion this should certainly have been expressed by some other word signifying not our action, but that of God. But nothing is plainer than our interpretation, nothing more pertinent to the apostle's object. The objection which Socinus raises that mention of satisfaction is not apposite here, or still more, that the glory of love is diminished by it, is invalid. For satisfaction is mentioned not with reference to punishment, but with reference to the mode of liberating us. Nor is it possible, as we have proved above, that the love of God for men should be displayed in any other way more clearly than in this, that though he was angry, that is, demanded punishment, yet he provided a way for our impunity by devoting Christ to this object.

IV. In 2 Cor. v., near the close, as in the passage from Romans, is found mention of a two-fold reconcilation. The former reconciliation is that by which God has reconciled all things, or the world, to himself, through Christ, or in Christ.[1] The latter is that to which the apostles, as ministers of reconciliation, to whom is committed the word of reconciliation, exhort men in the name of Christ, and God.[2] The former, therefore, cannot be conversion, for it is the antecedent, and

[1] vv. 18, 19. [2] vv. 18, 19, 20.

especial material of that discourse through which conversion is brought about.

Paul himself shows that it consists in a non-imputation of sins, that is, in a decree of non-imputation. Not to impute, and to remit sins, amount to the same thing.[1] How is this decree of non-imputation founded upon Christ? Let Paul answer:[2] "God hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin."

The objection of Socinus that non-imputation of sin conflicts with the mode of reconciliation through satisfaction lacks a reason. For, as has been explained above, satisfaction precedes, then the remission or non-imputation follows, not to dwell on the fact that it is not said absolutely that God does not impute sins, but that he does not impute them to the men who have sinned. But it is possible that sin should be both remitted or non-imputed to one, and imputed to another, for example's sake, or that another should be afflicted and punished for that cause, as is plain from many things alleged above, and especially from the history of David. It is not true, because the expressions "not imputing sins," and "he made him to be sin who knew no sin," do not exhibit entire verbal consistency, that they pertain to different things. They are connected by the copulative particles καὶ and γὰρ. No subject

[1] Rom. iv. 6, 7, 8. [2] 2 Cor. v. 21.

new or foreign to our argument intervenes. But it is said that God made the apostles ambassadors and ministers of a benefit provided by himself, **325 a**] that they are sent into the world for this purpose, to implant in men by their preaching faith in this benefit. For producing this belief there is a very powerful argument in the deliverance of Christ to death. For it is by no means credible that God was willing to allow his most dear and most innocent Son to be so grievously afflicted, except with some momentous end in view. But this end, ever peculiar and in perfect consistency with the act, on the testimony of Scripture throughout, with the aid of reason by induction, can scarcely be anything else than obtaining a right to pardon by an antecedent satisfaction. The expression, "We beseech you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God,"[1] although from the nature of the word it may signify either *throw off your hatred towards God* or *receive remission of sins* (viz. by penitence[2]), yet from the nature of the subject more readily admits the latter sense. For it is not common for the weaker to receive the stronger into favor. Those words of Paul express the ministry of reconciliation, which reconciliation he had just described as the non-imputation of sins. So Christ himself says that he

[1] v. 20. [2] Cf. Mark i. 4; Luke iii. 3; v. 31.

was sent to preach remission to captives,[1] and he commands his apostles to preach in his name remission of sins.[2] So Paul says that he proclaims the remission of sins.[3]

V. In Ephesians[4] it is written of Christ: "That he might reconcile both [Jews and Gentiles] unto God in one body." In this passage the dative θεῷ can be governed only by the word ἀποκαταλλάξῃ. But the interpretation of Socinus that θεῷ stands here by itself, or that to reconcile to God means to reconcile them to one another that they might serve God, is forced, harsh, and without authority. Neither can one draw a valid argument from the fact that in this place Paul is properly speaking of the peace made between Jews and Gentiles; for it does not follow that the peace made for both with God is alien from the discussion. The two different things which are united are so united that they are first and chiefly united with the connecting bond; and they are not united except by and because of the bond. Jews and Gentiles were made friends with each other through their friendship with God. It is remarkable that Socinus does not perceive this, since he says himself[5] that the apostle having begun to speak of the harmony

[1] κηρύξαι αἰχμαλώτοις ἄφεσιν, Luke iv. 18.

[2] κηρύσσειν ἐν ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν, Luke xxiv. 47.

[3] καταγγέλλειν ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν, Acts xiii. 38.

[4] ii. 16. ἵνα ἀποκαταλλάξῃ τοὺς ἀμφωτέρους ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι τῷ Θεῷ.

[5] On Col. i. 20–22.

obtained among creatures subjoins immediately, without transitional particles, the mention of that reconciliation by which men are made friends with God, — yes, even interjecting the word *καὶ*, which is commonly employed to connect only similar things. Hence it is manifest that these things are so connected that Paul in this passage referred the reconciliation of men with men to the reconciliation of men with God as he would an effect to its cause. It should be added that the blood of Christ is mentioned in this passage as if the reconciliation were effected by it. But it is common in Scripture to connect the blood of Christ with the remission of sins as an especially appropriate effect.[1]

325 b] VI. To the passage in Ephesians that passage to which allusion has already been made, viz. Col. i. 20, seems to correspond to such a degree that I have thought it should be brought in, rather than Eph. i. 9, 10, to explain the other. For there are many points of agreement. What is expressed in one passage separately by blood and the cross,[2] in the other is brought into one expression, "by the blood of the cross."[3] In the former you have *ποιῶν εἰρήνην*, in the latter *εἰρη-*

[1] Matt. xxvi. 28; Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14; Heb. ix. 22; Rom. iii. 24, 25; Rom. v. 9; 1 John i. 7; 1 Pet. i. 2; Rev. i. 5, viz. by propitiating power; 1 John ii. 2 and iv. 10.

[2] Eph. ii. 13 and 16.

[3] Col. i. 20.

νοποιήσας; there "to reconcile both unto God," here "to reconcile all things unto himself." The importance of this lies in the fact that in the former mention is made merely of men reconciled with one another because they had been reconciled to God; but in the latter, of men reconciled both among themselves and with the angels, because reconciled to God. εἰς αὐτὸν is everywhere *unto himself*,[1] that is, God, as it also is interpreted in Syriac לה, that is, *for himself*.[2] If those words meant what Socinus thinks they mean, namely, *into one*, it should have been written εἰς τὸ αὐτό, or at least εἰς αὐτό, and not εἰς αὐτόν, or εἰς αὐτόν, which necessarily refers to a certain person. It is no new thing that the preposition *in* with the accusative should be put instead of the dative, since among the Hebrews the interchange of בְּ and ל is very common. As Socinus confesses, the phrase καταλλάττεσθαί τινα πρὸς ἕτερον is in use among the Greeks. But no one will deny that in the apostles' style εἰς is put in the place of πρός, if he will diligently examine their writings.[3] Interchange of the same words occurs not infrequently in profane writers.

For these reasons it is not probable, as Socinus thinks, that in this paragraph the topic is simply the reconciliation of creatures with one another,

[1] [Lat. *in sese.*] [2] [Lat. *sibi.*]

[3] Vid. Matt. xv. 24; Acts xvi. 40; Eph. iii. 19.

but in the following paragraph the reconciliation of men with God. On the contrary, what is said universally in verse 20 is specially applied to the Colossians in verse 21, as is shown by the words καὶ ὑμᾶς, that is, *Nay, even you*, or *you also yourselves.* In the latter paragraph it is not said, as Socinus thinks, that reconciliation is made by rendering us blameless, but that we are reconciled in in order to render us blameless. Of an end Socinus makes a mode, certainly a great liberty to take! The Scripture everywhere hints that sins are remitted to us that for the future, bound by so great an obligation, we may live holily.[1] And it is to be noted that in this paragraph also mention is made of the body of Christ, which indeed was broken for us for the remission of sins,[2] and of his death, to which, as we have already seen, remission is in like manner frequently attributed as an effect. The apostle adds that we have been reconciled though we were alienated and hostile in mind, as he has elsewhere said that Christ died for us though we were sinners and impious.[3] We believe with the more correctness that he is here treating of the same benefit for the reason that the beginning from which the apostle had come down into this discourse was that we have redemption in Christ, viz. the remission of our sins.

[1] Luke i. 74. [2] 1 Cor. xi. 24; Matt. xxvi. 28.
[3] Rom. v. 6, 8.

And certainly we cannot more correctly understand how much God and Christ have loved us, and how much we owe to God and Christ than by considering that when we were as yet exposed to the wrath of God, and guilty of sins, a remission of sins was first obtained for us, and then [326 a applied to us. These two things the Scripture frequently connects.

In another place[1] Socinus says that God ought to be completely placated, and by no means angry with us, before Christ should be sent to make a covenant. But he seems elsewhere[2] to recognize how foreign to the truth this is, since he has made God, at the very moment when he offered us conditions of restoration to friendship, not placated, but placable. And certainly reason dictates this. For in setting all persons under conditions free, there are prior conditions. But a condition ought not to be merely offered, but also fulfilled, before the completed act. Wherefore the Scriptures say that we have peace with God after we have been justified by faith.[3] Before, we were children of wrath,[4] for our sins are the cause of separation, that is, turn God away from us.[5] This wrath excludes peace or friendship, but not every kind of love, taken in a broad sense.[6] Not even Socinus holds that sins are properly remitted to men be-

[1] i. 7. [2] i. 8. [3] Rom. v. i.
[4] Eph. ii. 3. [5] Isa. lix. 2. [6] Vid. John iii. 16; 1 John iv. 10.

fore repentance. But he who still imputes sins cannot be said to be placated at the time of the act, or, to use Socinus's term, fully placated.

To render this more clear we must make a distinction between three moments, if I may use the term, of the divine will.

The first is before the death of Christ was established, either in fact or in the divine decree and prescience. In this moment God was angry with the sinner, but not in such a way as to reject all plans for laying aside his wrath.

The second moment is when the death of Christ has been determined upon, in which God has not only decreed, but also promised, to lay aside his wrath.

The third is when a man with genuine faith believes in Christ, and Christ in accordance with the provisions of the covenant commends the believer to God. Here, now, God lays aside his wrath, and receives the man into favor.

But since active and passive verbs corresponding to the same things have a twofold signification, so as either to point only to the force and efficacy, or to include also the effect, viz. the ultimate effect, it follows that in the first moment neither of these is possible. In respect to that, God can only be said to be placable. In the second and third he may rightly be said to be placated with a distinction of the two senses which I have

already indicated. In the former sense it is said: "God reconciled the world to himself in Christ,"[1] and "We were reconciled to God when we were enemies."[2] In the latter: "Be ye reconciled to God,"[3] "We have received reconciliation."[4] The same is the meaning of the words "redemption" and "expiation," and of that phrase by which Christ is sometimes said to die for all, sometimes for particular ones.

Finally, we must note that the word "reconciliation" does not exclude satisfaction, or even payment or compensation. We find in Livy: "That he might by that gift reconcile to himself the minds of the citizens." Similar expressions are frequent in others. For this reason we ought not to avoid calling Christ our reconciler, as the Scripture also shows by adding to reconciliation the mention of blood.

[1] 2 Cor. v. 19. [2] Rom. v. 10. [3] 2 Cor. v. 20. [4] Rom. v. 11.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON OUR REDEMPTION MADE BY THE BLOOD OF CHRIST.

326 b] We come now to the second class of testimonies, which relates to redemption. We must first establish, as beyond controversy, the fact that redemption and similar words in the sacred writings are applied to our liberation from deserved punishment.[1] Socinus makes no objection. Nay, even those passages which say that we are redeemed from iniquity and vain conversation[2] pertain to the same thing, since it is very common to put *sin* for *the punishment of sin.* This is made evident in the passage from Titus[3] by the word καθαρίζειν, that is, *to expiate*, which we shall explain below; and in the passage from Peter[4] by the reference to a lamb, that is, a victim. Socinus does not deny that this redemption was ascribed to the death of Christ as a cause, since it is the testimony of many passages of Scripture.[5]

[1] Gal. iii. 13; Rom. iii. 24; especially, Eph. i. 7 and Col. i. 14.
[2] Tit. ii. 14; 1 Pet. i. 18. [3] Tit. ii. 14.
[4] 1 Pet. i. 18. [5] Eph. i. 7; Rom. iii. 24; Heb. ix. 12.

But the subject of this investigation is *how* the death of Christ is the cause of redemption. On our part, we say that the death of Christ was the cause of redemption, because God is induced by it to liberate us from punishment. But Socinus denies this. If there were any ambiguity in the testimonies in which mention is made of redemption, it would be sufficient for interpreting them to bring in other passages of the same argument, such as we have cited in great numbers, which show, and not obscurely, that Christ died for our sins, that he bore our punishment, and so obtained remission of sins for us, because God was placated by his death. But we trust that the same doctrine can be proved with sufficient clearness from the passages which contain the word "redemption," and other like words.

There are in the Scriptures two phrases, the one speaking of *the redemption of our sins*, the other of *our redemption*, different in form of expression, but both meaning the same thing.

The former expression occurs in the passage[1] where the death of Christ is said to have been suffered "for the redemption of the transgressions." By this style of speech, *to redeem transgressions*, or in Latin, *culpas*, *delicta*, *crimina redimere*, is signified not only the cause influencing one to liberate, but also such a cause as in-

[1] Heb. ix. 15. εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν παραβάσεων.

cludes compensation or satisfaction. This is so plain that Socinus ought to admit it also.

Since this is the most common signification of that phrase, we shall not feel permitted to withdraw from our position till two things are proved — that sometimes, even if less frequently, the phrase has another meaning, and that there is here sufficient reason why the more infrequent meaning should be preferred to the more frequent. Neither of these things is proved by Socinus. For he quotes no passage from either sacred or profane writer where the phrase under consideration means anything whatever but that which we have affirmed.

In one of Solomon's Proverbs[1] occurs the Hebrew word כֹּפֶר, which properly does not correspond to the Greek word *ἀπολυτροῦν*. Socinus notices this, and says that expiation, rather than 327 n] redemption, is designated by this word. It may be added that the original meaning of the word is *to cover*, and that the meaning is extended by a figure of speech. It is true that the Hebrew word, like many others, on account of the dearth of primitive words in that language, has many significations, so that it may signify now to redeem, and now other things. But it does not follow that the Greek word *ἀπολυτροῦν* has all the significations which the Hebrew כֹּפֶר has; for

[1] Prov. xvi. 6.

the word ἀπολυτροῦν has a simple use among the Greeks, corresponding to its derivation; but other significations of the word כָּפַר are expressed by other Greek words.

In Daniel[1] we find the word פְּרַק, which is by no means equivalent to the Greek ἀπολυτροῦν, but properly and frequently signifies *to bruise*, *to break*, *to tear off*, and, on account of this last, also *to liberate*. Yet if we interpret it in this passage, with the ancients, *to redeem*, we are not compelled to understand it as beyond the signification which we have defended. For God is induced by the fruits of repentance to prevent temporal punishments, as has been already noted.

The second form of expression, which has reference to the redeemed person, is found very frequently in the sacred writings accommodated to our argument.[2] In Greek the verb is λυτροῦν and ἀπολυτροῦν, and hence the verbals λύτρωσις and ἀπολύτρωσις. The question is: Is this act attributed to Christ properly, or improperly?

Socinus defines proper redemption[3] as liberation of a captive from the hands of his keeper by paying a price to that keeper. This is too restricted. For neither by nature nor usage is the

[1] iv. 24 [i.e. in Heb. Bib.; in Eng. iv. 27].

[2] Rom. iii. 24; Eph. i. 7, et al.

[3] That is ἀπολύτρωσις, for the Latin word redemption has various meanings.

word restricted to the captive alone, but may be used of every kind of inconvenience, as also the word liberation. You may therefore define more correctly: ἀπολύτρωσις, or redemption, is liberation of any one from inconvenience, λύτρον intervening. So Virgil used the words, and properly, when he said:

"Si fratrem Pollux *alterna* morte redemit."

Castor is liberated from perpetual death by a λύτρον intervening, viz. the alternate death of his brother.

Improperly ἀπολύτρωσις and redemption signify any liberation, even when a λύτρον does not intervene. But as Socinus confesses, and the laws teach us, we must not depart from the propriety of words, except for grave reasons. Therefore in doubtful cases ἀπολύτρωσις must be understood to be made with λύτρον intervening. But in this case there is no room for doubt, since the Scriptures plainly name the λύτρον. "For the Son of Man came to give his life a λύτρον for many."[1] With this passage must be connected those which say that redemption was made by death or in blood.[2] Though these passages were strongly contested by Socinus, he could invent nothing better to say than that λύτρον is here used improperly. But he defines λύτρον or price, in its proper use, as that which is received by the

[1] Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 45. [2] e.g. Heb. ix. 12.

keeper. Here, first, we must repeat what we have just said, that we ought not to aban- [327 b
don the proprieties of language, except in urgent cases. But if Socinus has assigned any reasons for inventing an impropriety, we trust they have been explained by us above.[1]

The comparison instituted between Moses and Christ scarcely needs a reply; for every similitude has its limits, beyond which it cannot be pressed. They are compared as liberators, and not in respect to the mode of liberation. It no more follows that Christ did not liberate by making satisfaction because Moses did not, than that Christ liberated by the death of enemies because Moses did. If the comparison illustrated the mode of liberation, to make it more exact you ought to say that Christ liberated us by miracles (like Moses), and not by death and blood, because these things are never ascribed to Moses, and cannot be. But the principal thing is that the word λύτρον, of the force of which we are treating here, is connected with the liberation obtained through Christ in Scripture, but never with that obtained through Moses. What are we to say when not even in the opinion of Socinus is the mode of liberation the same? For Moses, Joshua, and others liberated, not by doing anything about those who were to be liberated (a thing which

[1] Chaps. iv., v., and vi.

Socinus ascribes to Christ), but by removing those who stood in the way of liberty, viz. enemies.

The proper meaning of the word must therefore be retained. Yet the definition of Socinus must be somewhat changed, so that λύτρον may be properly understood as a thing or a deed by which any one is induced, although on the point of inflicting some evil on a man, to allow him to be released from it. In defining λύτρον a deed or thing, we do not disagree with Socinus, who admits that anything which satisfies another, and not merely money, may properly be called λύτρον. But he improperly restricts λύτρον to captivity alone, although this word comports with servitude, exile, and death, and every evil from which we can be liberated. For the root, viz. λύω, refers to these things, and the common usage is not violated thereby.

There is also another opinion of Socinus's which we do not approve, — that λύτρον, properly so called, may be accepted by any one. If the word *accept* be rigidly adhered to, as should be done in definitions, it cannot be applied to deeds, but to things only. But satisfaction can be made and liberation obtained by deeds also. This appears especially in that liberation which is granted upon transfer of punishment. Punishment is not properly accepted by every one, as appears from what we have said above, where we have shown

that in punishment no one is properly and naturally creditor. Besides, the word *acceptance* properly indicates, if not a transfer of ownership, at least some advantage to the accepting party. But in punishment regard is had not to the individual advantage of the person who punishes, but to the common good and the order of the state. There is therefore no acceptor in this case, except you please, altogether improperly, to call a judge an acceptor, as the guardian of law, equity, and the common good. *Λύτρον*, nevertheless, has its proper place, even in punishment. So the eye of Zaleucus was the *λύτρον* of the eye of his son, and in decimation those who are punished are the *λύτρον* of the whole legion.

The ancient Latins, whose whole language is a corruption of the Greek, by the insertion of one letter called *λύτρον lustrum*, and *λυτροῦν lustrare*. Ennius writes in Latin *lustra Hectoris* what in Greek would be *Ἕκτορος λύτρα*.[1] To lustrate a city is, therefore, to liberate it from punishment by a lustration, that is, substitutionary [328 a punishment, which is also called a propitiatory sacrifice.[a] Appianus says:[2] "They bear the purifying articles through the fleet, the officers

[1] Scaliger, 466 catalect.

[2] Civilium lib. v. *περιφέρουσιν ἀνὰ τὸν στόλον τὰ καθάρσια, συμπεριπλέον τῶν αὐτοῖς τῶν στρατηγῶν, καὶ ἐπαρομένων, ἐς τάδε τὰ καθάρσια ἀντὶ τοῦ στόλου τὰ ἀπαίσια τραπῆναι.*

making the circuit with them, and joining in the prayers that through those lustral offerings things ominous of ill may be averted from the fleet." So, according to the foolish doctrines of the heathen, the Decii lustrated the Roman army. Menoeceus once lustrated Thebes, of whom his mother says, in Papinius:

> "Lustralemne feris ego te, puer inclyte, Thebis,
> Devotumque caput, vilis ceu mater alebam?"

On which Luctatius, or whoever that ancient scholiast is: "It is a Gallic custom to lustrate a city with a human victim." He says *lustrate*, where Caesar had said *placate* the divine majesty of the immortal gods. Therefore in punishment *placamen* and *lustrum*, and the Greek ἱλασμός and λύτρον, are the same. The apostles use them in reference to the truth in the same sense as the pagans used them of a false faith. So in the Epistle to the Hebrews λύτρωσις and καθαρισμός are put for the same thing.[1]

But we infer that λύτρον must be taken in its proper sense in this argument not so much from the fact that there is no sufficient reason for descending to an impropriety, as from this fact, that from no sacred or profane writer has a passage been brought forward in which the signification of λύτρον is carried beyond the description given by us.[2] From the Greek Socinus brings for-

[1] Heb. ix. 12, 14, 15, 22, 23.

[2] See Isa. xliii. 3.

ward no passage, from the Hebrew only one,[1] in which כֹּפֶר occurs. But in addition to the consideration that כֹּפֶר has a wider signification than λύτρον, because λύτρον is from λύειν, which signifies to liberate, whereas כֹּפֶר is a word of many significations, as we have shown above, it cannot be proved that in this passage anything else is designated by the word כֹּפֶר than that which is able to move him who was on the point of doing injury not to do it, whether he has only the power and disposition to do injury, or also the authority and right. The passage of Solomon: "The כֹּפֶר (or if you like) λύτρον of a man's life are his riches," is like that of Job:[2] "All that a man hath will he give for his life." For one use of riches, among others, is this, that they are able to soothe many men's wrath, whether just or unjust, and so turn away imminent injury; according to the passage:

"Munera crede mihi, *placant* hominesque deosque."

And evidently there is in that proverb an elegant comparison of the advantages which the two fortunes each bestow. The rich man has that with which he may placate the enraged; the poor man is less exposed to the wrath of another.

But if it were entirely true that λύτρον may refer to any expenditure whatever, even when no one is induced to liberate (which is proved by no

[1] Prov. xiii. 8. [2] Job ii. 4.

example), yet the word ἀντίλυτρον which Paul employs[1] is too significant to admit so frigid an interpretation. The word ἀντὶ in composition signifies either contrariety or commutation. There is no place here for contrariety; the meaning is therefore compensation. In the same way the Greeks call those ἀντίψυχοι who devote themselves to death to liberate another. So ἀντίλυτρον is such a λύτρον that in giving it the liberator undergoes something similar to the evil which 328 b] hung over him who is liberated. There is an excellent circumlocution for this word in Galatians:[2] "Christ redeemed[3] us from the curse, being made a curse for us." Of the sense of this passage we have spoken above. Further, Peter compares the blood of Christ to gold and silver as something far greater than they, so far as price is concerned.[4] Now gold and silver are truly, and not figuratively, a price. Wherefore, also, blood must be equally, or much more truly, a price. Now price is that by expending which some thing or some right is acquired. And such is the nature of price that by its own power, or the estimation of others, it induces another to make over some thing or right, for example, impunity. We may here add those passages which show that Christ gave his flesh or himself for the

[1] 1 Tim. ii. 6. [2] Gal. iii. 13. [3] ἐξηγόρασεν.
[4] 1 Pet. i. 18. 19.

life of the world and to liberate us.[1] For this phrase, *to give one thing* for another, is perfectly well adapted to express a genuine price.

Socinus can evade the difficulties of these and other passages in which death or the blood of Christ are called the price of our liberation, only by saying that indeed it is the effect of Christ's death to liberate us from sin (for of liberation from the service of sin this is not the place to treat), but that it is in relation to ourselves, and not to God. In other words, God is not induced by it to liberate us; but we are induced to come to liberation. But this refuge is closed against him by what we have already said, and many other things.

For, first, the word λύτρον, and much more ἀντίλυτρον, are of such a nature as to denote that which is concerned with the liberator before it is concerned with him who is liberated.

Again, although buying is sometimes used for simply acquiring, or selling for alienating,[2] yet the word "price" added to the word "buying"[3] requires a nearer likeness. For it is the chief characteristic of a price that it is estimated by some one as of the same value as the article bought.

Further, the apostle explains ἀπολύτρωσις by

[1] John vi. 51; Tit. ii. 14. [2] [*Lat.* vendere pro mancipare.]
[3] 1 Cor. vi. 20; vii. 23.

ἱλαστήριον.[1] But ἱλάσκειν is an act which is engaged with the liberator before it is with him who is to be liberated. In other places[2] λύτρωσις is explained by καθαρισμός, that is, expiation. Of the force of this word we shall treat below.

Still further, when an effect is ascribed to anything very frequently, and in such a way that it is never found ascribed to anything else (as redemption is referred to the death and blood of Christ[3]) we must admit that the end is peculiar and near, rather than common and remote. But in our case Socinus would have the effect of liberation removed by many steps from the death of Christ, and so not peculiar, so that it agrees much more perfectly with other things to which it is not ascribed. His statements concerning the connection of our liberation with the death of Christ may be explained compendiously as follows: Liberation follows holiness of life; holiness the hope of reward; hope arises first and chiefly from the resurrection. But liberation is attributed to death, either because this is the way to the resurrection, or because joined and compared with the
329 n] resurrection it confirms the same hope. It follows hence, even upon the confession of Socinus,[4] that we are liberated much more by the

[1] Rom. iii. 24, 25. [2] Heb. ix. 12 sq.

[3] Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 45; Rom. iii. 24; Gal. iii. 13; Eph. i. 7; Tit. ii. 14; Heb. ix. 15; Rev. v. 9; [Acts] xx. 28.

[4] ii. 3.

resurrection of Christ than by his death. No, if we admit the truth, death has no connection with that effect, except casually. For the resurrection does not produce faith, except as a part of the glory of Christ. But supreme glory could have come upon Christ if he had not died. As for Christ's giving us an example that we should follow, it is a fact which cannot be at all adapted to remission of sins, which does not belong to Christ.

Why, then, is death so often mentioned in this matter of redemption? Socinus gives two reasons. The first is, that there is in death a certain expense which there is not in resurrection, and so the mention of death is more suitable to redemption; the second, because the love of Christ and God is more fully indicated in death. So far as the first is concerned, we rely upon the same reason. For if our liberation has not followed as an effect of the death of Christ in itself (which is the profession of Socinus set forth in unmistakable expressions), there was no need that Christ and the apostles should speak of redemption or price, especially so many times, when the liberation might be explained more fittingly by other words. But the second reason, that it is appropriate to those declarations which set forth the love of God, does not apply very well to others, at least, which do not treat of this; nor does it explain the word employed — redemp-

tion. I do not insist, at present, upon the fact that love is not shown by a thing which is not so much the cause of our benefit as the mere occasion. Socinus thinks that he presses our doctrine hard when he says that the Scriptures speak of the redemption made through Christ in such a way as to put something plain before our eyes, and not to indicate some concealed virtue, such as he thinks that is which we have drawn from the Scriptures. This is not wounding us, but supplying a weapon against himself. "For who knoweth the things of God, but the Spirit of God, and he to whom the Spirit will reveal them?"[1] The death of Christ was provided by God that the punishment of our sins might be exacted of him, and that he might be made our λύτρον. Isaiah had said this long before; Christ had said it; and the sacred writings under the first covenant had foreshadowed it; so that he who attended to those things could not be ignorant of God's will in this matter, not to say that even nature says, in a certain sense, that death is the wages of sin. This will of God having become known from the sacred oracles, the great love of God towards us is inferred from it, as John[2] and Paul[3] suggest. The same is indicated by the word μαρτύριον.[4] And these things, without any labor

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11.
[2] 1 John iv. 10.
[3] Rom. v. 8.
[4] 1 Tim. ii. 6; cf. vs. 4.

of investigation, are conveyed by the mere words of Scripture interpreted with simplicity. But the derivation of liberation from death which Socinus draws out by so many steps and various ways it is so impossible to make from the words of Scripture that not even from Socinus can we discover easily what he thinks to be the proper sense of Scripture in those passages.

We have, therefore, proved a true redemption, as just now we proved a true placation. But by proving either of these we prove what [329 b was proposed, viz. that we are liberated by the punishment of Christ, which he paid for our sins. I do not mean to say that all redemption or reconciliation is of this kind; but the matter under consideration does not admit of any other. It is therefore foolish and foreign to the subject to say, as Socinus does so many times, that one may be appeased though nothing is paid, and that one may be truly redeemed who owes nothing, and hence without payment. We treat of a placation and redemption which the Scriptures indicate was made by the presentation of something, viz. death, and of a redemption by which the same Scriptures testify we are liberated from deserved punishment. But such a presentation as liberates him who owes punishment from that punishment is rightly and properly called satisfaction. Socinus sees this, and in order to destroy satisfaction has destroyed also placation and true redemption.

Let me notice here, in passing, certain other things which he has treated, not indeed while conducting the argument upon redemption, but elsewhere, and which pertain to this argument.[1] He thinks that the only signification of the word *Μεσίτης* in the sacred writings is *interpreter of God.* But to me two passages seem to point plainly to another meaning. The one is in Timothy,[2] where there is said to be one Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus, who has given himself a ransom[3] for all. The other is in Hebrews,[4] where Christ is said to be the Mediator of the new covenant, in order that death having come for the redemption of transgressions, they who were called might obtain eternal life. To these may properly be added a third passage: "Jesus the Mediator of the new covenant."[5] The mediation here appears to consist in redemption or ransom.[6] This is consistent with the word "mediator." For to the duty of mediator pertain offices in behalf of men with God no less than in behalf of God with men. Not only among the unlearned, but also among those who speak more elegantly, he is called a mediator who placates any one. Hence Suidas has interpreted this word by *εἰρηνοποιός*.

[1] i. 7. [2] 1 Tim. ii. 5. [3] *ἀντίλυτρον.*
[4] Heb. ix. 15. [5] Heb. xii. 24.
[6] [*Lat.* Apparet hic *τὸ μεσίτευμα* statui in ipsa redemtione, aut etiam in ista.]

Socinus elsewhere says[1] that dignity of person has no influence upon the estimation of punishment; and so the divine nature of Christ and his consummate perfection give no weight to the value of his punishment. But we believe otherwise. We believe that this punishment must be estimated with the consideration in mind that he who bore it was God, although he did not bear it as God. This is the meaning of the phrase which declares that God purchased the church with his *own* blood.[2] In the same way it is elsewhere[3] said that the Lord of glory was crucified. The dignity of his whole person, that is, the dignity of Christ, contributed not a little to this estimation. So we find the following phrases in the Scriptures to give emphasis to the fact: "The blood of the Lord";[4] "The blood of Christ"[5]; "The blood of Jesus Christ the Son of God."[6] The perfect innocence and sanctity of Christ is an element of the same estimation. Hence the blood is said to be "precious as of a lamb without spot,"[7] where allusion is made to the custom of the Greeks, as well as the Hebrews, to bring to the sacrifices sheep of surpassing whiteness and every beauty of body. These, because they [330 a excelled the whole flock, were called by a word originated in the sacrifices, but transferred thence

[1] iii. 4. [2] Acts xx. 28. [3] 1 Cor. ii. 8. [4] 1 Cor. xi. 27.
[5] Heb. ix. 14. [6] 1 John i. 7. [7] 1 Pet. i. 19.

to profane things, — excellent.[1] The following[2] suggests the same thought: "My righteous servant shall justify many." "He made him to be sin who knew no sin."

Socinus argues that because Divinity itself did not suffer, therefore it does not come into the consideration of punishment. But this is as if one should say that it makes no difference whether you scourge a private man or a king, an unknown man or your father, because the blows are inflicted upon the body, and not upon the dignity or relationship. This dense error Aristotle long ago refuted in the Nicomachian Ethics:[1] "If he struck a ruler, he must be not only beaten, but also chastised." The common opinion also dissents from Socinus. For the peoples whose institutions are most highly praised estimate punishments by the dignity of the persons and other qualities. By the Roman laws, which are confessedly the most equitable, punishments are varied with regard to the condition of persons, and there is thought to be a true equality if persons not equal suffer punishments not equal.[4] That also other

[1] [The Latin play upon words cannot be exactly imitated: *pecudes, ... quae quod a toto grege* eximerentur, ... eximiae *dicebantur.*]

[2] Isa. liii. 2; 2 Cor. v. 21.

[3] v. 8. Εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι.

[4] L. *Moris.* § *istae.* L. *in servorum.* Et L. *Aut facta* § *per-*

nations celebrated for their wisdom had the same opinion has been abundantly shown by those who have written of the republic; and the interpreters of the Roman law prove the same thing.

sona. L. *Capitalium* § *ult.* D. de poenis. L. i. § ult. et L. *Qui caedem.* D. Ad L. Corneliam de sicariis. L. ult. § 1. D. de incendio. L. iii. D. de Privil. vet. L. ult. D. de sepul. viol. L. 1 et ult. D. de furib. balneariis.

CHAPTER IX.

THE MEANING OF THE STATEMENT THAT CHRIST DIED FOR US.

In the third class[1] we have put those testimonies which indicate a substitution, as when Christ is said to have tasted death for all,[2] to have suffered for the people,[3] to have suffered for us,[4] to have died for us when ungodly and sinners,[5] and to have died one for all.[6]

It is the common usage of all languages that when one has done or suffered anything instead of, or in place of, another, he is said to have suffered or done it for him. Thus we find in Terence: "Pro illo te ducam: Ego pro te molam." In Virgil:

> "meliorem animam pro morte Daretis
> Persolvo."

Also:

> "Unum pro multis dabitur caput."

This phrase is applied to things, as well as persons. That is said to be given, put, regarded for

[1] Contr. Soc., ii. 8. [2] Heb. ii. 9. [3] John xi. 50.
[4] 1 Pet. ii. 21. [5] Rom. v. 7, 8. [6] 2 Cor. v. 14.

this or that, which is given, put, or regarded in place of, or instead of it.[1] Socinus rejects this interpretation on account of the ambiguity of the word *for*, which frequently has the meaning *to the advantage of*. This is true of the Latin *pro*, as well as the Greek ὑπέρ. But the word ἀντί[2] clearly excludes that meaning, and requires a commutation. Thus it is said that "evil is rendered *for* evil"[3]; "an eye *for* an eye, and a tooth *for* a tooth"[4]; "serpent *for* a fish"[5]; "birthright *for* one morsel of meat"[6]; [330 b "hair *for* a covering."[7] Whenever that particle is applied to persons, it signifies that one person has succeeded to the place of another. So Archelaus is said to have reigned in Judea *in the place of* Herod his father,[8] that is, to have succeeded him in his kingdom. So Peter is commanded to give a piece of money *for* himself and Christ,[9] because in that act he being one sustained the part of two. In the same way in profane writers: "One *for* many,"[10] and similar passages. Checked here, Socinus does not dare to deny that by the phrase ἀντὶ πολλῶν a certain exchange is indicated. But he escapes by a miserable subterfuge. Since redemption is under

[1] חלף Arab., Syr.
[2] Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 45.
[3] 1 Pet. iii. 9; Rom. xii. 17.
[4] Matt. v. 38.
[5] Luke xi. 11.
[6] Heb. xii. 16.
[7] 1 Cor. xi. 15.
[8] Matt. ii. 22.
[9] Matt. xvii. 27.
[10] εἷς ἀντὶ πολλῶν.

discussion, he says, there is a place for the preposition *ἀντί*, even if the captive owes nothing for the redemption. This is true, but irrelevant. We do not infer the payment directly from the word *ἀντί*; but we infer from it that Christ died in our stead, that is, unless Christ had died we should have died, and because Christ died we are not to die with eternal death. For the word *ἀντί* joined with the name of a person and the verb *to give* requires, without exception, that the person indicated by the genitive should have given the same in genus or species that another has now given. It makes no difference whether it is according to law, as in a bond for debt, or contrary to law, as in case of anything captured by robbers. This being true, that we should have been subjected to death if Christ had not died, a payment is rightly inferred from the nature of the case. For we must have been subjected to death, either justly or unjustly. Not unjustly, for we had deserved death; therefore justly. If justly, we were therefore debtors for death. From this debt Christ obtained liberation for us by giving something. But to give something that by it another may be liberated from debt is either to pay or to make satisfaction. Therefore the expression "to give for many" indicates a true exchange, as always, not a metaphorical exchange, as Socinus pretends without giving proof.

With reference to another preposition ὑπέρ, we must observe that this, not indeed always, but almost always, has the same meaning as ἀντί. Paul wishes that he might be accursed for his brethren's sake,[1] that is, instead of the Jews, who would otherwise persevere in unbelief, and be accursed.[2] The apostles are ambassadors for Christ, that is, they are ambassadors instead of Christ himself.[3] Since, therefore, ἀντὶ necessarily denotes exchange, and ὑπὲρ may sometimes be used in the same sense, what should prevent us from interpreting a word of doubtful signification by one of certain meaning, especially when they are employed in the same argument?

But, in the first place, this interpretation seems to be required by the well-known passage: "If one died for all, then were all dead."[4]

But, again, even if the word ὑπὲρ, which is in itself ambiguous, had not been employed in these passages, but it had been said openly that Christ died for our good, yet by this the commutation would not have been excluded,—nay, it would rather be included by a comparison of other passages. For he who dies that he may liberate another thereby, dies for his good.

Neither can this sense be set aside be- [331 a
cause else where the act of Christ is proposed to us as an example. For it is sufficient for the

[1] ὑπέρ. [2] Rom. ix. 3. [3] 2 Cor. v. 20. [4] 2 Cor. v. 14.

example that there should be a certain general resemblance, although there may be a difference in the special mode, of which, notwithstanding, mention is made for the sake of marking it out more distinctly. This is very clear from the exhortation of Peter.[1] He would have us patient in bearing afflictions which we suffer innocently. He adduces the example of Christ, who, he says, also himself suffered. This was enough for the comparison; but he added "for us," which does not belong to the comparison, but refers to the passion of Christ considered in itself. The common thing, therefore, is patience; the mode differs. If not so, in vain would Paul ask whether Paul had been crucified for the faithful.[2] He could have been crucified for the church, that is, for the advantage of the church, as he says that he suffered for the church,[3] and as afterwards, to the great good of the church, he was beheaded, and Peter and other apostles crucified. But in that way in which Christ was crucified, in bearing our sins in our stead, neither could Paul be crucified nor any one else. The word *for* in these passages denotes something peculiar, which cannot be communicated to apostles. But it might be communicated if it differed from that of the apostles only in degree, and not also in its peculiar object. So in Hebrews ii. 10, the example is in

[1] 1 Pet. ii. 19. [2] 1 Cor. i. 13. [3] Col. i. 24.

this, that Christ by sufferings attained glory; the special mode in this, that Christ suffered "for all."[1] But as in those passages patience, so in other passages love is commended to us by the same example of Christ; but the special mode plainly designates the act of Christ. Yet if we examine those passages more closely, we shall see that the reference is not so much to the act of death as to the peril of death. For the phrase "to lay down life," which John alone employs,[2] is not properly to lose life, but as it were to pledge it, that is, to submit to the peril of death. And so in those passages that which is prescribed to us is not merely to the advantage of another, but also involves a certain exchange, very much as Horace says:

> "Paratus omne Caesaris periculum
> Subire, Maecenas, tuo."

In the remark of Caiaphas,[3] not only where he ignorantly let fall a prophecy, but where he spoke his own true sentiment, there was an indication of a substitution. He imagined the inevitable ruin of the Jews if Christ should be permitted to live; on the contrary, if Christ should be killed, that certain security would be obtained on account of it. Therefore he really wished to substitute the death of Christ for the ruin otherwise

[1] ὑπὲρ παντός, v. 9.

[2] x. 11, 15; 1 John iii. 16, as well as John xiii. 37, 38, xv. 13.

[3] John xi. 50.

impending. And so he wished the same in kind to befall Christ as that which the people would otherwise suffer, and he believed the death of Christ to be a near, and in itself a suitable, cause of the liberation of the people. This is the same as to say that he wished that Christ should perish in the place of the people, who otherwise — that is, under the contrary condition — would perish.

Here, as we pass on, it should be observed that Caiaphas placed the effect of Christ's death first not with the Jews, for whose liberation he was consulting, but with the Roman rulers, whose **331 b**] wrath he wished to escape. So that if it is true, as Socinus urges, that we are to take that interpretation of the words of Caiaphas which at the same time corresponds to the mind of the Holy Spirit and his own mind, this dying for the people must by all means signify that safety is to be secured from another. But that other, according to the mind of the Spirit, can be none but God. Hence it follows that this act of Christ has to do first with God, and then with men, which Socinus obstinately denies.

But those things which have been already said on the signification of exchange in the particle *for* are fully illustrated from the nature of expiatory sacrifices. For Scripture and the common opinion agree that blood is given in them for the life. This now, at last shall be explained.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE EXPIATION MADE BY THE DEATH OF CHRIST.

THERE remains a last class of testimonies, which show that the death of Christ was an expiatory act. Since these have been wrapped by the artifice of Socinus [1] in thick clouds, we have reserved them for the last, that they might receive some light from what has gone before.

Socinus and we are agreed upon the word. Both of us say that Christ died an expiatory victim, or sacrifice for sin; for this is the clear testimony of the divine Epistle to the Hebrews.[2] But of the proper force of that word Socinus takes one view, the Christian church another. The disagreement may be briefly and perspicuously explained, if we say that according to Socinus the effect of expiation is primarily and properly concerned with future sins, because the death of Christ, by begetting faith within us, draws us away from sin, but as to sins that are past, only secondarily; and in respect to these

[1] ii. 9–23.

[2] Especially chap. ix.

also all this action is engaged with us, and not with God; that is, God is not influenced to remit, but we are prepared to receive remission, viz. through emendation of life. But according to the doctrine of the church, which agrees with the Scriptures, the effect of expiation is properly concerned with past sins, and the act first with God, who is influenced to remit. That the act is first concerned with God, and not with men, is proved from the nature of the priesthood. For a priest "is ordained for men in things pertaining to God,"[1] but not for God in things pertaining to men, which is the office of a prophet. But since the sacrifice, especially the expiatory sacrifice, is an act of the priest as such (for the high-priest is appointed to offer "sacrifices for sin"[2]), it follows that a sacrifice is one of those things which are done for man with God.

The whole matter may be made clearer by a comparison of the sacrifices of the ancient law with this sacrifice. This comparison is derived from the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and also from the prophets and apostles.

The ancient law may be viewed in two aspects, either carnally or spiritually—carnally, inasmuch as it is an instrument of the Jewish state; spiritually, inasmuch as it had a shadow of good things 332 a] to come.[3] In the former view[4] the expi-

[1] Heb. v. 1.
[2] Heb. v. 1; viii. 3.
[3] Heb. x. 1.
[4] Contra Soc., ii. 9.

atory sacrifices of the law sanctified to the purifying of the flesh, the character of which we will explain.

The law of God had this sanction: "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all the things that are written in the law to do them."[1] Any one who had deflected even in the least degree from the law was subject to punishment.[2] This punishment, in a carnal sense, was a violent death, which is clear from the opposite, because life is promised to him who fulfils the law.[3] But as in every state rightly constituted the king, either through his judges or, if these fail, personally, exacts punishment, so in the Hebrew state, which Josephus has rightly called a theocracy (because God was its King[4]) God ordinarily exacted the penalties of the law by judges, yet exacted the same penalties in person if the judges failed in their duty. "The people shall stone him with stones, or[5] I will set my face against that man, and will cut him off."[6] This was not a mere threat; but God executed it frequently, as appears from many examples in the Old Testament. But as the legislator may relax his own law, especially a penal law, God, the King of the Hebrews, in certain crimes admitted expiatory vic-

[1] Deut. xxvii. 26; Gal. iii. 10. [2] See James ii. 10.
[3] Lev. xviii. 5; Gal. iii. 12. [4] Judg. viii. 23; 1 Sam. viii. 7
[5] [Grot. "*aut*"; Heb. "ו"; E. V. "And."] [6] Lev. xx. 3.

tims in place of the sinner himself, and by them, but not otherwise, decreed to liberate the sinner from death. The rash swearer deserved death according to the law,[1] but could be expiated by a victim.[2] "The priest shall atone for him," says the law, "and it shall be remitted to him."[3] If any one had lied unto his neighbor in that which was committed to him to keep, or in fellowship, or had deceived his neighbor, or stolen anything, he was guilty, and the law declared it.[4] But the same guilty man, in addition to restoring to the injured man that which was lost, as he was bound to do, might present a victim, be expiated, and receive remission for that which he had done.[5] Expiation and remission are frequently mentioned together.[6] Wherefore in crimes which pertained to the criminal law, God admitted propitiation, redemption, satisfaction, and finally compensation by the death of a beast for the death of a man otherwise due.

But universally, and for all crimes, the law did not permit such a relaxation of the carnal punishment. It was with reference to this that Paul said that through Jesus was announced remission of sins (that is, a spiritual remission), and that believers were justified in him from all sins from

[1] Ex. xx.7. [2] Lev. v. 5. [3] Lev. v. 6, 13.
[4] Lev. vi. 2; cf. Ex. xx. 15–17. [5] Lev. v. 16.
[6] Num. xv. 28; Lev. iv. 20; v. 13, 18; vi. 7.

which they could not be justified in the law of Moses, even carnally.[1] This is explained by an ancient author,[2] as follows: "But when other crimes have been committed to the injury[3] of the state, or of the life of men, for such crimes the law does not grant forgiveness, either through baptisms or the offering of irrational victims, but it gives a just and worthy recompense of punishment to the criminals by a just law. 'Life,' it says, 'for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth.' But when the just law of recompense cannot be so conveniently administered, it prescribes death by fire, or stoning, or sword, to the criminals. The daughter of the priest, if she has committed fornication is slain with fire; the daughter of the common man with stones; but the wife with the sword. But the law has never power through benevolence to save any such one by bap- [332 b

[1] Acts xiii. 38.

[2] Pseudo-Justin. "Quaestiones ad Orthodoxos": *Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πταισμάτων γεγενημένων εἰς βλάβην πολιτείας ἢ ζωῆς ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τοιούτων πταισμάτων οὐ δίδοσι συγχώρησιν, οὔτε διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος, οὔτε διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀλόγων θυσίας, ἀλλὰ δικαίαν τε καὶ ἀξίαν ἀμοίβην δίδωσι τοῖς πταίσασι διὰ τοῦ ἴσου τῆς ἀντιπλήξεως. Ψυχήν, φήσιν, ἀντὶ ψυχῆς, ὀφθαλμὸν ἀντὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ, ὀδόντα ἀντὶ ὀδόντος· ὅπου δὲ τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἀντιδόσεώς ἐστιν ἀπρεπές, ἐκεῖ τὸν διὰ πυρός, ἢ λίθου, ἢ ξίφους θάνατον ἀνταποδίδωσι τοῖς πταίσασι. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ θυγατέρα τοῦ ἱερέως πορνεύουσαν διὰ πυρὸς ἀναλίσκει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ λαϊκοῦ ἀνδρός, διὰ λίθου· τὴν δὲ ὕπανδρον διὰ ξίφους. Καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἰσχὺς τῷ νόμῳ ἐκ φιλανθρωπίας διὰ βαπτισμῶν τε καὶ θυσιῶν σῶσαι τῶν τοιούτων τινά.*

[3] That is, grave and scarcely tolerable.

tisms and sacrifices." The Hebrew masters have observed well on Ps. li. 18 that David did not promise a victim for homicide and adultery, because the law had provided no expiation for such offences. But as we have said before, so here it is manifest that in expiation the death of a sheep is substituted for the death of a man, from the fact that it is provided[1] that when the homicide is not found the people shall be atoned for by the blood of a sheep. The word "atonement" is explained in this passage,[2] "Atone[3] for thy people, O God, and lay not innocent blood to their charge." But the land could be cleansed from shed blood in no other way than by the blood of him who shed it, as the law says.[4] Another passage[5]: "For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul." Still another passage[6] represents the victim as bearing iniquity, the force of which phrase we have elsewhere explained.

This substitution Socinus is not willing to acknowledge,[7] nor is he willing to say that God is in any way induced by victims not to punish sin. To prove this he adduces the two following rea-

[1] Deut. xxi. [2] Deut. xxi. 8.
[3] [Heb. "כַּפֵּר"; E. V. "be merciful"; Grot. "*Expia.*"]
[4] Num. xxxv. 33. [5] Lev. xvii. 11. [6] Lev. x. 17. [7] ii. 10, 13.

sons: The errors of men could not have been punished in beasts, because there is no connection between men and beasts in species; and, again, God cannot receive anything, for he is Lord of all.

The first of these reasons is false. For a difference of individual (as they say) does not prevent a man's suffering the punishment of another's crime, provided that such infliction of evil be not unjust in itself; nor does diversity of species prevent a beast, which otherwise could have been killed justly, from being used, as an example that in its death may appear what a man has deserved. But man and beast are not connected in the order of living creatures alone, but also by that relation which subsists between a possessor and the thing possessed. For a beast is, on the whole, under human control. He who was to be atoned for was especially commanded to give a victim from his own possessions.[1]

The second reason is not pertinent to the subject. For it does not follow, if God gains nothing by the sacrifice, he is not therefore moved by it. For God is well pleased[2] with this, that a man in honor of the divine majesty should deprive himself of something granted to him. We have

[1] Lev. v. 6, 7.

[2] [Heb. xiii. 16. "But to do good, and to communicate forget not: for with such sacrifices God is well pleased."]

shown elsewhere that satisfaction may at any time be made not only by punishment, but also by any grateful and pleasing action. Holy Scripture in-
333 a] dicates that in the case of victims not only the thing but the disposition of the offerer was considered, and even the Gentiles believed the same. Seneca says: "It is no honor to the gods merely to present victims, though they are fat and glitter with gold; but the heart of the worshippers must be reverent and upright." Hence the Scriptures treating of the death of Christ speak now of love, now of obedience.

From what has been said it is now clear how victims for sin expiated sin in the Old Testament, viz. by inducing God to remit carnal punishment, and that by a certain satisfaction. But what the types performed carnally, Christ, the antitype, performs spiritually, and what the types did in certain sins only, Christ did in all, viz. by inducing God to remit spiritual punishment, and that by the most perfect satisfaction. For there is always more, and not less, in the thing designated by the type than in the type, as reason shows. The common feature of both the expiatory legal sacrifice and that made by Christ is, that without shedding of blood there is no remission.[1] This securing of remission through blood the divine writer in the same place calls now *ἁγιασ-*

[1] Heb. ix. 22.

μός,[1] now καθαρισμός.[2] In the ancient law the victims were animals,[3] but in this law of ours Christ is himself not only the priest, but also the victim.[4] That legal expiation is the "pattern"[5] and "figure"[6] of this celestial or spiritual. But how? Because it gave cleansing to the flesh,[7] that is, the taking away of the offence, but not to the spirit or the conscience,[8] while this expiation cleansed even the conscience.[9] That which in the ancient law was temporal death is in the new law eternal death,[10] and accordingly in that there was a temporal liberation, but here there is eternal redemption.[11] In this same passage an argument is drawn[12] from the efficacy of the legal victim to the efficacy of that offered through the Spirit, and we may consequently argue more securely in the following way: The legal victim took away the carnal offence by influencing God to make remission. Much more, therefore, will the victim offered through the Eternal Spirit take away the spiritual offence by influencing God in like manner to make remission.

Those passages in which Christ is called a lamb look in the same direction. It would be no great concession to admit that it was not common in

[1] Heb. ix. 13. [2] vs. 14, 22, 23. [3] vs. 12.
[4] vs. 14, 24. [5] ὑπόδειγμα, 23. [6] ἀντίτυπος, 24.
[7] vs. 13. [8] vs. 9. [9] vs. 14.
[10] Heb. x. 29. [11] Heb. ix. 12. [12] vs. 14. "how much more."

the law to offer lambs for sin. For in that case holy men might have named one kind of animal for another, so that the comparison should lie in the general signification of animal, and yet at the same time the innocence of the victim be expressed by mentioning a lamb rather than a ram or goat. In this way Peter adds, "Without blemish and without spot."[1] He may have had reference, at the same time, by a certain brevity of expression to the prophecy of Isaiah,[2] in the Greek translation of which the word "lamb"[3] appears. But[4] it is very clear that a lamb was employed in expiating pollutions[5] which by the ancient law were made so far equal to sin as even to receive the name sin. Whence it may be said, **333 b**] in either case, that the lamb was offered for an offence or a crime. In another place it is expressly added, "For that he sinned by the dead."[6] The effect is also the same in some respects. The polluted man was not admitted to the society of the Jewish state, except by such expiation. Even the paschal victim (which it is well known was for the most part a lamb[7]), in its first institution, had something of an expiatory character. For God said that, looking

[1] 1 Pet. i. 19.
[2] Isa. liii. 7.
[3] See Acts viii. 32 [also the present LXX].
[4] Contr. Soc., ii. 9.
[5] Lev. xiv. 12; Num. vi. 12.
[6] Num. vi. 11. [*Heb.* מֵאֲשֶׁר חָטָא עַל־הַנָּפֶשׁ]
[7] Ex. xii. 5.

upon its blood, he would turn away from the Hebrews that ruin which otherwise they would have had in common with the Egyptians, by imitation of whom they had contaminated themselves.[1] Cyril of Alexandria says,[2] "Which you will find to have been best delineated by the ancients in figures in the Mosaic books. For the slaying of a sheep purchased for the Israelites exemption from death and destruction, and placated the slayer. And this thing was a type and a figure of Christ." But the law shows also that for sin, as, for example, a rash oath, a lamb was commonly offered.[3] And when Christ is called a lamb, not only Peter shows that a sacrifice for sins is meant, by saying that we are redeemed with his blood,[4] but also John, in the Apocalypse, in many places, and among others where he says that he was slain.[5] But the sacrifice must be understood as a sacrifice for sin, because, on the testimony of Peter, it was the means of redemption. But this is the character of a sacrifice for sin alone.[6] From this it is the more plain that when the Baptist said that Christ was the lamb which should take away the sins of the world,[7] he was speaking of past sins, and not of future

[1] Ex. xii. 13; Heb. xi. 28.

[2] In his treatise: Quod unus sit Christus.

[3] Lev. v. 4, 6.

[4] 1 Pet. i. 18, 19.

[5] Rev. v. 6, 9, 12; xiii. 8.

[6] Contr. Soc., ii. 17.

[7] John i. 29.

sins, and of taking away the offence by obtaining remission from God, not through the generation of faith within them. Neither is it true,[1] as Socinus says, that the high-priest alone was a type of Christ, and that the yearly expiation alone, or at least the sacrifices which were offered for the people alone, gave a type of his sacrifice. For although in the high-priest and that established sacrifice the figure was in some respects more clear, which the Holy Spirit pursues with noteworthy care in the Epistle to the Hebrews, yet it cannot be denied that other priests and other expiatory sacrifices have a reference to the same thing, even if more obscurely. This is shown by the same Epistle,[2] where all carnal purification by victims is compared with the spiritual purification by Christ, and much more where,[3] after saying in general that almost all things are in the law purged with blood, and that without shedding of blood there is no remission of sins, the writer goes on to say, "It was therefore necessary that the patterns of things in the heavens should be purified with these." So also[4] the daily sacrifices are compared with the sacrifice of Christ. Socinus overturns the sense of this passage by expounding "daily" as "yearly," without prece-

[1] Contr. Soc., ii. 9.
[2] Heb. ix. 13.
[3] Heb. ix. 22.
[4] Heb. x. 11.

dent. For when he brings in Heb. vii. 27[1] to support this interpretation he fails to carry his point, since he falsely assumes that the priest in the annual sacrifices alone ought to make offering for himself. On the contrary, he ought to offer for himself as many times as he was conscious of sin.[2] Other passages[3] show that the paschal sacrifice was a figure of the sacrifice offered by Christ.

Although these things might suffice, yet [331 a from the common conception of the Gentiles, or rather from a most ancient tradition diffused through all lands, it is well to explain the nature of the sacred expiatory offering a little more at large. We cannot doubt that there were sacrifices before the law of Moses, under the imposition of that law which is called the natural law, whose rites were derived from God, and were transmitted to posterity by those who survived the flood and were dispersed through all lands. There remained for a long time among the descendants of Shem, and also Japhet, and perhaps Ham, an uncorrupted religion until it was displaced by the worship of many, and consequently false, gods. But even then, when God had been exchanged

[1] ["Who needeth not daily, as those high-priests, to offer up sacrifice, first for his own sins and then for the people's: for this he did once when he offered up himself."]

[2] Lev. iv. 3.

[3] John xix. 36; 1 Cor. v. 7.

for false gods, rites and ceremonies transferred from a pious to an impious use remained, a great testimony against them of truth received but held back in unrighteousness, as the apostle says.[1] Those nations therefore were most firmly persuaded that the gods were offended, and made angry by the crimes of men. From this anger regularly followed great calamities both private and public. Examine the excellent tract of Plutarch's—"Concerning those whom God is slow to punish,"—in which if you write God for gods, you will find many things worthy of being uttered by a Christian. The wrath of which he speaks was inferred from causes or effects; from causes if crimes had come to the public knowledge, from effects, portents, prodigies, heavenly signs.[2] Yet they hoped that they could avert this wrath by certain victims. By these the Divinity was said to be appeased, the guilty one, whether man or people, to be purged, or in ancient phrase, *februari*, the sin to be expiated and lustrated.

For these reasons the same sacrifices were called *ἱλαστικά*, *ἁγνιστικά*, *καθαρτικά*, or in Latin *placamina*, *februa*, *piamina*. The word *ἱλάσκεσθαι* is applied to victims by Homer and many others. The expression *ἁγνίζειν τὴν πόλιν καθαρμοῖς* oc-

[1] Rom. i. 18.

[2] Vid. Cic. de Harus. Res., Lucan 1 Phars., Greek and Roman Historians, *passim*.

curs in Plutarch on Romulus. This ἁγνίζειν is written also ἁγίζειν and ἁγιάζειν. In Herodotus[1] the Phrygian Adrastus, polluted with homicide, "stood in need of a sacred expiation."[2] Croesus made expiation for himself. Herodotus says that there was a similar mode of expiation among the Lydians and Greeks. In Hermogenes occurs the phrase:[3] "Not expiated from acts of sacrilege." Plato[4] for the same idea puts "liberations"[5] and "expiations of crimes."[6] Plutarch interprets καθάρσια by ἀποτρόπαια, that is, *averrunca*, things which avert the divine wrath. In Virgil and others nothing is more frequent in respect to sacred things than the word *placation*, the force of which Horace thus expresses:

"Mactata veniet mitior hostia."

Livy frequently says: "*Pacem Deos exposcere.*" Pliny says that there is favor for the flock in expiatory offerings to the gods. Ovid says that the gods are conciliated to man by victims. The word conciliate we have already shown to be equivalent to placate. *Purgare* and *purificare*, the translation of the Greek ἁγνίζειν, are employed because a crime seems to be a certain sort of uncleanness. The word *purification* is found in Suetonius and Pliny. Lucan uses the

[1] lib. i.
[2] καθαρσίου ἐδέετο.
[3] μηδὲ καθηράμενος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσεβημάτων.
[4] Rep. ii.
[5] λύσεις.
[6] καθαρμοὺς ἀδικημάτων.

expression "to purify the walls by a lustration." But the more common word is *to lustrate*, of the origin of which we have spoken above. So Livy speaks of lustrating the army with the *suovetau-*
334 b] *rilia*. Ovid explains *lustrare* by *expurgare:*

"Ego lustror ab illis,
Expurgante nefas novies mihi carmine dicto."

Servius on Virgil explains *Lustramurque Jovi*,[1] by *purge* and *expiate*. They thought victims to be ransoms substituted for their lives, as life for life.[2] Eusebius[3] teaches that the blood of slain animals atones for the lives of men. Thus he who offered held the head of the victim. Seneca[4] himself explains the *lustrale sacrum* as that by which ships are atoned for.[5] Papinius in the Thebaïs used the expression *caput lustrale*, which he explains as follows:

"Terrigenam cuncto patriae *pro sanguine* poscunt."

and also:

"Date gaudia Thebis
Quae pepigi et toto quae *sanguine* prodigus *emi*."

Therefore the *lustrale sacrum* is that which buys blood, that is, redeems by blood.[6] This has

[1] Aen. iii.

[2] λύτρα τῆς σφῶν ψυχῆς ἀντίψυχα ὥσπερ ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς.

[3] Apod. Genesis.

[4] in Troad.

[5] [*Lat.* piantur.]

[6] [The text of the second edition, 1617, has been amended in pencil by some reader, so as to be: "Lustrale ergo sacrum est quod *sanguine* (for *sanguinem*) emit, hoc est, redimit sanguine."]

to do with proving that for which we contended above in regard to redemption. It is to be noted that very frequently when writers are treating of sacred expiatory rites, mention is made of blood because from the ancient law of God given to Noah,[1] and thence handed down to all peoples, the blood stands for the life, and accordingly is called by the name of life.[2] Hence the passage of Virgil:

"Sanguine quaerendi reditus, animaque litandum."

Explaining these words from Trebatius, Macrobius says that those victims were called *animales*.[3] Sins are themselves properly said to be expiated,[4] that is, washed away,[5] whether by paying the punishment due, or something which has come into the place of the due punishment. As for example, in Virgil:

"Et culpam miserorum morte piabunt;"

that is, cause them to be atoned. Pliny: "It is common for wars to expiate[6] the luxury of a people." Cicero: "Your crimes the immortal gods have expiated[6] upon our soldiers." The same writer frequently has the expression *to expiate crimes by punishment.* Sallust speaks of expiating slaughter by slaughter, blood by blood. The word *supplicium* was first used in the sacred

[1] Gen. ix. 4. [2] See note 6, p. 227.
[3] Arnobius vii. adv. Gent., Servius on Aen. ii.
[4] [*piari.*] [5] [*lui.*] [6] [*Expio.*]

rites, and thence transferred to punishments.[1] But to expiate in sacrifice is to atone by putting a different thing in the place of punishment due. Hence Plautus :[2]

"Men' piacularem oportet fieri ob stultitiam tuam
Ut meum tergum stultitiae tuae subdas succedaneum."

Hence the author of the distichs which are ascribed to Cato, says :

"Cum sis ipse nocens, moritur cur victima *pro te?*"

Here *pro te* means *in your place.* In the same place he says that those who offer victims hope to obtain their own safety by the death of another. Hence sacrifices are in themselves properly expiatory :

"Ea prima piacula sunto."[3]

"Teque piacula nulla resolvent."[4]

Ovid calls them *piamina.*

"Februa Romani dixere piamina patres."

The force of this word he immediately explains as "that by which our crimes are expiated."[5] Pliny calls them *piamenta.* Crimes are improperly called *piacula*, for on account of them *piacula* are due, as Servius rightly remarks upon Virgil's expression :

"Distulit in seram commissa piacula mortem."

235 a] But although, as we have said, *to expiate*

[1] Contr. Soc., ii. 13. [2] [*Epidicus.*] [3] Aen. vi.
[4] Horace. [5] [Quo crimina nostra piantur.]

is properly *to wash away*, and so may be properly said of punishment or sin, that is, offence or debt; yet men have begun to use it for words of allied signification, to placate, and to lustrate. So Cicero says that the majesty of Ceres may be expiated. Livy: "That slaughter when known may be atoned for by some expiatory offering, the father has been commanded to expiate his son"; that is, lustrate him. So Seneca[1] has used the expression *to expiate the fleet*, that is *to lustrate the fleet.* Tacitus speaks of expiating prodigies, for the crimes on account of which the wrath has been excited which is indicated by prodigies. The passage occurs in his treatment of the Jews: "Prodigies had come forth which the nation, subject to superstition, but averse from religion, did not think it right to expiate by victims, or by vows."

Here we must note in passing, as we have said above, that means of expiation are not provided in the law of the Jews for expiating all divine wrath. From these things it manifestly appears that the lustral or expiatory sacred rites pertained to placating the divinity, and so to obtaining impunity for sins committed before. Pliny expresses this as follows: "The ancient opinion obtained in former times that all things were expiatory *by which the consciences of malefactors*

[1] in Troad.

were cleansed, and their sins blotted out." But we must not omit the remarkable passage of Porphyry on expiatory sacrifices: "For all divines have agreed in this, that in expiatory sacrifices the victims should not be touched by those who sacrifice them, and that such must use purification; for, they say, no one should go into the city, or into his own house, before he has cleansed his clothing and body with the water of a river or fountain."[1] That in which he says theologians are agreed, that the garments of those who had touched expiatory offerings should be washed, plainly agrees with the law delivered by Moses to the Hebrews.[2] But because the nations themselves were not ignorant under the leading of nature, that the more it was which they gave to God the more easily could forgiveness be obtained, especially if there was any equality between the ransom and that which was redeemed; so they advanced from the slaughter of animals in making expiation to the slaughter of men. Caesar[3] explains the cause: "Unless the life of a man is given for the life of a man, they think that the majesty of the immortal gods cannot be

[1] Πάντες γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ὡμολόγησαν οἱ θεόλογοι ὡς οὔτε ἁπτέον ἐν ταῖς ἀποτροπαίοις θυσίαις τῶν θυομένων, καθαρσίοις τε χρηστέον· μὴ γὰρ ἴοι τις εἰς ἄστυ, μηδ' εἰς οἶκον ἴδιον, μὴ πότερον ἐσθῆτα καὶ σῶμα ποταμοῖς ἢ πηγῇ ἀποκαθήρας, φασίν.

[2] Lev. xvi. 26, 28.

[3] Gallic War.

placated." First of all the Canaanites, that is, the Phoenicians, are found to have practised this. We read of these in the sacred writings that they were accustomed to placate Moloch by the slaughter of their own free citizens. This Moloch was Saturn, as the Jewish masters rightly explained. We learn, on the authority of Porphyry, who read it at the home of its interpreter, Philo of Biblus, that the history of the Phoenicians written by Sancuniatho was full of narratives of sacrifices of that kind. A part of these were Tyrians, among whom it was an ancient custom to immolate to Saturn a freeborn youth.[1] Curtius rightly observes that the Carthaginians, colonists of the Tyrians, had received this sacred custom from the founders of their city. It is to these that the following passage of Ennius relates:

"Ille suos Divis mos sacrificare puellos."

Diodorus and Justin relate the same of the Carthaginians, in the following words: "They immolated men as victims, and brought youths to the altars, beseeching the *peace* of the gods by their *blood.*"[2] Silius Italicus says that they were accustomed to beg the *favor*[3] of the gods by [335 b
slaughter. Lactantius, on the authority of Pescennius Festus, tells us that the Carthaginians, thinking that God was *enraged* with them, that they might *make atonement*, immolated two hun-

[1] Curtius, lib. iii. [2] lib. xviii. [3] [veniam.]

dred sons of noble families. Minucius Felix mentions it, and Tertullian in his apology, who says that Saturn was therefore called the Tomb of sons;[1] Plutarch also, in his book on superstitions. In Egypt men, and that, too, frequently of exquisite beauty, were anciently sacrificed, as Manetho relates, who adds that the custom was maintained to the times of Amosis, who substituted waxen images for men. The tradition comes concerning Heliopolis, that they made diligent investigation there whether the men who were destined for sacrifice were clean. In Cyprus, likewise, men were slain down to the time of Diphilus, who substituted the immolation of a bull. The same was formerly done in Rhodes, Chios, Tenedos, Salamis, and at Laodicea; also among the Damathian Arabs. The Persians buried men alive. Of the Albans this in particular has been handed down, that they were accustomed to immolate him whom they believed to have the greatest power with the gods through special sanctity. The Ionians, on the testimony of Pausanias, immolated a maiden and a boy, to appease the irate Diana. Of the Blemyae, Messagetae, Tauri, Neuri, and, on the whole, of the Scythae, we read similar things. This may suffice for Asia and Africa, to which we may add that the same rites were found both in ancient India (of which

[1] [tumulus filiorum.]

the same Mela had already treated), and upon the American continent by those who have brought these shores to our notice. In the Canary Islands it is not long since this was given up. To come to Europe, formerly in Crete boys were sacrificed to Saturn; in Lacedaemon, a man to Mars, as Ister and Apollodorus have told us. Nay, even all the Greeks alike had the same custom, according to the testimony of Philarchus, with the consent of Pliny, and examples are extant even in the times of the Persian wars. At Rome also yearly was slain a Greek boy and a Greek maiden, a Gallic boy and a Gallic maiden. The Latin Jupiter was also worshipped with human victims,—the Arician Diana as well. Pliny says that these sacrifices were formerly very common throughout Italy and Sicily, and that they were not given up at Rome before the six hundred and fifty-seventh year of the city.[1] The devotions of the Decii have the same origin, by which the ancients, as Cicero says,[2] thought that the gods were *placated.* Livy calls the Decii the atonement[3] for all the *wrath* of the gods, also the atonement[3] for *washing away*[4] the public peril.[5] Lucan:

"Lustrales bellis animas."

[1] [B. C. 96].

[2] De Nat. Deor. iii.

[3] [piacula.]

[4] [luo.]

[5] Vide supra, p. 406, the passage of Appian.

Nor must we omit the remarkable passage of Juvenal:

> "Plebeiae Deciorum animae, plebeia fuerunt
> Nomina: *pro* totis legionibus hi tamen et *pro*
> Omnibus auxiliis, atque omni plebe Latina
> *Sufficiunt Dîs* infernis, Terraeque parenti:
> *Pluris* enim Decii, quam qui servantur ab illis."

In this passage first the use of the particle *pro* is to be noted, which we have above indicated as a frequent particle, and, as it were, peculiar to this argument, so as to be the same as *instead of another*. It appears, again, that the Romans thought that the estimation of a sacrifice was increased by the dignity of him who was slain. Lastly, it is manifest from a comparison of authors that the following phrases are equivalent, viz. that God should be placated by a victim; and **336 a**] that the wrath of the gods should be expiated; or that the life of one sufficed with the gods for the life of others. The custom of the Gauls, as related by Caesar, on which we have touched above, and which is said by Pliny to have continued to the reign of Tiberius, is most noteworthy.[1] Of the same, Cicero says, The Gauls appeased the gods by human victims. Cicero uses the expression *to placate* the gods, as well as Caesar; Luctatius, *to lustrate the city*. Caesar explains himself: to give life for life. So

[1] Notes on the Massilians to Salvianus.

the Thracians worship Zamolxis; so the Germans, Mercurius and other gods, of whom Lucan, as follows:

> "Et quibus immitis *placatur* sanguine diro
> Teutates."

Tacitus and Pliny have told us that in Britain also sacred rites of this kind were celebrated. Procopius writes that to his own, that is, to the times of Justinian, the same was customary in the island of Thule. Porphyry has left the statement that this custom was not outgrown among the nations till the time of Hadrian. It has been specially handed down of the Massilians that whenever they were afflicted with a pestilence they were accustomed to maintain a poor man at the public expense, who, adorned with sacred bows and clothed with sacred garments, was led through the city with execrations, that upon him all the evils of the state might fall, and so was immolated to the immortal gods. All these things being gathered together, we shall see that not without reason did Pliny exclaim of the sacrifices: "So they harmonized with the whole world, discordant as it was, and ignorant of itself." The following may be said in passing of human victims. The nations did not sin by them in this respect only, that they made sacrifices to false gods, but also that they had no such command as Abraham had for worshipping the Divine Majesty

in this way. But the custom of the Gentiles in expiating sins by the slaughtering of men or of sheep affords no little help in understanding the nature of expiatory sacrifice, and the words proper to this argument. We are not to despise this labor, for Socinus says that the Baptist when he called Christ the Lamb of God, had reference to sacrifices on the whole, by which not only among the Hebrews, but also among the Gentiles, sins were believed to be expiated. But we cannot doubt, since the divine writer to the Hebrews employs very frequently in this very argument on expiatory sacrifice the Greek words *καθαρίζειν* and *ἁγιάζειν*, that he employed them in that sense which was the received sense in the Greek language.

From this it is easy to see what is meant when Christ is called a sacrifice for sin, or an expiatory sacrifice. Socinus gives three interpretations:[1] the first, that the death of Christ by generating faith draws us back from our sins; the second, that death itself is a certain antecedent to obtaining remission of sins; the third,[2] that it furnishes, as it were, a testimony to the remission itself, or to the decree made concerning it. Of these three only the second is pertinent here, not because Christ did not do those other things also, — and, indeed, much more effectively than Soci-

[1] ii. 16, 17. [2] ii. 20.

nus thinks,—but because those things do not pertain to a sacrifice for sin. For Socinus[1] confesses that the likeness of legal sacrifices for sins (to which similar sacrifices of the Gentiles, considered not according to fact, but accord- [336 b
ing to the opinion of the Gentiles, may be compared) and the sacrifice performed by Christ consists in expiation. But those sacrifices did not draw us away from sin, especially not by creating faith in anything. Neither did they furnish testimony to a remission conferred, nor to a certain decree. But, as Socinus recognizes, they were a certain requisite antecedent of remission. This is shown by the words of the law: "He shall expiate and it shall be remitted." With this, therefore, the comparison is concerned, and plainly it is necessary that the expiation should signify the same when it is applied to legal sacrifices and when to Christ. For the writer to the Hebrews deduces both from the same decree, viz. that without shedding of blood there is no remission, but that expiation is made with blood.[2] The passage[3] where it is said that it is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin furnishes no objection. For we must repeat from the preceding context the phrase *according to conscience*, as appears plainly upon a comparison of similar passages.[4] The blood of beasts took away

[1] ii. 10. [2] Heb. ix. 22. [3] Heb. x. 4. [4] Heb. ix. 9, 14.

sins, that is, the temporal offence, but it did not take away the spiritual offence, as has been shown above.[1] In the Apocalypse, the expression "washed us from our sins" cannot be explained, "who declared us washed," without greatly perverting it. Neither are we permitted to expound the passage,[2] "The blood of Christ *cleanseth* us from all sin," "*declares* us to be cleansed." It is manifestly opposed to the appropriate meaning of the words and the perpetual use of Scripture in this argument. Socinus confesses that the word uncleanness in many places signifies offence. *Καθαρίζειν* and *ἁγιάζειν* are to take away that offence, or to effect remission, as the writer to the Hebrews expounds the words.[3] Christ himself purges our sins.[4] Christ purges our conscience from dead works,[5] that is, on the confession of Socinus himself,[6] liberates our conscience from offence and punishment, and the fear of punishment. In the Old Testament also טָהֵר has the same sense.[7] The *καθαρίζειν* of these passages is replaced in similar passages by *ῥαντίζειν*[8] and *λούειν*,[9] "to wash," to which also the prophecy of Zechariah refers.[10] There is evidently no reason why we should depart from this sense in the two passages of John. If Jesus is called "faithful witness,"[11] the word "to

[1] Contr. Soc., ii. 17. [2] 1 John i. 7. [3] Heb. ix. 22.
[4] Heb. i. 3. [5] Heb. ix. 14. [6] ii. 15.
[7] Ps. li. 9. [8] Heb. x. 22. [9] Heb. x. 22.
[10] Zech. xiii. 1. [11] Rev. i. 5.

wash" ought not to be referred to this testimony. The expressions "faithful witness" and "washed" are not immediately connected; but we have between them allusion to the first-begotten of the dead, to the kingdom, and to love, so that even a blind man might see that many offices and benefits of Christ are brought together to illustrate his dignity.[1] In the Epistle of John it is altogether absurd to interpret καθαρίζειν of the declaration of cleansing, but not of the cleansing itself, since a little later ἀφιέναι and καθαρίζειν are brought into close contact. The apostle is arguing from the conjunction. If you walk in the light you shall have cleansing, that is, re- [337 a
mission, through the blood of Christ, because sins are imputed to no one who walks in the light. The declaration of the Baptist, who calls Christ the Lamb that taketh away the sins of the world, since it has reference to the expiatory sacrifices both of the Hebrews and of the Gentiles, on the confession of Socinus,[2] evidently does not permit us to interpret "to take away sins" otherwise than "to take away the offence." This was the work of the expiatory sacrifices; but they did not alure from sinning.[3] "Putting away sin"[4] is the same as "obtaining remission."[5] This "putting

[1] Contr. Soc., ii. 13. [2] ii. 9. [3] Heb. ix. 26.

[4] εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἁμαρτίας.

[5] πρὸς τὸ καθαρίζεσθαι ὑμᾶς, and πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι ὑμῖν ἄφεσιν.

away of sin" was accomplished "by the sacrifice of himself."[1]

But Socinus, although he attempts to wrest certain passages from their true sense, yet, convicted by many others, is compelled to confess that there are indications in the sacrifice of Christ that it makes an expiation antecedent to the remission of sins, as if requisite thereto. Yet he denies that God is induced by that sacrifice to make remission, but says that a certain faith is begotten within us, by which we are led to emendation of life so as to obtain remission of sins. But he forgets what he has previously said,[2] that the figure ought to agree with that which is figured in the point in which the comparison is made. Nor does he remember that which Scripture shows, — that the expression "All things are purged with blood" pertains in the same way to the legal sacrifices and to Christ.[3] But it is evident that the legal sacrifices did not beget such a faith. Nor is it a tolerable exposition of the word *expiate* to say that it is to do anything which is required for remission. On the contrary, all such words as καθαρίζειν, ἁγιάζειν, which the apostle uses, are significant, by their own nature and by perpetual use, not merely of antecedence of order, but also of a certain efficacy.

Scripture also supplies us with another and very

[1] διὰ τῆς θυσίας αὐτοῦ, vs. 26. [2] ii. 10. [3] Heb. ix. 22.

sure argument for overturning the interpretation discovered by Socinus. For it says that there was need of a new priest after the order of Melchisedec.[1] But proclaiming faith in God — nay, even confirming this proclamation by death — could have been done by the Levitical priesthood. Wherefore if the priesthood of Christ effects nothing else, as Socinus would have it, it follows that there was no need of him.

Besides, that Christ died for our sins is believed upon unto salvation.[2] Therefore the expiation of Christ was not prepared to bring us to believing, since it is itself among those things which are to be believed.[3] For what serves to produce faith in another thing must necessarily be different from that thing.

Again, the expiation of Christ has an effect upon us after the planting of such faith. Christ was appointed High-Priest to expiate the sins of his people, that is, of believers.[4] Therefore *to expiate* cannot be *to bring to faith.*

Notice, also, the passage[5] where Christ's blood of sprinkling is said to speak better things than that of Abel. The blood of Abel cried to God for vengeance; the blood of Christ cries to God for remission. Socinus denies that God is placated

[1] Heb. vii. 2.
[2] 1 Cor. xv. 2, 3.
[3] Contr. Soc., iv. 10.
[4] Heb. ii. 17.
[5] Heb. xii. 24. [There is some unimportant variation in the texts at this point.]

337 b] by expiatory sacrifices; but the writers above cited by us prove the contrary, inasmuch as they employ the word *placate* to express those sacred rites. Hence arose that phrase employed in the passage quoted from Hebrews, *to expiate sins*,[1] that is, *to atone for sins by placating God.*

Socinus recognizes no satisfaction in the expiatory sacrifices. But the simple word *expiation* means nothing else than *washing*. In many places the authors quoted by us, when they wish to express expiation by circumlocution, say: Give blood for blood, life for life, soul for soul, buy with blood, attain salvation by the death of another. The Hebrew words have the same signification, for כָּפַר[2] is not only *to cover*, but also *to redeem*,[3] and *to placate*,[4] and consequently *to expiate*. חִטֵּא is *to wash*,[5] whence it comes to be used in the sense *to expiate*. But expiation is first attributed to victims;[6] then to the priest on account of the victims which he presents;[7] last of all, to God who accepts the payment.[8] For as the word *redeeming* is employed for any liberation, so expiation is employed for a similar effect, even when no pay-

[1] ἱλάσκεσθαι ἁμαρτίας.

[2] [So the other editions. The Hebrew given by the folio appears to be כשׁ! The references agree with כָּפַר with one exception. I have accordingly corrected the reading and the doubtful reference. — Tr.]

[3] Ex. xxi. 30; Ps. xlix. 8.

[4] Gen. xxxii. 20.

[5] Gen. xxxi. 39.

[6] See Heb. ix. 13, 23.

[7] Frequently so in Leviticus.

[8] [luitio.]

ment[1] intervenes.[2] But to Christ expiation is attributed as a victim, and so the word blood is added. But the blood of the victims, as has been proved above, is given instead of the life of the sinner. Hence it is impossible that the word expiation is used here improperly. Besides, if Socinus's opinion were true, that expiation is much more really made by resurrection and ascension to heaven than by death and the shedding of blood, because the former are better fitted to persuade us to exercise faith than the latter, at least in some passage of Scripture would expiation be attributed to those acts. This is nowhere done.

Socinus makes a false statement when he says[3] that expiation is ascribed to the declaration of the divine will. The passages which he quotes do not prove this. For in Heb. i. 3 Christ is said to uphold all things by his word, because all things obey his command. The word ῥῆμα is found in the same sense elsewhere.[4] In Heb. x. 26, 29, knowledge of the truth and sanctification with blood are not put for the same thing, but many benefits are conjoined that the crime of the ungrateful man may be more evident. Sometimes, indeed, reference to a covenant is connected with blood,[5] but much more frequently reference to a sacrifice. We must therefore take that interpre-

[1] [hitio.] [2] Ps. li. 9. [3] ii. 20.
[4] Heb. xi. 3; Luke v. 5. [5] ii. 13, et passim.

tation which unites these. This will be accomplished if we consider that part of the covenant in which Christ stipulated that if he should submit to death those who believed in him should obtain forgiveness of sin. God made this promise.[1]

But when Christ is said to present his blood in heaven, — that is, exhibit his death to the Father, and, as it were, remind God of it, — when, furthermore, it is said that he makes intercession, these things do not take away the expiation made upon the cross. The expiation made upon the cross influences God to grant remission, and **338 a**] secures to us the right, but under a certain condition and mode in which is comprehended on the part of Christ intercession, and on our part a genuine faith, as was explained when we were discussing satisfaction.

But Socinus contends[2] against the Scriptures when he denies that the expiation was made before Christ entered heaven. The Scriptures have everywhere attributed the redemption, the expiation, the satisfaction, the putting away of sin to death, and indicate that these things are already completed.[3] The offering is indeed made in heaven, but in such a way that Socinus ought not to deny that title to the death completed upon earth, in opposition to the clear words of Paul,[4]

[1] Isa. liii. 10.
[2] ii. 13, 15.
[3] Contr. Soc., ii. 21.
[4] Eph. v. 2.

where Christ is said to have given himself an offering for us. To have studied the mere order of the words is abundantly to have refuted Socinus. In the same passage offering and sacrifice are properly connected.

All the Greek and Latin books show that the sacrifice is performed at the moment when the victim is slain. Hence it follows that the verb *mactare* signifies, first, *to sacrifice*, and then, by an extension of the meaning to other things, *to slay* in any way. Hence Ammonius distinguishes between *θύειν* and *σφάττειν* as words denoting genus and species: *θύεσθαι* is to slay in honor of the gods, *σφάττεσθαι* to slay for any cause whatever.[1] Plutarch says that the Gauls and Scythians believed that the gods are delighted by the blood of slain men, and that this is the most perfect sacrifice.[2]

Sacrifice consists, therefore, in slaying. In this matter the Scriptures speak in the same way Abraham, commanded[3] to offer his son, prepares to slay him; and so, because he had already completed the slaying in mind, although not with the hand, he is said to have offered his son.[4] There

[1] *Θύεσθαι μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τιμῇ Θεοῦ, σφάττεσθαι δὲ τὸ δι' ἡντιναοῦν αἰτίαν φονεύσασθαι.*

[2] *Θεοὺς εἶναι χαίροντας ἀνθρώπων σφαττομένων αἵματι, καὶ ταύτην τελειοτάτην θυσίαν.*

[3] Gen xxii. 2, 10.

[4] Heb. xi. 17.

are passages where *θύειν* means simply *to slay*, without regard to sacrifice.[1] Christ is called by John the Lamb slain.[2] Paul expresses it thus:[3] Christ our passover is sacrificed[4] for us. But the paschal lamb was not commonly brought into the temple, so that *sacrificed* is the same as *slain*, as *passover* is the same as *lamb*. Christ appeared in heaven with the Father through his sacrifice.[5] Therefore the sacrifice preceded and the appearing followed. So elsewhere in the same Epistle Christ
338 b] is said to have entered the heavenly sanctuary in his own blood, having obtained eternal redemption for us,[6] and to have sat down at the right hand of the majesty on high, when he had by himself purged our sins.[7] In these passages the past tenses show that redemption or expiation had been made before Christ entered the palace of heaven.[8]

Therefore, although Christ was a High-Priest of such a kind that he ought not to remain, like the Levitical priests, upon the earth,[9] but, passing into the heavens, to be made higher than the heavens,[10] since his priesthood was to be eternal and unchangeable,[11] yet he was a true priest, and a true victim, even at the moment when he laid

[1] John x. 10. [2] *ἀμνίον ἐσφαγμένον*, Rev. v. 6, 12; xiii. 8.
[3] 1 Cor. v. 7. [4] *ἐτύθη*. [5] Heb. ix. 26. [6] Heb. ix. 12.
[7] Heb. i. 3. [8] Contr. Soc., ii. 23. [9] Heb. viii. 4.
[10] Heb. iv. 14; vii. 26. [11] Heb. vii. 24.

down his life upon the earth. And so he is said to have come into the world[1] (that is, upon this earth, according to the interpretation of Scripture[2]) to do the will of God,[3] that is, to offer[4] his body prepared by God, or sanctified by him,[5] for sin.[6] On this passage we must notice, at the same time, that we are said to be sanctified by the offering "once for all." Now Christ intercedes as often as we have need of intercession. So that here not intercession but slaying must be understood. The offering of Christ, like that of some victims under the law, is two-fold: first, in the slaying; secondly, in the exhibition. In case of victims under the law, the first was accomplished in the temple, the second within the sacred fane. In case of Christ, the first on earth, the last in heaven. The first was not the preparation of the sacrifice, but the sacrifice. The last, not so much the sacrifice as the commemoration of the sacrifice already made. Wherefore, since appearing and interceding are not properly sacerdotal acts, except so far as they depend upon the virtue of the finished sacrifice, he who takes away the sacrifice takes away also the true priesthood of Christ, in opposition to the plain authority of the Scriptures, which assign to Christ a priestly dignity, distinct from his prophetic and royal dignity, not figura-

[1] Heb. x. 5. [2] John xviii. 37; 1Tim. i. 15.
[3] Heb. x. 7, 9. [4] vs. 10. [5] vs. 5. [6] vs. 8, 12.

tively so called, but most truly. His priesthood is set over against the Levitical priesthood, which was a genuine priesthood, as a more perfect species of the same genus over against a less perfect species. The inference of Heb. iii. 8, that Christ must have somewhat to offer, would not be legitimate except for a genuineness of the priesthood into which he had been inducted.

But it is by no means wonderful that they who have taken away from Christ the glory of his nature, that is, his true Deity, should also diminish his offices and refuse to acknowledge his special benefits.

To thee, O Lord Jesus, as true God, as true Redeemer, as true Priest, as true Victim for sins, with the Father and the Spirit, together one God, be honor and glory. Amen.

THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ANCIENTS.

Justin *to Diognetus:* He gave his own Son a [**339 a** ransom for us. Oh sweet exchange!

The Author of the exposition of the Faith, attributed to Justin: Through the perfect life blotting out the transgression, and through the death not due extinguishing what was due.

Justin, *Quaestiones ad Orthodoxos, Quaest.* xcix.: But that he who brought the blood of beasts offered it to God as his own life,[1] the sacred Scriptures testify.

Irenaeus, *Bk.* v. *Chap.* i.: For he would not have truly had the flesh and blood by which he redeemed us, except he had repaired in his own person the ancient doing[2] of Adam.[3]

Tertullian *against the Jews, Chap.* xiii.: It became Christ to be made the sacrifice for all nations, who was brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so opened he not his mouth.

Origen *on Leviticus, Hom.* iii., *near the beginning:* If any one accurately recalls those things which have been said, he may object because we asserted that the sacrifice which we have said the high-priest offered for sin was a type of Christ; and it will not seem appropriate to the true Christ, who knew no sin, that he should be said to have offered a sacrifice for

[1] [ψυχή.]

[2] [fictio.]

[3] The Greek of this passage as cited by Theodoret, Dial. ii, chap. xxvi. is as follows: *Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ἀληθῶς σάρκα καὶ αἷμα ἐσχηκώς, δι' ὧν ἡμᾶς ἐξηγορήσατο.*

sin, although the matter involves a mystery — the same one is himself both priest and victim. See, therefore, whether we may resolve this difficulty as follows: Because Christ committed no sin, yet was made sin for us, while he who was in the form of God thought fit to be in the form of a servant, while he who is immortal dies, and impassible suffers, and invisible is seen, and because to us men both death and every other frailty in the flesh arose from the condition of sin, — he himself also who was made in the likeness of men, and was found in fashion as a man, without doubt offered as a sacrifice to God for the sin which he had received from us (because he bore our sins) a spotless victim, that is, uncontaminated flesh.

Origen *on Numbers, Hom.* iv.: If there had been no sin, it would not have been necessary that the Son of God should be made a lamb, nor would there have been any need that he, placed in flesh, should be slain; but he would have remained what he was in the beginning, the Word of God. But **339 b**] since sin entered into this world, and the necessity of sin required propitiation, and propitiation is made only by a victim, it was necessary that a victim for sin should be provided. — *On Matthew, Chap.* xvi. Treatise ii.: A man can indeed give nothing in exchange for his soul; but God, for the souls of all men, gave in exchange the precious blood of his own Son. For we have not been bought with corruptible silver or gold, but with the precious blood of the spotless Lamb. — *On the Epistle to the Romans, Bk.* ii. *Chap.* ii.: Ye confess without doubt that it is true which has been written in the Epistle of Peter: Because we were not redeemed with corruptible silver and gold, but with the precious blood of the Only-begotten.[1] If, therefore, we were bought with a price, as Paul also bears witness, without doubt we were bought from some one whose servants we were, and who demanded

[3] [1 Pet. i. 18.]

the price which he wished in order to discharge those whom he held. Now, the devil was the one who held us, to whom we had been delivered by our sins. He demanded, therefore, as our price, the blood of Christ. But until the blood of Jesus was given, which blood was so precious that it alone sufficed for the redemption of all men, it was necessary that those who were instructed in the law should each for himself, as by a certain imitation of the future redemption give his own blood; and on this account we for whom the price of the blood of Christ has been paid do not regard it as necessary to offer a price for ourselves, that is, the blood of circumcision.

Origen *against Celsus*, *Bk.* i.: Or did the disciples not see that he who had been so recently crucified willingly received this death in behalf of the race of men, not unlike those who died for their native countries to remove prevailing pestilences, or sterility, or impediments to navigation? For it was likely that among the natural properties of things, for reasons unspeakable or difficult of comprehension by most men, was this property that one righteous man, by dying voluntarily for the public, might avert calamities by appeasing the evil demons who produced pestilences, or sterility, or impediments to navigation, or any such thing. Let, therefore, those who are unwilling to believe that Jesus died in behalf of men by crucifixion say whether they will not receive the many stories of the Greeks and barbarians about the death of certain ones for the public to terminate the evils that had previously seized upon cities and nations; or have those things come to pass, but yet it is altogether improbable that he who was a man died to destroy the great demon, even the prince of demons, who had subjected all the souls of men who had come upon the earth? — *A little below, on* [**340 a**
Isa. liii.: They who have become sinners, and have been healed by the death of the Saviour, say these things. God

delivered him who had himself known no sin, in his purity, for all who had sinned.

Cyprian, *Epistle* viii. *to Clem. and the people:* He prayed for us, though he was not himself a sinner, but bore our sins.— *Epist.* lxiii. *to Caecilius*, § 9: Christ bore us all who also bore our sins. — *To Demetrianus*, § 22: This grace Christ imparts, this gift he ascribes to his own mercy, by undergoing death upon the trophy of the cross, by redeeming the believer with the price of his own blood, by reconciling man to God the Father, by quickening the mortal with heavenly regeneration. — *The same, or rather some other writer of the book On the Chief Works of Christ to Pope Cervelius, Serm.* vii. *upon the Reason of Circumcision:* That one offering of our Redeemer was of so great dignity that it was alone sufficient to take away the sins of the world,— who entered by so great authority into the sacred place, in his own blood, that thereafter no request of suppliants stood in need of the blood of another. — *The same, Serm.* xvi., *on the Ascension of Christ:* Who, having been purchased in our behalf for thirty pieces of silver, wished us to know how great a difference there was between the price which was given for him and that which he himself gave for the world, since he, though bought and sold for so little money, redeemed the condemned for so great a price. There can therefore be no doubt that the magnitude of the price surpassed the matter in hand, nor could the loss which a just condemnation had by all means merited be made equal to the obedience of Christ, which graciously continued even to death, and, morever, paid that which he did not owe.

Lactantius, *On the Benefits of Christ:* You who enter and come to the doors of the midst of the temple, pause all alike, and gaze upon one who, guiltless, suffered for your crime, etc. — *And again:* For your sake, and for your life, I entered the womb of the virgin; I have been made man, and have suffered a cruel death, etc.

Eusebius of Caesarea, *Bk.* x., *Demonstratio Evangelica, Preface:* For it was necessary that the Lamb of God, which had been assumed by the great High-Priest, should be offered as a sacrifice to God in behalf of the rest of the kindred lambs and of the whole human flock. For since by man came death, by man also came the resurrection of [**340 b** the dead. — *Bk.* x. *Chap.* i.: And, as when one member suffers, all the members suffer with it, so when the many members suffer and sin, he himself also, according to the principles of sympathy (since, though he was the λόγος of God, it pleased him to take the form of a servant, and to assume the common body of us all), receives the labors of the suffering members upon himself, and appropriates to himself our diseases, and suffers and labors in behalf of us all, according to the laws of love. But the Lamb of God not only having done these things, but also suffered punishment, and undergone in our behalf vengeance which he himself did not owe, but which we owed on account of the multitude of our sins, was made to us the source of the forgiveness of our sins, inasmuch as having received death on our behalf, and having taken upon himself stripes and insults and dishonor due to us, and having drawn upon himself the curse attaching to us, he had become a curse for us. For what else is he than a substitute for souls?[1] Wherefore, speaking in our person, the oracle says: "By his stripes we are healed"; and: "The Lord delivered him for our sins." — *Bk.* i. *Chap.* x.: And God looked upon Abel and upon his gifts, but unto Cain and his sacrifices he had no respect. From this you may understand how he who slew an animal was said to be acceptable, rather than he who brought to God his sacrifice from the earth. And even Noah immediately offered upon the altar whole burnt-offerings of all clean beasts, and of all clean fowls, and the Lord smelled an odor of a sweet savor. But also Abraham

[1] [ἀντίψυχον.]

is said to have sacrificed; so that according to the testimony of the sacred Scriptures, he was thought by the ancient friends of God to have offered first of all the sacrifice of animals. Now, we do not think that his conception was induced by chance, or that it originated with man, but rather that it was inspired by God. For since they saw, inasmuch as through sanctity of manners they were in peculiarly close relations with God, and were enlightened by the Divine Spirit, that they had need of a great remedy for cleansing the sins of mortals, they thought that they owed a ransom for their salvation to him who supplied them with life and breath. Since they had nothing better or more precious than **341 a**] their own lives to sacrifice, they offered instead of this the sacrifice of dumb beasts, reckoning them as substitutes[1] for their own lives. And they did this, not supposing that they committed fault or wrong, because they were not taught that the life of brutes was like the rational and intelligent force of man, or had learned that it was anything else than their blood, and the vital force in the blood. This they esteemed themselves to be offering as bringing life for life to God. And this very thing Moses explained somewhere[2] very clearly, saying: "The life of all flesh is its blood, and I have given you the blood upon the altar to make atonement for your sins. For their blood shall make atonement instead of life. For this reason have I said to the sons of Israel, No soul of you shall eat blood." Notice, now, particularly in this how he said: "I have given it to you to make atonement upon the altar for your souls. For the blood shall make atonement instead of the life." For he clearly says that the blood of the slaughtered animals makes atonement instead of the life of man. Now this very thing, also, the law about sacrifices leads him who examines it carefully to understand. It directs that every one who sacrifices should put his hands

[1] [ἀντίψυχα.]

[2] [Lev. xvii. 11.]

upon the head of the victim, and bring the animal to the priest, having hold of its head, as if offering the victim instead of his own head. Now, therefore, it says of each one: "He shall place it before the Lord, and shall put his hands upon the head of the gift." This was observed with every victim, no sacrifice being otherwise offered. By these things the saying that the victims which were offered were substitutes[1] for their lives, is explained. Christ is called "the purification[2] of the world," and "the substitute[1] of [341 b sinners. Below he is said to "offer himself as a substitute[1] for us all."

Antonius the Hermit, *Epist.* ii.: In which also the Father of his creatures, moved with pity for our plagues, which could not be cured except by his goodness alone, sent the Only-begotten for us, that through our servitude he might assume the form of servitude, and deliver himself for our sins. And it is our sins which have abased him, but by his stripes[3] have we all been healed.

Macarius, Bishop of Jerusalem, *Bk.* ii. *Acts of the Council of Nice:* But he himself came as the Saviour of all, and in our name bore, in his own flesh, the punishment owed by us.

Athanasius, *On the Incarnation of the Word of God:* But since also that which was due from all was yet to be paid; for the death of all, as I have previously said, was due, which was the chief reason for his coming into the world; for this reason, he first exhibited the signs of his divinity by his works, and then offered also sacrifice in behalf of all, delivering his own temple to death in the place[4] of all men, in order that he might liberate all from liability to account and from the ancient transgression, and show himself superior to death; exhibiting, as the first fruits of the resurrection of the whole, his own uncorrupted body. — *And below:* For there was need of death, and it was necessary that death

[1] [ἀντίψυχα.] [2] [καθάρσιον.] [3] [livore ejus.] [4] [ἀντί.]

should be suffered in behalf of all, in order that what was due from all might be paid. Whence, as I said before, the Word, since it was not possible that he should die (for he was immortal), took upon himself a body capable of dying, in order that he might offer it in behalf of all as his own, and might, as himself suffering in behalf of all on account of his entrance into it, conquer him that hath the power of death, that is, the devil, and release those who through fear of death were subject to bondage. Surely, since the common Saviour of all has died in our behalf, all who believe in Christ shall no longer now, as of old, according to the threat of the law, surely die. — *The same, in the same place:* And by such a kind of death has salvation come to all, and every creature been redeemed. This is the life of all, who surrendered to death his own body, like a sheep, a substitute for the salva-
342 a] tion of all. — *The same, upon the Sufferings and Crucifixion of the Lord:* But seeing how unbearable wickedness was, and that the mortal race was not able to resist death, nor able to pay the punishment of sins (for the excess of iniquity transcended all punishment); and seeing also the goodness of the Father, and seeing his own sufficiency and power (for Christ was the power of God and the wisdom of God), he was moved with benevolence, and, pitying our weakness, he assumed it; for he himself, as the prophet says, took our infirmities and bare our sicknesses. And having had mercy upon our mortality, he was surrounded with it; for Paul says, he humbled himself unto death, even the death of the cross. And seeing how impossible it was that our punishment should suffice for payment, he took this upon himself, for Christ became a curse for us. And thus now surrounded with and clothed in man's circumstances, he brought our offerings in himself unto the Father, in order that, as himself suffering, he might render suffering man blameless, and compensate for small things by great things.

Hilary of Pictavium, *in Chap.* xiv. *Matt.* xiv.: The Lord who was alone to suffer for all resolved the sins of all.

Hymn on the Epiphany: Jesus shone forth, the pious Redeemer of all nations, etc. The happy John trembled to immerse[1] in the river him who is able with his own blood to cleanse the sins of the world.

Optatus Milevitanus, *On the Schism of the Donatists, against Parmenianus, Bk.* iii.: When you say, Redeem your souls, whence have you bought them that you may sell them? Who is that unknown angel who makes a [342 b market of the souls which, before his coming, the devil possessed? Christ our Saviour redeemed them with his own blood, as the apostle says: Ye were bought with a great price. For it is certain that all were redeemed by the blood of Christ.

Victor of Antioch *on Mark* xv.: And why, you ask, did the Lord and Maker of all things, being made man for our sakes, endure so great ignominy and so great sufferings? He was made like us; he took upon himself our miseries and crosses that he might raise up our nature, fallen through sin, and finally restore it to its former grade of dignity. The advantages, therefore, which have flowed to us through his sufferings are very many; for he himself paid our debts for us, himself bore our sins, himself for our sake both suffered and groaned.

Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechism* xiii.: Now he released those who were held down by sin, and redeemed the whole world of men. And do not wonder if the whole world was redeemed; for he who died in their behalf was no mere man, but the only-begotten Son of God. And yet the sin of one man Adam was able to bring death upon the world; but if by the sin of the one death obtained dominion over the world,[2] how shall not rather life reign by the righteousness

[1] [mergere.]

[1] [ἐβασίλευσεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον.]

of one? And if then, on account of the tree of which they ate, they were cast out of Paradise, will not they who believe enter more easily now into paradise on account of the tree of Jesus? If he who was first formed from the earth brought universal death, does not he, then, who formed man from the earth bring eternal life, being himself the life? If Phineas, moved with anger against him who did wrong, caused the anger of God to cease, does not Jesus, not having apponted another, but having given up himself, a ransom, appease the wrath against men?

Basil, *Homily, Ps.* xlviii.: One thing was found, surpassing all things else, which was given for payment for the ransom of our souls — the holy and precious blood of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Gregory Nazianzen, *Orat.* xlii., *which is the second upon the Passover:* The victim, great and (so to speak) incapable of being offered according to its primary nature, was mingled with the lawful sacrifices as a purification not for a small part of the world, or for a short time, but for all the world, **343 a**] and forever. — *The same, in the same place:* A few drops of blood form anew the whole world, and become to all men, like the rennet to milk, a means of drawing and binding us into one. — *The same:* It remains to examine a deed and decree overlooked by most persons, but carefully examined by me. For unto whom was the blood shed in our behalf, and concerning what was it shed, great and celebrated of God, and of the high-priest, and of the victim? For we were held in bondage by the devil, sold under sin, and deriving pleasure from sin. But if the ransom comes into the hands of no one else than he who holds us in bondage, I inquire unto whom it was offered, and for what cause. If to the devil, alas, what an insult! if the robber receives not a ransom only from God, but also God himself as a ransom, and so a reward far exceeding his own tyrannical power, on

which account it was just to spare us. But if to the Father, in the first place, how? for we were not held by him. And again, what was the reason that the blood of the Only-begotten was pleasing to the Father, who would not receive even Isaac from his father when he was offered, but changed the sacrifice, furnishing a ram in the place of the commanded victim? Or is it evident that the Father receives the sacrifice, not having asked it, or being in need of it, but for the sake of the dispensation, and because man ought to be sanctified by the human in God, in order that he might himself deliver, having conquered the tyrant by force, and bring us unto himself through our Mediator, and unto the honor of the Father who provided this, and to whom all things appear to be conceded.

Gregory of Nyssa, *to the Monk of Olympius concerning the Form of a Perfect Name:* But having learned that Christ who gave himself a ransom for us is redemption, we [**343 b** are instructed by such a word to learn that, inasmuch as he bestowed upon us a certain gift for each soul,— immortality, — he made those among them purchased from death through life his own peculiar possession.

Ambrose *on Tobit* x.: Lo, the prince of this world comes, and finds nothing of his own in me. He owed nothing, but he paid for all, as he himself testifies, saying, What things I had not taken I was then paying back. — *The same, on the Patriarch Joseph, Chap.* iv.: Joseph was sold into Egypt, because Christ was to come to those to whom it was said, Ye have been sold by your sins. And so by his own blood he redeemed those whom their own sins had sold. But Christ, sold by undertaking a condition, is not held by the price of a fault and sin, because he committed no sin. He therefore contracted the debt at our price, not by his own expenditure; he took away the handwriting, removed the usurer, freed the debtor, alone paid that which was owed by all.

Ambrose *concerning Esau, or concerning the Flight of the Age, Chap.* vii.: God so took flesh as to abolish the curse of sinful flesh, and was made a curse for us that blessing might absorb the curse, perfection the sin, pardon the sentence, life death. For he accepted death that the sentence might be fulfilled, and perfect satisfaction even unto death be made for him condemned through the curse of the flesh. Therefore nothing was done contrary to the sentence of God, since the condition of the divine sentence was fulfilled. For the curse extends even unto death, but after death is grace. — *The same, Bk.* ix. *Epistle* lxxi.: The Lord Jesus, coming, forgave to all the sin which no one could avoid, and destroyed our accusation[1] by the effusion of his own blood. This is what he says: Sin abounded through the law, but grace abounded through Jesus. Because, after the whole world was subdued, he took away the sin of the whole world. — *Bk.* i. *Epistle* ii.: See whether that is the saving victim which the Word of God offered in himself, and sacrificed in his own body. — *And a little after*: But that he poured out his blood upon the altar, we may understand thereby the cleansing of the world, the remission of all sins. For he poured out that blood upon the altar as a victim, to take away the sins of many. For the victim is a lamb, but not a lamb of an unreasoning nature, but of divine power, of whom it is said, "Behold the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sins of the world." For not only did he cleanse the sins of all by his blood, but also forgave them by divine power. — *The same, on Luke, Bk.* vii. *Chap.* xii.: The adversary esteems us as captive slaves at a small rate. But the Lord, who is a fit judge of his own work, redeemed us for a great price, as beautiful servants whom he made in his own image and likeness; as the apostle said, For ye were bought with a great **344 a**] price. With a great one, indeed, which is not

[1] [*Lat.* Chirographum.]

estimated in money, but in blood, because Christ died for us, who liberated us with precious blood, etc. And precious, indeed, because it is the blood of a spotless body, because it is the blood of the Son of God, who not only redeemed us from the curse of the law, but also from the perpetual death of impiety.—*The same, on Luke, Bk.* x. *Chap.* xxii.: "I have sinned, because I have betrayed innocent blood." The price of our Lord's passion is the price of blood, therefore the world is bought with the price of blood by Christ.—*Bk.* iii. *concerning Virginity, near the end:* We had been pledged to an evil creditor by sins. We have contracted an accusation for fault, we owed the punishment of blood. The Lord Jesus came, and offered his own blood for us.—*And a little below:* Do you therefore also conduct yourself worthily of such a price, that Christ who cleansed you, who redeemed you, may not come, and if he finds you in sin say to you: What advantage in my blood? What have I done for you by descending into corruption?—*Bk.* i. *of the Apology of David, Chap.* xiii.: Well says the apostle, Because the Lord Jesus forgave you your trespasses, blotting out the handwriting of ordinances that was contrary to us, and took it out of the way, nailing it to his cross. He blotted out the ink of Eve with his own blood, he blotted out the obligation of the hurtful inheritance.—*On the Epistle to the Hebrews, Chap.* ix.: But his was the whole bodily cleansing of the Old Testament; but now there is the spiritual cleansing of the blood of Christ. Thus he says: This is the blood of the New Testament for the remission of sins. In those sacrifices, they were sprinkled upon the surface, and again the sprinkled part was washed; for the people did not always go about sprinkled with blood. But in the soul it is not so; but the blood mingles with its essence, making that fountain clean, and producing unutterable beauty. On this account was the slaying of the lamb and the sprinkling of his blood

over the lintels of those who were to be liberated. On this account, also, we read of all the sacrifices of the Old Testament, that they may point out one sacrifice through which there is a true remission of sins, and a cleansing of the soul forever. —*The same, or rather the Author of the Comments on the Epistles of Paul which are ascribed to Ambrose, on* 1 *Cor.* vi.: Because we were bought for a dear price, we ought more carefully to serve our Lord, lest, offended, he return us to that death from which he has redeemed us. For he bought us with so very dear a price as to give his own blood for us. — *The same, upon the Epistle of the same, Chap.* xi.: We receive the mystical cup of the blood for the protection of our body and soul, because the blood of the Lord has redeemed our blood, that is, has made the whole man safe. For the flesh of the Saviour was given for the salvation of our body; but his blood was shed for our soul. — *The same on* 2 *Cor.* v.: Since he was offered for sins, not undeservedly is he said to have been made sin (because even the victim in the law which was offered for sins was called sin), that we might be the righteousness of God in him, who knew no sin; as Isaiah says: He who did no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth, was slain as a sinner, that sinners might be justified before God in Christ.

Epiphanius Haeres. lv.: First he offered himself, in order to abolish the sacrifice of the Old Testament, having offered the more perfect living sacrifice in behalf of the **344 b**] whole world, himself being the offering, himself the sacrifice, himself the priest, himself the altar, himself God, himself man, himself king, himself high-priest, himself sheep, himself lamb, having become all in all for us, in order that life might come to us in every way, and that he might establish the unchangeable foundation of his priesthood forever.

Andreas of Cesarea *on Apoc. Chap.* i.: Honor, glory, and

dominion are becoming to him who, kindled with burning love, by his own death liberated our race from the chains of death, and by the effusion of life-giving blood and water, washed us from the uncleanness of sins, and received us into a royal priesthood.

Prudentius *on Roman. Mart.:* This is that cross, the salvation of us all. Romanus says: This is the redemption of man.

Chrysostom *in the Preface of his Commentary on Isaiah:* How great is the clemency of God toward us! He spared not the Son, that he might spare the slave; he delivered up the Only-begotten, that he might redeem slaves openly ungrateful; he paid the blood of his own Son for the price. — *The same*, viii. *To the Romans:* And he prepares others to intercede in our behalf, in order that he may confer benefits upon us, as he did with Moses; for he says to him, Suffer me and I will destroy them, that he might provoke him to supplication in their behalf. — *Below:* For this reason frequently for David's sake, now such a one and now such a one, he says, is reconciled with them, effecting this very thing again, that also form may be given to the reconciliation.

Eleazar *in the speech in the Maccabees begs God for the people:* Make our blood their purification, and for their life receive my life.

Jerome *against the Pelagians, Bk.* i.: And he says, when he would enter in, let him offer a calf for sin, and a ram for a burnt-offering, and let him take two goats from the whole people: one of them let him offer for his own sin, and one for the sin of the people, and the ram for a burnt-offering. The other goat receives all the sins of the people for a type of our Lord and Saviour, and bears them into the desert, and so God is appeased for the whole multitude. — *The same, Isa.* liii.: He was despised and rejected when he hung upon the cross, and was made a curse for us, bore our sins, and said to the Father, My God, why hast thou forsaken me?

Augustine *on the Trinity, Bk.* xiii. *Chap.* xiv.: What is the righteousness by which the devil was conquered? What **345 a**] except the righteousness of Jesus Christ? And how was he conquered? Because, though the devil found nothing in him worthy of death, yet he slew him. And truly it is just that the debtors whom he held should be dismissed in freedom when believing in him whom without any debt he slew. This is why we are said to be justified in the blood of Christ. For so was that innocent blood shed for the remission of our sins. — *And below:* Thence he goes to the passion that he might pay for us debtors what he himself did not owe. — *And in the next chapter:* Then that blood, since it was the blood of him who had no sin at all, was shed for the remission of our sins, that, because the devil deservedly held them whom he bound by the condition of death as guilty of sin, he might deservedly discharge them through him whom, guilty of no sin, he had unjustly punished with death. By this righteousness was the strong man conquered, and by this chain bound, that his goods, which while they were in his possession had been, with him and his angels, vessels of wrath, might be taken away, and might be converted into vessels of mercy. — *The same on John, tract.* xli.: We are not reconciled except by the taking away of sin, which is the medium of separation; but the mediator is the reconciler. That, therefore, the middle wall of partition may be taken away, that Mediator came, and the priest was himself made the sacrifice. — *City of God, Bk.* vii. *Chap.* xxxi.: God sent to us his own Word, who is his only son, by whose birth and sufferings for us, in the flesh that he took, we might know how much God prized man, and might be cleansed by that one sacrifice from all sins, and, love being spread abroad in our hearts by his Spirit, might conquer all difficulties, and come into eternal rest. — *Declaration on Ps.* xcv.: Men were held captive under the devil, and served demons, but they have

been redeemed from captivity. For they could sell themselves, but they could not redeem themselves. The Redeemer came and gave the price, shed his own blood and bought the whole world. Do you ask what he bought? See what he gave, and discover what he bought. The blood of Christ is the price. What is of so great value? What except the whole world? What except all nations? Very ungrateful are they to their price, or very proud are they, who say either that that was so little as to buy Africans alone, or that they are themselves so great that it was given for them alone. Therefore let them not exult, nor be proud; he gave for the whole as much as he gave. He knows what he bought, because he knows for how much he bought it and how much he gave for it.—*On Ps.* cxxix.: Our priest received from us what he should offer for us, for he received from us flesh. In the flesh he was made a victim, he was made a whole burnt-offering, he was made a sacrifice.—*Against two Epistles of the Pelagians, Bk.* iv. *Chap.* iv.: But how do the Pelagians say that death alone passed to us through Adam? For if we die on this account, because he died, but he died because he sinned, they say that punishment passes over without fault, and that innocent children are punished by an unjust judgment by suffering death without deserving it. Which the Catholic faith acknowledges concerning the one sole Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who was thought worthy to suffer death for us, that is, the punishment of sin, without sin. For as he alone was made Son of Man in such a way that we might be made [**345 b** through him sons of God; so he alone received, without deserving it, punishment for us, that we through him might obtain pardon without meriting it. Because as no good was due to us, so no evil was due to him.—*Against Faustus the Manichaean, Bk.* xiv. *Chap.* iv.: Christ received without guilt our punishment, that thereby he might resolve our guilt, and

also put an end to our punishment. — *The same in the Eighth Sermon concerning Time:* There is principally a twofold cause why the Son of God was made the Son of Man. One is, that, like man, by bearing all things for us, he might liberate us from the chains of sins. For so Isaiah the prophet had prophesied: "He bore our sins," etc. But the other cause of our Lord's passion is that he might excite us, whom he has redeemed by his own blood from vices and crimes, not only by the aid of instruction and grace, but also by his own example, to the pursuit of holiness. *Concerning Time, Sermon* ci.: Death could not be conquered except by death. Wherefore Christ bore death, that an unjust death might conquer a just death, and might liberate the guilty justly, while he was slain for them unjustly. — *And Sermon* cxli.: Our Lord Jesus Christ, by sharing punishment with us without fault, takes away both fault and punishment. — *On our Lord's Sermon in Luke, Sermon* xxxvii.: It is your fault that you are unjust; it is your punishment that you are mortal. That he might be your neighbor he undertook your punishment. He did not receive your sin. Or if he received it, he received it to destroy it, not to do it. — *And presently:* By receiving the punishment, and not receiving the sin, he has destroyed both sin and punishment.

Cyril *on Leviticus, Bk.* x.: Then all the people cried out that he should let Barrabas go, but deliver Jesus to death. Here you have the goat which was sent away into the desert alive bearing the sins of the people, who cried out and said, Crucify, crucify. The one, therefore, was the goat sent away alive into the desert; and the other is the goat which was offered to the Lord a victim for propitiating sins again, and which made a true propitiation for the people believing in himself. — *The same against Julian, Bk.* ix.: See therefore the sacrament, and how it is well delineated in the two goats.

For the he-goat, that is, the goat,[1] was slain for the sins of the priest and of the people, according to what was commanded in the law. But inasmuch as Christ was offered for our sins, he is brought into comparison with the goat. For, as the prophet Isaiah says, "All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." For two goats are taken not because there are two Christs, that is, two Sons, as some think, but rather because it was proper that he who was even to be slain for us should be seen dying, indeed, according to the flesh, but living according to the spirit. — *The same on John, Bk.* ii. *Chap.* i.: One lamb is slain for all, that he might offer the whole race of man to God the Father. One for all that he may gain all, that all may live no longer to themselves, but to Christ, who died for all, and for all rose from the dead. For since we were in sin, and were therefore due to death and destruction, the [**346 a** Father gave his own Son for our redemption. One for all, since both all are in him and he is better than all. — *The same in the Homily delivered at Ephesus against Nestorius:* Truly these impious heretics are the sons of perdition and the seed of iniquity, who deny the Lord by whom they were bought. For we were bought with a price, not indeed corruptible, as gold and silver, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot. But how would the blood of a common man like ourselves have been the redemption of the world?

In the Exegesis to Valerian on the Incarnation of the Word, which may be found Concil. Eph. Vol. vi. *Chap.* xvii.: He who was without a body as God, confesses that a body has been prepared for him, that, when it had been offered for us, he might heal us all by his own stripes, according to the word of the prophet. But how could one, having died for all, pay

[1] [*Lat.* Caper enim, hoc est, hircus.]

the just price for all, if we say that his suffering was that of any mere man? But if the Word, having suffered in his human nature, transferred upon himself the sufferings of his own flesh, as if they were his own, and claimed them for himself, then, and not until then, do we most rightly assert that the death of one according to the flesh has abounded to the life of all men.

Theodoret, *Question* ix. *upon Numbers:* For the Lord Christ alone, even as man, is blameless; and foreseeing this the prophet Isaiah cries, "Who did no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth." And for this reason he took upon him the sins of the rest, having none of his own. "For he," says the prophet, "hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows." And the great John says: "Behold the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sins of the world." For this cause, even among the dead, he is free, as having suffered death unjustly. — *The same, Sermon* x. *on Providence, introduces the Lord speaking as follows:* For I have paid the debt in behalf of the race. For, not owing death, I suffered death, and not being subject to death I accepted death, and being blameless I was enrolled among the blameworthy, and being free from debts I was yet numbered among the debtors. Therefore I paid the debt of nature, and, having suffered an unjust death, I abolish the just; and I, who have been unjustly held, release those who are justly held, from bondage. Behold nature's indictment taken away! Oh bitter death! Behold it nailed to the cross, and freed from the marks of sin! Behold how it has received no accusation of evil! Therefore the eyes of this body made payment for the evil-beholding eyes; the ears of this body, for the ears that had received defilement; the tongue, likewise the hands and the other parts, for the members of whatever kind that had committed iniquity. But since the debt was paid, it was fittting that those who had been imprisoned for it should be

released from prison, and should receive their former liberty, and return to the country of their Father.

Proclus of Constantinople, *Homily on the Nativity of Christ:* The nature of man owed much in consequence of sins, and was in perplexity over the debt. For through Adam all had been accused of sin; the devil held us slaves; he made boast of having purchased us, employing for a proof our much suffering body. The evil falsifier of the passions stood pressing the debt upon us, and demanding justice from us. There was therefore need of one of two things, — either that death, arising from the condemnation, should be laid upon all, since also all sinned; or that such a payment should be made in recompense as to satisfy every righteous demand. A man, therefore, could not save us; for he lay under the debt of sin. An angel could not redeem humanity, for he did not know how to provide such a ransom. It remained, therefore, that the sinless God should die in behalf of those who had sinned. For this was the only deliverance from the evil left. What then? He that brought all nature from nothingness into being, who was not perplexed to find a way of delivery, found out for them that were condemned a most sure life, and release most becoming to death, and is made man of a virgin in such a manner as he himself knows, — for reason is not able to interpret the wonder, — and dies in what he became, and paid the ransom in what he was; as Paul says: "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins." Oh great work! he purchased immortality for others, for he was himself immortal. [346 b

Leo *concerning the Passion, Serm.* xii.: What hope do they leave for themselves in the safeguard of this sacrament who deny the truth of the human substance in the body of our Lord? Can they tell by what sacrifice they have been reconciled, by what blood redeemed? Who is he who delivered himself for us an offering and a sacrifice for a sweet [347 a

savor? Or what sacrifice was ever more consecrated than that which the true Priest laid upon the altar of the cross by the offering of his own flesh? For although the death of many saints was precious in the sight of the Lord, yet the slaying of no innocent one was the propitiation of the world. The just received, they did not bestow, crowns; and from the fortitude of the faithful have proceeded examples of patience, not gifts of justice. For the death of each one of them was single, nor did any one pay the debt of any other one by his death, since among the sons of men our Lord Jesus Christ alone has appeared, in whom all have been crucified, all dead, all buried, all also raised again.

Claudianus Mamertus *on the State of the Soul, Bk.* ii.: Hilary of Pictavium, in many of his lofty discussions, having a somewhat different opinion, asserted these two things in opposition to the truth; First, that nothing incorporeal was created; Second, that Christ felt no pain in his passion. But if his passion was not genuine, our redemption also could not be genuine.

Anastatius Sinaita, *Bishop of Antioch, on the True Doctrines of the Catholic Faith, Bk.* iv., *on the Passion and impassible Deity of Christ:* His blood was poured forth, which sufficed to redeem many, perhaps it were better to say *all,* for the *many* are even *all.*

Procopius of Gaza, *on Exodus* xxiv.: Since Christ is conjoined with the Father in nature, if we should be made partakers of him through the Spirit, we would be connected through him also with the Father, coming into the society of the divine nature. Nor did they ascend the mountain otherwise than sprinkled with the blood of Christ, who gave himself for us as the price of redemption, offering his flesh as a blameless sacrifice to God and the Father.

Gregory the Great, *Moral, Bk.* iii, *ch.* xiii.: Another, created for Paradise, would proudly seize upon the similitude

of divine power, but nevertheless the Mediator atoned for the faults of this pride, without fault. Hence it is, that a certain wise man says to the Father: Since thou art just, thou justly disposest all things; thou also condemnest him who did not deserve to be punished. But we must consider how he is just, and justly disposes all things, if he condemns him who does not deserve to be punished. For our mediator did not deserve to be punished for himself, because he had contracted no pollution of sin. But, unless he suffered an undeserved death, he would never liberate us from deserved death. Since, therefore, the Father is just in punishing the just, he justly disposes all things, because he thereby justifies all things, in that he condemns him who without sin is for sinners.

Isychius *on Leviticus, Chap.* xvi.: The Law made the children of Israel liable to curse and death, that on that account they might have the necessary expiation; [**347 b** and in their behalf, indeed, principally, is the sacrifice of the Only-begotten slain. But he is slain also for all men, so that Caiaphas said, It is expedient for us that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not. And confirming what was said, and at the same time also correcting it, the evangelist John added: "This, however, he spake not of himself, but, being high-priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation; and not for that nation only, but that also he should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad," viz. the Gentiles. — *A little below:* Jesus was offered for Israel according to the flesh, and made an offering for all the human race for the expiation of our uncleannesses.

Antiochus, *in the Exomologesis:* Thy Word, stained with no least sprinkling of sin, whom thou didst send through the bowels of thy mercy, that he might call back into the way his own creation, was made flesh, suffered himself, for our

sake, to be crucified, and abolished the hand-writing that was against us, having been made a propitiation for our sins.

Sophronius of Jerusalem, *Epistle to Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople:* Christ thought fit to die for men, and for their redemption poured his own divine blood, and bestowed a gift more divine than every dignity — his own life.

Elias of Crete, *upon Oration* i. *of Nazianzen:* Christ is said to be redemption, as bringing us, sold to sin, into liberty, and because, for the expiation of the whole world, he gave himself, as it were, the price of redemption.

Nicephorus of Constantinople, *Epistle to Leo* iii. *which is extant in Baronius, Vol.* ix. *Annal.* p. 587. *Edit. Mor.* ii.: I believe that he was crucified, not in the substance in which he shines with the Father, although it is said that the Lord of glory was crucified, in the declaration of retribution, but in our earthly nature, in which he took upon him our earthly mass, and was made a curse for us, that he might make us partakers in the blessing which flows from him, and suffered to bear death according to the flesh of malefactors, that by sustaining the sting of death, he might condemn death in his own flesh, and destroy him who had the power of death, that is, the devil.

Mark the Hermit, *in his book concerning them that think themselves justified by Works, Chap.* xx.: Christ is master according to essence, and master according to the dispensation, because he both made them that [before] were not, and redeemed, through his own blood, them that were dead to sin, and bestowed grace upon them that thus believed.

Theodore Abucara, *Bishop of the Carians, Discussion* xv. *Chap.* v.: God, in his just judgment, demanded of us all things that were written in the law, when we were not competent to pay them; for that reason our Lord paid them for us, and assumed the curse and condemnation to which we were exposed, and further took it upon himself. What things

we ought to have suffered, he himself bore. — *The same, in the same place:* Now tell me, what those five enemies are from which Christ has liberated us.

A. Death; the devil; the curse of the law, and [348 a its condemnation; sin; and hell.

B. As far as pertain to death, you have said that this was destroyed by the obedience of Christ; so also you have told how it liberated us from servitude to the devil. Now tell us how he redeemed us from the curse of the law, having been made a curse for us? — *After a little:*

A. God in his just judgment demanded of us all those things that were written in the law, though we were not competent to pay them; for that reason Christ our Lord paid them for us, and assumed the curse and condemnation to which we were exposed, and further took it upon himself, and himself bore what things we ought to have suffered, having been scourged, spit upon, smitten, struck upon the ears, crucified, and put to death for us.

Theophylact, *on those words* (*Heb.* i.) "*When he had by himself purged our sins*": When he had spoken of the majesty of the Divine Word, then he discoursed of the care which he took for men through his flesh, which was of much greater importance than that he sustains all things. Moreover, he lays down here two things, both that he cleansed us from sins, and that he did this through himself. For by the cross and death which he sustained he purged us, not only because he died for our sin, though he was himself free from all sin, and because he paid the penalty, which nevertheless he did not owe, for us, and freed that nature, which was condemned simply because of the sin and transgression of Adam, etc. — *On Chap.* ix.: Christ died for this purpose that he might cleanse us, and left to us in his testament pardon of our fault, and the use of our Father's goods, having been made a Mediator of our Father. For the Father was

not willing to bestow upon us the inheritance, but was angry with us, as sons rejecting him, and estranged from him. Christ, so made Mediator, reconciled him to us. How? He himself bore for us that which we ought to have suffered (for we deserved to die), and made us worthy of his testament.

Anselm, *on the Conception of the Virgin, and Original Sin, Chap,* xxi.: Does any one say, If they have not each the sin of Adam, how do you assert that none is saved without satisfaction for the sin of Adam? For how does a just God exact from them satisfaction for that which they have not? To which I say: God does not exact from any sinner more than he owes; but since none can pay as much as he owes, Christ alone paid more than is due for all that are saved.

Bernard, *Epistle* cxc. *to Innocent:* It was a man who owed, a man who paid. For if one, he says, died for all, then all died, viz. that the satisfaction of one may be imputed to all, just as he alone bore the sins of all; nor is there any one found to purchase, and another one to make satisfaction, because one Christ is head and body. The head, therefore, **348 b**] made satisfaction for the members, Christ for his own bowels.

Arnold Carnotensis, *in his work upon the Seven last Words spoken by Christ upon the Cross, Treatise* i.: He is deserted with them that are deserted, and pays tribute for the nature which he had assumed, and, purposing to convey his race with him beyond the sea of this world, he gave the rapacious pirates the passage-money of his own flesh, and deceived their greedy teeth glued together, and took off, and carried away, both himself and his prey. For debtors he offered himself a debtor, and, what he did not owe of himself, he, of his own accord, refused not to owe, and so the exactor took of him who gave himself for all the sum of the whole debt.

Nicetas Choniates *in his Annals, found in John Com-*

menus: Christ, who stretched out his hands upon the cross, and brought the whole world into unity with a few drops, by his own fall raised again our fallen nature.

Nicolaus of Cusa, *Cardinal, Excitationes, Bk.* x.: For our justification did Christ so do. For we, sinners, in him paid the penalties of hell, which we justly deserved.

Rabbi Albo, *Chap.* xxv, *Oration* iii, *of the Book on* עקרים[1]: Besides the wise among them are accustomed to bear penalties and punishments due to a multitude of sins. For so we have found that God commanded Ezekiel the prophet to lie upon his side and sustain punishment, in bearing upon himself the iniquity of the house of Israel, and so it is not to be wondered at, if the priest is punished for the sin of the people.

Varro: *Lustrum,* derived from *luo,* that is, *to pay,* because every fifth year taxes and tribute were paid through the censors.

Lucan: Hic redimet sanguis populos, hac caede luetur
Quidquid Romani meruerunt pendere mores.[2]

Julius Firmicus: That the offence being mitigated, he might compose man with God by fortunate reconciliation.

John Arn. *Bk.* ii. *p.* 480: God did not lack other modes of redeeming.

Sapient. *Contr.:* The causes why the human race must have been so redeemed, in this infirmity we do not yet discern, but after this they will be an object of study in all eternity.

Livy. The word *piaculum* is employed by *Livy, concerning the Decii.*

[1] [Probably עֲקָרִים, *foreign residents among the Hebrews.*]

[2] [Prose translation: This blood shall redeem the peoples, by this slaughter shall be atoned whatever Roman manners have deserved to pay.]

Servius *on Aen.* iii. (*See Theol. notat.* iv. 18, *sq.*): To be *lustrated* is to be liberated from the hatred of the gods.

Pliny, *Bk.* iii. *Epistle* ix.: Finally, that the most powerful, having given some very cheap thing, as a kind of piacular offering, might not escape other punishment.

Salv.: Government cannot be, except there is just judgment in the ruler (21).

Ovid: Hanc animam pro meliore damus.[1]

[NOTE. — A number of references previously omitted are given by the editor of the folio at this point, which have been also omitted by the translator because their proper places are quite uncertain.]

[1] [" This life for a better we give."]

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES.

CHAPTER I.

Note a, p. 1.

Origin of this Treatise. — The doctrine of the atonement was not a principal issue in the discussions of the Reformation period. The real centre of this movement was in the doctrine of justification by faith alone, in contrast with the Mediaeval doctrine of justification by works. The atonement received some attention as affording the objective basis of justification, and with more or less completeness the Reformers formed and taught a theory of the method of its operation. Still the atonement was not in any proper sense a principal issue of the times. We find in the writings of the Reformers a great deal said about the church and the sacraments, about predestination and grace, and they pursue the discussion of justification with Antinomians and others. But what discussion of the atonement there is, is called out by the inclinations of individual minds, rather than by the exigencies of the great controversy with Rome. Even the Council of Trent, although it alludes to the subject in its comments upon the Apostles' Creed, does not define the doctrine of the atonement as a distinct topic.

Accordingly, Grotius's treatise springs only indirectly from the general current of the times. It is strictly a reply to the treatise of Socinus. It has no connection with other previous writers, whether Protestant or Catholic, but with Socinus alone.

The Socinian views were first held by Laelius Socinus, but were adopted and promulgated with great zeal and success by his nephew Faustus. When rightly estimated the Socinian views appear to us in two aspects, partly as a natural recoil from the extreme views of some Protestant theologians, and partly as a rejection of the supernatural element in theology. We can but sympathize with a man who rejects views about sin and justice which outrage those fundamental and constitutional beliefs upon which are founded our moral and intellectual life. But on the other hand, we cannot avoid the impression that Socinus in rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity and an expiatory atonement, showed himself to be without deep religious feeling and moral earnestness. Grotius seems to have perceived this double character of the Socinian theology, and on the one part undoubtedly sympathized with many of the objections raised against the ordinary method of presenting the atonement. But, on the other, he felt a deep religious repugnance to the system as a whole, as appears from the almost impassioned manner in which he closes this treatise. It may be that he was influenced by the charge of Socinianism, which was made against the Arminians, to disprove his Socinianism by an attack upon Socinus (so suggests De Burigny, *Vie de Grotius*, Vol. i. p. 135). But his chief reason was the

danger that these doctrines, which he recognized as the revival of the old doctrines of Arius and Paul of Samosata, would spread and work their injurious work in his own country (Vossius's preface). Conceding Socinus's valid objections, he bent his strength to opposing his errors, and as Socinus had rested his cause largely upon certain so-called legal principles, Vossius tells us that Grotius, who was already a learned jurisconsult and held high positions in the State, determined to oppose him from a legal point of view. At first it was Grotius's object to confine himself to the satisfaction of Christ, by which we obtained immunity from punishment, in distinction from the imputation of his merits to us, and in this department to content himself with a mere answer to Socinus's false legal arguments. But Socinus's errors in interpretation and mistakes in history called for a more extended notice. And yet the work was finally published not as a complete view of the subject, but strictly as a reply to Socinus. Through a failure to understand this peculiarity of the treatise some have been led into needless confusion and inapplicable criticism.

Baur says (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*, p. 414 sq. Translated in the Bib. Sac., Vol. ix. p. 259 sq.), that Grotius originally intended "to defend the satisfaction theory which was held in the church," but that the "actual result was, that instead of defending that theory he substituted an entirely different one in its place." It is evident, as Baur asserts, that the theory of Grotius is entirely different from that which was gaining ground among the Protestant theologians,

but it seems gratuitous to imply that Grotius did not know this. He evidently believed that in previous discussions the argument had begun at the wrong place. Since the atonement related to punishment and release from punishment, God should be considered in the matter as a ruler. With this starting-point the true nature of the satisfaction became plain. In consequence of the fragmentary character of the work, Grotius does not explain the deep foundation of God's governmental acts in the moral nature of himself and his creatures. But it does not follow that Grotius did not have clear views, or an honest purpose in writing this treatise. His very form of stating the church doctrine, while it does not exclude the common satisfaction theory, certainly prepares the way for his own theory, in speaking of the *exhibition* of God's justice. An exhibition is an exterior fact, and involves relations to other beings than the one making the exhibition. While the governmental theory is not stated in these words, it is at least implied. It was Grotius's purpose from the first to present and defend this theory.

The work of Socinus to which Grotius replies is entitled: *De Jesu Christo Servatore*, and is to be found in the collection called *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, *Soc. Works*, Vol. ii. p. 115, etc.

A brief statement of Socinus's view may be useful in gaining an understanding of Grotius's meaning.

The fundamental element of Socinus's system is to be found in his conception of justice. This is entirely different from that held by Calvin and the Reformed theologians. To them justice seemed to be an attribute

of God, residing in him, and perfectly exercised and displayed in all his works. Justice demanded the punishment of every sin. Since justice demanded it, sin must be punished; and accordingly, since the forgiven sinner was freed from punishment, the sacrifice of Christ must be the bearing of that punishment for the satisfaction of justice.

Socinus also recognizes a justice which is an essential attribute of God, and perfectly displayed in all his works; but it is justice in the sense of righteousness or equity. That justice by which sins are punished is not an attribute of God, but merely a result of the action of his will (i. 1). In this respect it is like its opposite, mercy. Both are effects of God's will, but they are mutually exclusive. Justice is exercised in punishing, mercy in forgiving men; but they are both displays of God's righteousness. "God," says Socinus, "is said to be just no less in exercising mercy than in avenging injuries, for it is equal and so just that God should keep his promises, and so treat with favor and kindness repentant sinners" (i. 1).

With such a conception of justice, Socinus cannot admit the current satisfaction theory of his contemporaries. Mercy and justice are so far from being united in the atonement, that justice is entirely laid aside in forgiving sinners, and mercy alone prevails (i. 1). There is no recognition of any obstacle on God's part to the forgiveness of sinners.

A large part of Socinus's treatise is taken up with objections against the necessity and possibility of a satisfaction to justice. God was entirely able to forgive

sins without antecedent satisfaction, just as every private person or a king may forgive injuries against himself without requiring any compensation (iii. 1). The justice of God does not prevent this, for it is not an attribute residing in God and unfailingly executing itself. If it were, God could never forgive even the least sin. Besides, God has never required satisfaction from those whom he has forgiven, but only a pure life (iii. 2). If a satisfaction were required we must have given it ourselves. The only satisfaction we could give would be the bearing of our punishment, that is, eternal death. Except, therefore, we should perish, divine justice could not be satisfied (iii. 3). Transfer of punishment from one to another, and so a vicarious satisfaction is impossible, for the punishment is a corporal punishment and could not be transferred. Besides the law of God requires that "the soul that sinneth *it* shall die," and not another. That another should be punished is entirely to change the law, and thus in the very act of satisfying to render the satisfaction null and void (iii. 3). Substitution was further impossible because the substitute must bear the punishment of eternal death. Christ did not suffer this, and so cannot have made satisfaction for even one person; and if he had made it for *one*, he could certainly for no more, since he could suffer only *one* eternal death. Neither could the obedience of Christ be a satisfaction for our sins, because being a man, he was under the law, and must perfectly obey for himself (iii. 5).

For all these reasons, elaborated at great length, and supported from both reason and Scripture, Socinus re-

jects the theory of a satisfaction for sins in the sacrifice of Christ. He presents the theory which he holds in the following summary form: "I think and hold to be the orthodox doctrine that Jesus Christ is our Saviour, because he has announced to us the way of eternal salvation, has confirmed it, and in his own person both by his example and by rising from the dead manifestly exhibited it, and because he will himself give to us who believe in him eternal life" (i. 1). He announces the way of salvation in a sense in which none of the prophets, or of his successors, the apostles, could, since he was the original herald of it, and the one by whom all the others were selected and instructed. He confirmed it not merely by his miracles, but chiefly by his death; and also by his resurrection. He exhibited the way of salvation in his life, which is imitable by us, and by the imitation of which we shall be saved; and also by rising from the dead which both illustrated what salvation was, and gave us a pledge of it. And, finally, he will, of his own power, which he has both as man and as mediator, give to us eternal life.

It will be noted that in this theory the element of "moral influence" enters very slightly, if at all.

After Grotius had written, the controversy was resumed by Johannes Crellius Francus, in a work entitled: *A Reply to the Book of Hugo Grotius which he wrote concerning the Satisfaction of Christ against Faustus Socinus.* This may be found in the *Bib. Frat. Pol.* A rejoinder was made by Andreas Essenius in: *The Triumph of the Cross, or the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction and Merit of our Lord Jesus Christ vindi-*

cated .... especially from Crellius, Utrecht, 1666. This follows the argument of Grotius very closely, but on some points differs from it.

Note b, p. 1.

In contrast with this definition Socinus defines "the common and so-called orthodox doctrine" as follows: "That Jesus Christ is our Saviour because he has made full satisfaction for our sins to divine justice by which we as sinners deserved to be damned; and which satisfaction by faith is imputed to us who believe by the gift of God" (i. 1.)

Note c, p. 2.

It is necessary to observe upon the threshold of this treatise that the words *penalty* and *punishment* are not employed by Grotius in their strict signification. Strictly they signify pain or evil inflicted upon the transgressor in satisfaction of justice; or with a more general meaning, some say: "Evil inflicted in satisfaction of justice" (Hodge's Theol., i. p. 417). But in this treatise punishment is considered, in analogy with human punishment, as the act of the divine Ruler. It does not conflict with distributive justice, but it has another object primarily, viz. to promote order and the public good. Christ "pays the penalty for our sins," not in the sense that he satisfies the demands of distributive justice, but in the sense that his affliction serves as an example and a warning to sinners. Strictly speaking, in Grotius's view, he was not punished at all, but his affliction is substituted for our punishment. Further remarks upon this topic will be reserved for chapter ii.

Note d, p. 17.

Upon 1 Pet. ii. 24, the following extracts from the commentators should be noted.

Meyer (Huther) translates: "Who himself has borne our sins in his body up upon the tree" (*auf das Holz* in distinction from *dem Holze*, as is expressly remarked below). "The expression employed in this verse is to be understood by the reference to Isa. liii. and the actual fulfilment of the prophecy therein contained. ..... The Heb. נָשָׂא has the accusative ..... so that *to bear the sins is to suffer the punishment for the sins*, whether it be for one's own sins or for the sins of another; as now ἀνήνεγκε represents נָשָׂא, so the meaning is the same; 'he bore the suffering for the sins of many.'—But this suffering is in case of the servant of God such an one that by it they whose sins are in question, and for whom he bears the punishment, are free from the punishment, so that it is a representative suffering. As now Peter clearly had this passage in mind, the thought which he here expresses can be nothing else than this: that Christ, representing us, has borne the punishment which we have deserved for our sins, and so has borne our sins."

Lange (Fronmüller): "The exegesis is determined by Isa. liii. All exegetical attempts to explain away the idea of substitution and the system of sacrifice closely connected with it are altogether futile. As in the Old Testament, the expressions, 'to carry one's sin,' or 'to bear one's iniquity,' are equivalent to 'suffer the punishment and guilt of one's sin,' Lev. xx. 17, 19; xxiv.

15; Ezek. xxiii. 35, so 'to carry another's sin' denotes 'to suffer the punishment and guilt of another,' or 'to suffer vicariously,' Lev. iii. 17, 19; Num. xiv. 33; Lam. v. 7; Ezek. xviii. 19, 20. Can this be done in any other way than by the imputation of the guilt and sin of others, as was the case in the sin and guilt offerings?"

Calvin is quoted by Lange approvingly: 'As under the law the sinner, in order to become free from sin, offered a sacrifice in his stead, so Christ took upon himself the curse which we have merited by our sins in order to expiate it before God.'

Alford: "'Took them to the tree and offered them up on it,' constr. praegn., as the above (viz. 'bore to sacrifice,' 'carried and offered up') sense of ἀνήνεγκεν requires."

De Wette translates: "Who took our sins (our guilt and punishment) upon himself, and bore them up in his body upon the tree (*auf das Holz.*)"

Note e, p. 21.

The following extracts are from Delitzsch (Edinburgh translation). On Isa. liii. 4: "Matthew has very aptly rendered נָשָׂא by ἔλαβε, and סָבַל by ἐβάστασε. For whilst סָבַל denotes the toilsome bearing of a burden that has been taken up, נָשָׂא combines in itself the ideas of *tollere* and *ferre*. When construed with the accusative of sin it signifies to take the debt of sin upon one's self, and carry it as one's own, i.e. to look at it and feel it as one's own (e.g. Lev. v. 1, 17), or more frequently to bear the punishment occasioned by sin, i.e. to make expiation for it (Lev. xvii. 16; xx. 19, 20; xxiv. 15), and in any case in which the person bearing it is not himself

the guilty person, to bear sin in a mediatorial capacity, for the purpose of making expiation for it (Lev. x. 17). The LXX render this נָשָׂא, both in the Pentateuch and Ezekiel, λαβεῖν ἁμαρτίαν, once ἀναφέρειν; and it is evident that both of these are to be understood in the sense of an expiatory bearing, and not merely of taking away, as has been recently maintained in opposition to the *satisfactio vicaria*, as we may see clearly enough from Ezek. iv. 4–8, where שֵׂאת עָוֹן is represented by the prophet in a symbolical action."

Verse 6, l. c. is translated: "And Jehovah caused the iniquity of us all to fall upon Him." In comment: "Many of the more modern expositors endeavor to set aside the *poena vicaria* here, by giving to הִפְגִּיעַ a meaning which it never has..... What other reason could there be for God's not rescuing him from this bitterest cup of death, than the ethical impossibility of acknowledging the atonement as really made without having left the representative of the guilty, who had presented himself to him as though guilty himself, to taste of the punishment which they had deserved. It is true that vicarious expiation and *poena vicaria* are not coincident ideas. The punishment is but one element in the expiation, and it derives a peculiar character from the fact that one innocent person voluntarily submits to it in his own person. It does not stand in a thoroughly external identity to that deserved by the many who are guilty; but the latter cannot be set aside without the atoning individual enduring an intensive equivalent to it, and that in such a manner that this endurance is no less a self-cancelling of wrath on the

part of God than an absorption of wrath on the part of the Mediator; and in this central point of the atoning work, the voluntarily forgiving love of God and the voluntarily self-sacrificing love of the Mediator meet together, like hands stretched out to grasp one another from the midst of a dark cloud."

The question now arises whether Grotius in basing his doctrine upon such passages as these does not really support the commonly received satisfaction theory to the overthrow of his own theory. What he means by punishment has already been indicated. But can the punishment of our sins, endured according to these passages by Christ as a strict substitute for us, be anything else than the satisfaction of the retributive justice of God? The punishment of our sins, in the strict use of that term, certainly is intended to satisfy the retributive justice of God. If Christ took the punishment of our sins upon himself, as these passages indicate, did he not suffer under the retributive justice of God?

The answer to this question depends upon the amount of philosophical accuracy that we may expect to find in the statements of Scripture. No sooner do we put the words "philosophical accuracy" and "the Scriptures" together, than we perceive that they express contrary ideas. The Scriptures were not written for philosophical purposes nor in philosophical language, as is evident upon the slightest examination of them. Take, for example, the question of the mode of regeneration. Is the work of the Holy Spirit *miraculous*, immediately producing a change in the very constitution of the soul, or is it *supernatural*, working upon the soul by the presen-

tation of motives, according to the soul's own laws? If the third of John is examined with this question in mind, no light will be cast upon the subject. The Scripture expressions admit equally well of either interpretation. Light must be sought from the affirmations of conscience, from experience, and from the teachings of philosophy, if it is to be obtained at all. We need not expect, therefore, to find philosophical accuracy in the passage of Scripture now before us. The meaning of the sacred writers is sufficiently answered when it is said that Christ suffered, and that his sufferings were substituted and accepted for our punishment. All parties to the contest really admit this in principle. Take the most hearty supporters of the strict satisfaction theory, and no respectable number of them will be found to say that Christ was guilty of our sins, or that God disapproved of him as a sinner, or that he suffered remorse, or that he suffered eternal death. But all this is necessary if he strictly bore *our* punishment, for these things are a part of our punishment. Deviation from the strictest meaning of these passages is, then, only a matter of degree, and when you have decided to reject the rigidest interpretation, where have you the criterion by which you shall decide whether to stop with accepting the sufferings of Christ as our *punishment*, or as *afflictions* which serve the same general purpose as, and are substituted for, our punishment?

Upon the meaning of the word נָשָׂא the reader may consult an article in the Bib. Sac., Vol. xxx. p. 422, in which all the occurrences of this word are carefully examined, and much light shed upon the subject. The

writer concludes his article with the following general remarks as to the sense in which Christ is said to have borne our sins:

(1) Christ bore our sins by enduring their consequences (suffering, temptation, death). (2) Christ bore our sins upon his sympathetic heart. (3) By forgiving them. (4) As a representative. (He endured pains that typified eternal punishment). (5) Christ did not bear our sins by being punished for them. נָשָׂא not merely does not favor this theory; it positively contradicts it. The eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel is a standing witness against such a belief.

Note f, p. 22.

Gesenius defines נָגַשׁ among other meanings *to exact*, but נִגַּשׁ *to be pressed, harassed.* Delitzsch renders the verse (liii. 7), "He was ill treated; whilst he suffered willingly [נִגַּשׁ] and opened not his mouth," etc.

Note g, p. 24.

Delitzsch renders Isa. liii. 5: "Whereas he was pierced for our sins, bruised for our iniquities; the punishment was laid upon him for our peace; and through his stripes we were healed." Comment: "His suffering was a *mūsâr* which is an indirect affirmation that it was God who had inflicted it upon him, for who else could the *yōsēr* (mᵉyassēr) be? We have rendered *mūsâr* "punishment;" and there was no other word in the language for this idea; for though נָקָם and פְּקֻדָּה have indeed the idea of punishment associated with them, the former signifies ἐκδίκησις, the latter ἐπίσκεψις, whereas *mūsâr* not only denotes παιδεία, as the chastisement of love (Prov. iii. 11), but also as the infliction of punish-

ment (= *τιμωρία, κόλασις*, Prov. vii. 22; Jer. xxx. 14), just as David, when he prayed that God might not punish him in his anger and hot displeasure (Ps. vi. 2), could not find a more suitable expression for punishment, regarded as the execution of punishment, than יָסַר. The word itself signified primarily being chastised, and included from the very outset the idea of practical chastisement, which then passed over into that of admonition in words, of warning by example, and of chastity as a moral quality. In the case before us in which the reference is to a sufferer, and to a *mūsâr* resting upon him. this can only mean actual chastisement."

The following extracts pertain to 2 Cor. v. 21:

Meyer: "*ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησε*]. The abstract stands for the concrete (cf. *λῆρος, ὄλεθρος* and the like in the classics) more strongly setting forth that for which God made him, and *ἐποίησε* expresses the establishment of the condition in which Christ appeared as the concrete of *ἁμαρτία*, as *ἁμαρτωλός*, namely when he suffered the punishment of death. Cf. *κατάρα*, Gal. iii. 13. To take *ἁμαρτίαν* as *sin-offering* (אָשָׁם, חַטָּאת) is not even well established by the dialect of the LXX, is against the constant usage of the N.T., and here especially also against the preceding *ἁμαρτ.*"

Lange: "The idea expressed in making him to be sin must be that God made him the bearer of sin when he suffered, inasmuch as by his sufferings and death as a malefactor he was treated as a sinner (*ἁμαρτωλός*), or was given up to the fate of those who were sinners. The interpretation of *ἁμαρτίαν* as sin-offering is consistent neither with usage, with the context (*τὸν μὴ γνόντα*

ἁμαρτίαν), nor with the contrast (δικαιοσύνη). Sin becomes actualized in one in whom there is no sin when he becomes a sinner in outward appearance though he is not so in reality. God allows sin to become an actual experience to him who has never committed it in fact."

De Wette: "ἁμαρτία is not equivalent to חַטָּאת *sin-offering*, also not to ἁμαρτωλός, but according to the contrast of δικαιοσύνη like κατάρα, Gal. iii. 13, stronger, almost for personified sin, for the representation of sin, that on account of which he laid the punishment of sins upon him."

Note h, p. 27.

The following pertain to Gal. iii. 13:

Meyer: "Those bound to the law are subjected to the curse of God therein announced; but from this constraint of the curse, out of which they would not else have come, has Christ redeemed them, and that by his having given his life for them on the cross, as a ransom paid to God, the *Dator et Vindex legis*, in that he procured by his *mors satisfactoria*, borne according to the gracious counsel of God in obedience to the same, the forgiveness of sins, so that now the curse of the law had no more relation to them."

Lange (closing with a quotation from Meyer): "The thought is not that Christ suffered the *definite*, just-named curse of the law, to which the subjects of the law are exposed, but in a general sense, that he became an accursed one; it is meant to express not *what* curse he became, but *that* he became a curse (the *that*, moreover, appears from the following Scripture passage). — Ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν: ὑπέρ in all places where the discourse is

of the atoning death is not = instead of, but = in behalf of. The satisfaction which Christ rendered, was rendered in our behalf; that it was vicarious is implied in the nature of the act itself, not in the preposition. The curse of the law would have had to be realized in that all who did not completely satisfy the law (and this no one could), would have been compelled to endure the execution of the Divine ὀργή against them; but for their deliverance from this sentence Christ with his death has intervened, inasmuch as he died as *accursed*, whereby, as through a ransom, that damnatory relation to the law was dissolved.' "

Alford: "κατάρα, abstract, to express that he became not only accursed, but the curse co-extensive with the disability which affected us."

De Wette: "*Has become a curse*, viz. inasmuch as he has expiated the curse, the punishment of the sin, which the law threatened."

Note i, p. 33.

We are to recur to the Socinian conception of justice for the explanation of Grotius's remarks.

Socinus in commenting on Rom. iii. 24, says (ii. 2): "God, in order that he might show himself veracious and faithful, and at the same time show in what manner he would have us just with himself (for these words *his righteousness* signify both things, as is evident from that which he adds a little after in explanation of himself, *that he might be just, and the justifier*, etc.), exhibited himself appeased with us in such a way as not only to redeem or liberate us, according to the ancient promises, from sins, that is, from the punishment of sins, by for-

giving them to us; but also to determine that Christ himself should shed his blood and be tortured like some criminal. For the intervention of the blood of Christ, though it could not move God to grant us this liberation from the punishment of our sins, yet moved us to receive it when offered, and to exercise faith in Christ, whence we are justified; and at the same time he strongly commended to us the ineffable goodness of God towards us."

Upon the word propitiation, after explaining that ἱλαστήριον is the word which was used in the O. T. to designate the cover of the ark, or the mercy-seat, "not because it placated God to the people of Israel, but because God, showing himself propitious and placated in it, gave his responses"; Socinus says: "Christ has been most appropriately called by this name by Paul in this place, since God not only exhibits himself most thoroughly appeased in him to us, but even declares through him what he wished us to know; whence our justification has followed."

Note j, p. 36.

The principal interest in this passage (Rom. iii. 25, 26), gathers about the words ἱλαστήριον, ἔνδειξις, δικαιοσύνη, πάρεσις. The following extracts from the Commentators may be of value.

Meyer (Edinburgh translation): "ἱλαστήριον] is the neuter of the adjective ἱλαστήριος, used as a substantive, and hence means simply *expiatorium* in general, without the word itself conveying the more concrete definition of its sense. The latter is supplied by the context. .... In our passage the context makes the notion

of an atoning sacrifice (comp. Lev. xvii. 11) sufficiently clear by ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι. . . . . If it is objected to the interpretation of *expiatory offering* that it does not suit προέθετο because Christ offered himself as a sacrifice to God, but God did not present him as such to humanity, the objection is untenable, since the idea that *God* has given Christ to death pervades the whole N. T.; not that God has thereby *offered* Christ as a sacrifice, which is nowhere asserted, but that he *has set forth* before the eyes of the universe him who is surrendered to the world by the very fact of his offering himself as a sacrifice in obedience to the Father's counsel, as such actually and publicly, viz. on the cross." "εἰς ἔνδειξιν τ. δικ. αὐτοῦ] purpose of God in the προέθετο . . . . . αἵματι. The δικαιοσύνη is *righteousness*, as is required by the context, ... in the strict sense the opposite of ἄδικος in ver. 5, the *judical* (more precisely, the punitive) *righteousness* which had to find its holy satisfaction, but received that satisfaction in the propitiatory offering of Christ, and is thereby practically demonstrated and exhibited. On ἔνδειξις in the sense of *practical proof*, comp. 2 Cor. viii. 24, and on εἰς Eph. ii. 7: ἵνα ἐνδείξηται." — "διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν κ.τ.λ.] *on account of the passing by of sins that had previously taken place*, i.e. *because he had allowed the pre-Christian sins to go without punishment*, whereby his righteousness had been lost sight of and obscured, and therefore came to need an ἔνδειξις for men. Thus the atonement accomplished in Christ became "the divine Theodicée for the past history of the world," (Tholuck) and, in view of this ἔνδειξις, that πάρεσις ceases to be an enigma. — πάρεσις which occurs

only here in the N. T. . . . . is distinguished from ἄφεσις in so far as the omission of punishment is conceived in πάρεσις as a *letting pass* (ὑπεριδών, Acts xvii. 30; comp. xvi. 16), in ἄφεσις (Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14) as a *letting free.* Since Paul according to Acts, *l.c.*, regarded the non-punishment of pre-Christian sins as an "overlooking" (comp. Wisd. xi. 23), we must consider the peculiar expression πάρεσις here as *purposely chosen.* Comp. Ecclus. xxiii. 2. If he had written ἄφεσις, the idea would be, that God instead of retaining those sins in their category of guilt (comp. John xx. 23) had *let them free*, i.e. had *forgiven* them. He has not forgiven them, however, but only *let them go unpunished* (comp. 2 Sam. xxiv. 10) *neglexit.* . . . . The pre-Christian sins are not those of individuals prior to their conversion, but the sum of the sins of *the world before Christ.* The ἱλαστήριον of Christ is the epoch and turning-point in the world's history (comp. Acts xvii. 30; xvi. 16).

Lange explains ἱλαστήριον by *mercy-seat*, and supports his explanation by the following reasons: (*a*) the Septuagint uniformly has translated כַּפֹּרֶת ἱλαστήριον. (*b*) In Heb. ix. 5 ἱλαστήριον means the mercy-seat. (*c*) This view is sustained by the idea pervading the whole Epistle, of the contrast between the old worship, which was partly heathen, and partly only symbolical, and the real N. T. worship. (*d*) The ἱλαστήριον unites as symbol the different elements of the atonement.

Note k, p. 41.

Socinus has foreseen this objection and answered it with a considerable degree of success. He says: "Whom of the Apostles and disciples of Christ can we name

who was especially delivered to death by God for this end, that by his blood God might confirm to us his new and eternal covenant? Many of these were, indeed, slain, and became partners of the afflictions of Christ, and were regarded worthy of the favor of God because they suffered for Christ, upon whom by the favor of the same God they had believed; but on this account most that they might obey God rather than man. Whence even if the truth has been in some degree confirmed by them (for they have been called martyrs for this reason), they must not on that account be compared with Christ in this regard, because they have done nothing but give testimony to Christ himself. For they are not called, on account of the death which they bore for the sake of the gospel, simply martyrs, or witnesses, but they are called martyrs or witnesses *of Jesus Christ*" (i. 3).

Note l, p. 42.

Socinus was not so successful in removing this objection. He can say only: "We ought to notice that Christ confirmed the way of salvation which he had announced not only by miracles, but *especially* by the effusion of his blood" (i. 3).

Note m, p. 42.

The passage to which Grotius here alludes is found in ii. 4. Socinus seems to waver in his interpretation of the passages of Scripture under consideration (Matt. ix. 6; Mark ii. 10; Luke v. 24). He says: "He (Jesus) adds also the words 'upon earth' as if he should say: I, myself, although mortal and dwelling upon the earth, while I am with you have this power, and have descended upon the earth endowed with it. This gift has been

committed to me dwelling upon the earth, though you are ignorant of it." Then he adds in a parenthesis: "Although since it is evident from Mark that the words 'upon earth' are to be joined with the word 'forgive,' I suspect that their sense is different, as I suggested a little before when I asserted for Christ the power of giving the fullest pardon of sins *in this* life, and also *for that time*." Socinus is not, on the whole, to be held responsible for this position, however, as it is his view that to Christ as a man is given the power of bestowing eternal life upon his followers. He who can bestow eternal life can certainly forgive sins in another world as well as in this.

Note n, p. 44.

Socinus's meaning will be more evident upon reading the following passage (i. 3): "But we ought to notice that Christ confirmed the way of salvation which he had announced not only by miracles, but most of all by the shedding of his blood which was therefore said to be the blood of the everlasting covenant (Heb. xiii. 20), and by Christ himself was called the blood of the New Testament (Mark xiv. 24). For as covenants were anciently ratified and confirmed by shedding the blood of some animal, so God has ratified and confirmed his new and everlasting covenant, which he has made with us through Christ, by the blood of his own Son, the same Christ. Christ, therefore, died that he might establish the new and everlasting covenant of God of which he had himself been the mediator, whence he had deservedly obtained the name of a true and faithful witness. And he has so confirmed the divine promises that he has in a

certain way bound God himself to perform them, and his blood constantly cries to the Father to remember the promises Christ has announced to us in his name, and to confirm which has not refused to shed his own blood."

It is, then, by confirming the promises and the covenant that the death of Christ induces us to exercise faith.

Socinus dwells at some length upon the office of the resurrection in creating faith in our hearts. He says (i. 5): "Paul in 1 Cor. xv. throughout the chapter employs the words *resurrection from the dead* in place of the eternal and blessed life, or in place of that resurrection which is followed by the eternal and blessed life." — "The head and, as it were, foundation of our whole faith and salvation in the person of Christ, is the resurrection of Jesus Christ himself." — "The resurrection causes us to have faith in God, who ought to be the ultimate and especial end and scope of our actions and of our faith, and leads us to place our hope in him." — "By the resurrection Jesus Christ is declared to be the Son of God with power. But he who believes that Jesus Christ is the Son of God conquers the world, and has eternal life, unless, indeed, a man can possibly acknowledge that Jesus Christ is the dearly beloved Son of God, and possessed of the highest power in heaven and upon earth, and not believe that all things which he has said are true, and not place in him the hope of his salvation. Whence, as we have seen before, correction of life and then the pardon of our sins, in which consists the happiness of men, necessarily follows; which

he believes will be given to him by Christ himself. Wherefore, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ were penitence and the forgiveness of sins, as we have said before, not only given to the people, but also announced in the name of Christ himself to the whole world."

Note o, p. 46.

In the general scope of his objections against Socinus at this point Grotius is perfectly correct. Forgiveness of sins is ascribed in the Scriptures to the death of Christ, and any system which ascribes it to another source, or which tries to give another efficacy to the death of Christ, is so far in error. Socinus is undoubtedly right in saying that the resurrection of Christ put the crowning proof upon the words of the Saviour, and so confirmed his promises to us and excited our faith in him. But the resurrection does not, therefore, take the place of the sacrificial death as the centre of the redemptive system. The remission of sins is so repeatedly ascribed in Scripture to the death of Christ that no theory which does not succeed in making this death the centre of the atoning work adequately presents biblical truth.

Yet Grotius's criticisms at this point are not quite so apposite as they should be, because Socinus and he differ more fundamentally as to the death of Christ than these criticisms imply. The truth is that Socinus does not ascribe the forgiveness of sins to the death of Christ as its ground, but to the goodness of God. The death of Christ is an incident to redemption. It plays so small a part in Socinus's conception that it is only seldom alluded to in his pages. It serves a certain purpose, but it is merely to confirm what is otherwise an-

nounced, and does not lay the foundation of anything new. It is necessary to give Christ a full portion in our sufferings, to exhibit him as the conqueror of death, and it is the path to the resurrection which confirms his promises, but it is not in itself and apart from other things an element, and by no means the chief element, of the atonement. Grotius has, therefore, made the antithesis between his view and that of Socinus too sharp at this point. Socinus would not claim that "rightly and fitly" (p. 45) is remission said to be obtained through the death of Christ in the sense in which Grotius would employ those words.

Note p, p. 49.

On this passage (Rom. iv. 25) Meyer (Edinburgh translation): "διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν] *on account of our justification*, in order to accomplish on us the judicial act of transference into the relation of δικαιοσύνη (comp. v. 18). For this object God raised Jesus from the dead; for the resurrection of the sacrificed one was necessary to produce in men *the faith* through which alone the objective fact of the atoning offering of Jesus could have the effect of δικαίωσις *subjectively*, because Christ is the ἱλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως (iii. 25). *Without* his resurrection, therefore, the atoning work of his death would have remained without subjective appropriation; his surrender διὰ τὰ παραπτ. ἡμῶν would not have attained its end, our justification."

CHAPTER II.

Note a, p. 51.

Speaking of the Grotian theory and the two others to which it is opposed, Baur says (*Versöhnung*, p. 433, Bib. Sac., Vol. ix. p. 271): "While they start from the idea,—the church theory from the idea of the absolute justice, the Socinian from the idea of the absolute goodness of God,—or at least put the historical fact into such a relation to these respective ideas that our whole mode of conceiving that fact is to be determined by them, the theory of Grotius is founded upon exactly the opposite view. This theory cannot rightly be said to start from an *idea;* since, in the penal example which it beholds in the death of Christ, absolute justice and absolute goodness neutralize each other in such a way that the theory hardly has a definite principle left."

We may readily admit that the theory as presented by Grotius is not presented in its ideal form. The work, as has been already observed, is an incomplete one, and consequently lacks a careful exposition of the idea underlying the theory. But there is some evidence in it that Grotius held at least the rudiments of such an idea. In his remarks upon justice (which are always more or less incidental), we find expressions which indicate that he believed in punitive justice as an element in the nature of God (p. 34, and p. 110 "[Socinus] says that punitive justice does not reside in God, but that it is an effect of his will. Certainly the act of punishing is an effect of the will; but the justice or rectitude from which other things as well as the execution of

punishment spring, is an attribute residing in God"); and yet he believed that the demands of this justice were not satisfied (p. 73), else all sinners would be punished eternally; and that, although it is just in the nature of things to punish sinners eternally, it is not unjust to leave them unpunished (p. 77). The phrase "rectoral justice" (Lat. *justitia rectoris*), occurs on p. 113, — a phrase which points to some distinction between the justice of a ruler and justice simply considered. It is especially significant when we consider that Grotius makes God's position in this matter that of a ruler. He shows why it is necessary that God should be considered as a ruler in this matter, and also dwells upon the great principle which induced him to provide the atonement, viz. the principle of love. It only remains for Grotius to show how the principle of love works in a double way, both leading God to forgive sinners and preventing him from forgiving them without an example in consequence of the demands of his government, and he has presented the ideal basis of his theory in the conception of love dominating all the actions of God.

Supplying this missing step, we may accordingly say with some degree of confidence that Grotius's conception of God was that of a being always acting under the supreme control of benevolence. It is to be remembered that he was an Arminian, and rejected the common Calvinistic teaching of his day as to the arbitrary will of God. The Arminians objected to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination not simply because it failed to show the reason for predestination, but because it denied

that there was any reason, and founded it upon an unreasonable, or at least unreasoning will. Grotius believed that there was reason back of every act of God, and accordingly could not accept the idea of a mechanical, self-acting, and insatiate justice blindly calling for the exact satisfaction of its claims. The justice of God was justice *with a reason*, and because he was a governor it became *rectoral* justice. God's government flowed from his character. That character was love, and the government of God was accordingly one of the many displays of his eternal love. This is the *idea* of the Grotian system. (Comp. p. 109, beginning at "Further, God not only testified").

If it is necessary to trace the derivation of Grotius's theory from this source it may be briefly done as follows:

The justice of God demands the eternal punishment of every sinner (p. 73). If justice is satisfied this result inevitably follows. When men have sinned nothing remains but to forgive them or permit a whole race to be lost. That is, God must either *waive* the demands of justice or he must *execute* them to the eternal destruction of all men. His love prompts him to forgive. But the question arises: May not free forgiveness result in harm on the whole, even if it does benefit a few? May not love in its broad sense, as love to the whole, *oppose* forgiveness as well as *suggest* it? Evidently it does, for free forgiveness will do great harm in breaking down the authority of God's law, and thus injuriously affecting God's government over the entire universe as well as over the race of man. All moral beings, angels as well as men, would say upon seeing the free forgiveness of

men that God was a *weak* ruler, and thus be *tempted* to sin against him; but, what is of vastly greater importance, they would say that he was an *unrighteous* ruler. A righteous ruler must *disapprove* of sin. But to forgive is to express approval of the *sinner*, and thus is to express approval of the *sin*, unless something else shall at the same time exhibit the contrary feeling. But God cannot express approval of sin without not simply *appearing* to be, but *being* an unrighteous ruler, and so he cannot forgive sin freely without being an unrighteous ruler. Now the government of God rests upon his character. It is good because God is good, and so may claim the submission of creatures ultimately because he is good. If he should forgive sins without an atonement his subjects would therefore feel *called upon* in *conscience*, and by the deepest feelings of their nature, to rebel against him, that they might serve some righteous ruler, that is, to leave the service of him who would have thus proved himself to be no true God in order to serve him who should be the true God. Regard for his own government, therefore, both on the side of love for men, and love for himself, impelled God not to forgive men without an atonement.

God, therefore, determines to set up an example in the affliction (or, as Grotius inexactly called it, the punishment) of Christ in order that while forgiving men for Christ's sake he might express in that death for sake of which they were forgiven, his disapproval of sin. The punishment of sinners is *just*, and the affliction of Christ is *not unjustly* substituted for their punishment. Accordingly God *expresses* the demands of justice, and his re-

gard for them, while at the same time he does the only thing that he can do, if he will save sinners, and *waives* its real claim.

The Grotian theory is thus directly deduced from the doctrine that God is governed in all his acts by benevolence. It starts from the idea of the *love* of God as the Socinian theory does from a perverted conception of the *goodness* of God.

Note b, p. 55.

The refutation of this error will also be the refutation of the error of those who hold the satisfaction theory so-called. The Socinian and the common view of the atonement have this point of agreement in that they both start from the personal relations of God to sin. With the orthodox theologians an offence has been committed against the dignity of God, and justice calls for its punishment. This justice must be satisfied, and a personal repudiation of a personal indignity made. So with the Socinians, an offence has been committed against the dignity of God, but he hears no such call of justice, and as the offence is entirely against himself lets it go without any further ado. We must say that if God is to be influenced by reasons entirely applying to himself we do not see but that the Socinians have the best of the argument. But Grotius's view is that God for great reasons pertaining to his whole plan of the universe, which are not merely personal but rectoral, cannot forgive without an atonement.

Note c, p. 55.

The meaning of the words punishment, penalty, etc., having been already explained, and fully illustrated in

the preceding notes, it will be necessary only to point out the examples which show our explanation to be correct.

A good example may be found on p. 23. We are bidden there to look upon the punishment of Christ as an "example." On p. 55 a quotation from Lactantius, which is approved by Grotius, reads: "We rise to punishment not because we are injured, but that order may be preserved, manners corrected, license repressed." A second element is here added to the object of punishment. The same thought is brought out on p. 60. In punishment for debt it is said that "the cause of punishment is the viciosity of the act, not that anything is lacking to me." By the "viciosity of the act" is evidently meant its injurious tendency. Other passages like the above might be quoted, as p. 100: "the death of Christ is a weighty example against the great crimes of all of us with whom Christ was very closely connected"; and p. 106, "God was unwilling to pass over so many sins and so great sins without a distinguished example."

Perhaps the clearest passage is the following (p. 64): "The right of absolute ownership, as well as the right over the thing loaned, is secured for the sake of him who has that right; but the right of punishing does not exist for the sake of him who punishes, but for the sake of the community. For all punishment has as its object the common good, viz. the preservation of order, and giving an example; so that desirable punishment has no justification except this cause, while the right of property and debt are desirable in themselves. In this sense

God himself says that he is not delighted with the punishment of those who are punished."

And, finally, a significant passage from p. 37: "God devoted his Son that he might openly testify of the desert of sin, and of his own hatred of sin, and at the same time, as far as it could be done in sparing us, consult for the order of things, and for the authority of his own law."

CHAPTER III.

Note a, p. 72.

Grotius here rejects the word acceptilation as descriptive of the action of God in waiving the claims of the law. But he has always been charged with teaching the thing signified by that word. Bretschneider (vid. Bib. Sac., ix. p. 267), defines acceptilation as follows: "That which takes place when one consents to accept a thing as an equivalent, although it is not in itself really equal to that in place of which it is received; its sufficiency for the given purpose being constituted not by its own inherent worth, but by the receiver's determination to accept it."

Now we say, first, that in the nature of the case Grotius's theory cannot be one of acceptilation. Christ is punished for an example. His punishment is to have an effect upon moral agents, and that too, at least as great as would have been produced by the punishment of the sinners themselves. This moral influence in deterring from sin is not affected by God's estimate of that punishment. God cannot command a man to feel awe and fear in contemplation of Calvary, but that awe

and fear must spring up naturally in every breast. It must be called out by that which is in itself fitted to excite such emotions. To call the death of Christ an awful spectacle will not make it so. It must have an inherent value of its own, and one plain to every beholder, — we may even say, so plain that it cannot be gainsaid nor resisted, — or it is worth nothing as an example. For the purpose designed it must be "really equal to that in place of which it is received." But this is not a theory of acceptilation.

But, again, Grotius's representations are inconsistent with acceptilation.

1. When arguing against the word acceptilation (p. 125), Grotius represents it as an imaginary payment, and says that Christ made a real payment, namely his blood. Baur tries to trip Grotius at this point (Bib. Sac., ix. p. 268), by observing that the opposite of acceptilation is "only that particular kind of payment in which is rendered the very thing that was due, or else its perfect equivalent." To this we may reply that in one sense the sacrifice of Christ is a perfect equivalent of the punishment of the sinner, as has been shown above, in that it serves the same purpose; but that in another sense it is far different, for it does not satisfy the claims of distributive justice. Grotius, however, does not acknowledge the antithesis proposed by Baur. He sets payment over against acceptilation as its *contradictory*, but suggests also a *contrary*, satisfaction. In his mind satisfaction is neither acceptilation nor payment. God could have refused the satisfaction of Christ because the law demanded the punishment of the guilty

one himself. The mere substitution of another as payer (in case of punishment, not in debt, though Baur perpetually confounds the two), makes the punishment the payment of another thing. But the payment offered — the satisfaction — accomplished the desired objects, and accordingly was accepted. God was not bound to accept, hence it is satisfaction, not payment. But it was in itself sufficient, hence it is satisfaction, not acceptilation.

2. Grotius brings out the inherent worth of Christ's satisfaction. This is involved in the elements of his theory as we have seen. It appears also in his remarks upon acceptilation. But we also have an explicit statement of the fact. On the one hand emphasis is laid upon the thought that Christ was the only begotten Son (p. 110). On the other he speaks of "the consummate fitness of Christ for displaying a distinguished example. This consisted in his intimate union with us, and in the incomparable dignity of his person" (p. 113). Again: "We believe that this punishment must be estimated with the consideration in mind that he who bore it was God, although he did not bear it as God. . . . . The dignity of his whole person, that is, the dignity of Christ, contributed not a little to this estimation" (p. 177). In connection with this latter passage a number of arguments (overlooked by Baur), are adduced to prove the worth of the sacrifice as residing in the dignity of Christ's person. They are the same arguments that are adduced by the advocates of the older theory to prove the inherent worth of the atonement as a satisfaction to justice (Hodge, Theol. ii. 475, 483 sqq.). If they prove inherent worth for these, they do for Grotius; if inherent worth for the

satisfaction of distributive justice, equally for the satisfaction of rectoral justice. But if this is the case, Grotius holding the inherent dignity of Christ's person, cannot have advanced a theory of acceptilation.

Note b, p. 75.

At this point it is necessary to use some little caution lest we should infer that the law is an arbitrary exercise of God's legislative power. On the contrary, Grotius's view is that it has its origin in certain fixed and natural relations (p. 110). God acts the part of a lawgiver in establishing the law. He can establish whatever law he chooses, but his own character calls for a law based upon the principles of right. This he establishes in the exercise of his legislative justice. He then executes it in his capacity of ruler, and dispenses its rewards and punishments. Grotius has shown forgiveness to be the act of God considered as ruler, and not as offended party. It was as one *capable* of receiving offence that he *established* the law. The *execution* of the law is another thing, and belongs to him in another relation. But it should be remembered that the same character appears in all these acts of whatever class.

CHAPTER IV.

Note a, p. 85.

This passage brings out in strong relief the reasonableness of Grotius's view of Christ's sufferings. They are put by him in the same category with the sufferings which come upon us in consequence of human sodality. The object of the temporal penalties, or more properly speaking, painful consequences, of transgression, is not to

satisfy the distributive justice of God, but to *express* that justice for the warning of men, and to exhibit the essential evil of sin. A good illustrative example may be found in things involving no moral relations. If I put my finger in the fire I am burned. It makes no difference if I do it unconsciously, I am burned all the same. In this case it is easy to see the object of the pain. It is that the hand may not be entirely lost. So even the unconscious violations of natural laws are followed by afflictions for the warning of men. Yet a man is not held guilty in a moral sense, that is, pronounced a sinner, for unconscious violations of law, nor can we believe that God will *punish* him for them; but he is made to suffer afflictions for them.

Just so there is a natural connection between our sins and Christ's sufferings. He was not guilty of our sins, nor was he punished, in the strict sense of the word. But there existed a law whereby the sin of men brought suffering upon the race. God would not allow even his own Son to enter the world and become a member of the race of man without suffering the consequences of sin. Thus our sins resulted in the affliction of Christ, which served as an example of their essential evil, and as a warning against them. But more than this; God appointed by a special decree that these afflictions, thus naturally expressive of the evil of sin, should afford testimony of his hatred of sin. Thus in accordance with nature and by special decree is Christ afflicted for us.

Note b, p. 88.

In commenting upon the Grotian theory, Oxenham (The Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement, by H. A.

Oxenham, M.A., 2d ed., London, 1869, p. 238), says: "But if the theory itself is startling, the line of argument it is supported by is more startling still. In this world the innocent often suffer for the guilty, children bear the burden of their fathers', subjects of their rulers' sins; nay, it frequently happens in the execution of justice, that good and bad are punished together, or the good instead of the bad; therefore, while the law must visit crime, it need not touch the criminal! But does not Christian instinct, to say nothing of Scripture, teach us that these inequalities of earth will be rectified by unerring wisdom in the world beyond the grave? or, rather, are not these very inequalities a confirmation of our belief in the new heavens and new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness? Such seeming difficulties, which from the days of Job have tortured the philosopher, and sometimes disquieted the saint, run up at last into the one insoluble riddle of all metaphysics and all theology, the origin of evil. When once the existence of evil is accepted as a fact, though its original permission cannot be explained, they cease to be difficulties, and are felt to be a temporary and incidental interruption of the perfect order of the universe introduced by sin. They have also their bearings on the sacrifice of Christ..... But it is quite a different matter when the experience of human history, *delirant reges plectuntur Achivi*, is converted into a principle of divine governance, and it is gravely inferred that because God for wise ends permits the afflictions of the righteous, he *punishes* them for others' sins." — It is evident that Mr. Oxenham misunderstands the word *punishment* as found in Grotius.

He acknowledges that the sufferings of men are for *wise* reasons, and that though interruptions of the universe, they are introduced by sin. Let him now understand that Grotius means simply to place the sufferings of Christ in the same category with them, and that punishment means, in his use, simply example, and all difficulty will vanish. There is no such difference between the governing principles of this world and the next as some seem to imagine. There will be no sin in heaven, and consequently no sufferings. But introduce sin there, and it would work precisely as it does here. Its working is *natural*, and no less natural in Christ's death than elsewhere.

CHAPTER V.

Note a, p. 106.

Prof. Crawford (The Doctrine of the Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement, 2d ed., 1874, p. 388), in commenting upon the governmental theory of the Atonement, says: "It represents the Atonement as nothing more than a hollow and unreal exhibition of principles which are not truly and substantially involved in it. . . . . "In order to produce or to sustain in their [rational creatures'] minds an *impression* that sin and its threatened penalties are inseparably connected, and that even in the exercise of his boundless mercy he cannot compromise the requirements of justice, he gave up his only-begotten Son to humiliation, agony, and death. It is true, *the impression thus to be produced is an erroneous one* — we theologians have found out that it is so; for we are too wise to be taken in by mere appearances.

Nevertheless, the erroneous impression is a salutary one."

Prof. Crawford does not intend to misrepresent the New England theory in these words, but he shows that he does not understand it. Grotius says that Christ was punished in our stead; but he never intended to convey the impression that God's distributive justice was satisfied. The cross simply stood for an example of the punishment *due* to sin, and a warning of what *would* come upon the sinner if he did not avail himself of the offers of mercy. The New England divines are equally simple in meaning and more clear in their statements. When sin has once been committed all that can be done if the sinner is to be saved is to forgive him. This destroys all possibility of satisfying justice, which would forever condemn him. Only, the sin must be forgiven in such a way that the evil of it may spread no farther.

The conception of justice underlying the governmental theory in both its Grotian and New England forms may be analyzed as follows:

(1) A feeling of displeasure on the part of God in view of sin, and demand for its expression; (2) A sense of fitness of punishment to sin; (3) A motive for gratifying that feeling by the infliction of that fit punishment, viz. the display of his own character; (4) A choice to do it.

The result is an act of distributive justice. The first and second elements bring to view the justice in the act; the third shows the purpose of the act, without which, or an equivalent, the act could not take place; the fourth, God's freedom in it all. The choice is not

a necessary result of the first and second elements, and if a sufficient motive against it intervene, it will not be made.

The office performed by the sufferings of Christ in the view of Grotius and the New England divines, may be thus analyzed:

(1) The sufferings of Christ are a consequence of sin; (2) They show God's sense of the fitness of pain to sin; (3) They exhibit God's displeasure with sin; (4) They show that he is not careless of sin though he forgives; (5) They thus vindicate his character as loving right, by showing how he hates wrong; (6) They also serve as an example to deter from sin; (7) On both these grounds they remove the danger to law in pardoning sin.

The difference between the followers of the older school and the followers of Grotius in respect to justice is not so great, however, as some have thought. We may compare them easily under such an arrangement as the following:

The Old School.	*The Grotians*
1. Justice *must* be satisfied.	1. Justice *may* be unsatisfied.
2. Another person than the guilty one *may* be punished.	2. The guilty one *must* be punished, if any one is.

The difference between them is, that while one is *longer* the other is *broader*. The one insists on a satisfaction, but admits such a satisfaction that to the other it becomes no satisfaction at all. The other does not claim a satisfaction, but secures every element of the satisfaction insisted upon by the first, except the name.

Note b, p. 107.

In a note (Bib. Sac., ix. p. 273), Baur (apparently) quoting from a writer in the Evang. Kirchenzeitung for 1834, says: "The question was: Why God would not forgive sin otherwise than on account of the death of Christ? The answer which Grotius gives stands in no necessary or even real connection with sin. Grotius himself acknowledges that God who in accordance with his love desired to spare, i.e. to admit the relaxation of the law, had also power to do it without setting forth any penal example, but that he was desirous of showing his wrath at the same time with his love. But why any additional example, when a sufficiently strong one is given in the case of the reprobate and his final condemnation? And to what exceptions and objections does Grotius in this way expose himself? Is it not, for example, the grossest injustice, nay, the grossest cruelty, in God if, merely for the purpose of exhibiting his wrath, he gives over his Son to the most excruciating tortures, when he might forgive sin without them, yea, when he actually does (according to Grotius) forgive men without them?" — The last sentence contains a gross misrepresentation of Grotius. God does forgive sin without the tortures of Christ in the sense that the tortures are only a reason *justifying* forgiveness, and not a ground of *right* to forgiveness; but sinners are not forgiven entirely without the tortures, but *because* of them. How it can be called a reasonable objection to Grotius that he does not ascribe a reason for Christ's sufferings sufficient to acquit God of the charge of cruelty in in-

flicting them, when the reason ascribed is nothing less than the authority of divine law, and the preservation of a universe of holy beings who would otherwise be led into sin, we cannot see. A careful study of these pages (104 and 110) would destroy such an objection.

Note c, p. 110.

Oxenham (Catholic Doctrine, p. 237), says: [According to Grotius] "the spectacle on Calvary was a grand dramatic exhibition of God's retributive justice, and having thus publicly vindicated the authority of his law, he consented to remit all further penalties of disobedience. Yet surely if a conspicuous example were needed to deter men from sin for the future — and it could have no other object — not only was there no ground for selecting an innocent victim, but it was absolutely essential that punishment should fall upon the guilty; the greater the criminal the more forcibly would the lesson be conveyed. Least of all was the incarnation of a divine person requisite that the Father might teach us the heinousness of our iniquities by visiting their merited chastisement on his sinless Son." These remarks are cited chiefly to show how differently the same facts appear to different minds.

Note d, p. 114.

Upon this passage (beginning with "But that the punishment") Baur remarks (Vers. Bib. Sac., ix. p. 271): "That the divine-human dignity of the Redeemer is as necessary a presupposition for the theory of the church as it is superfluous to that of Socinus, is obvious at first sight. The theory of Grotius, on the contrary,

although it recognizes that dignity in form, really nullifies it in fact, since it is unable to explain what is the precise importance of that dignity in the work of redemption. How Christ should have been peculiarly fitted to stand as a penal example on account of the dignity of his person as God-man, it is not easy to see. If he became incarnate for this end only, which could with equal ease have been secured by him as a mere man, as the Socianians hold, and so includes in himself nothing which is in its own nature necessary, then there is, and will always remain, an irreducible disproportion between the means and the end. Instead of falling back upon the internal necessity of things, and drawing an argument from thence, as was done in the theory of the church, and instead of entirely renouncing an idea whose rational necessity cannot be acknowledged, as was avowedly done by Socinus, Grotius has given us a mere vindication, flattering himself that it has done all that can be justly demanded of it, when by suggesting some plausible end to be accomplished, it has relieved the presupposed fact from the charge of being absolutely inconceivable. Such is the difference between the formal, judicial point of view, having as its outward standard of reference, a given case in law, and the speculative, which goes back to the internal idea of things, or to the absolute nature of God." This criticism loses much of its apparent force when we remember that Grotius's work is professedly incomplete, and strictly a defence *against Socinus*. Baur should have read the title-pages of books he criticised. But, really, we do not see but that Grotius has done as much towards showing the

necessity of the incarnation as is now done by the advocates of what Baur calls the "church theory." The old arithmetical demonstration — the infinity of Christ's nature × his finite sufferings = the finiteness of our nature × the infinity of our sufferings, — is now given up, and the argument urged is that Godhead is necessary to the *dignity* of Christ's sufferings, and that their dignity while not making them an arithmetical equivalent of our punishment, gives them a real equivalence. But this view, although not developed by Grotius is more than hinted at. See pp. 86, 100, 110, 113, and 176 sq. Professor Smeaton says (The Doctrine of the Atonement as taught by Christ himself, Edinburgh, 1868, p. 369): "The infinite value of the atonement, viewed in connection with the incarnation of the Son of God, is exhibited forcibly by ..... GROTIUS, *De Satisfactione.* The latter is *peculiarly fresh and clear* upon this point;" and then quotes pp. 176 sq.

CHAPTER VI.

Note a, p. 122.

The following extracts from Baur, for the most part reliable, will be read with interest. (See Bib. Sac., ix. p. 263 seq.). "The best scale for the measurement of their [the theories of Grotius and of the church] mutual relations is furnished by the idea of satisfaction. The main point in the church's theory of satisfaction is this, that what Christ did was precisely the same thing which men themselves were to have done. If Christ had not made a strict and perfect satisfaction for men, they could not have been released from sin. Socinus objected to

this, that satisfaction and forgiveness were contradictory ideas. This assertion Grotius, as the defender of the church's doctrine of satisfaction, could not admit. He therefore replied that satisfaction and forgiveness were not strictly simultaneous; that according to the conditions established by God the latter then first follows the former when a man by faith in Christ turns to God and prays him for the forgiveness of his sins. This distinction must certainly be made if the objection of Socinus is to be successfully met, and the two ideas are to be permitted to stand side by side. But Grotius could not stop here." Could not, Baur intimates, because he would not, but could not, say we, because this does not answer Socinus's objection. The universal Christian idea of forgiveness is that it is an act of *grace*. But upon such an idea of satisfaction as Baur here advances, forgiveness follows sin like a debt due to the sinner for Christ's sake, so that he can *claim* salvation. There may be grace in providing the atonement, but no grace in forgiving. To answer Socinus's objection, therefore, Grotius must show that satisfaction instead of creating a *claim* to *favor* merely opens a *way* to *forgiveness*, or renders it *consistent* to forgive. To resume: "Grotius could not stop here. If it is only a penal example that is furnished by the death of Christ, then the idea of satisfaction, strictly speaking, has no further relevancy. As, however, Grotius wished to retain this idea he brought to his assistance a peculiar distinction which is made in law between the two ideas denoted respectively by the terms *solutio* and *satisfactio*. If, said Grotius, the very thing which is owed be paid either by the

debtor himself, or, which is in this case the same thing, by another in the debtor's name, then the discharge of the debt takes place by that very act, but it is to be called a discharge, not a remission (*remissio*). Not so, however, when something else is paid than the specific thing which was due." In corporal punishment, Grotius would say, the fact that another *person* pays the punishment, itself makes the payment a payment of another *thing*, for, he says (p. 124), "In the obligation is prescribed the affliction of the guilty party himself." Baur continues: "In this case there must be added, on the part of the creditor or ruler, an act of remission as a personal act; and it is this kind of payment that may be either accepted or refused by the creditor which is properly called in the technical language of the law, satisfaction." Grotius himself states it better (p. 124): "Some act of the ruler must intervene that liberation may come to one from the punishment of another, for the law demands that the delinquent shall himself be punished. This act with respect to the law is a relaxation or dispensation; with respect to the debtor, a remission." Resuming from Baur a little below: "This, then, is the precise meaning of the theory of Grotius, and the difference between it and the satisfaction theory of the church. The idea of satisfaction is let down from its full and real import to the idea of a mere rendering of something; Christ has made satisfaction so far as he has fulfilled a condition, of whatever kind it may be, upon which God has suspended the forgiveness of the sins of men; so far as he has given to God a something with reference to that end. This something is that penal

example without the setting forth of which God could not have forgiven the sins of men." In a note Baur adds: "It is always of a mere *aliquid* that he speaks, never of an *equivalent.*" But it is an *aliquid* that is equivalent, though not identical. "Hence such expressions as that in the death of Christ 'there was no payment of the very thing due so as to liberate *ipso facto*, for our eternal death was in the obligation,' can be regarded only as a direct contradiction of the theory of the church, it being an essential part of that theory that Christ has endured eternal death for men." Such language is nonsense, and we are glad Baur acquits Grotius of using it!

Note b, p. 138.

In commenting upon these pages (134–138), Baur says: "In what does the peculiarity of the Grotian theory consist? It can be found only in that idea of penal example which Grotius transferred to the death of Christ; though even in this respect it cannot be concealed that there is a close affinity between the two theories. Although Grotius chooses to hold fast the idea of satisfaction in a certain sense, it nevertheless amounts to nothing else at last but the idea of a penal example through which God, for the purpose of maintaining the authority of his law, declares in the language of palpable fact his hatred and abhorrence of sin. For what other purpose, however, should the authority of the law be maintained than that sin may be prevented at the same time that the pardon of sin is bestowed? The principal thing insisted on, then, both by Grotius and Socinus is the moral impression produced

by the death of Christ, with only this difference, that this moral element is taken by Grotius in a negative sense, by Socinus in a positive sense; since, according to Grotius, the moral effect of Christ's death consists in the fact that it is a setting forth of the punishment which is connected with sin, while, according to Socinus, it consists in the moral disposition which was exhibited by Christ in his death. Even by Socinus himself, therefore, the bestowment of pardon is made dependent upon a moral condition which is connected with the death of Christ."

The true affiliation of the Grotian theory is not with Socinus as Baur hastily concludes, but with the "theory of the church." Socinus represents God as entirely ready to forgive sin, and recognizes no obstacle to forgiveness except on the part of man. Christ's death plays some part, but only a subordinate part, in removing this obstacle by exciting in man penitence and faith. But Grotius recognizes an obstacle to forgiveness on the part of God, and here he agrees with the "church." The "church" makes that obstacle to reside in God's punitive justice, which must be satisfied, Grotius in God's regard for his character, and for the authority of his law, and for his moral government. The "church's" theory does not lack a moral element, for the pain of punishment must have its influence upon the soul of the punished sinner and "stop his mouth," or else justice is not satisfied. True, it is the moral influence of the afflictions of Christ upon the universe that upholds, according to Grotius, the authority of the law, and deters moral creatures from sin. But if there were but two beings

in the universe, God and the sinner, that sinner could not be forgiven without an atonement, for God must sustain the character of his law before that sinner *and himself.* If this is not an obstacle to forgiveness on God's part as substantial as any lying in punitive justice, and separated by an infinite remove from the lawlessness of the Socianian view, we cannot imagine what could be. An instructive passage upon this point will be found on p. 187 sq.

CHAPTER VIII.

Note a, p. 157.

Prof. Smeaton (Doctrine of the Atonement, p. 411), quotes this passage, and uses it as an argument to show that Grotius held that λύτρον may mean a sacrifice. (See also p. 153). But Grotius's position is the same as Prof. Smeaton's. The latter says (p. 152): "The word does not mean the redemption itself, but the price of it, or the price given to redeem another. And it will be found that the term "ransom" wherever it is used involves a causal connection between the price paid and the liberation effected, — that is, a relation of cause and effect." Grotius (p. 161) says: "The death of Christ was the *cause* of redemption, because God is induced by it to liberate us from punishment." "By this style of speech, *to redeem transgressions*, ... is signified not only the cause influencing one to liberate, but also such a cause as includes compensation or satisfaction." See also pp. 166–171, etc.

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DE

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DEFENSIO FIDEI CATHOLICÆ DE SATISFACTIONE CHRISTI.

CAPVT I.

Ostenditur Controversiæ status, & vera sententia Scripturæ verbis explicatur.

ANtequam ad hanc disputationem veniamus, ponemus primùm eam sententiam quam ex Sacris Literis depromptam imperturbatâ Fide hactenus Christi Ecclesia defendit, ut deinde quid inter hanc & Socini placitum intersit, clarè appareat: deinde eandem sententiam explicabimus allatis quibusdam Scripturæ testimoniis, quæ quia aliò detorsit Socinus, obiter vera eorum interpretatio vindicabitur.

Catholica ergo sententia sic habet: Deus motus suâ bonitate ut nobis insigniter benefaceret, sed obstantibus peccatis, quæ pœnam merebantur, constituit, ut Christus volens ex sua erga homines charitate, cruciatus gravissimos & mortem cruentam atque ignominiosam ferendo pœnas penderet pro peccatis nostris, ut salvâ Divinæ justitiæ demonstratione, nos, intercedente verâ Fide, à pœna mortis æternæ liberaremur.

Causa efficiens rei, de qua agimus, prima est Deus: *Deus Filium suum unigenitum dedit, ut qui credit in eum non pereat*, Iohan. III, 16. *Deus proprio Filio non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum*, Roman. VIII, 32. *Deus impegit in Christum peccata nostra omnium*, Esaiæ LIII, 6. *Deus Christum fecit peccatum*, II Cor. V, 21.

Causa quæ Deum movit, prior est misericordia sive φιλανθρωπία [*charitas erga homines*]. *Ita Deus dilexit Mundum, ut Filium daret*, Ioh. III, 16. *Commendat Deus suam in nos charitatem, quòd, cùm peccatores adhuc essemus, Christus pro nobis est mortuus*, Roman. V, 8.

Causa altera, quæ Deum movit, sunt peccata nostra pœnam commerentia. *Traditus est* Christus *propter peccata nostra*, Rom. IV, 25. Vbi est διὰ [*propter*] cum accusativo: quæ apud Græcæ linguæ Authores sacros & profanos usitatissima est nota causæ impulsivæ. Vt cùm dicitur, διὰ ταῦτα, *propter hæc, venit ira Dei in filios contumaciæ*, Ephes. V, 6. Quoties verò phrasis ista *propter peccata* perpessionibus jungitur, diversum à causa impulsiva sensum non recipit. *Corripiam vos septies propter peccata vestra*, Levit. XXVI, 28. *Propter ista abominanda Dominus Deus ejicit eas à conspectu suo*, Deut. XVIII, 12. Et passim alibi in Sacris Literis: neque usquam aliter. Idemque planè valet phrasis altera *pro peccatis*, quoties & ipsa perpessionibus adhæret. Huc illa pertinent: *Christus mortuus est* ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν [*pro peccatis nostris*], I Corinth. XV, 3. *Christus semel passus est* περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν [*pro peccatis*], I Petri III, 18. Christus *dedit se* περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν [*pro peccatis nostris*], Galat. I, 4. *Christus obtulit sacrificium* ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν [*pro peccatis*], Hebr. X, 12. His tamen in locis Socinus (lib. II, cap. VII, lib. III, cap. VII, lib. II, cap. XXV, & clariùs lib. IV, cap. XIII) finalem causam, non impulsivam vult denotari: imò quod amplius est addit, *Pro* dictione & Græcâ ὑπὲρ nunquam impulsivam, semper autem finalem causam declarari. Posterius hoc, quò Socinus nititur, verum non esse multi loci evincunt. Nam ὑπὲρ & περὶ significare solent non minùs causam impulsivam, quàm causam finalem. Dicuntur Gentes laudare Deum ὑπὲρ ἐλέους [*pro misericordia*], Rom. XV, 9. *Gratiæ agantur pro nobis*, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, inquit Paulus II Corinth. I, 11; ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν [*pro vobis*], ad Ephesios I, 16, & ὑπὲρ πάντων [*pro omnibus*], Ephes. V, 20. *Oramus* ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ [*pro Christo*], II Cor. V, 20. *Magna est mea gloriatio* ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν [*pro vobis*], II Corinth. VII, 4, IX, 2, & XII, 5. *Angustiæ* ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ [*pro Christo*], II Cor. XII, 10; *Gratias ago Deo* περὶ ὑμῶν [*pro vobis*], I Cor. I, 4, *Deus arguet impios* περὶ πάντων τῶν ἔργων ἀσεβείας [*pro omnibus operibus impietatis*], Iud. 15. Sic & Latini dicunt, *pro beneficiis gratias agere* aut *reddere*, ut sæpissimè Cicero. Idem dixit, *ulcisci pro injuriis, pro magnitudine sceleris pœnas persolvere, supplicia pro maleficiis metuere*: ut Plautus, *castigare pro commerita noxia*. Et Terentius, *pro dictis & factis ulcisci*. His omnibus locis *pro* causam non finalem sed impulsivam significat. Sic & cùm *pro peccatis passus*, aut *mortuus* dicitur Christus, causam finalem (ut vult Socinus) intelligi res ipsa non patitur. Nam cùm finis sit duplex, τέλος ᾧ, καὶ τέλος οὗ [*finis cui, & finis cujus gratiâ*], ut finis cui sit medicina est æger, finis cujus gratiâ est sanitas, peccato neutrum convenit. Sive enim cum Socino dicas finem esse mortis Christi ut à peccatis retrahamur, sive etiam ut consequamur remissionem peccatorum (ut omittamus hunc finem ex ipsius sententia morti non potuisse tribui nisi remotissimè) neutrum indicari potest istis vocibus, *propter peccata*, vel, *pro peccatis*: Nam finis cui erit homo; finis autem cujus gratiâ non peccata, sed id quod peccatis maximè pugnat,

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destructiò peccatorum, vel remissio. Quis unquam dixit pharmacum sumi propter mortem, id est, mortis avertendæ causâ? sed propter morbum sumi ideò dicitur, quòd morbus nos eò adigat. Sequitur ergo ut impulsiva causa hîc accipienda sit. Quare cùm & particula מן apud Hebræos causam antecedentem sive impulsivam denotet, ut Psal. XXXVIII, 9, & alibi sæpè, locus Esaiæ LIII, 5, meliùs & Scripturis aliis congruentiùs transferri non potest quàm, *Dolore afficitur ob defectiones nostras; atteritur ob iniquitates nostras:* Et ille Rom. VI, 10. Christus τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν [*peccato mortuus est*], quid aliud denotare potest quàm, *mortuus est ob peccatum?*

Causa autem impulsiva cùm possit esse multiplex, hoc loco meritoria accipienda est. Agitur enim de pœna, ut mox ostendemus. Peccata autem pœnæ causa sunt non aliter quàm per modum meriti. Neque verò ostendi poterit voces istas, *ob peccata*, vel, *propter peccata*, præsertim ubi perpessionibus junguntur, aliter sumi usquam in Sacris Literis quàm in hoc meriti significatu. Non evincit contrarium locus ille I Reg. XIV, 16. *Tradet Deus Israëlem propter peccata Ieroboami.* Nam peccata Ieroboami illo loco significant genus ipsum peccati; idololatriam scilicet, cujus populo auctor fuerat Ieroboamus: idque manifestè explicant sequentia, *quibus peccavit, & quibus peccare fecit Israëlem.* Hæc enim verior est interpretatio, quàm illa à Socino allata, *qui peccavit, & peccare fecit Israelem.* Peccata ergo illa, quorum auctor erat Ieroboamus, imitator populus, traditionis istam pœnam merebantur. Vt jam taceam testari Sacras Literas, meritò imitatores alieni peccati pœnas dare, non tantùm ob sua, verumetiam ob aliena peccata; quod tam manifestum est, ut Socinus (lib. II, cap. VII, & lib. III, cap. X) ipse fateri cogatur, puniri aliquem posse, dum culpæ affinem ob peccata aliena. Locus autem Psalmi XXXIX, 12. quem Socinus citat, manifestè contra ipsum facit: Ait enim, *In increpationibus propter iniquitatem corripuisti aliquem, & liquefieri fecisti ut tineam desiderium ejus:* hoc est, Si quem velis punire quantum meretur peccatum, profectò ei homini ipsa vita vitalis non erit. Hac enim ratione Deum vult permovere ad miserationem: ut alibi, *Si iniquitates observaveris,* (hoc est, rigidè earum pœnas exegeris) *quis stabit,* aut *sustinebit?* Psalm. CXXX, 3. Manet ergo illud inconcussum, phrasin, *ob peccata*, causam denotare impulsivam, & quidem meritoriam. Nam quòd Socinus alicubi hoc quærit effugium, ut dicat satis esse ad hujus phraseòs veritatem, ut qualiscunque occasio indicetur, id primùm ipsius positioni repugnat, quâ dictionem *pro* dixerat nunquam ad impulsivam, semper verò ad finalem causam referri, cùm occasio causa finalis sit nullo modo: si autem causa dici meretur, ad impulsivam referri debeat. Deinde verò talem expositionem vocum *pro peccatis*, &, *propter peccata*, tum Scripturæ, tum sermonis communis usus planè repudiat. Intelligi hinc potest, quàm non rectè Socinus (lib. III, cap. X) neget, præter Dei & Christi voluntatem, causam antecedentem mortis Christi posse reperiri: quod planè adversatur Pauli dicto, *Si per Legem justitia, ergo Christus* δωρεὰν [*gratis*] *est mortuus*, Gal. II, 21. Vbi vox δωρεὰν [*gratis*], Socino (lib. II, cap. XXIV) agnoscente, significat sine causa: sed addi debuit, sine causa antecedente, quæ originaria & maximè frequens hujus vocis est significatio. Origo est à voce δωρεὰ, quæ *donum* significat, hoc est, dationem talem, quæ causam juris antecedentem non habeat: unde cœpit ad alia quoque transferri, in quibus antecedens causa non reperitur. Sic David, Psalm. XXXV, 19. de inimicis suis loquens, ait, *Oderunt me* חנם [*gratis*], hoc est, cùm odii causas ipsis nullas præbuerim: quod sibi applicans Christus apud Ioh. XV, 25 ait, *oderunt me* δωρεὰν [*gratis*] eodem planè significatu. *Omne* חנם, inquit David Kimchi, *in Scriptura exponitur ut* חן [*gratiâ*]: Pagninus, *particula excludens pretium, causam aut meritum.*: Locus ipse Pauli de quo agimus aliam quàm antecedentem causam intelligi non patitur. Nam, quam causam Socinus comminiscitur, nimirùm ut fides fieret vitam emendantibus remissionis peccatorum, hæc causa finalis ad prædicationem, & ad resurrectionem, non autem ad mortem pertinet. Quod cùm videret Socinus (lib. II, cap. XXIV), mortis nomine hîc Christum intelligi voluit, & prædicationem quoque ac resurrectionem includi; tum distortè, tum contra Pauli mentem. Negans enim Paulus Christum sine causa mortuum, indicat causam aliquam esse propriam, quæ ad mortem Christi pertineret. Nam alioqui potuit ob certam causam prædicasse, & ob certam causam præmio esse affectus, (nam juxta Socinum huc duntaxat refertur resurrectio) & non tamen esse mortuus. Præterea, mortem Christi à Paulo peculiariter respici, satis ostendit id quod præcedit, *qui tradidit semetipsum pro me.* Ista enim traditio mortem ubique in Scripturis designat. Et hoc ipsum Dei gratiam vocans Paulus negat id à se sperni aut rejici, causamque continuò reddit, *Nam si per Legem est justitia, Christus jam sine causa erit mortuus*: ex contrario designans causam propriam, cur se tradiderit Christus mortuusque sit, hanc esse, quòd nos per Legem justi non essemus, sed rei pœnæ. Nostra ergo ἀνομία [*iniquitas*] causa est antecedens mortis Christi.

Causa efficiens altera est ipse Christus, & quidem volens. *Pono*, inquit Christus, *animam meam: nemo eam tollit à me, sed ego pono eam à memetipso*, Ioh. X, 17, 18. *Christus tradidit se pro nobis, pro Ecclesia*, Gal. II, 20. Ephes. V, 2, 25.

Causa quæ Christum movit, fuit ipsius φιλανθρωπία [*benevolentia erga homines*]. *Hoc est*, inquit, *præceptum meum, ut diligatis alter alterum, sicut ego dilexi vos. Majorem hâc charitatem homo non habet, quàm ut animam suam ponat pro amicis suis. Vos amici mei estis*, Ioh. XV, 13, 14. *In fide Filii Dei, qui amavit me, & tradidit seipsum pro me*, Gal. II, 20. *Qui dilexit nos, & lavit nos à peccatis nostris in sanguine suo*, Apoc. I, 5. *Christus dilexit nos, & tradidit semetipsum pro nobis oblationem*, Eph. V, 2. *Christus dilexit Ecclesiam, & seipsum tradidit pro ea*, Eph. V, 25.

Materia est tum cruciatus mortem antecedentes, tum præcipuè mors ipsa. Cruciatus Esaias efficaci vocabulo חבורה [*livorem*] LIII, 5. & Petrus μώλωπα [*livorem*] appellavit, I *Pet.* II, 24. (sic erat in Græca editione Esaiæ, citante Origene contra Celsum lib. I).

Ideo-

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Ideoque & crucis mentionem videmus fieri, ubi hoc argumentum tractatur: *Reconciliavit utrosque Deo per crucem*, Ephes. II, 16. *Pace facta per sanguinem crucis*, Coloss. I, 20. Neque verò cruciatuum nomine intelligendi sunt soli dolores corporales, sed vel imprimis illæ perpessiones animi longè gravissimæ, quas Euangelistæ vocibus λυπεῖσθαι [*contristari*], ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι [*pavere*], ἀδημονεῖν [*mæstum esse*] significant, & quas præcipuè respiciens Christus à Deo se derelictum exclamat. Altera materiæ pars, mors ipsa passim urgetur: *Pono animam meam*, Ioh. X, 18. *Reconciliavit nos per mortem*, Coloss. I, 22. *Morte intercedente ad redemptionem transgressionum*, Heb. IX, 15. Hæc mors consideratur in Sacris Literis cum duabus præcipuè qualitatibus, ut cruenta, & ut ignominiosa. Qualitas illa mortis cruentæ voce *sanguinis* denotatur. *Hic est sanguis Novi Federis, qui pro multis effunditur in remissionem peccatorum*, Matth. XXVI, 28. Luc. XXII, 20. *Deus acquisivit Ecclesiam suo sanguine*, Act. XX, 28. *Deus Christum constituit propitiatorium per fidem in sanguine ipsius*, Rom. III, 25. *Iustificati in sanguine ipsius*, Rom. V, 9. *Habemus redemptionem per sanguinem ipsius peccatorum remissionem*, Ephes. I, 7. *Qui longè eratis, propè facti estis in sanguine Christi: ipse enim est pax nostra*, Eph. II, 13, 14. *Habemus redemptionem per sanguinem ipsius*, Coloss. I, 14. *Pace facta per sanguinem crucis*, Coloss. I, 20. *Non per sanguinem taurorum aut vitulorum, sed per sanguinem proprium semel intravit in sancta, repertâ æternâ redemptione*, Heb. IX, 12. *Sine sanguinis effusione non fit remissio*, Heb. IX, 22. *Accessistis ad sanguinem purificationis, melius loquentem quàm sanguis Abel*, Heb. XII, 24. *Secundùm purificationem sanguinis Iesu Christi*, I Pet. I, 2. *Sanguis Iesu Christi mundat nos ab omni peccato*, I Ioh. I, 7. *Christus lavit nos à peccatis nostris in sanguine suo*, Apoc. I, 5. Qualitas autem altera mortis ignominiosæ notatur tum ipsa *crucis* voce, (ipsi enim isti supplicio inest maxima ignominia, unde dictum est, *Pertulit crucem, spretâ ignominiâ*, Heb. XII, 2.) tum voce *contemptus*, quam usurpat Esaïas LIII, 3. Notetur hîc obiter non tantùm locis nunc allegatis aliisque similibus, qui de remissione peccatorum aut solùm aut potissimùm agunt, mentionem fieri mortis, crucis, sanguinis; sed passim profiteri Apostolos, se nihil nosse, nihil docere nisi Christum, & quidem crucifixum, I Cor. I, 23, & II, 2. Ideoque ipsum Euangelium ab ipsis vocari sermonem crucis, I Cor. I, 18. Adde jam quòd Christus sanctissimum Cœnæ suæ ritum instituit non propriè ad vitæ aut resurrectionis, sed mortis fusique sanguinis memoriam, I Cor. XI, 26. Quæ toties repetita manifestè ostendunt proprium aliquem ac peculiarem effectum huic morti & sanguini tribuendum, quod Socinus facere non potest. Nam exemplum sanctimoniæ tota vita Christi præbuit, magis quàm mors ipsa, quæ brevi momento peracta est. Confirmatio autem promissionis de vita cœlesti propriè in ipsa Christi resurrectione consistit, ad quam mors solam viæ habet rationem: ita ut huc respiciens Scriptura resurrectionis mentionem facere debuerit, non mortis; certè non toties & adjunctis notis ἐμφάσεως [*emphaseos*]. Socinus ipse, lib. I, cap. III, laborans, ut ostendat viam salutis sanguinis effusione confirmatam, cùm veram sustulisset, quam nos defendimus, nullam aliam probabilem ejus confirmationis causam substituere potuit, neque ullum verum adferre discrimen, cur id Christi solius, non etiam Martyrum aliorum morti tribui debeat. Neque verò unquam explicare Socinus poterit, quomodo Christus sanguine suo fuso Deum nobis devinxerit (quod aliquo modo verum ipse concedit lib. I, cap. III), si Deus ob fusionem sanguinis nihil promisit.

Forma est pœnarum pro peccatis nostris persolutio: quod districtè negat Socinus (lib. III, cap. IX, & lib. II, cap. IV,). Quare hoc ipsum breviter probabimus. Hebræi ut significent id quod Latini dicunt *pœnas pendere*, nullam habent phrasin magis receptam quàm hanc *ferre peccatum*, cui similis est Latinorum locutio, *luere delicta*, hoc est, delictorum supplicia. חטאתי *reus sum*, Gen. XLIII, 9, XLIV, 32. *Si quis blasphemum non indicaverit, feret peccatum ipsius*, Levit. V, 1. *Qui nuditatem sororis suæ retexit, peccatum suum ferto*, Levit. XX, 17. Sic expiatoriæ victimæ dicuntur portare iniquitates offerentium, Lev. X, 17. quia sanguis ipsarum est pro anima humana, Levit. XVII, 1. Neque tantùm conjunctim, sed & separatim istæ voces inveniuntur sensu eodem. Sic βαστάζειν τὸ κρίμα [*portare judicium*] dicitur, Gal. V, 10. *Ferre ob peccata*, Ezech. XVIII, 20. Et *supervenire alicui peccatum*, id est, pœna peccati, II Reg. VII, 9. Eadem planè phrasi dixit Petrus Christum peccata nostra sursum tulisse in corpore suo in lignum, I Pet. II, 24. Poterat dixisse ἤνεγκε [*tulit*], sed quia simul significare voluit adscensum in crucem, dixit ἀνήνεγκε, hoc est, *tulit sursum eundo*: quod de dicta phrasi nihil imminuit, sed ei addit aliquid. Itaque Syrus transtulit: *portavit, & ascendere fecit*. Socinus ut vim hujus loci enervet, primo ait ἀνήνεγκε significare *abstulit*: sed contra naturam usumque vocis. Nam nec particula ἀνὰ eam patitur interpretationem, nec quisquam Græcus Scriptor ita usus est ea voce. In Novo quoque Testamento nusquam occurrit eo significatu; sed aut *sursum ferre* significat, Luc. XXIV, 51. aut *sursum ducere*, Matth. XVII, 1. Marc. IX, 2. Et quia victimæ in locum superiorem, hoc est, in aram adferebantur, ideo illæ quoque dicuntur ἀναφέρεσθαι [*sursum ferri*], Heb. VII, 27. Iac. II, 21. unde & Christus ipse dicitur se ἀνενέγκαι [*sursum tulisse*], Heb. VII, 27, & nos laudis sive spiritualia sacrificia ἀναφέρειν [*sursum ferre*] dicimur, Heb. XIII, 15. & I Pet. II, 24. Vnum duntaxat locum citat Socinus (lib. II, cap. VI.) Heb. IX, 28. ubi vult ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας [*sursum ferre peccata*], nihil aliud esse quàm auferre: sed immeritò, & citra exemplum, & non id exigente loci sententiâ. Nam opponuntur inter se duo Christi adventus: prior, quo peccata nostra tulerit; alter, quo venturus sit χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας [*absque peccato*], hoc est, non gravatus, non oneratus ullis peccatis, sed ab iis solutus & immunis. Non sunt autem ista ἀντίθετα [*opposita*], esse χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας [*absque peccato*] & *peccata auferre*, sed esse χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας [*absque peccato*] & *peccatis oneratum esse*. Vnde apparet illo quoque ad Hebræos loco ἀνενεγκεῖν esse aut *sursum ferre*, in crucem scilicet, ut in loco Petri (idque appositè, quia hîc quoque ad

sacrificia alluditur: crux autem fuit velut ara; תרומה apud Mosem est ἀναφορὰ [*subvectio*]: in quo inest significatio τοῦ ἄνω [*sursum*]. Kimchi τὸ וקף [*suspendere*] (Vnde וקיפא Syriacè, σαυρὸς [*crux*]) exponit per רום [*exaltare*], vide Annotata ad Ioan. III, 14. & XII, 32.) aut simpliciter *perpeti*, ut apud Thucydidem κινδύνους ἀναφέρειν [*subire pericula*]. Est ergo ἀναφέρειν *ferre*, non *auferre*: quod ipse Petri contextus evincit. Agitur enim non de quovis Christi beneficio, sed de summâ ejus patientiâ, quæ non auferendo sed ferendo ostenditur. Quod addit Socinus, cum hoc sensu, quo Christus dicatur *tulisse peccata nostra*, non satis rectè cohærere quod sequitur, *ut peccatis mortui justitiæ vivamus*, sine ulla causa dicitur. Manifestè enim indicat Petrus, Christum ita tulisse peccata nostra, ut nos simul à pœna liberaret: unde addit statim; *Ipsius vibice sanati estis*. Optimè autem hæc cohærent; si Christus tam dura subiit, ut peccatorum veniam consequeremini, sanè eam adepti per fidem, à peccatis cavere debetis in posterum. *Dedit nobis Deus, ut, liberati ex manu inimicorum nostrorum, ipsi serviamus in omni sanctitate & justitia*, Luc. I, 74, 75. *Ecce sanus factus es, ne pecces post hac*, Ioh. V, 14. *Pretio empti estis: glorificate ergo Deum in corpore vestro*, I Cor. VI, 20. Nec aliud agit Paulus cap. VII, & sequentibus ad Romanos, quàm ut ostendat, summis Dei & Christi beneficiis excitari nos debere, ut sanctè vivamus. Affinis Petri loco (imo quo proculdubio Petrus respexit, ut ex verbis quoque sequentibus, *vibice ejus sanati sumus*, apparet) est apud Esaïam LIII, 11, *Justificabit Servus meus justus multos, & iniquitates ipsorum bajulabit*. (Vide de toto hoc loco Esaïæ Orig. I. adversus Celsum). In Hebræo est, ועונתם הוא יסבל [*& iniquitates ipsorum bajulabit*]: vox autem עון *iniquitatem* significat, atque etiam *iniquitatis pœnam*, ut II Reg. VII, 9. Vox autem סבל est *sustinere, bajulare*, quoties autem bajulare ponitur cum nomine peccati, aut iniquitatis, id in omni lingua, & maximè in Hebraïsmo significat pœnas ferre. Nam נשא quidem interdum significat *auferre*: סבל autem nunquam. Disertè ergo hîc dicitur Christus laturus pœnas eorum qui justificantur. Hæc phrasis nullam aliam interpretationem recipit. Neque obstat, quod hæc portatio iniquitatis apud Prophetam videatur post resurrectionem poni. Gloriæ enim Christi Propheta quasi alternis opponit antecedentes passiones, modò naturali, modò inverso ordine, qui effectu posito causam reddit. Ita post mentionem æternæ perdurationis excidii & plagæ fit mentio vers. 8. Deinde vers. 20. post contritionem & morbum & sacrificium, semen, longævitas & prosperitas nominantur. Quibus conjunguntur liberatio à molestia ac multorum justificatio vers. 11. Redit iterum Propheta ad pœnas pro peccatis toleratas & subjungit, *Ideo fore ut prædam partiatur*, quia scilicet morti se dederit, annumeratus defectoribus: decere enim ut is qui peccata multorum tulit, jus habeat pro eis intercedendi vers. 12. Quod verò, ait Socinus, hanc quoque vocem סבל peccato adjunctam non semper includere imputationem aliquam, sed satis esse si designet affligi quempiam occasione qualicunque facti alieni, id nullo exemplo probat, neque unquam sacra Scriptura ita loquitur. Imo Græci etiam Latinique Autores, cùm ea phrasi utuntur, semper imputationem includunt. Citat firmandæ huic exceptioni Socinus Ieremiæ locum, qui sic habet: *Patres nostri peccaverunt, & non supersunt; nos verò pœnas eorum ferimus* Thren. V, 7; neque hîc patitur ullam imputationem intelligi. At quo argumento probat aliud hîc significare eam phrasin, quàm aliis omnibus in locis, ubi extat? Fateri cogitur ipse Socinus, quoties filii patrum sequuntur vestigia, non propria tantum sed & paterna peccata ipsis imputari. Est enim manifesta Dei vox Exod. XX, 5. Eos autem de quibus agit Ieremias, parentibus suis fuisse similes, ostendit id, quod apud Prophetam sequitur, *Væ nobis quia peccavimus*, vers. 16. Neque verò hoc alienum est ab Ieremiæ instituto. Vt enim eorum qui tum vivebant miseriam exaggeret, ait in ipsos redundare & propriorum & avitorum scelerum pœnas: eoque multò meliorem ipsorum sorte fuisse parentum sortem, qui pariter rei, ante tamen exempti essent vitæ, quàm ista acerbissima supplicia velut in iræ Divinæ thesauro coacervata tandem simul effunderentur. Etiamsi verò ambigua esset harum vocum, *ferre peccata*, in Sacris Literis significatio, tamen tum hoc Esaïæ, tum isto Petri loco certam faceret interpretationem adjuncta mentio perpessionum Christi & liberationis nostræ. Peccata enim ferre patiendo, atque ita ut inde liberentur alii, aliud indicare non potest, quam pœnæ alienæ susceptionem. Apud eundem Esaïam, vers. 6, & 7 est; *Deus conjecit sive impegit in eum pœnam omnium nostrûm. Exigitur, & ipse affligitur*. Hîc nullum non lapidem movet Socinus (lib. II, cap. V); ut sensum genuinum verbis extorqueat; novamque interpretationem comminiscitur: *Deus occurrit per ipsum* (vel cum ipso) *iniquitati omnium nostrûm*. Sed reclamat apertè vox Hebræa הפגיע ejus conjugationis quæ non unicam, sed duplicem actionem significat. Quare cùm פגע propriè significet *occurrere*, sequitur ut הפגיע sit, *fecit occurrere* & per metaphoram *deprecatus est*: quia deprecator preces suas quasi interponit. Deprecari hîc locum non habet: nam tum diceretur Deus pro Christo esse deprecatus: ea enim est hujus vocis, sequente ב particula, significatio: Ierem. XV, 11. Neque fecit deprecari hîc convenit, tum quia sequitur בו, quod est, *in illum*, cùm alioqui dici debuisset, *fecit illum deprecari*, tum quia omnia, quæ proximè antecedunt & sequuntur, ad afflictionem, non ad deprecationem pertinent. Non ferunt ergo verba hæc sensum alium quam hunc: fecit Deus illi occurrere, hoc est, impegit, incussit in illum peccatum omnium nostrûm. *Exigitur peccatum* (hoc est, secundùm phrasin Scripturæ pœna peccati) *& ipse affligitur*. Objicit hîc nobis Socinus locum Levit. XVI, 21 & 22, ubi dicuntur peccata imponi hirco expiatorio, & ipse hircus ferre peccata populi in vastam solitudinem. Arbitratur autem nihil esse manifestius, quàm non posse ullo modo dici hunc hircum pœnas pro populi peccatis pertulisse, quod quo jure sibi sumat non video. Nam pœna sanè generaliter sumpta, etiam in bestias cadit. *Sanguinem omnium animarum vestrarum reposcam: ab omni bestia*

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bestia reposcam illum, Genes. IX, 5. *Cùm cornu ferierit bos aliquis virum aut mulierem ita ut moriatur, omnino lapidator bos ille*, Exod. XXI, 28. *Si quis cubuerit cum jumento, omnino morte afficitor; jumentum quoque ipsum occiditote*, Levit. XX, 15. *Maledicta fuit diluvio terra propter hominem*, Genes. VIII, 21. Nec est quod objiciat Socinus, ἀπεκπομπαῖον [*ablegatitium*] hunc hircum interimi non solitum: ad peccatorum autem remissionem fusionem sanguinis, sive mortem, requiri. Nam hunc ipsum hircum de loco sublimi præcipitatum in deserto atque ita neci datum, etsi Scriptura disertè non prodit, Hebræi Interpretes consentiunt: quod ut non esset, quid tamen aliud illa in vastam solitudinem abactio, quàm mortem minimè naturalem, aut ex fame, aut ex ferarum laniatibus minabatur? Notanda quoque est apud Esaiam vox נגש. Certissimum enim est נגש (Schin punctum habente in cornu sinistro) propriè significare, *exigere*, ut apparet II Reg. XXIII, 35. Zachar. IX, 8. Metaphoricè autem sumi pro *opprimere*. Passivum ergo נגש est aut *opprimitur* aut *exigitur*. Opprimitur hîc locum non habet, quia sequitur in eodem commate והיא, *& ipse* affligitur: unde apparet hoc verbum referri ad aliud nomen, quàm ad illud cui aptatur vox *affligitur*. Nullus enim erit sensus, si quis de eodem dicat: opprimitur & ipse affligitur. Restat ergo ut vox illa propriè sumatur, ut significet, *exigitur*, & referatur ad nomen proximè antecedens, quod est peccatum. Exigere autem peccatum nihil aliud est, aut esse potest, quàm exigere pœnam peccati. Cohærent ergo exactio pœnæ & Christi afflictio.

Præcesserat apud eundem Prophetam vers. 5, *Castigatio pacis nostræ imponitur ei, & livore ejus fit curatio nobis*. In Hebræo *castigatio* dicitur מוסר, quæ vox afflictionem non qualemcunque significat, sed eam quæ pœnæ habeat rationem, sive sit παραδειγματικὴ [*exemplaris*], sive νουθετικὴ [*monitoria*] tantùm, quibus vocabulis commodè pœnarum genera olim distinxit Taurus Philosophus. Atque inde factum, ut quælibet νουθεσία [*admonitio*] voce מוסר per καθάχρησιν [*abusionem*] significaretur. Cùm verò νουθεσίας [*admonitionis*] significatio in Christo locum non habeat, præsertim cùm de afflictionibus agatur mortem includentibus; restat afflictionem intelligamus, quæ conjunctum habeat παράδειγμα [*exemplum*]. Nam ab omni culpæ respectu sepositum vocis istius Hebrææ usum non est reperire. Verum est pacis nomine apud Hebræos bonum qualecunque significari: sed hîc si ex subjecta materia intelligamus bonum impunitatis, apparebit inter se optimè opponi punitionem Christi & impunitatem nostram: quanquam nihil vetat pacis nomine reconciliationem intelligi, etiam nullâ factâ inimicitiæ mentione; quam præcessisse res ipsa & sequentia Prophetæ verba satis indicant. Nam nec inimicitiæ mentionem fecerunt Angeli, cùm pacem super terram promulgarunt venturam, Luc. II, 14, nec Apostolus, cùm pacem nos dixit habere apud Deum, Rom. V, 1. Sicut autem peccatum pro pœna usurpant Hebræi, ut præter cætera loca nunc allegata apparet Zachar. XIV, 19. & Gen. IV, 13. ita & eum qui pœnam luit, peccatum iidem vocant, ut & Latini piaculum tum pro crimine sumunt, tum pro eo qui criminis pœnas pendit. Unde est quod hostiam piacularem pro peccato peccatum vocet Scriptura Levit. IV, 3, & 29. & V, 6. Psalm. XL, 7. Hanc ergo loquendi formulam sequens Esaïas de Christo dixit (cap. LIII, 10), תשים אשם נפשו, *posuit peccatum animam suam*: hoc est, animam suam fecit peccatorum pœnæ obnoxiam. Nec aliter Paulus: *Eum, qui peccatum non noverat, Deus peccatum fecit, ut nos simus Dei justitia in ipso*, II Cor. V, 21. Apparet apud Paulum in utroque membro adjunctum sumi pro subjecto. Socinus (lib. I, cap. VIII) ut Paulini loci autoritatem eludat, per vocem *peccatum* vult intelligi hominem pro peccatore ab hominibus habitum: primùm sine exemplo; nusquam enim vox Hebræa aut Græca sic accipitur: deinde Paulus Deo hanc actionem tribuit, quod Christum peccatum fecerit. At verò quod Christum Iudæi & alii pro facinoroso & malefico habuerunt, ejus rei nullo modo autor est Deus: Imò contra voce cœlesti, editisque miraculis hoc egit, ut omnibus testatam faceret Christi innocentiam. Deinde ista nova Socini interpretatio verbis Esaïæ, quæ similem phrasin continent, aptari nullo modo potest. Quod enim Paulo dicitur fecisse Deus, hoc Esaïas Christo tribuit, quòd nimirum animam suam posuerit peccatum; sive quòd se peccatum fecerit. Præterea opponit Paulus peccatum & justitiam. *Nos facti sumus justitia Dei*, hoc est, nos sumus justificati, sive à pœna Divina liberati, *Christus verò* ut id fieret *factus est peccatum*, id est, pœnam Divinam tulit. Notanda in iisdem Pauli verbis altera quoque ἀντίθεσις [*oppositio*]: *Eum qui peccatum non noverat*, hoc est, qui pœnam non merebatur, *Deus peccatum fecit*, hoc est, pœnas ferre voluit. Christus innocens fuit non humanæ tantùm, sed & Divinæ legi. Requirit ergo vis oppositionis, ut pœnas tulerit legis etiam Divinæ. Præterea innocentes à malis malè haberi quotidianum est: At hîc eximium aliquid notat Apostolus. Hoc autem quid esse potest aliud quàm quod Deus incommerito pœnam inflixerit?

Non multùm dissimilis est prioribus ille Pauli ad Galat. locus, III, 13. *Christus nos redemit à maledicto legis, factus pro nobis maledictum. Scriptum est enim, Maledictus qui pendet in ligno: ut ad Gentes perveniret benedictio Abrahami in Christo Iesu.* Hic eo minus laborare nos necesse est quid voluerit Paulus, cùm Christum dicit esse factum κατάρα, hoc est, *maledictum*, sive *execrationem*, quando ipse semet interpretatur, & Mosem dicti sui autorem allegans ostendit per κατάραν [*execrationem*] se intelligere ἐπικατάρατον [*maledictum*]: Ἐπικατάρατος autem, ipso Paulo interprete, est is qui est ὑπὸ κατάραν [*sub maledicto*]. Execratio, inquit Socinus, hoc loco ipsam execrationis pœnam significat: quod verum est. Nam κατάρα [*maledictum*] passim pœnam ex legis sanctione proficiscentem significat, II Pet. II, 14. Matth. XXV, 41. Et hîc addita legis mentio vetat maledictum aliter accipi. Hanc autem κατάραν [*execrationem*], in Christo fuisse ipsam crucem fatetur idem Socinus (lib. II, cap. I). Crux ergo Christi pœnæ rationem habuit: & hoc est quod nos dicimus. Concedet fortè Socinus crucem pœnam

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fuisse, quia Christo à Pilato Iudice per modum pœnæ irrogata est. Sed hoc sententiæ Pauli non satisfacit. Vt enim probet Christum factum fuisse pœnæ obnoxium, Mosen citat apertè dicentem, eos qui suspenduntur (secundùm Legem Divinam scilicet) esse ἐπικατάρατος τῷ Θεῷ [*maledictos à Deo*] (vide de hoc Mosis loco Masium ad Ios. cap. VIII): quare & in Paulo Mosen citante, & ad Christum referente hæc verba vox eadem supplenda est: quasi dixerit, Christum factum τῷ Θεῷ ἐπικατάρατον [*maledictum à Deo*]: hoc est, pœnæ à Deo irrogatæ & quidem ignominiosissimæ obnoxium. Nam Apostoli cùm passionem Christi ad usus nostros referunt, non in ea respiciunt hominum facta, sed factum ipsius Dei: ut ex multis locis ante allegatis liquet.

His omnibus addi & illud potest [a] mortem ipsam, hoc est, destructionem ejus personæ, quam corpus & animus constituunt, quatenus à Deo infligitur, semper aliquam habere pœnæ rationem: Hebræi, בלא חטא אין מיתא [*absque peccato non est mors*]; non quod Deo jus non sit eam aliter homini infligere (est enim Dominus creaturæ) sed quod ipsius bonitati aliter visum fuerit. Vt rectè intelligatur hujus peculiaris controversiæ status: non negamus hominem, cùm conditus est, fuisse χοϊκὸν [*terrenum*], cui adfuerit vis quædam vitalis, non autem vis vivifica, ut nos Paulus docet 1 Cor. XV, 45, 46. ac proinde eam fuisse corporis conditionem, ut Deo non sustentante interitura fuerit: attamen ex Divino decreto non fuisse eum moriturum, si in innocentia perstitisset, contendimus (vide Theophilum ad Autol. lib. II. Arnob. adversus gentes: Iustinum respons. ad Orthod. quæst. XXXII). Evincit hoc ipsa creaturæ istius nobilitas atque eminentia, ut quæ sola ad imaginem Dei condita dicatur, hoc est, mente liberoque arbitrio prædita, quod fundamentum est dominationis ipsius in cæteras creaturas. Non potest enim rerum aliarum esse dominus, qui suarum actionum dominus non sit. Hæc igitur excellentia supra res cæteras argumento est, plus aliquid quàm temporarium usum in hominis creatione spectatum. Athenagoras: οὐ γὰρ ἡμᾶς ὡς πρόβατα ἢ ὑποζύγια, πάρεργον, καὶ ἵνα ἀπολοίμεθα καὶ ἀφανισθείημεν, ἔκτισεν ὁ Θεός [*non enim nos, tanquam pecora aut jumenta, obiter, & ut periremus & aboleremur, creavit Deus*]. Deus homines condidit διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ζωὴν καὶ διαμονήν [*ob propriam ipsorum creatorum vitam & incolumitatem*]; & mox: Ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ζωὴν, οὐκ ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἐξαπομένην, εἶτα παντελῶς συνεισβεβυμένην [*ob ipsorum creatorum vitam: non autem talem, quæ in exiguum tempus accenderetur, mox deinde in perpetuum extingueretur*]. Iam verò illâ Divinâ voce quid clarius, *Si comederis, morieris* Gen. II, 17? De actu mortis hîc agitur, sive illa violenta esset futura, sive citra violentiam. Ipsum ergo mori non erat eventurum homini, nisi peccati conditio extitisset. Non minùs clarum & generale Pauli illud, *Stipendium*, id est pœna, *peccati mors*, Rom. VI, 23. Ante dixerat, *Per peccatum mors, & ita in omnes homines mors pervasit* (V, 12). *Omnes*, inquit, *homines*: Agit ergo de communi totius humanitatis exitu. *Per hominem* ergo, id est, ex facto humano *mors, & per hominem resurrectio mortuorum*. Sicut in Adam *omnes moriuntur* (quotquot moriuntur) *ita & in Christo omnes vivificabuntur* (quotquot vivificabuntur) 1 Corinth. XV, 21, 22. Quis vel ipsa verba legens non videat hanc sententiam ad Corinthios isti ad Romanos respondere ad amussim? Agitur ergo de morte, quæ communis est Adami posteris, & ex qua resurgunt qui resurgunt. Quare & collato hoc loco cum illo ad Romanos, agi hîc de Adamo peccatore dicimus. Quod enim hîc dixit *Per hominem*, ibi dixit *per peccatum*. Animalis Adami conditio viginti & ultra post versibus ab Apostolo attingitur, aliâ plane occasione: hîc enim mors resurrectioni opponitur: ibi verò qualitates primitus creati ac deinde resuscitati corporis inter se conferuntur: quorum illud habuit cum naturali moriendi possibilitate conjunctam ex Divino beneficio vivendi quoque possibilitatem: hoc verò vitam ita in se habebit, ut nulla ei adsit naturalis moriendi possibilitas. Omittere non possum, quin hîc addam locum insignem præstantissimi Scriptoris libri Sapientiæ, qui etsi in Hebræo Canone non est, venerandam tamen habet antiquitatem, & apud Christianos semper in pretio est habitus. Ita ergo ille: Ὁ Θεὸς θάνατον οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τέρπεται ἐπ' ἀπωλείᾳ ζώντων. ἔκτισε γὰρ εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα, καὶ σωτήριοι αἱ γενέσεις τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐταῖς φάρμακον ὀλέθρου, οὐδὲ ἄδου βασίλειον ἐπὶ γῆς. δικαιοσύνη γὰρ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν. ἀσεβεῖς δὲ ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ τοῖς λόγοις προσεκαλέσαντο αὐτὸν, φίλον ἡγησάμενοι αὐτὸν ἐπόθησαν, καὶ συνθήκας ἔθεντο πρὸς αὐτὸν, ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσι τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος εἶναι [*Deus mortem non fecit, nec lætatur in perditione vivorum. Creavit enim ut essent omnia: & sanabiles fecit nationes orbis terrarum: & non est in illis medicamentum exterminii, nec inferorum regnum in terra. Iustitia enim perpetua est & immortalis. Impii autem manibus & verbis accersierunt illam: & æstimantes illam amicam, defluxerunt, & sponsiones posuerunt ad illam: quoniam digni sunt, qui sint ex parte illius*], I, 13, 14, 15, 16. Et mox: ὁ Θεὸς ἔκτισε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ ἀφθαρσίᾳ, καὶ εἰκόνα τῆς ἰδίας ἰδιότητος ἐποίησεν αὐτόν. φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον. Πειράζουσι δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος ὄντες [*Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem, & ad imaginem similitudinis suæ fecit illum. Invidiâ autem diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum: imitantur autem illum, qui sunt ex parte illius*], II, 23, 24. Mortem hîc, quam Deus dicitur non condidisse, nec velle, voluntate scilicet peccatum antecedente, qualemcunque intelligi ostendit oppositum ἀφθαρσίᾳ [*immortalitas*], in cujus spem homo dicitur conditus, eaque spes pars fuisse Divinæ imaginis, aut certè ejus consequens non obscurè indicatur. Ἀφθαρσία [*immortalitas*] autem mortem omnem sive violentam, sive non violentam excludit. Et quod Apostolus dixit, per hominem & per peccatum intrasse mortem, auctor hic non minus verè dixerat, per Diaboli invidiam mortem introiisse. Omnes enim istæ locutiones idem factum notant, primum scilicet hominis peccatum Diabolo suggerente commissum. Nec obstat quod auctor hic specialem quendam mortis effectum circa impios notat: Mors enim ex primo peccato ingressa, & in omnes homines jus adepta, per singulorum peccata gravia & continua vim quandam peculiarem accipit;

a contra Socinum lib. III, cap. VII, VIII, IX.

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pit; quo sensu peccatum dicitur mortis stimulus, 1 Cor. xv, 56. Itaque hi, quibus morte obitâ omnis ad vitam meliorem aditus præcluditur, meritò federati mortis, sive dedititii, & peculium mortis appellantur. Facillimum esset demonstratu, si id ageretur, & Iudæorum veterum & Christianorum perpetuam hanc fuisse sententiam, mortem qualemcunque hominis, peccati esse pœnam: ut non immeritò Christiani Imperatores hoc in Pelagio & Cælestio dogma præter cætera improbaverint, quod dicerent, mortem non ex insidiis fluxisse peccati, sed exegisse eam penitus legem immutabilis constituti.

Vt ergo quæ hactenus dicta sunt in unum colligamus, cùm dicat Scriptura Christum à Deo castigatum, hoc est, punitum esse, tulisse Christum peccata nostra, (id est, pœnas peccatorum) factum esse peccatum, (hoc est, peccatorum pœnæ subditum) factum esse execrationem apud Deum sive execrationi, hoc est, pœnæ legis obnoxium: ipsa autem Christi passio plena cruciatibus, cruenta, ignominiosa, aptissima sit pœnæ materia: cùm præterea dicat Scriptura, hæc ipsi à Deo inflicta ob peccata nostra, (id est, peccatis nostris ita merentibus) cùm ipsa mors stipendium, hoc est, pœna peccati dicatur: sanè quin quoad Deum pœnæ rationem habuerit Christi passio & mors, minimè est dubitandum: neque audiendæ sunt Socini interpretationes à perpetuo vocum usu citra exemplum recedentes: præsertim cùm nulla obstet ratio, quominus recepta verborum significatio retineatur, quod infra planius fiet. Est ergo punitio in Deo activè, in Christo passivè: cujus tamen passioni actio quædam accedit, voluntaria scilicet pœnalis passionis susceptio.

Finis rei de qua agitur secundùm Dei & Christi intentionem, qui in actu positus, effectus etiam dici potest, duplex est: justitiæ nimirum Divinæ demonstratio; & peccatorum remissio quoad nos, hoc est, impunitas nostra. Nam si sumas pœnæ exactionem impersonaliter, finis ejus est Divinæ justitiæ demonstratio: si verò personaliter, hoc est, cur Christus sit punitus, finis est, ut nos impunitatem consequeremur. Finis prior indicatur à Paulo cùm dicit de Christo; *quem Deus constituit placamen in sanguine ipsius ad demonstrationem justitiæ suæ: propter dissimulationem peccatorum præcedentium in tolerantia Dei.* Deinde addit verbis prope iisdem repetitis: *ad demonstrationem justitiæ suæ hoc tempore, ut sit ipse justificans eum qui est ex Fide Iesu*, Roman. III, 25, 26. Hîc proximè sanguini, id est, cruentæ morti connectitur finis εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ [*ad demonstrationem justitiæ suæ*]. Iustitiæ Dei vocabulo non ea intelligenda est justitia, quam in nobis Deus operatur, aut quam nobis imputat, sed ea quæ in Deo est: sequitur enim; *ut sit ipse justus*, id est, ut justus esse appareat. Iustitia hæc Dei, id est, rectitudo, pro diversis objectis diversos habet effectus.[a] Circa benè aut malè facta creaturæ effectus ejus inter cæteros est ἀνταπόδοσις [*retributio*]: quò respiciens Paulus dixit δίκαιον παρὰ Θεῷ ἀνταποδοῦναι τοῖς θλίβουσι θλῖψιν, hoc est, *justum est apud Deum affligentibus afflictionem retribuere* II Thessal. I, 6. Et alibi: *Omnis transgressio & inobedientia accipit* ἔνδικον μισθαποδοσίαν [*justam mercedis retributionem*] Hebr. II, 2. Et illud, ὧν τὸ κρῖμα ἔνδικόν ἐστι [*quorum damnatio justa est*], Rom. III, 8. Syrus transtulit, *quorum condemnatio justitiæ reservatur.* Itaque idem est ἡμέρα ὀργῆς [*dies iræ*] & ἡμέρα δικαιοκρισίας [*dies justi judicii*]: Roman. II, 5. Et extremum judicium dicitur futurum ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ [*in æquitate*], Actor. XVII, 31. Et alibi, ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ κρίνειν [*in æquitate judicare*], est severè vindicare, quod ostenditur additâ voce *pugnare*, multoque magis iis, quæ paulò post sequuntur: *Ex ore ejus prodibit gladius acutus ut percutiat Gentes; ipse enim reget eas in virga ferrea; & ipse est qui calcabit lacum vini excandescentiæ & iræ Dei omnipotentis*, Apoc. XIX, 11, & 15. Sic & Deus justus & judicia ejus justa dicuntur ideo quod in peccata severè animadvertit, Apoc. XVI, 5, 7. Vnde & δίκη [*ultio*] vocatur tum illa ipsa justitia Dei puniens, Actor. XXVIII, 4, tum pœna per eam illata II Thess. I, 9. Iudæ 7. Et δικαίωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ [*Iustitia Dei*] explicatur à Paulo hoc esse, quod qui mala committunt aut approbant digni sunt morte, Rom. I, 32. His παρώνυμα [*agnata*] sunt ἔκδικος, *punitor*, Rom. XIII, 4. I Thessal. IV, 6. Et ἐκδίκησις, *pœnæ exactio*, Lucæ XXI, 22. II Thessal. I, 8. I Petri II, 14. cujus vis explicatur verbo ἀνταποδοῦναι [*retribuere*], Roman. XII, 19. Hebr. X, 30. Scimus justitiæ nomine sæpe veracitatem, sæpe etiam ἐπιείκειαν [*æquitatem*] significari: sed cùm eâ voce, ut multis jam testimoniis ostensum est, etiam illa Dei proprietas indicetur, quæ Deum movet ad peccata punienda, & quæ in ipsa peccatorum punitione demonstratur, dicimus hanc significationem hujus esse loci propriam. Opponuntur enim diversa tempora, nempe ante Christum, & Christi tempus: priori tempori tribuitur πάρεσις [*transmissio*] peccatorum, quæ etiam explicatur voce ἀνοχῆς [*sustentationis*]. Πάρεσις non remissionem, sed *transmissionem* significat, cui rectè additur ἀνοχή, *sustentatio*, quâ voce inducias etiam Græci appellant, quod per eas ad tempus inhibeatur bellum. Huic transmissioni atque inhibitioni opponitur demonstratio talis justitiæ, quâ Deus sit justus, id est, justus appareat. Olim cùm Deus pleraque peccata impunita transmitteret, non satis apparebat ipsius τὸ ἀνταποδοτικόν [*retributivum*]. Tandem ergo ostendit quam justus esset ἀνταποδότης [*retributor*], cùm Filium suum voluit hoc nomine sanguinem fundere, ut placamen fieret humani generis, redimeretque omnes eos, qui unquam credidissent aut essent in Deum crediturí. Ita simul conjunxit Apostolus gratiæ, id est, bonitatis Divinæ quæ in creaturas fertur, & justitiæ illius, quæ recti ordinis atque etiam ἀνταποδόσεως [*retributionis*] custos est, apertam demonstrationem. Sanè ipsa vox sanguinis, vox placaminis, atque etiam redemptionis ostendunt non de sola bonitatis testatione hîc agi. Conjunxit etiam impetrationem cum applicatione: impetratio est per sanguinem, applicatio per Fidem: recteque dicitur illa ipsa, de qua agimus, Dei Iustitia manifesta fieri per Fidem: illam nimirum, quâ Christi sanguis ad Deum placandum fusus creditur: quæ Fides omnem operum gloriationem, omnem in Lege fiduciam penitus excludit. Finis hic, nempe Divinæ justitiæ demonstratio ex forma quoque rei de qua agimus rectè colligitur.

[a] contra Socini lib. I, cap. I, paragraph. Dico igitur.

Pœnæ enim finis est demonstratio justitiæ ἀντιποδοτικῆς [*retributivæ*] circa peccata: item ex causa antecedente, quam supra ostendimus esse meritoriam. Non potest autem alicujus actionis causa impellens esse meritoria, nisi & finis sit τὸ ἀντιποδοῦναι [*retribuere*].

Finis alter, ut diximus, est nostra impunitas. Hoc significanter dixit Paulus, δικαιωθέντες ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ, σωθησόμεθα ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς [*justificati in sanguine ipsius, salvi erimus ab ira*], Rom. v, 9. Nam ὀργὴ, *ira* Dei, ut & Socinus (lib. I, cap. I) agnoscit, significat interdum affectum (si ita loquendum est) puniendi, Ioh. III, 36. Rom. I, 18. Sæpe verò pœnam ipsam, Michææ VII, 9, unde & ἀπωλείας, id est, *exitii* voce explicatur, Roman. IX, 22. Hinc Lex dicitur ὀργὴν [*iram*] operari, hoc est, pœnam parere, Rom. IV, 15. hinc ἐπιφέρειν ὀργὴν [*inferre iram*] est punire, Rom. III, 5, & Magistratus dicitur vindex in maleficos constitutus εἰς ὀργὴν [*in iram*], id est, ad pœnam infligendam, Rom. XIII, 4, eique parendum non solùm διὰ τὴν ὀργὴν [*propter iram*], hoc est, pœnæ formidine, sed & propter conscientiam. Impunitas autem pœnæ opponitur. Pœna est mors æterna, sive detentio sub morte, cujus satelles diabolus: qui propterea mortis habens potestatem, per mortem (Christi) destructus dicitur, Heb. II, 14. Nam de veniæ potius impetratione hîc agi, quàm de peccati mortificatione, ostendit quæ sequitur mentio liberationis à mortis metu. Et Christus dicitur, ὁ ῥυόμενος ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης [*qui nos eripit ab ira futura*], I Thess. I, 10. Hæc ipsa impunitas receptissimâ phrasi sacræ Scripturæ vocatur peccatorum remissio, quæ propriè mortem Christi consequitur, ut multi loci ostendunt: quales sunt hi; *Hic est sanguis meus novi fœderis, qui pro multis effunditur in remissionem peccatorum*, Matth. XXVI, 28. *Habemus in ipso redemptionem, per sanguinem ipsius remissionem peccatorum*, Eph. I, 7, & Coloss. I, 14. *Sine sanguinis effusione non fit remissio*, Heb. IX, 22. Qui loci explicant illum Pauli supra citatum, *Justificati gratis ipsius gratia per redemptionem quæ est in Christo Iesu; quem proposuit Deus placamen per fidem in sanguine ipsius, ad demonstrationem justitiæ suæ, propter dissimulationem peccatorum antecedentium in tolerantia Dei ad demonstrationem justitiæ suæ, ut sit ipse justus & justificans eum, qui est ex fide Iesu*: ubi multis verbis idem significantibus res easdem exposuit, Rom. III, 23, 24, 25, 26. Nam sicut demonstrationem justitiæ suæ bis expressit, & tertiò addidit, *ut sit Deus justus* (id est, ut justus appareat) quæ pertinent ad finem priorem: ita alterum quoque finem tum repetitâ voce justificationis, tum redemptionis indicavit. Iustificatio, ut notum est, passim in Sacris Literis, sed maximè in epistolis Paulinis absolutionem significat, quæ præsupposito peccato consistit in peccatorum remissione, ipso Paulo semet clarè explicante, præsertim Roman. IV, 2, & 6. Quare his locis remissionem peccatorum sanguini Iesu adscribentibus adjungendus ille, quem modo citabamus, *Iustificati in sanguine ipsius*, Roman. V, 9. Item hi, qui ablutionem peccatorum sanguini aut morti tribuunt. *Sanguis Christi mundat nos ab omni peccato*, I Iohan. I, 7. *In purgationem sanguinis Iesu Christi*, I Pet. I, 2. *Christus lavit nos à peccatis nostris in sanguine suo*, Apocal. I, 5. Quanquam enim abluere, mundare, & voces similes significare possint aut efficere ne peccata committantur in posterum, aut commissa ne appareant, posterior tamen interpretatio Scripturæ phrasi est convenientior. Sic delere iniquitates exponitur peccatorum non recordari, Esaïæ XLIII, 25, & mundare ab iniquitate idem esse ostenditur quod condonare, Ierem. XXXIII, 8. Et ἐξαλειφθῆναι τὰς ἁμαρτίας [*delere peccata*] manifestè eundem habet sensum, Actor. III, 19. Planeque pro eodem sumuntur ἀφεῖναι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, *peccata remittere*, & καθαρίζειν ἀπὸ πάσης ἀδικίας, *mundare ab omni iniquitate*, I Ioh. I, 9. Et alibi ponuntur ut συνώνυμα [*synonyma*], τὸ καθαρίζεσθαι, id est, *mundari*, & γίνεσθαι ἄφεσιν, *remissionem contingere*: Heb. IX, 22. Quare & Socinus (lib. II, cap. XVII) fateri cogitur, apud Iohannem Apocalypseos I, 5, ubi τὸ καθαρίζειν [*mundare*] tribuitur sanguini, rectiùs liberationem à pœna, quam animi emundationem intelligi. His adjungatur illud Esaïæ modò citatum (cap. LIII, 5), *Castigatio pacis nostræ super eum*, id est, pœna ejus nobis pacem apud Deum parit. De qua pace agunt Angeli, Luc. II, 14. Et illud ejusdem Esaïæ ibidem: *Livore ejus sanitas nobis*; id est, per pœnam ejus impunitas nobis. Ex his ergo testimoniis manifestum est impunitatem peccatorum nostrorum finem esse mortis Christi, atque etiam ejusdem mortis effectum.

Socinus, qui hanc connexionem mortis cum remissione peccatorum nobis facta non vult agnoscere, alias adfert, mirum quàm alienas à vocibus & scopo Scripturæ. Videntur autem omnes istæ, quas passim libro suo inspersit, reduci posse ad quatuor hæc capita. Primum est, quod Christus, cùm prædicasset pœnitentibus patere peccatorum remissionem, ad ei prædicationi testimonium perhibendum, mortem non recusaverit (Socinus lib. I, cap. II, & III). Sed hic sensus mortem Christi magis effectum facit remissionis, quàm remissionem mortis. Nam rei existentia causa est testimonii, non contra. At Scriptura dicit nos remissionem consequi per sanguinem, Ephes. I, 7. Coloss. I, 14, & sanguinem delere peccata nostra, I Ioh. I, 7. Item sanguinis effusionem esse aliquid antecedens, sine quo non fiat remissio, Heb. IX, 22. Deinde si vera esset hæc interpretatio, possent & Martyres dici sanguinem fudisse in remissionem peccatorum, & nos per ipsorum sanguinem consequi remissionem: cùm tamen Scriptura hoc privilegium soli Christo tribuat. Accedit quòd causa interfectionis Christi quoad homines non propriè fuerit prædicatio pœnitentiæ & remissionis peccatorum, sed quòd Deum dixisset Patrem suum, parem se faciens Deo, Ioh. V, 18, ac proinde Deum se profiteretur, Ioh. X, 33. Quamobrem mors ejus propriè huic professioni, non prædicationi veniæ testimonium præbuit. Testatio denique de doctrina non minus, imò magis etiam per miracula Christi facta est, quàm per mortem. At miraculis nusquam tribuitur effectus hic, quod per ipsa habeamus peccatorum remissionem. Secundum quod adfert Socinus (lib. I, cap. VI) est, quod Christus suâ morte consecutus sit jus donandæ remissionis.

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nis. Sed evertit hanc positionem Socinus ipse (lib. II, cap. IV), qui ostendit Christum in terris viventem hoc jus habuisse atque exercuisse. Quod autem meum est, id amplius meum fieri non potest. Ac nequis existimet (quod Socinus innuit magis quàm affirmat) hanc Christi potestatem ad pœnas duntaxat spectasse temporales & vitæ præsentis, notandum est, cùm Christus dicitur (Math. IX, 6) jus habuisse remittendi in terra peccata, non illo additamento *in terra* effectum restringi, sed actionis locum ἐμφατικῶς [*efficaciter*] denotari: nam & Apostolis dicitur (Matth. XVIII 18), *quæcunque solveritis in terra*: ubi quanquam solvere est solutum declarare, illud tamen *in terra* locum tantùm actionis designat: sequitur enim *soluta erunt in cœlo*. Illud ergo voluit Christus, sibi, quantumvis in terris agenti, jus tamen illud adeo eximium ac cœleste competere: neque aliud miratur populus, quàm jus tantum hominibus (hoc est, κατ' ἀναλλαγὴν [*secundùm permutationem*], uni ex hominum numero) datum. Ipse etiam Christus priùs peccata remittit paralytico, quàm paralysim, pœnam scilicet temporalem, tollit; apertèque jus utrumque distinguens, alterum per alterum probat, invisibile per visibile. Non est ergo Christus morte demum suâ jus remittendi peccata consecutus, ac proinde huc trahi non possunt sententiæ, quæ morti adscribunt effectum remissionis peccatorum. Præterea, Scriptura modum connexionis inter mortem & remissionem explicat voce placaminis, aliisque similibus, quæ ad jus donandæ veniæ aptari nequeunt. Tertium est, quod in Christi morte exemplum nobis patientiæ & obedientiæ proponitur (Socin. lib. I, cap. IV). Sed exemplum hoc ad sanctificationem, & quæ eam sequitur gloriam æternam aliquo modo, ad remissionem verò peccatorum planè non pertinet. Christus enim suâ obedientiâ & patientiâ nullam sibi veniam est consecutus, ut qui peccatum non haberet. Quare ubi Christus imitandus nobis proponitur, ut viam, quam ille ingressus est, insistentes, ad eandem metam perveniamus, nihil esset magis alienum quàm remissionis peccatorum ullam mentionem facere. Et phrases Scripturæ, Sanguis nos mundat, Per sanguinem ipsius habemus remissionem, planè hunc sensum respuunt. Restat quartum quod maximè placuit Socino: ita ut hoc ipsum plurimis locis (lib. I, cap. V, & passim) velut causæ suæ statumen inculcet: Est autem hoc, quod mors Christi nobis id ipsum persuadeat, quod ad remissionem peccatorum obtinendam requiritur, Fidem scilicet, sive, ut Socinus ipse explicat, spem consequendæ vitæ æternæ. Sed profectò quid magis est à vero alienum, quàm mortem innocentissimi hominis tam cruentam per se ad hoc valere, ut nobis persuadeat, sanctè viventibus summa gaudia à Deo esse præparata? Quare, hujus commenti absurditatem videns Socinus, ait mortem quidem hoc non efficere, sed resurrectionem Christi, & quæ porro resurrectionem ejus sunt consecuta. Mortem autem debuisse præcedere. Sed hoc si vellet Scriptura; resurrectionis aut potius evectionis in cœlos & sessionis ad dextram Dei perpetuò meminisset, ubi de remissione agitur peccatorum; non mortis & sanguinis, certè non tam sæpe, & verbis tam significantibus. Illa enim tam frequens, tam usitata conjunctio sanguinis cum remissione, effectum aliquem non communem, sed proprium, non longè remotum, sed propinquum indicat. Quæ enim istæ sunt ambages? Remissio peccatorum non contingit nisi sanctè viventibus (ita enim loquitur Socinus lib. III, cap. XI): ad sanctimoniam vitæ facit Fides & spes certa præmii: hanc fidem ingenerat exemplum Christi ob vitæ sanctimoniam (ut vult Socinus lib. II, cap. II) à mortuis excitati & glorificati: istam excitationem mors antecessit: rectè ergo aptèque dicitur remissio per Christi mortem obtineri. Nonne hoc verè est, quod ipse in aliis reprehendit (lib. III, cap. VIII), *Vtinam ne in nemore Pelio?* Pro causa enim non propinquum aliquid aut saltem modico intervallo remotum, sed quod longissimè ab effecto dissitum est, adfertur: quod si uno in loco Scripturæ fieret, esset forte minùs mirum; sed toties, tam obscurè, imo tam frigidè loqui Scripturam, quis sanus crediderit? Multum dissimile est Pauli illud, Christum à mortuis excitatum ad nostri justificationem, Rom. IV, 25, quod ut explicetur nihil opus est tam longo Socini ambitu. Resurrectio enim Christi Fidem & fiduciam in Deum & Christum nobis ingenerat: cui Fidei promissa est peccatorum remissio. Et hæc series manifestè ostenditur, Act. XIII, 33, 38. Rom. I, 4, & X, 9. Mors autem tantum abest ut apta sit Fidem ingenerare, ut contra maximè homines ab ea Fide absterreat. Ideoque in prædicando Euangelio Apostoli ignominiæ crucis, & mortis miseriæ resurrectionem semper opponunt. Per mortem verò, &, quam plerumque Scriptura in hoc argumento exprimit, sanguinis effusionem, quæ causa propriè non est resurrectionis, sed antecedens duntaxat, ipsam resurrectionem velle indicatam, quid est aliud quam noctem nominare, ut per eam intelligatur dies? Præterea, si ad remissionem peccatorum mors non pertineret, nisi propter resurrectionem secutam, quomodo accidere potuisset, ut remissio hæc ad resurrectionem rarò admodum, ad mortem autem innumeris locis referretur? Adde jam quod morti etiam seorsim, hoc est, quâ à resurrectione & gloria Christi abstrahitur, effectum impetratæ redemptionis Paulus tribuit. Ait enim: *Si cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii ejus, multò magis reconciliati servabimur per vitam ipsius*, Rom. V, 10. Opponitur mors vitæ gloriosæ, & ut illi reconciliatio, ita huic conservatio distinctè adscribitur. Reconciliatio impetratur inimicis per mortem ut actum sacerdotalem: reconciliati custodiuntur Regiâ virtute, ad quam aditum fecit resurrectio. Sic & alibi reconciliationem ipsâ prædicatione, quæ Fidem ingenerat, idem Apostolus priorem statuit. *Deus erat in Christo mundum reconcilians sibi, non imputans eis peccata ipsorum: & posuit in nobis sermonem reconciliationis: itaque nomine Christi legatione fungimur, & velut Deo rogante per nos oramus Christi nomine; reconciliamini Deo*, II Cor. V, 19, 20. Duplex hîc reconciliatio ponitur, prior quæ sermone annunciatur:

ciatur: altera quæ fit per sermonem: illa est impetrationis; hæc applicationis: illa sermone prior; hæc sermone posterior. Nos de priore illa agimus, meritoque negamus eam referri posse ad Fidei ingenerationem quæ fit per sermonem. His adde, quod id ipsum quod ad salutem creditur, nudum argumentum quo ad Fidem salutarem perducimur, esse non potest. Diversum enim sit necesse est argumentum à re quam persuadere cupias. At hoc ipsum quod Christus mortuus sit pro peccatis nostris, ut caput ejus euangelii quod creditur, & quo salutem adipiscimur, ponitur ab Apostolo Paulo 1 Cor. xv, 1, 2, 3. Accedat insuper illud Iohannis III, 16, ubi Christus dicitur *datus* (in mortem scilicet) *ut credentes non pereant*. Ad aliud ergo prodest, quam ut credant. Et sanè si libeat attendere, idem non obscurè monstrat is ipse Pauli locus, qui à Socino citatur firmandæ suæ sententiæ: is nempe de quo jam egimus Rom. IV, 25: *Qui traditus fuit* (in mortem scilicet) *propter peccata nostra, & resurrexit propter justificationem nostram* (aut potius, propter justificationem jam obtentam). Cùm peccata sint malum, justificatio bonum (Rom. VII, 7), apparet vocem *propter* in utroque membro non similiter sumi: & in posteriore quidem membro finalem causam notari convenit: in priore significari impulsivam satis, ni fallor, supra ostendimus: planè ut si dicam pharmacum sumi propter morbum, & propter sanitatem. Iustificatio ergo finis est resurrectioni propositus, nempe per ingenerationem Fidei, fatente Socino. Quanquam equidem nescio, an resurrectio hoc loco spectetur ut argumentum ad persuadendam Fidem, an potiùs totum Christi statum gloriosum designet, qui hunc sibi finem propositum habet inter cæteros, ut Euangelii præcones mittantur, & uberrimâ vi spiritus ipsorum opera promoveatur, eumque in modum effectâ Fide, homines peccatorum veniam adipiscantur. Ita enim Christus ipse: *Data est mihi omnis potestas in cœlo & in terra. Profecti ergo docete omnes gentes. Ecce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem seculi*, Matth. XXVIII, 18, 19, 20. Antea verò, ut Iohannes ait, *nondum erat Spiritus* (eâ nimirum vi ac copiâ) *effusus*. Causa additur; *quia Iesus nondum erat ad gloriam evectus*, Ioh. VII, 39. Paulus quoque de Christo: *Cùm in sublime ascendisset, captivam duxit captivitatem, & dedit dona hominibus: dedit alios quidem Apostolos, alios verò Prophetas, alios autem Euangelistas, alios autem Pastores & Doctores ad compactionem Sanctorum*, Ephes. IV, 8, 12. Vtro autem modo sumas, apparet resurrectioni, quâ à morte distinguitur, finem aliquem adscribi peculiarem. Vicissim morti sive traditioni in mortem separatim adscribitur, quod ob peccata contigerit. Id autem ipsum & resurrectioni nusquam adscribitur, & hoc loco eidem non obscurè adimitur. Mors ergo Christi in hoc negotio, & à resurrectione, & à Fidei ingeneratione sequestranda est; & in iis locis quæ ex morte Christi remissionem deducunt peccatorum, distinctus quidam effectus intelligendus est, quem præ se fert ipsa verborum simplicitas, consentiens cum aliis Scripturæ vocibus, quæ Christum ob peccata nostra mortuum cruentâ morte, pœnasque nostrorum criminum ab ipso exactas fuisse pronunciant: de quibus jam egimus, cumque illis, quæ Deum nobis per Christi sanguinem placatum ac reconciliatum, sanguinem ejus pretium fuisse pro nobis datum, Christum vice nostrâ mortuum, & piamen fuisse nostrum, non obscurè testantur, de quibus infra agendi erit locus.

CAPVT II.

Quomodo in hoc negotio Deus considerandus sit: & ostenditur considerandum ut Rectorem.

INtellecto controversiæ statu, & firmatâ Scripturis eâ sententiâ, quâ fides Ecclesiæ nititur, ad disjiciendas objectiones, quas Socino sua ratio, aut, ut veriùs loquar, abusus rationis dictavit, imprimis opus est intelligi, quæ partes, sive quod officium sit Dei in hac re, de qua agitur. Fatetur Socinus agi de liberatione à pœnis; nos addimus insuper agi etiam de pœnarum inflictione. Vnde sequitur, omnino hîc Deum considerandum, ut Rectorem. Nam pœnas infligere, aut à pœnis aliquem liberare quem punire possis, quod justificare vocat Scriptura, non est nisi Rectoris quà talis primò & per se: ut, puta, in familia patris; in republica regis, in universo Dei. Hoc etsi manifestum est omnibus, probari tamen facilè potest ex eo quod pœna sit ultimum in coactione: coactio autem non competat nisi superiori, τῇ ὑπερεχούσῃ ἐξουσίᾳ [*supereminenti potestati*]. Vnde Seneca clementiam definivit lenitatem superioris adversùs inferiorem in constituendis pœnis. Nec obstat quod vindicatio interdum privatis & nullâ superiori potestate instructis tribui videtur. Nam ista vindicatio aut facti est, non juris, quæ pugnat cum ipsa naturali æquitate, aut jus aliquod significat non primò aut per se alicui competens, sed alienâ concessione; quomodo raptorem raptæ pater, proscriptum quivis interficit: aut denique non significat ipsum puniendi actum, sed postulationem duntaxat pœnæ infligendæ aut à Deo aut ab alio rectore: quibus vindicandi modis totidem modi respondent peccatorum remissionis sive condonationis, quam privatis sæpe & Scriptura & communis sermo tribuit. Sed hæc assertio eò minus probationis indiget, quia ipse Socinus alicubi (lib. III, cap. 1) fatetur Deum in puniendis, absolvendisque hominibus statuendum esse tanquam Principem: quo nihil verius dici potuit. Nec aliud significavit Iacobus, cùm dixit, unum esse Legislatorem qui possit servare & perdere, Iac. IV, 12.

Habemus ergo veram Dei in hoc negotio χάριν [*affectionem*], quâ repertâ facile est alias omnes removere. Primum ergo damus hoc postulanti Socino, Deum non esse hîc spectandum ut Iudicem sub lege constitutum. Nam talis qui sit Iudex is nocentem non posset à pœna liberare etiam pœnam in alterum transferendo: non quia id per se injustum sit, sed quia legi non congruat, cujus ipse minister electus est. Quod his verbis expressit Lactantius de ira Dei, cap. XIX, *Iudex peccatis veniam dare non potest, quia voluntati servit alienæ: Deus autem potest, quia est legis suæ ipse disceptator & judex, quam cùm poneret, non utique ademit sibi omnem potestatem, sed habet ignoscendi licentiam*. Rectè Seneca, *Clementia*, inquit, *liberum*

liberum arbitrium habet; non sub formula, sed ex æquo & bono judicat. Æquitas enim est etiam adstricti formulæ judicis: at clementia propriè ita dicta non est nisi summi in quaque communitate rectoris. Idem Seneca Principem hoc jubet cogitare: *Occidere contra legem nemo non potest; servare nemo præter me.* Agnovit hoc discrimen Augustinus: *Judicibus statutum est, ne liceat in reum datam sententiam revocare. Nunquid & ipse Imperator sub hac erit lege? nam ipsi soli licet revocare sententiam & reum mortis absolvere, & ipsi ignoscere.* Et Symmachus: *Alia est conditio Magistratuum, quorum corruptæ videntur esse sententiæ, si sint legibus mitiores: alia Divorum Principum potestas, quos decet acrimoniam severi juris inflectere.* Quò & Cicero respexit, cùm pro Ligario ad Cæsarem dixit: *Non feci, non cogitavi. Ad judicem sic agi solet; sed ego ad parentem loquor, Erravi, temere feci, pœnitet; ad clementiam tuam confugio: delicti veniam peto; ut ignoscas, oro.* Quintilianus: *Deprecatio rara est, & apud eos solos judices qui nullâ certâ pronunciandi formulâ tenentur.*

At Socinus, quanquam loco supra citato Deum ut summum Principem statuit, passim tamen in omni hoc actu longè aliam ipsi χάριν [*affectionem*] tribuit, nimirum partis offensæ. Vult autem partem omnem offensam esse pœnæ creditorem: atque in ea tale habere jus, quale alii creditores in rebus sibi debitis, quod jus sæpe etiam dominii voce appellat: ideoque sæpissime repetit Deum hîc spectandum, ut partem offensam, ut creditorem, ut dominum, tria hæc ponens tanquam tantundem valentia. Hic error Socini cùm per totam ipsius tractationem latissimè diffusus sit, & dici ferme possit in hac materia esse ipsius τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος [*primum falsum commentum*], accuratè refelli debet.

Id ut fiat prima hæc ponatur assertio: Punire non est actus competens parti offensæ quà tali. Probatur hoc, quia alioqui oporteret omni parti offensæ competere per se jus puniendi: quod falsum esse ex eo apparet, quòd punire probavimus actum esse τῆς ὑπεροχῆς [*eminentiæ*]: ipso etiam Socino fatente, cum Deum hîc spectandum dicit ut Principem, unde aliud argumentum nascitur firmissimum: Si punit Deus & pœnam tollit ut Princeps, non ergo ut pars offensa. Non potest enim idem duobus diversis tribui quà talibus. Interim non negamus Deum, qui peccata punit, vel impunita dimittit, rectè dici partem offensam; sed punire, aut impunitum dimittere, ei tribui qua pars offensa est, negamus. Notissimum enim est, posse aliquid de aliquo dici quod ei non conveniat quà tali: sicut Iurisconsultus canit, non quà Iurisconsultus, sed quà Musicus. Notavit hoc rectè Lactantius; *Surgimus ad vindictam* NON QUIA LAESI SUMUS, SED UT DISCIPLINA *servetur, mores corrigantur, licentia comprimatur. Hæc est ira justa, quæ sicut in homine necessaria est, sic utique in Deo à quo ad hominem pervenit exemplum.* Est quidem recepta regula, neminem esse idoneum in sua causa judicem: sed hæc regula non est juris naturalis, sed positivi, ideoque nec universalis. Planè enim locum non habet in summis rectoribus, sub quo nomine & parentes quoad familiæ curam comprehendo. Imperatores in sua causa judicare, notant Iurisconsulti ad L. *Et hoc Tiberius.* D. de hæred. instit. Hoc accidere etiam in criminibus potest, ut in judicio læsæ Majestatis, & in bellis quæ ob injuriam illatam Regi à Rege indicuntur: cujus rei insigne est exemplum, 11 Sam. x. Puniunt ergo aut impunita dimittunt crimina Principes etiam læsi, non tamen quà læsi: nam si id facerent ut læsi, jam & aliis læsis idem esset juris, qui tamen lædentem nec punire possunt, nec impunitum præstare. Rursum si punire aut impunitum dimittere Principibus quà læsis competeret, jam jus illis non esset puniendi crimina, in quibus læsi non sunt, cujus contrarium ratio monstrat & experientia. Ac nequis existimet ideo à Principe maleficos puniri, quod Reipublicæ noceant, cujus ipse præses est; videmus subditos etiam qui extra territorium & in hominem extraneum graviter deliquerunt, rectè & cum laude puniri. Vnde apparet manifestè jus puniendi non competere læso quà læso, cùm nec positâ læsione statim ponatur, nec remotâ removeatur: contra verò Superiori ut Superiori idem jus competere. Nam simulatque ὑπεροχὴν [*eminentiam*] ponis, & jus puniendi ponis: eaque remota removes. Quicquid autem de jure pœnæ irrogandæ dicitur, id simul de jure dandæ impunitatis necesse est intelligi. Hæc enim naturali nexu inter se cohærent. Fefellit fortè Socinum, quod interdum in Sacris Literis, atque inter cætera in Dominica precatione nobis exemplum Dei peccata remittentis proponitur, ut nos quoque læsi aliis peccata condonemus. Sed cogitare debuit exempla sumi non tantùm à rebus quæ genere proximo sint eædem, sed & ab iis quæ aliquid habeant similitudinis, præsertim cùm rebus similibus, etsi genere proximo diversis, idem aliquod nomen ob similitudinem imponitur. Sic vetat nos Christus judicare, immisericorditer nimirum, ne & ipsi judicemur: additque, quâ mensurâ alios mensi fuerimus, eadem nobis remensum iri. Matth. VII, 1, 2, ubi judicare illud prius ab altero distat toto genere. Nam prius est judicium libertatis: alterum judicium potestatis. Eodem modo longè aliud est in Deo & in aliis rectoribus remittere peccata: aliud verò in privatis ab altero læsis. Illi enim oppositum est punire; huic verò pœnam postulare, aut optare, aut etiam conqueri, Coloss. III, 13. Distant ergo intrinsecus, sed extrinsecus quodammodo conveniunt. Nam causa impellens ad utrumque est *benignitas* sive φιλανθρωπία: effectus verò est, quod is qui peccavit ab incommodo aliquo liberetur: aut reipsa, aut certè quantum est in remittente: quæ convenientia sufficit ut exemplo sua vis constet.

Altera hæc sit assertio: Naturaliter pars offensa quà talis nullum jus habet in pœna. Hoc plus aliquantò est quàm quod prima adsertio collegerat. Ibi enim negavimus actum ipsum puniendi competere parti offensæ: hîc negamus jus aliquod ipsi competere, non modò ad actum per se exercendum, sed etiam ad obligandum alterum ut exerceat: hoc est, partem offensam non esse in pœna verè creditorem: quod tamen putat Socinus, & tanquam certissimum sæpe repetit. Creditorem hîc intelligo non strictâ significatione juxta vocis originem, eum qui

qui fidem alterius secutus est, sed generaliùs juxta Iuris definitionem : Creditores sunt quibus ex qualibet causa debetur. Verum autem esse quod dicimus, sic probatur. Notissimum est duplex esse Ius, Naturale, aut Positivum : quare debitum quoque omne aut hinc aut illinc oriri necesse est. Ius naturale consistit in ipsa rerum inter se adæquatione; tale ergo est & naturale debitum. At Ius positivum est, quod ex libero actu voluntatis nascitur : qui est duplex, Contractus & Lex. Contractus est effectus ejus potestatis, quam quis habet in se & sua : lex verò effectus ejus potestatis, quam quis habet in alium & aliena. De positivo debito hîc non agimus : ideo addidimus vocem naturaliter, cujus rei causam infra explicabimus. Naturâ verò ex facto tuo mihi nihil aliud debetur, ac ne deberi quidem potest, quàm æqualitas secundùm rem, hoc est, ut quantum mihi per te abest, tantundem reddatur : hoc uno verbo vocare licet indemnitatem aut restitutionem. Hinc creditorem τὸν ἔλαττον ἔχοντα [*minus habentem*] rectè vocavit Aristoteles. Habet autem hoc locum tum in acceptionibus ἑκουσίοις [*voluntariis*], tum in ἀκουσίοις [*non voluntariis*], ut idem Aristoteles notat. Sicut enim reddere teneris mutuum aut depositum, ita & rem furto sublatam. Et hactenus naturaliter etiam ex delicto creditores fieri possumus. Neque id locum habet in his dumtaxat delictis, in quibus rei corporalis acceptio intercedit ; sed in aliis etiam factis alicui noxiis : ita qui alterum vulneravit, debet & mercedes medicis præstitas, & impendia ob curationem facta, & operarum intertrimentum L. ult. D. de his qui effuder. Mirati sunt quidam quod Aristoteles homicidium quoque posuerit inter συναλλάγματα [*contractus*], in quibus versatur τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον [*Ius quod vim corrigendi atque emendandi habet*] : sed rectè notavit Eustathius, non aliâ id ratione fieri, quàm quia uxori, liberis aut cognatis occisi aliqua soleat fieri damni compensatio : de qua videre est in L. IV, §. I, ad L. Corn. Sic & is qui mendacio famam læsit alterius, veri professione resarcire debet id quod de dignitate ipsius delibavit. Ex quibus omnibus apparet id quod ex delictis naturaliter debetur diversum esse à pœna. Causa enim naturalis istius debiti est primò & per se non vitiositas actus, sed quia mihi aliquid abest : nam etiamsi citra vitium absit, ut in deposito, non eô minùs mihi restitutio debetur. Causa autem pœnæ est ipsa actus vitiositas, non autem quod aliquid mihi absit. Nam etiamsi nihil absit cuiquam, rectè actus punietur, ut in gravibus delictis, quæ inchoata tantùm & non consummata sunt. Est & aliud discrimen non minùs insigne, quod restitutionis modum & quantitatem ipsâ rei naturâ determinat : pœna etsi in genere suo causam habet naturalem, aliquo modo (ut infra dicemus) determinari tamen non potest, nisi per actum liberum voluntatis. Adde quod ante condemnationem, pœna, quatenus in dando aut in faciendo consistit, non debetur ordinariè : at restitutio omnino debetur. Restitutionis debitum in hæredem transit, pœna non transit. Quæ ideo duntaxat referre libuit, ne quis id quod læso propriè debetur cum pœna temerè confundat. Interea verum est Lege positivâ ut & contractu, introduci posse ut creditori jus aliquod quæratur in pœnam, quam tunc quoque à rei seu damni persecutione jura manifestè distinguunt L. *Si pignore*, §. *cum furti*. D. de furtis. Instit. de lege Aquilia. §. *his autem verbis*. Sed hoc plerunque constitui solet in pœnis pecuniariis, quæ scilicet non modò damnum adferunt ei qui læsit, sed & læso lucrum. In pœnis autem corporalibus, in quibus nullum est verum lucrum læsi, hoc ipsum vix usurpatur. Ideoque videmus Reges aliosque summos Rectores pœnam remittere sontibus etiam invitâ parte læsâ, injuncta ipsis solâ damni restitutione : quod injustum nemo judicat. Esset autem hoc injustum, si pœna læso deberetur, præsertim ubi nulla Reipublicæ necessitas remissionem postularet, L. 2. C. de in jus vocando. Quare quòd minores Magistratus pœnas corporales nequeunt remittere, non id evenit ob jus aliquod læsi in pœna (nam læso consentiente nihilo magis possent) sed quia lex superioris illam potestatem ipsis non concessit, imò expressè negavit : quod similiter intelligendum est de Regibus cum Deo comparatis, in iis delictis quæ omnino puniri ab ipsis Lex Divina imperat. Hæc eô spectant, ut appareat Deum quoque à nobis læsum in pœna propriè non esse creditorem. Nam id qui affirmat, aut eo jure nititur quod ex rebus ipsis nascitur, aut jure constituto. Eo jure quod ex rebus ipsis oritur læsum non esse in pœna creditorem, satis ut arbitror ostendimus. Ius autem constitutum, non quo pœna, sed quo creditum tale pœnæ sit introductum nec allegatur, nec, si allegetur, probari poterit : neque ulla cur ita constituendum fuerit dari potest ratio. Objiciet fortè aliquis, quod Deus pœnam peccatorum remittens alicubi cum creditore de jure suo cedente comparatur, ut Matth. XVIII, 35. Sed, ut supra ostendimus, comparatio non exigit ut res genere proximo conveniant, sed quavis similitudine contenta est. Sic Christus pedes discipulorum lavans exemplum dedit discipulis, ut quemadmodum ipse fecerat, sic & illi facerent : hoc est, inservirent alter alteri. Similitudo autem Dei peccata remittentis, & creditoris de jure suo cedentis major est quàm Dei ejusdem peccata remittentis, & læsi condonantis offensas, qua de similitudine modo egimus. Conveniunt enim Dei & creditoris actus non tantùm causâ movente, quæ est benignitas, & effecto, quod est liberatio à miseria aut molestia; sed eo insuper, quod in utroque præcedit jus aliquod, in Deo ad puniendum, in creditore ad exigendum creditum : & utrimque contingit dissolutio quædam obligationis antea existentis ; quanquam in ipsa obligatione, ut & in dissolutione aliquid sit dissimile, quod cùm ad eam rem ad quam adfertur id exemplum propriè non pertineat, similitudinem sive παραβολὴν [*comparationem*] vitiare non potest.

Tertia assertio hæc esto : Ius puniendi in rectore non est aut jus absoluti dominii aut jus crediti. Probatur hoc primò ex fine, qui optimè solet distinguere facultates. Nam jus absoluti dominii, ut & jus crediti comparatum est ejus gratiâ, qui id jus habet : at jus puniendi, non punientis causâ existit, sed causâ communitatis alicujus. Pœna enim omnis propositum habet bonum commune ; ordinis nimi-

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nimirum conservationem & exemplum: ita quidem ut rationem expetibilis non habeat nisi ab hoc fine, cùm jus dominii & crediti per se sint expetibilia. Hoc sensu Deus ipse dicit se pœnâ eorum qui puniuntur non delectari. Rursus nunquam cum justitia pugnat de jure dominii aut crediti cedere: quia natura hæc est proprietatis, ut eâ tam uti quàm non uti liceat. At quædam peccata impunita dimittere (putà non resipiscentium) esset injustum in rectore, etiam in Deo, ut fatetur Socinus (lib. 1, cap. 1). Non est ergo jus puniendi idem cum jure dominii aut crediti. Præterea nemo ob id justus dicitur, ac justitiæ nomine laudatur, quòd dominio suo utatur, aut quòd credi tum exigat. At quivis rector, atque ipse Deus, justus ob id dicitur, & justitiæ nomine laudatur, quòd pœnas non remittat, sed severè exigat. *Iustus es Domine, quòd sic judicasti*, Apoc. XVI, 5. quod pluribus locis supra probatum est. Iterum, virtutum diversitas oritur ex diversitate objectorum. At virtus quâ de dominio aut de credito nostro cedimus, liberalitas vocatur, non clementia: illa verò quâ impunitas conceditur, non liberalitas, sed clementia.

Quærat fortè aliquis cùm deberi pœna dicatur, quis hîc sit creditor? Vix enim videtur posse intelligi debitor, ubi creditor sit nullus. Sed notandum est, vocem *debere* non semper notare relationem inter duas personas. Sæpe enim, debeo hoc facere, nihil aliud est, quàm convenit hoc à me fieri, sine respectu ad personam alteram. Ita debeo pœnam, id est dignus sum pœnâ, & pati eam teneor absolutè: non autem relatè ad hunc aut illum. Ideo perinde est in qua Republica, sub quo rectore aliquis pœnas delicti luat; æquè enim apud omnes liberabitur: quod non ita procederet, si, ut aliarum rerum, ita pœnæ certus extaret creditor: uni enim illi, non etiam aliis, nisi jussu ipsius facta solutio debitorem liberaret. Contrarium fermè in præmio apparet: rectè enim dicitur, debetur illi præmium: at certa persona quæ debeat (sepositâ lege positivâ) non apparet. Nam si quis dicat Rempublicam esse certam quæ debeat præmium, quia beneficium acceperit, is gratiam à præmio non distinguet. Quin ipsa experientia docet, à rectoribus eos etiam præmiis ornari, qui non suæ Reipublicæ speciatim, sed qui humano generi profuerunt, ut rerum in commune utilium repertores: imò etiam consiliis præclarè susceptis etsi successus defuerit, ac proinde utilitas ad neminem redundarit, reddi præmia videmus. Ergo ne hîc quidem ulla est inter definitas personas relatio, qualis in illo debendi genere, quod est ἐκ συναλλαγμάτων [*ex contractibus*]. Si quis tamen cupiat in pœna aliquid sibi dari; quod sit creditori ἀνάλογον [*æquipollens*], non ineptè fortè dicetur, ordinem rerum, bonumque publicum fungi vice creditoris, cujus ordinis bonique dispensatio rectori permissa est. Hoc enim indicare videtur trita sententia, *Delicta puniri publicè interest*. Atque hinc evenit, quòd cùm in causis aliis judex inter duas partes cognoscat, in causis criminum sæpe reus appareat, actor non appareat: quia ordo ipse seu bonum publicum quasi actoris loco est: quod & Scriptura videtur innuere, cùm dicit peccatum clamare contra peccatorem. Et ubi quis agit ad pœnam, agit aut ut quilibet (quemadmodum iis in locis ubi accusationes promiscuè omnibus patent) aut ut à lege ad hoc ordinatus: quod iis in locis contingit, qui publicè constitutos accusatores habent: quorum utrumque certum est indicium naturâ & reipsâ nullum hîc esse definitum adversarium & pœnæ quasi flagitatorem.

Sequitur alia dubitatio, quæ vis sit ejus vocis cùm rector aliquis dicitur peccata, aut quod idem est, pœnam ἀφιέναι [*dimittere*] aut χαρίζεσθαι [*condonare*]. Hâc enim voce decepti multi existimarunt dominium hîc aliquod aut creditum antecedere, in quo multum falluntur. Nam vox Græca ἀφιέναι propriè significat *à se amovere*; atque ita sumitur Matth. IV, 20, & alibi sæpe: unde sumptâ metaphorâ significat & *deserere* & *dimittere* & *permittere*, frequentissimè autem *rationem alicujus rei non habere*: quod Latini simili locutione dicunt, missum aliquid facere: itaque Scholiastæ Græci passim τὸ ἀφιέναι exponunt per τὸ ἀμελεῖν [*curæ non habere*]. Ita sumi hanc vocem apparet Matth. XV, 14. XVIII, 12. XXIII, 23. Marc. VII, 8. Itaque & ἁμαρτήματα ἀφιέναι est *peccata missa facere*: quod alibi longius hanc translationem persequens Scriptura vocat peccata in mare projicere, Mich. VII, 19. Sicut & Latini Poëtæ ea quæ extra curam poni significant dicunt, ventis tradi in mare raptanda. Quare sicut opposita sunt missum aliquid facere & retinere, ita opponuntur inter se ἀφιέναι τὰς ἁμαρτίας [*dimittere peccata*] & κρατεῖν [*retinere*], Ioh. XX, 23. Missa ergo facere peccata, ut & delere peccata & tegere, idem est quod alibi planiùs effertur, non recordari, Ierem. XXXI, 34. Non recordari autem, ut Latinum ignoscere, significat punire nolle. Quare sicut in illis vocibus non recordari, tegere, delere, retinere nolle, non est dominici juris aut crediti significatio, ita nec in voce ἀφιέναι [*dimittere*]. Sed quia vox ista quæ missum facere significat, generalis est, ideo & ad ea quæ in dominio habemus, & ad nomina, & ad res alias pari jure aptatur. Sic & vox χαρίζεσθαι [*condonare*] ad omne gratificandi genus pertinet. Christus cæcis τὸ βλέπειν ἐχαρίσατο [*visum gratificatus est*], Lucæ VII, 21. ἐχαρίσθη [*donatum est*] *vobis pro Christo pati*, Phil. I, 29. Ita & Iudex qui in gratiam alicujus hominem condemnat, aut absolvit, dicitur eum alteri χαρίζεσθαι [*condonare*], Actor. III, 14. XXV, 11, & 16. Quæ omnia declarant nullum ea voce aut dominium aut creditum necessariò significari. De Latinis vocibus, quæ in hoc argumento usurpari solent donandi, condonandi, remittendi, minùs nos necesse est esse sollicitos, cùm in Sacris Literis non exstent. Et tamen earum quoque facile est rationem reddere. Accidit enim istis vocibus quod aliis pluribus, imò ferme omnibus, ut à similibus ad similia producantur. Donare propriè est quod suum dominio sit, id gratis alienum facere: pœna ergo propriè non donatur: nam quod donatum est antea existit & postea manet: pœna nec fuit antequam donaretur, & donando efficitur ne existat. Sed in eo est similitudo, quòd sicut donator jus habet in re, ita rector in pœna; non tamen idem jus aut æquè liberum. Nam jus dominii, ut ante diximus, est domini causâ: jus puniendi boni communis gratiâ:

cujus ut aliarum rerum communium dispensatio ad rectorem pertinet. Secunda convenientia in eo est, quod tum in donatione jus donantis, tum in impunitatis concessione jus quod fuerat rectoris ad puniendum tollitur. Tertia quod & donatio & impunitatis concessio nascitur ex eodem fonte benignitatis: & alteri prodest. Neque hîc tantùm, sed & alibi sæpe donandi vox ad ea transfertur, in quibus jus dominicum locum non habet: ita donari dicitur aliquis à Magistratu civitate, vacatione, honore, præmio: ita Seneca moram donare dixit pro auferre moram in alicujus gratiam: ita tempus nostrum dicimur donare aliis. Remittere autem primigenio significatu est, ut Græcum ἀφίεναι, *à se amovere*. Sic librum remittit arbor: eques frena. Sic aures remittuntur, & per translationem custodia, disciplina, animus: passimque opposita sunt remitti & intendi. Hinc creditum remitti dicitur, cùm ejus nulla habetur ratio: nec aliter pœna. Neque ea vox pœnæ aptatur propter creditum, neque credito propter pœnam; sed utrique propter aliud, in quo illa inter se conveniunt. Addi potest aliquo modo dici etiam posse pœnam deberi alicui; non propriè, quia nemo hîc est verè creditor; sed ob similitudinem quandam. Quia enim ut creditor jus habet sibi debitum exigendi, ita rector jus habet puniendi, & accusator pœnam flagitandi, propterea καταχρηστικῶς [*per abusionem*] interdum dicimur pœnam debere aut rectori ut Deo, aut accusatori ut diabolo: quamquam nec diabolo fiat injuria, si pœna non infligatur homini, neque cum Dei justitia consistat, ut de pœna quavis in infinitum remittat: quorum neutrum in veris creditoribus locum potest habere.

CAPVT III.

Qualis sit Dei actus in hoc negotio, & ostenditur esse legis relaxationem, sive dispensationem.

EXaminatis partibus, quibus in hoc negotio Deus fungitur, facile erit nomen aliquod ipsi actui dare. Ac primùm, cùm Deus hîc, quemadmodùm probavimus, sit spectandus ut rector, sequitur actum hunc esse actum jurisdictionis generaliter dictæ. Vnde sequitur, non agi hîc de acceptilatione, ut putat Socinus: illa enim actus non est jurisdictionis. Propiùs ut designetur suum huic actui genus, potest is ipse actus considerari, aut cum relatione ad Divinam sanctionem, sive, ut recentiores Iurisconsulti loquuntur, legem pœnalem, aut citra eam relationem: quod ideo adjicimus, quia etiamsi lex nulla pœnam expressisset, naturaliter tamen ipse actus humanus, sive intrinsecam habens pravitatem ex rei natura immutabili, sive etiam extrinsecam ob contrarium Dei præceptum, eo ipso pœnam aliquam, & quidem gravem, merebatur: hoc est, par erat hominem peccatorem puniri. Hîc si subsistamus, erit actus Dei de quo agimus, punitio unius ad impunitatem alteri consequendam: de cujus actus justitia mox agemus. Si verò præterea respiciamus sanctionem sive legem pœnalem, erit actus ipse via ad indulgentiam seu temperamentum ejusdem legis, quam indulgentiam hodie dispensationem vocamus: quæ definiri potest, actus superioris, quo legis manentis obligatio circa quasdam personas aut res tollitur. Sanctio hæc est: Homo comedens de vetita arbore omnino morietur, Genes. II, 17, ubi per unam speciem peccati omne peccati genus indicatur, ut exprimit lex eadem clariùs explicata, *Maledictus qui non manserit in omnibus præceptis Legis*, Deut. XXVII, 26. Galat. III, 10. Mortis autem & maledicti voce his locis intelligimus præcipuè mortem æternam. Perinde ergo se res habet, quasi in hunc modum lex esset concepta: Omnis homo peccans pœnam ferat mortis æternæ.

Non est ergo hîc legis istius executio; nam si legem Deus omnino exequeretur, non posset quisquam peccator servari à pœna mortis æternæ. At nunc scimus fidelibus non esse κατάκριμα [*condemnationem*], quia liberati sunt à morte, Rom. VIII, 1, 2, & redempti ab execratione, Gal. III, 13.

Non est etiam hic actus legis abrogatio; nam lex abrogata vim nullam habet obligandi. At infideles adhuc obnoxii sunt eidem legi. Ideo scriptum est, quod ira Dei manet ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀπειθοῦντας [*super incredulos*], Ioh. III, 36, & quod illos occupat ira Dei ad finem usque, I Thessal. II, 16.

Non est etiam interpretatio Legis κατ' ἐπιείκειαν [*secundùm æquitatem*]: nam ea interpretatio ostendit aliquod factum aut personam sub legis obligatione nunquam fuisse comprehensam: sicut opera religionis & misericordiæ sub interdictione operandi in Sabbato nunquam fuerunt comprehensa, Matth. XII, 5, & 7. At verò omnes homines (quippe conclusi sub peccatum, Rom. XI, 32. Gal. III, 22), etiam hi qui liberantur, naturâ sive per se filii sunt iræ, Ephes. II, 3, hoc est, obligati legis sanctione. Non ergo declaratur nulla esse obligatio: sed hoc agitur, ut ea quæ fuit, tollatur; id est, ut relaxatio seu dispensatio legis contingat.

Quæri hîc possit, an lex ista pœnalis sit relaxabilis. Sunt enim leges quædam irrelaxabiles, aut absolutè, aut ἐξ ὑποθέσεως [*ex hypothesi*]. Absolutè irrelaxabiles sunt, quarum oppositum immutabilem in se pravitatem continet ex rei ipsius natura, ut putà lex quæ vetat pejerare, aut falsum testimonium contra proximum ferre. Sicut enim dicimus Deum non posse mentiri, Hebr. VI, 18, aut semet abnegare, II Tim. II, 13; ita non minùs rectè dicemus, Deum non posse actiones per se pravas facere, aut approbare, aut jus ad eas concedere. Ἐξ ὑποθέσεως [*ex hypothesi*] verò irrelaxabiles sunt leges, quæ feruntur ex definito decreto quod Scriptura vocat τῆς βουλῆς ἀμετάθετον [*immutabile consilii*], sive ἀμετανόητον [*non pœnitendum*], qualis est lex de damnandis his, qui nolunt in Christum credere, Hebr. III, 18. Leges autem positivæ omnes absolutè sunt relaxabiles: neque ad necessitatem hypotheticam ex definito decreto confugiendum est, ubi nota talis decreti nulla exstat. Quod autem quidam verentur, ne si id concedamus, injuriam faciamus Deo quasi eum statuamus mutabilem, in eo multum falluntur. Nam lex non est aliquid internum in Deo, aut ipsa Dei volun-

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voluntas, ſed voluntatis quidam effectus. At voluntatis Divinæ effectus mutabiles eſſe certiſſimum eſt. Neque verò Deus legem poſitivam promulgando, quam aliquando velit relaxare, aliud ſe velle ſignificat, quàm reipſa velit. Scriò enim Deus oſtendit velle ſe, ut lex rata ſit atque obliget, ſalvo tamen jure relaxandi, quod legi poſitivæ ſuapte naturâ cohæret, neque ullo ſigno à Deo abdicatum poteſt intelligi. Imò quod eſt amplius, ne abrogandi quidem jus Deus à ſe removet, ut exemplo legis cæremonialis apparet. Aliud ſanè eſt, ſi legi poſitivæ adhæreat aut juramentum aut promiſſio, quorum utrumque notatur Hebr. VI, 18. Nam juramentum ſignum eſt immutabilitatis rei cui adjicitur. Pſalm. XCV, 11. CX, 4. Hebr. III, 11, 18. VI, 17. VII, 21; promiſſio autem jus dat parti, quod ab ea auferri ſine injuria non poteſt. Quanquam ergo promittere eſt liberum, tamen liberum non eſt promiſſa frangere: ideoque id ad ea referri debet, quæ immutabilem in ſe pravitatem continent. Hoc ergo Deus non poteſt, qui fidelis propterea dicitur, quod promiſſa ſervet, 1 Theſſ. V, 24. Videamus ergo, an in dicta lege pœnali inſit aliquid, quod relaxationem planè repudiet.

Ac primò objici poteſt, juſtum eſſe naturaliter ipſos ſontes puniri pœna tali, quæ delicto reſpondeat: ac proinde id non ſubjacere libero arbitrio, neque eſſe relaxabile. Vt huic objectioni reſpondeatur, ſciendum eſt non ſequi injuſtum ex quavis negatione juſti, etiam poſitis iisdem circumſtantiis: quemadmodum enim non ſequitur, ſi liberalis Rex dicendus eſt, qui alicui mille talenta dederit, ideo ſi non dederit; illiberalem fore: ita non eſt perpetuum ut id quod juſtè fiat, non niſi injuſtè omittatur. Naturale autem aliquid, ut in phyſicis, ita in moralibus aut propriè aut minùs propriè dicitur. Naturale in phyſicis propriè eſt, quod rei cujusque eſſentiæ neceſſariò cohæret, ut animanti ſentire: minùs propriè verò, quod alicui naturæ conveniens & quaſi accommodatum eſt, ut homini dextrâ uti. Sic ergo in moralibus ſunt quædam propriè naturalia, quæ neceſſariò ſequuntur ex rerum ipſarum relatione ad naturas rationales, ut perjurium eſſe illicitum: quædam verò impropriè, ut filium patri ſuccedere. Quòd ergo is qui deliquit pœnam meretur, eoque punibilis eſt, hoc ex ipſa peccati & peccatoris ad ſuperiorem relatione neceſſariò ſequitur, & propriè naturale eſt. Vt verò puniatur quivis peccator pœnâ tali quæ culpæ reſpondeat, non eſt neceſſarium ſimpliciter & univerſaliter: neque propriè naturale, ſed naturæ ſatis conveniens. Vnde ſequitur, nihil obſtare quo minùs lex hoc ipſum imperans ſit relaxabilis. Nota definiti decreti ſive irrevocabilitatis in ea, de qua agimus, lege non apparet: neque eſt lex promittens; ergo ne horum quidem quicquam relaxationem impedit. Neque enim admittendum eſt, ut comminatio promiſſioni adæquetur. Nam ex promiſſione jus aliquod acquiritur ei cui facta eſt promiſſio: at comminatione apertiùs duntaxat declaratur meritum pœnæ in peccante, & jus puniendi in comminante. Neque metuendum eſt, ne Dei veracitati aliquid decedat, ſi minas non omnes impleat. Omnes enim minæ, quibus non adeſt irrevocabilitatis ſignum, intelligendæ ſunt ex ſuapte natura de jure comminantis ad relaxandum nihil imminuere, ut antea expoſitum eſt: & Divinæ adverſùs Ninevitas clementiæ exemplo manifeſtè apparet. Non eſt hîc omittendum Philoſophos veteres ex lumine rationis judicaſſe, nullam eſſe materiam magis relaxabilem lege pœnali. Itaque Ariſtoteles τὸν ἐπιεικῆ [*virum æquum*] ait eſſe συγγνωμονικὸν [*propenſum ad ignoſcendum*]: & Sopater in Epiſtola ad Demetrium ſic ait: Τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον τὴν αὐστηρὰν τῶν νόμων φωνὴν παραμυθούμενον, ἀμεμφὴς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ χαρίτων ἀληθινῶν καὶ ἐλευθέρων πρόφασις. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ σωαλλάγματα τῆς δίκης ἐπανορθωτικὸν ἐκφύγει παντελῶς τὸ τῶν χαρίτων γένος; τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐγκλήμασι κείμενον οὐκ ἀναίνεται τὸ πρᾶον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον τῶν χαρίτων πρόσωπον [*Ius quod æquum appellatur ſeveram legum vocem molliens, mihi videtur irreprehenſibilis gratiarum genuinarum ac liberalium ſpecies: Iuſtitiæ pars quidem illa, quæ contractus ad æqualitatem reducit, omnino reſpuit omne gratiarum genus. At ea pars quæ circa delicta verſatur, non repudiat mitem & humanum vultum gratiarum*]. Ex his, quæ huc usque dicta ſunt legem iſtam Dei poſitivam & pœnalem diſpenſabilem fuiſſe apparet. Sed hoc non obſtat quo minùs rationes quædam fuerint, quæ hanc relaxationem poſſent (ut more humano balbutiam) diſſuadere. Hæ autem peti poſſunt aut à natura legum univerſarum, aut ex propria legis materia. Legibus omnibus commune eſt, quod relaxando aliquid videtur de autoritate legis deteri. Proprium hujus legis, quòd etſi ea lex, ut diximus, inflexibilem rectitudinem non habet, eſt tamen ipſi rerum naturæ atque ordini perquàm conveniens. Ex quibus ſequitur, non quidem omnino non relaxandam fuiſſe legem, ſed non facilè, neque levi de cauſa. Atque id ſecutus eſt ſolus ille πάνσοφος νομοθέτης [*ſapientiſſimus legislator*]. Cauſam enim habuit graviſſimam, lapſo in peccatum genere humano, legem relaxandi; quia ſi omnes peccatores morti æternæ mancipandi fuiſſent, periiſſent funditus ex rerum natura duæ res pulcherrimæ, ex parte hominum religio in Deum, & ex parte Dei præcipuæ in homines beneficentiæ teſtatio. Neque verò Deus in relaxanda lege cauſas duntaxat, & quidem graviſſimas, ſecutus eſt, ſed & relaxationi modum adhibuit ſingularem, de quo infrà agendi aptior erit locus.

CAPVT IV.

An injuſtum ſit Chriſtum puniri ob peccata noſtra, & oſtenditur non eſſe.

ARgumenta, quibus Socinus hoc dogma it labefactatum, non ſatis recto ordine ab ipſo poſita, hoc modo nobis digerenda videntur, ut prima ſit claſſis earum ratiocinationum, quæ id quod factum defendimus injuſtum fuiſſe colligunt: ſecunda earum, quæ cauſam negant fuiſſe ita faciendi: tertia, quæ id quod aſſerimus, à Deo factum negant. Nam ſi res ipſa injuſtitiam continet, fruſtra ejus cauſa quæritur, cùm injuſti nulla poſſit eſſe rationabilis cauſa: fruſtra etiam an factum ſit

disputatur, cùm nihil injusti à Deo possit fieri. Causæ quoque examinatio, cùm naturâ facti antecedat quæstionem, prius quoque tractanda est. Vt ergo ad justi atque injusti veniamus quæstionem, primùm separanda sunt ista; An justum fuerit Christum puniri ob peccata nostra; &, An id aliquid facere potuerit ad veniam nobis impetrandam. Nam posterius hoc ad secundam classem referendum est, quæ de causa facti disputat: ad primam verò hanc propriè non pertinet. Nam etiamsi talis causa pœnæ non fuisset, non inde sequeretur in ipsa pœna injuriam aliquam contineri. Injuria autem videtur quæri posse aut in ipsa materia, hoc est, in gravissimis afflictionibus & morte comparatis ad ejus, qui ista patiebatur, innocentiam, aut in forma, hoc est, in pœna comparata ad peccata aliena tanquam causam meritoriam. Ostendemus ergo in neutro esse injuriam.

Primùm ergo non fuisse injustum, ut Christus innocentissimus à Deo gravissimis cruciatibus, ipsâque morte afficeretur, fatetur Socinus (lib. III, cap. IX, & X), ut hinc nullum subsidium ipsius causæ possit accedere. Idemque res ipsa manifestissimè demonstrat. Nam gravissima passum esse Christum, mortuum quoque, sacra Historia ostendit; hoc ipsum à Deo factum, non minùs clarè Scriptura loquitur. Nihil autem à Deo injustè fieri, sine contumelia Divini Numinis negari non potest.

Ad alteram ergo partem transgrediens affirmo, [a] non esse simpliciter injustum aut contra naturam pœnæ, ut quis puniatur ob peccata aliena. Injustum cùm dico, manifestum est me loqui de injustitia, quæ ex rebus oriatur, non quæ ex Iure positivo, ut quo nequeat imminui Divina libertas. Dictum probo; Exod. XX, 5. & XXXIV, 7. *Deus visitat parentum iniquitates in filios, nepotes, & abnepotes. Patres nostri peccaverunt, & nos pœnas eorum ferimus*, Thren. V, 7. Ob factum Chami execrationi subjicitur Canaan, Gen. IX, 25. Ob factum Saulis suspensi sunt filii ejus & nepotes Deo approbante, II Sam. XXI, 8, 14. Ob factum Davidis pereunt LXX millia, & exclamat David, *Ego peccavi & iniquè feci; hæ oves quid fecerunt?* II Sam. XXIV, 15, & 17. Sic ob factum Achanis filii puniuntur, Iosuæ VII, 24. & ob factum Ieroboami posteritas ipsius, I Reg. XIV, 10. Hi loci manifestè ostendunt, puniri aliquos à Deo ob aliena peccata. Videat, si cui otium est, Chrysostomum Homil. XXIX in Gen. cap. IV, Tertullianum adversus Marcionem.

Objicit Socinus illud apud Ezechielem cap. XVIII, 20, *Anima quæ peccavit ipsa morietur: filius non portabit iniquitatem patris, neque pater portabit iniquitatem filii:* sed his verbis Deus non quid necessariò sibi faciendum sit docet; sed quid facere liberè decreverit. Non magis ergo hinc sequitur iniquum omnino esse, ut filius ullam paterni delicti pœnam ferat, quàm iniquum esse, ut non moriatur peccator. Locus ipse evincit, non agere hîc Deum de jure perpetuo & immutabili, sed de ordinario providentiæ suæ cursu, quo se posthac adversùs Iudæos usurum profitetur ut omnes calumniæ ansas abrumpat.

[a] Contra Soc. lib. III, cap. III.

Neque magis ad rem facit, quod scriptum est Deut. XXIV, 16, *Ne morte afficiuntor patres pro filiis: neque filii pro patribus: sed quisque ob peccatum suum morte afficitor.* Cujus etiam fit mentio, II Reg. XIV, 6. Lex enim hæc est ex parte positiva, lata hominibus à Deo, qua Deus non adstringitur, ut qui eam sibi nusquam tulerit, neque verò ullâ lege possit adstringi. Manifesta quoque est rationis diversitas, quia potestas hominum arctior est quam Dei; quod infra clariùs explicabitur, ut jam taceam in hominibus metui abusum potestatis, in Deo non metui.

Excipit Socinus, nusquam in Scriptura reperiri innocentes ob nocentum peccata punitos. Sed hæc exceptio ad rem non facit. Nam cùm legamus punitos aliquos non ob sua tantùm peccata (quorum ratione nocentes erant) sed insuper ob aliena, sequitur punitos etiam quà non erant nocentes. Si autem ex parte aliquis potest puniri quà non est nocens, quo minus & in totum possit, natura non obstat; partium enim & totius jus est idem. Adde jam quod posteri Saulis omnino erant innocentes quo ad peccatum illud ob quod puniebantur. Si autem potest quis puniri quâ innocens est, poterit & innocens. Ac si quis rectè advertat, innocentia non magis obstat punitioni quàm afflictioni: imo illi neutiquam, nisi propter hanc. Quare distinctio nocentis & innocentis ad quæstionem illam pertinet, An affligi quispiam jure possit: non autem ad hanc, An afflictio ejus vim possit habere pœnæ. Concesso enim non esse de essentia pœnæ relationem ad peccatum proprium, concesso etiam innocentem posse affligi (ut à Deo ad tempus posse fieri fatetur Socinus) nihil planè afferri potest, cur ex ipsa rerum natura (nam de lege positiva hîc non agimus) injustum sit innocentem ob noxam alterius tali afflictione puniri, præsertim si ipse ad pœnam talem sponte se obligaverit, ejusque suscipiendæ in se potestatem habuerit: quod infra tractabitur.

Vrget Socinus, saltem inter nocentem & eum qui puniatur, conjunctionem aliquam debere esse, quam agnoscit inter patrem & filium; inter Christum autem & nos non agnoscit. Dici hîc posset, non esse hominem homini alienum, naturalem esse inter homines cognationem & consanguinitatem, carnem nostram à Christo susceptam: sed longè major alia inter Christum & nos conjunctio à Deo destinabatur. Ipse enim designatus erat à Deo ut caput esset corporis, cujus nos sumus membra. Atque hîc observandum est, perperam à Socino eam conjunctionem, quæ ad pœnas alteri ob alterius peccata irrogandas sufficiat, ad carnem solam restringi: cùm mystica conjunctio vim non minorem hîc habeat: quod in exemplo Regis & populi maximè apparet. Supra citata est historia populi Israëlitici ob culpam Davidis puniti. Qua de re sapienter disserens autor vetus quæstionum & responsionum ad orthodoxos, quæ Iustini nomine circumferuntur, sic ait, ὡς σύγκειται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὕτως καὶ ἡ βασιλεία σύγκειται ἐκ τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ τῶν βασιλευομένων. καὶ ὥσπερ ἁμαρτήσας ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἁμάρτημα διὰ χειρὸς, κἂν τυπτηθῇ εἰς τὸν νῶτον οὐκ ἀδικεῖ ὁ τυπτήσας αὐτὸν, οὕτως οὐκ ἀδικεῖ Θεὸς

ἐπὶ

ὅπὶ πῆς τῶν βασιλέων πλαίσμασι τ λαὸν πιμωρούμενος [*sicut homo ex anima & corpore constituitur : ita regnum ex Rege & eis, qui reguntur, coagmentatur. Et quemadmodum si homo manibus peccatum committens, tergo pœnas pendat, non iniquè, qui in eum animadvertit, agit : ita non injustè Deus facit, Principum delicta populi pœnâ coërcens*].

Tandem huc Socinus devenit, ut dicat hoc saltem non inveniri in Scripturis, punitum innocentem ob eas culpas, quarum ipse nocens impunitatem tulerit. Sed hoc quoque ad rem non facit. Nam cùm per se & universaliter injustum non sit nocenti impunitatem dare (quod fatetur Socinus) neque sit injustum punire aliquem ob peccata aliena, ne in his quidem conjunctis injustitia esse poterit. Imò id ipsum injustum non esse, manifestum facit Scriptura Achabi exemplo; qui ipse suorum peccatorum accepit impunitatem, quorum pœna de filio ac posteritate ejus exacta est, 1 Regum XXI, 29. 11 Reg. VIII, & IX, & X. Sed hoc accuratiùs examinabitur, ubi ad illam veniemus quæstionem, Ecqua causa Deum moverit, ut Christum ob peccata nostra pœnis afficeret.

Neutiquam ergo stant à Socino Sacræ Literæ, quæ id à Deo factum ostendunt, quod ipse injustitiæ immeritò accusat. Sed neque majus illi à recta ratione præsidium, quam mirum est toties ab illo jactari, monstrari nusquam. Sed ut omnis hîc error dematur, notandum est, esse quidem essentiale pœnæ, ut infligatur ob peccatum, sed non item essentiale ei esse, ut infligatur ipsi qui peccavit : idque similitudine præmii, gratiæ, & ultionis manifestum est. Nam præmium sæpe in bene meriti liberos aut cognatos, & gratia in propinquos ejus qui beneficium contulit, & ultio in ejus qui offendit amicos conferri solet : neque eò desinunt esse quod sunt, præmium, gratia, ultio. Huic illud accedit, quod si contra naturam esset pœnæ, infligi ei qui non peccavit, jam hoc ipsum non injustum esset dicendum, sed impossibile. Atqui vetat Deus ob patris delictum puniri ab hominibus filium, non vetantur autem impossibilia. Præterea, injustitia propriè non accidit relationi, (qualis est punitio) sed ipsi actioni, qualis est materia punitionis. Et hîc verum discrimen quæri necesse est, cur non æque sit omnibus liberum punire aliquem ob alienum peccatum atque est præmio afficere, aut gratiâ ob alterius meritum aut beneficium. Actus enim cui inest præmium aut gratia, est actus beneficus, qui sui naturâ omnibus permittitur. At actus cui pœna inest, est actus nocivus, qui nec omnibus, nec in omnes concessus est. Quare ut pœna justa sit, requiritur ut actus ipse pœnalis sit in potestate punientis : quod tripliciter contingit, aut antecedenti jure ipsius punientis, aut justo ac valido consensu ejus de cujus pœna agitur, aut ejusdem delicto. Cùm per hos modos actus factus est licitus, quo minus deinde ordinetur ad pœnam peccati alieni, nihil intercedit, modò inter eum qui peccavit & puniendum aliqua sit conjunctio. Conjunctio autem hæc est aut naturalis, ut inter patrem & filium; aut mystica, ut inter Regem & populum; aut voluntaria, ut inter reum & fidejussorem.

Provocat Socinus ad omnium Gentium judicia. Sed primùm ad Deum quod attinet, non dubitarunt Philosophi puniri ab ipso in liberis parentum peccata : quod Plutarchus facundè explicans libro ὠδὶ τῶν ὑπὸ θείᾳ βραδέως πιμωρᾳμένων [*de his, qui serò à Numine puniuntur*], sic ait, ἔστι δήπᾳ καὶ γένος ἐξηρτημένον ἀρχῆς μιᾶς καὶ δυνάμεί τινα καὶ κοινωνίαν διαπεφυκυῖαν ἀναφερόσης· καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν οὐχ ὥς τι δημιούργημα πεπιημένον ἀπήλλακται τοῦ γεννήσαντος· ἐξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ, οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γέγονεν, ὡς ἔχει τι καὶ φέρεται τῶν ἐκείνου μέρος ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ κολαζόμενον παρὰ τοῦ γεννήσαντος καὶ πιμωρούμενον [*Est nimirum etiam genus à principio pendens uno vim quandam & communionem continuam habente, neque quod indè nascitur, tanquam opificium ab opifice, à procreante liberatur; ex ipso enim non ab ipso natum est : itaque aliquam à sua origine partem in se habet & trahit, sive pœnâ ut par est, sive honore afficiatur*]. Et mox : οὐδὲν δεινὸν οὐδ' ἄπορον ἂν ἐκείνων ὄντες ἔχωσι τὰ ἐκείνων [*Nihil mirum neque absurdum est si illorum cùm sint, habeant quæ illorum sunt*]. Addit deinde non dissimile quid ab eo, quod ex scriptore Christiano modò citavimus : γελοῖος ὁ φάσκων ἄδικον εἶναι τῶν ἰσχίων πονοῦντων κάμνειν τὰ ἀντίχειρα [*Ridiculus enim sit, qui injustè fieri dicat, quod coxendicibus laborantibus pollices uruntur*]. Valerius autem Maximus de Dionysio Siculo agens : *Tametsi debita tot sacrilegiis supplicia non exsolvit, dedecore tamen filii mortuus pœnas rependit quas vivus effugerat.* Similes sunt loci sexcenti apud Historicos & Poëtas. Sic & populum à Deo puniri ob peccatum Regis non minus recepta fuit sententia ab Hesiodi usque temporibus, qui dixerat Δίκην [*Iustitiam*] Iovis esse filiam, quæ Iovem interpellaret

——ὄφρ' ἀποτίσῃ
Δῆμος ἀπαφαλίας βασιλέων. ——
[*Vt pendat populus Regum pro crimine pœnas.*]

Puniri alios ob aliorum delicta non audet negare Socinus. Est enim in pœnis pecuniariis res manifesta. Satisdatorem pro reo pœnâ pecuniariâ plecti ait Vlpianus L. *si quis reum.* D. de cust. & exhib. reorum. In pœnam furti rectè accipi fidejussorem ait Cajus, quia pœnam ob maleficia solvi magna ratio suadeat. L. *Si à reo.* D. de fidejuss. Atque hoc ipsum sufficit, ut appareat non esse de natura pœnæ, ut is & solvat, & necessariò plectatur qui deliquit. Cur autem in corporalibus pœnis idem jus non sit, hanc adfert rationem Socinus (lib. III, cap. III), quia pecunia alterius effici possit : atque ideo pro alio soluta brevis manus fictione videatur donata delinquenti, ac deinde ab ipso numerata; corporalis autem vexatio alterius effici nequeat; sed hoc subtiliter magis quàm verè dicitur. Nam ista ratio nonnihil facit ad pariendam ipsi reo liberationem. Verùm ut alteri infligatur pœna quam alter sit commeritus ista ratio non efficit. Nam ea si valeret sæpe ne præmium quidem benemeriti solvi posset conjunctæ personæ; quia scilicet res, in qua præmium consisteret, non posset fieri ejus, qui bene esset meritus : sive quia is esset mortuus, sive quia res ipsa esset incorporalis. Athenienses bene meritorum filios publicè educabant. Romani veteranorum filiis privilegia indulserunt decurionum. Perfectissimorum (quos vocabant) & nepotes & pronepotes quæstionibus

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nibus noluerunt subjici. Memoriam parentum liberis ad impunitatem profuisse, in Græcis Romanisque historiis legimus. At educatio, privilegium, impunitas liberorum non potest effici educatio, privilegium aut impunitas parentum mortuorum. Imò si verum esset quod dicit Socinus, jam à fidejussore nolente reum forte absentem ab obligatione pœnæ pecuniariæ liberari, pœna non posset exigi. Hæc ergo quod ad hanc quæstionem attinet, non est vera differentia inter pecuniarias pœnas & corporales; veriorem mox indicabimus. Illud verò maximè miror, quod Socinus dicat, omnium Gentium ac sæculorum legibus & consuetudinibus probatum, non posse corporalem pœnam, quam unus debeat, ab altero persolvi. Nam apud Persas sanè antiquitus ob unius noxam peribat propinquitas, teste Marcellino. Apud Macedonas devota erant capita eorum, qui sanguine perduelles contingerent, Curtio narrante. In Græciæ civitatibus mos fuit cum tyrannis tyrannorum liberos occidi, ut Halicarnassæus & Cicero notant. Non sunt quidem hæc probanda, sed evincunt tamen illud de omnium Gentium consensu non esse usquequaque verum. Et in his quidem exemplis ad pœnam sufficere videbatur citra consensum ullum sola personarum conjunctio: quod merito à Romanis repudiatum notat Halicarnassæus. Cæterùm ubi consensus aliquis antecederet, fermè ausim dicere omnium eorum, quos Paganos dicimus, neminem fuisse, qui alium ob alterius delictum puniri injustum duceret. Ostendit hoc jus occidendorum obsidum humanissimis etiam populis usitatum. Thessali olim ducentos quinquaginta obsides interfecerunt, ut narrat Plutarchus. Romani Volscos trecentos securi percussere: Tarentinos dejecerunt de saxo Tarpeio, ut est apud Livium; Gothorum, Dacorum, Anglorum similia exstant exempla. Et ut rectè notarunt viri doctissimi, ita jus esse creditum est. Sic & in capitalibus judiciis vades capite plecti solitos, si rei se non sisterent, unde Græcis ἀντίψυχοι [*vicem animæ præstantes*] appellantur, tum aliunde, tum ex nobili illa Damonis & Pythiæ historia satis apparet. Neque sanè mirum est ita ab illis judicatum. Nam quia credebant unicuique homini non minorem esse potestatem in vitam suam quàm in res alias, ut docet frequens atque adeo decantata apud Græcos, Romanos, aliasque gentes αὐτοχειρία [*suimet interfectio*], unde & illud in Tragœdia, *Ius vitæ ac necis meæ penes me est*: planè consequens erat, ut crederent vitam quoque non minùs quàm cætera validè posse obligari. Priore enim posito, posterius concedi erat necesse. Ac sanè si quis omne hoc negotium quâ oportet diligentiâ excusserit, inveniet verum discrimen, cur ex consensu minùs aliquis ad pœnam corporalem quàm ad pecuniariam teneatur, hoc esse, quod consentiens parem in corpus ac pecuniam potestatem non habeat. Neque tamen recentioribus Iurisconsultis assentior, ex Vlpiani quodam responso hoc probantibus qui dixerit, Dominum membrorum suorum neminem videri, L. *liber homo*. D. ad legem Aquil. Domini enim vocem strictè sumit ex usu juris civilis, quatenus servo opponitur. Nam quia lex Aquilia districtè de servo loquitur, directam actionem quæ verbis legis respondeat negat libero homini vulnerato posse accommodari: ita tamen ut ex paritate rationis dandam putet utilem. Et ut verè dicam quod sentio, quanquam Romanorum æquitatem, in moderanda hac pœnarum extensione, maximè mirer, induci tamen non possum ut credam, ab illis existimatam esse rem planè & per se injustam, unum ob alterius noxam corporaliter plecti. Neque eo moveor, quod fidejussiones sub pœna capitali ab ipsis interdictæ fuerunt. Vetari enim solent multa, non quòd omnino injusta putentur, sed quòd periculosa, ut fidejussiones mulierum omnes, aliorum etiam pro dote. Hoc ergo juris fuit civilis: quod cùm cesset inter populos exteros, ideo in obsidibus aliter ab ipsis Romanis observatum est. Quid quod tantò post Christiani Imperatores statuerunt, ut commentariensis, reo per familiæ suæ culpam carcere elapso, pœnam ipsius ferret? L. *ad commentariensem*. C. de custod. reor. Quid quod hodie quoque, aut non ita pridem, nobiles juris magistri tradiderunt regulam hanc, Ne quis obligare se posset ad pœnam capitalem, cessare si lex aut consuetudo eum morem firmaverit?

Ad eas verò pœnas quod attinet, quæ non consensum aliquem, sed solam personarum conjunctionem respiciunt, quanquam vetant leges Romanæ filium paternæ pœnæ successorem constitui, aut ullâ ob patris crimen maculâ notari, hoc ipsum tamen, non ab initio, sed ab eo tempore, quo Sp. Cassius tyrannidis damnatus est, obtinuisse notat Halicarnassæus. Quarè nec ipsi quidem Romani hoc jus putarunt ex perpetua quadam & immutabili justitiæ regula descendere: quippe cùm Arcadius & Honorius Imperatores eorum qui Majestatem læsissent filiis vitam videri voluerint non ex juris necessitate sed Imperatoriâ lenitate concedere, cùm alioqui, ut ipsi loquuntur, paterno debuissent perire supplicio, L. *quisquis*. C. ad L. Iul. Majest. Omitto jam quòd mortem perduellium liberis irrogatam non à Tiberio tantùm & Severo, sed & à Theodosio, ex historiis probari potest. Notandum præterea in eadem Arcadii & Honorii lege filiis perduellium auferri jus omne ab intestato, aut ex testamento cuiquam succedendi, infamiam ipsis inuri, vetari ne ad honores aut Sacramenta perveniant: deinde addi, *sint postremò tales, ut his perpetua egestate sordentibus, sit & mors solatium & vita supplicium*. Exclusio ab honoribus circa liberos eorum, qui in Rempublicam peccassent, jampridem Romanis à Syllanis temporibus erat usitata. Vt autem scelera parentum filii sua egestate luant, Cicero ait & antiquum esse, & OMNIUM Civitatum; ac nominatim addit Themistoclis liberos egusse: quæ eò duntaxat adferuntur, ut appareat, non eum fuisse consensum gentium, quem pro se adducit Socinus: neque verò Romanos, quorum inter omnes populos conspicua maximè æquitas fuit, id discrimen respexisse in pœnis quod pecunia possit fieri alterius, corporalis pœna non possit. Nam nec egestas filiorum, nec infamia, nec ab honoribus exclusio potuit fieri parentum egestas, infamia aut exclusio ab honoribus, nisi fortè per fictionem quandam, quæ patrem,

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patrem, & liberos pro uno eodemque homine habet.

Illud quoque mirari libet, quod de Zaleuci facto, cujus historia est apud Diodorum Siculum & Ælianum, ita pronunciat Socinus, ut dicat eum pessimè audire, ejusque nomen inter impotentes & temerarios Principes ac populorum Iudices censeri. Antiquitas sanè omnis Zaleucum, tum ob leges sapientissimas, tum & istius facti nomine maximè laudavit, ut ex his quos dixi Scriptoribus, & Plutarcho aliisque apparet: neque puto ullum Scriptorem veterem de eo facto aliter judicasse. In oculis est omnium Valerii Maximi sententia: *Nihil illis etiam justitiæ exemplis fortius. Zaleucus urbe Locrensium à se salubberrimis atque utilissimis legibus munitâ, cùm filius ejus adulterii crimine damnatus, secundùm jus ab ipso constitutum, utroque oculo carere deberet, ac tota Civitas in honorem patris pœnæ necessitatem adolescentulo remitteret, aliquamdiu repugnavit. Ad ultimum precibus populi evictus, suo prius, deinde filii oculo eruto, usum videndi utrique reliquit. Ita debitum supplicii modum legi reddidit, æquitatis admirabili temperamento, se inter misericordem patrem & justum legislatorem partitus.* Ac profectò si quemadmodum exulandi, ita oculum sibi eruendi libera esset homini potestas, nihil posset isto Zaleuci facto præclarius reperiri: præsertim cùm legis præcisa obligatio aut propter ipsius principatum, aut propter populi consensum cessaverit. Erravit ergo Zaleucus, ut Pagani fermè omnes, quòd jus sibi in corpus suum majus vero asseruit. Cæterum factum istud tantoperè celebratum testimonium præbet contra notitiam illam, quam hominum mentibus impressam Socinus putat, non posse quenquam alieni delicti in se pœnam suscipere.

Vt quæstionem hanc concludamus, non hoc quæritur, an cuilibet judici liceat cuivis pœnas quascunque alieni criminis infligere. Nam Iudicibus inferioribus lex superiorum hanc potestatem adimit. Neque hoc quæritur, an summæ inter homines potestati in quavis pœna, & in quemvis hoc ipsum liceat. Obstat enim interdum aut Lex Divina, aut naturalis ratio: sed hoc propriè quæritur, an actus qui sit in potestate superioris, etiam citra considerationem delicti alieni, possit ab ipso superiore ordinari in pœnam alieni delicti. Hoc injustum esse negat Scriptura, quæ Deum hoc sæpius fecisse ostendit: negat natura, quia vetare non probatur, negat apertè consensus Gentium. Et ut res nudior ponatur ob oculos, quis injustam putat decimationem usitatam in Romanis legionibus, ubi is qui deliquit, & cui posset ignosci non minùs quàm alteri, punitur non pro suo tantùm, sed pro omnium delicto? quis injustum putet, si Summâ Potestate legem relaxante vir aliquis Reipublicæ utilis, sed ob culpam exilium meritus, retineatur in Republica, alio tamen sponte sua se ad exilium obligante, ut exemplo satisfiat? quis injustum putet, si Reipublicæ summus rector honores, quibus sustinendis alii æquè pares reperiuntur, perduellium liberis, alioqui non indignis, neget? Nihil profectò hîc iniqui est. Nam in prima facti specie delictum puniti proprium, in secunda consensus validus ejus cujus res agitur, in tertia rectoris libertas permittebant id fieri, quo rector in pœnam utitur. In facto nostro habuit Deus potestatem affligendi Christum innocentem ad mortem usque temporariam, fatente Socino, jure scilicet dominico: habuit & Christus concessione Divina, imò ut Deus ipse, potestatem, quam nos non habemus, in vitam & corpus suum. *Ego*, inquit Christus, ἐξουσίαν, hoc est, *jus & potestatem, habeo ponendi animam meam*, Ioh. x, 18. Nihil ergo iniquitatis in eo est quòd Deus, cujus est Summa Potestas ad omnia per se non injusta nulli ipse legi obnoxius, cruciatibus & morte Christi uti voluit ad statuendum exemplum grave adversùs culpas immensas nostrûm omnium, quibus Christus erat conjunctissimus, naturâ, regno vadimonio: quod quàm non modò justè, sed & sapienter à Deo sapientissimo ac justissimo fuerit institutum, sequenti capite magis apparebit, ubi Divini hujus consilii causam indagabimus.

CAPVT V.

An sufficiens causa fuerit quæ Deum moveret ad Christum pro nobis puniendum, & ostenditur fuisse.

SOcinus (lib. III, cap. I) noluisse Deum, ut Christus pœnas pro nobis penderet, sæpe hoc argumento probare nititur, quòd cur Deus ita vellet nulla causa appareat. Non utemur hîc Iurisconsultorum perfugio, qui negant omnium quæ à majoribus sunt constituta, rationem reddi posse: quanquam nobis hoc multò justiùs quàm ipsis patere debebat, cùm humanæ voluntatis causas hominibus indagare ob communitatem naturæ non sit adeo difficile: Divinæ autem voluntatis causæ ipsâ sui sublimitate sæpe nos lateant. Quis mentem Domini novit, à consiliis ipsi quis fuit? Rom. XI, 34. Itaque sæpe sunt ἀνεξιχνίαστοι αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ [*imperveſtigabiles viæ ejus*], Rom. XI, 33. Addi poterat, sæpe voluntatem Dei ipsam sibi pro causa sufficere. Nam his exemptis quæ certam & ad unum determinatam rectitudinem in se continent, quæ Deus vult quia justa sunt, hoc est, quia naturæ suæ congruunt; in cæteris omnibus quæ vult, justa efficit volendo. Sic, *cujus vult miseretur, & quem vult indurat*, Rom. IX, 18. Sed ad ista nos confugere nihil necesse est, cùm causas nobis sui consilii Deus ipse satis apertè patefecerit. Illud duntaxat præfari nos convenit, non rectè Socinum postulare, ut talis causa reddatur, quæ evincat Deum aliter agere non potuisse. Talis enim causa in his, quæ liberè Deus facit, non requiritur. Liberam autem esse hanc actionem qui dixerit, habiturus est adstipulatorem Augustinum XIII de Civit. cap. X, qui non alium modum possibilem nos liberandi Deo defuisse, sed sanandæ miseriæ nostræ convenientiorem modum alium non fuisse, nec esse potuisse profitetur. Sed & ante Augustinum Athanasius serm. III contra Arrianos dixerat, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἀπιδημήσαντος αὐτοῦ μόνον εἰπεῖν ὁ Θεὸς καὶ λύσαι τὸν κατάραν· ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν δεῖ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις λυσιτελῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐν παντὶ τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λογίζεσθαι [*Poterat Deus, illo nequaquam præsente, loqui solùm, & solvere maledictum, sed oportet considerare, quid hominibus utile sit, & non inquirere in omnibus, quid Deo sit possibile*]. Naz. Epistolâ

ad

ad Trident. *Possibile fuit Deo etiam sine incarnatione (Christi) nos salvare, solâ voluntate suâ.* Bernardus epistolâ cxc, contra Pel. & Basl. *Quis nescit omnipotenti ad manus fuisse alios atque alios modos nostræ redemptionis, justificationis, liberationis, verùm hoc non præjudicat ejus quem è multis elegit, efficaciæ.* Eo autem iniquior est ista Socini postulatio, quòd ne ipse quidem cruciatuum & mortis Christi causas reddit, quæ aliquam secum necessitatem trahant. Nam ad sanctitatis viam nobis monstrandam poterant sufficere oracula & miracula: poterat & Christus sine morte, & mors sine Christo. Nam Prophetarum quoque & Apostolorum afflictiones & mortes, Christi quoque vita hunc usum abundè nobis præstare poterant. Potuit & Christus post vitam hîc innocenter actam, ut Enoch aut Elias, in cœlum sine morte transferri, & inde majestatem suam terris ostendere. Hæ enim sunt causæ, quibus Christi mortem Socinus adscribit, ut cuivis apparet, cum isto effecto nullâ necessitate connexæ. Quòd si ipsi sufficit causas allegare non cogentes, ut ita dicam, sed invitantes & suadentes, ut aliis secum disputantibus duriorem legem ferat, æquitas non patitur.

Sufficientem autem causam & quidem gravissimam ex Scripturis assignare nobis non erit difficile, sive id quæramus, cur Deus nobis remittere voluerit pœnas æternas, sive cur aliter quàm Christo punito remittere easdem noluerit. Prius illud causam habet in bonitate, quæ proprietatum Dei maximè Deo propria est. Vbique enim Deus semetipsum hoc maximè attributo describit, quòd benignus sit & clemens: Exod. xxxiv, 7. Ion. iv, 2. ii Chron. xxx, 9. Psalm. lxxxvi, 5, & 15. ciii, 8. cxi, 4, 5. cxlv, 8. Esaiæ lv, 7. Ierem. xxxi, 20. Ioël. ii, 13. Lucæ vi, 36. Rom. ii, 4. Propensus ergo est Deus ad juvandum beandumque hominem: at hoc non potest facere manente illa horribili æternâque pœnâ. Accedit quod si mors æterna cunctis incumberet, felicitatis desperatione Religio tota perierat. Magnæ ergo parcendi causæ. Altera ex parte causam Deo, cur Christo pœnam imponeret, illa Scripturæ testimonia jam ante nobis adducta evincunt, quæ Christum ob peccata nostra traditum, passum, mortuum loquuntur. Hæc enim loquendi genera, ut ibi ostendimus, causam impulsivam notant. Ex his verò, quæ de fine diximus, intelligi potest, non modò causam fuisse aliquam, sed & quæ illa fuerit: nimirum quòd tot & tanta peccata sine insigni exemplo transmittere Deus noluerit. Hoc autem ideo quia omne peccatum vehementer Deo displicet, eoque vehementiùs quo ipsum est gravius: Proverb. xi, 20. Psalm. v, 5. xlv, 8. Esaiæ lxvi, 4. Zach. viii, 17. Rom. i, 18. Hebr. xi, 2. Cùm verò Deus sit activus, & ratione utentes creaturas in id condiderit, ut suas proprietates magis testatas faceret, conveniens est illi, etiam quantopere sibi peccata displiceant, actu aliquo testari: actus autem ei rei convenientissimus est pœna. Hinc est illud in Deo, quod quia aliud vocabulum significantius non suppetit, iram vocant Sacræ Literæ, Exod. xxxii, 10, 11. Num. xi, 1. xvi, 22. xxv, 3, & seq. Psalm. ii, 5. vi, 2. Ioh. iii, 36. Rom. i, 18. ii, 8. Ephes. v, 6. Coloss. iii, 6. Apoc. vi, 16. Hâc ira Deus se impediri testatur, quo minus bene hominibus faciat, Gen. vi, 7. Ierem. v, 25. Esaiæ lix, 2. Deut. xxxii, 29, 30. Præterea, omnis peccati impunitas per se hoc habet, quod efficit ut peccata minoris æstimentur, sicut contra ratio expeditissima arcendi à peccato est formido pœnæ. Hinc illud, *Veterem ferendo injuriam invitas novam.* Ergo prudentia quoque hoc nomine rectorem ad pœnam incitat. Augetur præterea causa puniendi, ubi lex aliqua publicata est, quæ pœnam minatur. Nam tunc omissio pœnæ fermè aliquid detrahit de Legis authoritate apud subditos. Hinc illud Politicorum præceptum τοὺς κειμένους νόμους ἰσχυρῶς διαφυλάττειν [*positas leges magno studio custodire*]. Gravissimæ ergo Deo causæ puniendi, præsertim si & magnitudinem & multitudinem peccatorum expendere libeat. Quia verò inter omnes Dei proprietates antestat amor humani generis, ideo Deus cùm justè posset & moveretur ad punienda peccata omnium hominum dignâ & legitimâ pœnâ, hoc est, morte æternâ, his qui in Christum credunt parcere voluit: parcendum autem cùm esset, aut aliquod exemplum aut nullum adversùs tot & tanta peccata statuendo, sapientissimè eam viam elegit, quâ plures simul ipsius proprietates manifestarentur, nimirum & clementia & severitas, sive peccati odium, legisque servandæ cura. Sic Zaleuci factum laudans Ælianus causas ejus refert duas, ἵνα μὴ ὁ νεανίσκος τυφλωθῇ πάντως [*ne prorsus cæcus fieret adolescens*], & ἵνα μὴ διαφθαρῇ τὸ ἅπαξ κεκυρωμένον [*ne quod semel ratum habitum erat, irritum fieret*]: quarum causarum illa eò spectat, ut aliquid de lege mutetur per clementiam; hæc verò ne nimium mutetur. Notant qui de legum relaxatione scripserunt, eas esse optimas relaxationes, quibus annexa est commutatio, sive compensatio: quia scilicet eo modo & legis auctoritati minimum perit, & rationi ei quæ causa est legis aliquatenus mos geritur: ut si qui rem teneatur tradere pretium persolvendo liberetur. Proxima enim sunt idem & tantundem. Talis commutatio non modò inter res, sed interdum quoque inter personas admittitur, modò id fieri possit sine alterius injuria. Sic in carcerem filii patribus succedere permissi, ut Miltiadi Cimon. Et ne extra pœnalia judicia, & quidem Divina abeamus, exstant similis facti expressa in Sacris Literis vestigia. Davidi homicidæ & adultero pronunciatur Dei mandato à Nathane: *Tralatum est à te peccatum* (hoc est, peccati pœna) *non es enim tu moriturus* (quod alioqui lex postulabat) *sed quia Dei inimicis occasionem omnino dedisti Deo contemptim obtrectandi, filius iste qui tibi natus est* (tibi scilicet conjunctissimus, tuæque pœnæ vicarius) *omnino moriturus est*, ii Sam. xii, 13, 14. Achabus & homicidio se & rapinâ inquinaverat: denunciat ei per Eliam Deus futurum, ut canes lingant ejus sanguinem. Verumtamen mox conspecto ipsius pavore, & quadam Divini numinis reverentiâ, dixit idem Deus, *non inducam malum illud* (quod scilicet & ipse meruerat, & ego eram comminatus) *diebus ejus: diebus filii ejus* (qui scilicet præter suas, paternas quoque pœnas feret) *inducam malum illud super domum ejus* i Reg. xxi, 29. Vtrobique Deus

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relaxat legem seu pœnæ comminationem, sed non sine compensatione aliqua, ipsam pœnam in alterum transferendo: atque ita simul & clementiam suam & severitatem, sive peccati odium testatum facit. Sic ergo Deus crediturus in Christum volens parcere, causas habuit sufficientes, justas magnasque, cur à Christo volente, pœnas peccatorum nostrorum exegerit, nempe, ut verbis Æliani utar, ἵνα μὴ ἀμφθαρῇ τὸ ἅπαξ κεκυρωμένον [*ne, quod semel ratum habitum erat, irritum fieret*], & ne minoris penderentur peccata, si tot & tanta sine exemplo transmitterentur. Adde quod hoc ipso Deus non tantùm suum adversus peccata odium testatum fecit, ac proinde nos hoc facto à peccatis deterruit: (facilis enim est collectio, si Deus ne resipiscentibus quidem peccata remittere voluit, nisi Christo in pœnas succedente, multò minùs inultos sinet contumaces) verùm insigni modo insuper patefecit summum erga nos amorem ac benevolentiam: quòd ille scilicet nobis pepercit, cui non erat ἀδιάφορον [*indifferens*] punire peccata, sed qui tanti id faciebat, ut potiùs quàm impunita omnino dimitteret, Filium suum unigenitum ob illa peccata, pœnis tradiderit. Planè ut περὶ συγγνώμης [*de indulgentia*] dictum est à veteribus, esse eam οὐδὲ κατὰ νόμον, οὐδὲ κατὰ νόμον, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ νόμον καὶ ὑπὲρ νόμον [*neque secundùm legem, neque contra legem, sed supra legem & pro lege*], id de hac Divina gratia sit verissimum. Supra legem est, quia nos non punimur: pro Lege, quia non omittitur pœna: & ideo fit remissio ut in posterum Legi Divinæ vivamus.

His rectè intellectis, concidunt omnia illa, quæ de causæ defectu objicit Socinus: ita ut per singula ire minimè sit necesse. In quibus tamen non pauci notari possunt errores, ut cùm capite primo libri primi, item libri tertii capite primo tradit Iustitiam punientem non residere in Deo, sed esse effectum voluntatis ipsius. Punire sanè effectus est voluntatis: sed justitia illa sive rectitudo ex qua nascuntur tum alia, tum pœnarum retributio, proprietas est in Deo residens. Scriptura enim concludit Deum esse justum, quia pœnas reddat delictis, ex effecto causam colligens. Sed in hunc errorem inductus videtur Socinus, quòd Dei proprietatum effectus quosvis esse credidit necessarios omnino, cùm multi sint liberi, intercedente scilicet inter proprietatem & effectum actu libero voluntatis. Sic bonitatis Dei est effectus bona sua communicare: at hoc ante creationem non fecit. Ejusdem bonitatis est, parcere sontibus: at parcere Deum iis quos pœnis æternis punit, vix quisquam dixerit. Sunt ergo quædam Dei proprietates, quarum exercitium, tum quoad actum, tum quoad tempus & modum actus, imo etiam quoad objecti determinationem, pendet à libera ipsius voluntate, cui tamen semper præsidet Sapientia. Neque ideo quia liber est Deo proprietatum istarum usus, dici potest, cùm iis utitur, sine causa facere quod facit. Neque enim quia licuit Deo mundum non condere, ideo frustra mundum condidit: neque quia licuit Deo quosdam non punire (quod in iis præsertim, quorum Deus pœnitentiam non exspectat, verum esse fatetur Socinus) ideo cùm eos punit, sine causa punit. Multa quippe liberè fiunt, attamen ex gravi causa.

Alter error est supra quoque indicatus, quod Deum peccata remittentem planè idem vult facere quod homines, qui de jure suo decedunt. Ostensum est à nobis pœnam non esse in dominio aut credito, aut illis per omnia posse comparari. Suum donare, creditum remittere nunquam non per se honestum est. Per se cùm dicimus, ea quæ adsunt κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς [*per accidens*] excludimus, qualis est ipsius donantis indigentia: quæ præterea in Deo locum non potest habere. At pœnam remittere interdum non fuerit honestum: ne Deo quidem, ut Socinus agnoscit. Latum ergo hîc discrimen est: origo autem discriminis inde, quod juris dominici & crediti proximum fundamentum est relatio quædam rei ad personam: pœnæ autem, relatio rei ad rem, nimirum æqualitas delicti cum nocumento aliquo, conveniens ordini & bono communi: quare ne illud quidem verum est, quod ut certissimum posuit Socinus (lib. III, cap. I), Rempublicam nihil commissuram injusti, si nocentem absolvat, nisi jus proprium privati alicujus simul lædat, aut Dei Legem infringat. Nam aut Reipublicæ voce multitudinem intelligit eam quæ regit, aut eam quæ regitur. Multitudo quæ regitur, ut jus legum ferendarum, ita & temperandarum non habet. Multitudo autem quæ regit, ut Senatus in statu optimatium, aut major pars comitiorum in statu populari, non plus potest quam alii summi rectores, putà in regno reges liberi, & respectu familiæ patres. At justitiæ rectoris pars est servare leges etiam positivas & à se latas, quod verum esse tam in universitate libera quam in Rege summo probant Iurisconsulti: cui illud est consequens, ut rectori relaxare legem talem non liceat, nisi causa aliqua accedat, si non necessaria, certè sufficiens: quæ itidem recepta est à Iurisconsultis sententia. Ratio utriusque est, quod actus ferendi aut relaxandi legem non sit actus absoluti dominii, sed actus imperii, qui tendere debeat ad boni ordinis conservationem.

Illud quoque reprehensione indiget quod dicit Socinus (lib. III, cap. X), præter Dei & ipsius Christi voluntatem, non posse ullam legitimam causam reddi mortis Christi, nisi dicamus Christum meritum fuisse ut moreretur. Nam inest quidem in antecedente causa meritum, ut supra (cap. II) diximus, sed impersonaliter. Merebantur enim peccata nostra ut pœna exigeretur: quòd verò pœna in Christum collata fuerit, hoc ita ad Dei & Christi voluntatem referimus, ut ea quoque voluntas causas suas habeat, non in merito Christi (qui peccatum cùm non nosset à Deo peccatum factus est) sed in summa Christi aptitudine ad statuendum insigne exemplum: quæ tum in maxima ipsius nobiscum conjunctione, tum in incomparabili personæ dignitate consistit. Socini autem illa collectio manifestis Scripturæ testimoniis refellitur. Cur mortuus sit infans Davidis causa antecedens aperta redditur; quia David gravissimè peccando occasionem impiis dederat contumeliosè insultandi Divino nomini. Est ergo hîc meritum, sed non infantis. Et in Achabi posteritate punienda præter meritum

proprium, respexit Deus ad merita peccatorum Achabi: unde apparet causam antecedentem pœnæ esse quidem meritum, sed non semper meritum personæ quæ punitur.

CAPVT VI.

An Deus voluerit Christum punire: & ostenditur voluisse; simulque satisfactionis natura explicatur.

ABsolutis duabus quæstionibus, An justè potuerit Deus Christum volentem ob peccata nostra punire; &, An causa aliqua sufficiens fuerit cur id Deus faceret; restat tertia, An revera etiam hoc fecerit, aut quod eôdem recidit, facere voluerit Deus. Id enim negat Socinus, tum alibi passim, tum ex professo lib. III, cap. II. Nos cum Scriptura defendimus, voluisse hoc & fecisse Deum. Traditus enim, passus, mortuus dicitur Christus ob peccata nostra, Rom. IV, 25. I Cor. XV, 3. I Pet. III, 18. Esaïæ LIII, 5. Imposita est Christo castigatio pacis nostræ. Deus conjecit in Christum peccata nostra, id est, pœnas peccatorum, quæ ita exactæ sunt, ut ipse eo nomine affligeretur. Tulit Christus peccata nostra, hoc est iterum, pœnas peccatorum, Esaïæ LIII, 5, 6, 7, 11. I Petr. II, 24. Christus se peccatum fecit, & Deus Christum fecit peccatum & maledictum, hoc est, pœnæ peccatorum obnoxium, Esaïæ LIII, 10. II Cor. V, 21. Galat. III, 13. Christi sanguis effusus est in remissionem peccatorum, ita ut ea remissio non obtigerit sine sanguinis effusione, sed per eam, Matth. XXVI, 28. Hebr. IX, 22, & alibi passim.

Opponit hîc multa Socinus: exempla quædam & promissiones ante Christum: dicta quædam de his, quæ per Christum se dare dixit Deus: vocem remittere & condonare, & ipsam liberalitatis naturam, ex quibus consequi arbitratur, velle Deum impunitatem nobis resipiscentibus concedere, nullâ à quoquam pœnâ eo nomine exactâ.

Ad exempla indulgentiæ quod attinet (præterquam quod ex iis nihil universale rectè concluditur) notandum est ea aut pertinere ad pœnas temporarias, aut ad æternas. Si ad temporarias tantùm, ut in Achabo, manifestum est discrimen: nam, ut vulgò dici solet, quod differtur non aufertur. Adde jam quod in ipso Achabi facto, ut & in facto Davidis, contrarium ejus apparet quod inferre vult Socinus, illa ipsa pro se allegans. Pœna enim temporaria ita ablata est à Davide & Achabo, ut in alios sit translata. Et in ipsa Lege non remittuntur peccata, nisi fuso victimarum sanguine, ut infra explicabitur. Si verò de pœnæ æternæ remissione agitur, nullo argumento probat Socinus, eam esse factam cuiquam citra respectum Dei ad Christum.

De promissionibus idem statuendum quod de exemplis: obiterque notandum, cùm Deus resipiscentibus promittit gratiam se facturum pœnarum temporalium, non id semper intelligendum de totis pœnis, sed de tantis. Sæpe enim Deus etiam resipiscentes solet punire, sed paternè & leniter. Sic à Babylonica captivitate populum pœnitentiâ ductum in patriam restituit Deus, sed pristinam libertatem & regni gloriam non reddidit. Ad pœnas verò æternas quod attinet, nulla est remissionis promissio, quæ Christi respectum excludat. Huc pertinent illa Sacræ Scripturæ effata, quæ sine ullo temporis discrimine Christum ostendunt pro omnibus gustasse mortem, dedisse se ἀντίλυτρον [*redemptionem*] pro omnibus, Hebr. II, 9. I Timoth. II, 6: multoque magis illa, quæ per comparationem additam omnem temporis restrictionem repudiant, ut cùm omnes dicuntur peccasse & justificari per redemptionem in Christo, Rom. III, 23, & cùm per unum Christum ita dicitur in omnes (quotquot scilicet justificantur) venisse justitia, quemadmodum per unum Adamum in omnes venit condemnatio, Rom. III, 12. V, 17, 18 (vide ad hunc locum ad Rom. explicationem Cyrilli adv. Anthrop. cap. IX) I Cor. XV, 22. Hinc est quod Christus dicitur agnus mactatus à jacto mundi fundamento, Apoc. XIII, 8; quem locum à Socini interpretatione (lib. II, cap. XXVI) satis vindicant tum ipsa verborum series, tum similis Petri locus, ubi redemptio dicitur facta per sanguinem Christi agni inculpati & immaculati, præcogniti ante jacta mundi fundamenta, manifesti autem facti ultimis temporibus, I Pet. I, 19, 20. Quare alibi Christi mors dicitur intercessisse ad redemptionem etiam earum transgressionum, quæ sub priore pacto fuerant, Hebr. IX, 15, & per sanguinem ipsius justitia Dei demonstrata dicitur ob dissimulationem peccatorum præcedentium, quæ Deus tolerasse interim & sustentasse ostenditur, ipsâ justitiæ demonstratione in Christi tempus dilatâ Rom. III, 25. Accedit illustris ille ad Hebræos locus IX, 25, & seq. *Non ut sæpius offerret seipsum sicut Princeps Sacerdos in sacrarium intrat quotannis cum alieno sanguine (alioqui oportuisset eum sæpe passum fuisse à jacto mundi fundamento) sed nunc semel in consummatione sæculorum ad peccatum per immolationem sui ipsius è medio tollendum factus est manifestus. Et sicut statutum est hominibus semel mori, deinde judicium: ita & Christus semel oblatus, ut sursum ferret multorum peccata*, &c. Cujus loci tota series si rectè attendatur, & præsertim conferatur Petri ille locus, I Pet. I, 19, ubi de re eadem iisdem prope vocibus agitur, apparebit hôc differre Christi sacrificium à Levitico, quòd hujus vis esset limitata annuo tempore, illius verò vis se per omnia sæcula extendat: quippe cujus passio apud Deum ante omne ævum pro peracta sit habita, etsi reipsa certo tempore peracta, & sic decretum Dei nobis apertissimè sit revelatum. Ni verò ita esset, oportuisse Christum sæpiùs subire passiones, non postquam cœpit prædicare, sed ab ipsa mundi origine. Quæ voces nullam planè habent significationem, nisi vis mortis Christi ad omnia peccata se extendat, quæ ab ipsa mundi origine hominibus unquam remissa fuerunt: planè sicut judicium post mortem ad omnia ea peccata se extendit, quæ vitâ durante homo commisit. Contraria verò Socini interpretatio (lib. II, cap. XXVI) non modò voces reddit inanes, sed argumentum quoque Scriptoris enervat. Non enim sequitur, posito Chri-

Christum sæpius offerendum fuisse, debuisse eum pati non tantùm sæpius, sed etiam sæpius à jacto mundi fundamento, nisi simul ponas Christum sæpius offerendum fuisse à jacto mundi fundamento. Hæc enim inter se connexa sunt; quia non latius porrigitur effectus oblationis, quàm immolationis dignitas. At offerri debuisse Christum sæpius à jacto mundi fundamento; positâ, quam Scriptor epistolæ ad Hebræos oppugnat, paritate sacrificii Christi & Levitici, non aliunde sequeretur, quàm quia effectus oblationis Christi ad ea peccata porrigitur, quæ à jacto mundi fundamento unquam sunt commissa & remissa. Nam si Levitico par esset (hoc est virtutis certo tempore limitatæ) certè à tempore, quo mortuus est Christus, efficacia ejus ad antiquissima peccata non posset pertingere, sed opus planè fuisset inter utrumque tempus multos ejus generis actus interponi.

Ad ea nunc testimonia ut veniamus, quæ ad Christi & novi fœderis tempus Socino videntur propriè pertinere. Dicit quidem Hieremias XXXI, 34. Deum propitium fore peccatis: sed non negat id, quod dicit Paulus Rom. III, 25, hanc propitiationem fieri in Christi sanguine; sive Christum à Deo respici, imò, omnes Prophetæ (in quibus & Hieremias) testimonium præbent, remissionem peccatorum per nomen, hoc est, vim atque virtutem Christi accipi, Act. X, 43. Et liberatio per Christum obtigisse nobis dicitur juxta fœdus illud quod cum Patribus Deus fecerat, & juxta ea quæ per Prophetas prænunciaverat, Luc. I, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74. Baptista quoque Divino mandato pœnitentiâ ductis remissionem pollicetur, eamque propter viscera misericordiæ Dei nostri Luc. I, 77; sed idem Christum esse dixit agnum qui tollat peccata mundi, per mactationem scilicet, quod exprimit Apocalypsis, aut per sanguinem, ut Petrus loquitur: quibus locis Agni itidem facta mentio clarè monstrat quò Baptista respexerit.

Vox remittendi, quam urget Socinus, in Græco est ἀφίναι, quod vetus interpres κατὰ πόδας [*verbotenus*] transtulit, *dimittere*. Supra autem ostendimus neque Græcæ, neque Latinæ vocis eam esse vim, quæ juris proprii cessionem omnimodam necessariò includat, cùm origo & primitiva vocis significatio opposita sit τοῦ κρατεῖν, quod est *retinere*, aut *adducere*: unde porro similitudine quadam tum ad pœnas, tum ad credita transferri cœpit: nec ad illa tantùm, sed & alia. Nam ἄφεσιν [*dimissionem*] Græci vocant etiam rei insontis in judicio factam absolutionem. Ostendimus etiam supra quantum intersit inter remissionem crediti & remissionem pœnæ: & in pœnæ remissione, quæ à rectore fiat, nullam esse juris talis proprii ac privati, quale Socinus indicat, dominii scilicet absoluti aut crediti, abdicationem. Hæc igitur illinc peti possunt. Nunc illud duntaxat addendum est, non esse verum quod vult Socinus, remissionem pugnare cum quavis solutione antecedente. Quod ut intelligatur, descriptionem quandam ponemus remissionis debiti, quæ species illas duas, nempe crediti & pœnæ, sub se contineat: idque juxta ejus vocis usum tum in jure civili, tum in sermone communi. Remittere ergo debitum est actus aut creditoris aut rectoris, pœnæ seu crediti obligatione reum liberantis. In gratiam eorum, quibus minùs sunt cognita juris vocabula, explicationem fusiorem adhibebimus. Obligationis destructio in jure liberatio dicitur. Hanc præcedere potest solutio, sequi non potest: quia actus nullus versari potest circa id quod non existit ampliùs. Contingit ergo liberatio, interdum antecedente solutione aliquâ, interdum citra omnem solutionem. Sed alia solutio ipso facto liberat, alia non ipso facto. Ipso facto liberat solutio rei planè ejusdem quæ erat in obligatione. Perinde autem est ipse reus solvat, an alius pro eo hoc animo ut ipse liberetur: quod ideo notandum est, quia si alio animo alius idem solvat, liberatio non contingit, L. *si pœnæ*. L: *in summa*. D. de cond. indeb. L. *Cassius*. D. de solut. Vbi ergo idem solvitur aut à debitore, aut ab alio nomine debitoris, nulla contingit remissio: nihil enim circa debitum agit creditor, aut rector. Quare si quis pœnam pertulerit quam debet, liberatio hîc erit, remissio non erit. Ac talis liberationis professionem in jure crediti propriè ac strictè ἀποχὴν [*apocham*] vocant Iurisconsulti, L. *Si accepto*. §. 1. D. de Acceptil. Alia verò quævis solutio ipso facto non liberat, puta si aliud quàm quod in obligatione est, solvatur, L. 1, §. 2. D. de reb. cred. Sed necesse est actum aliquem accedere creditoris aut rectoris, qui actus rectè & usitatè remissio appellatur. Talis autem solutio quæ aut admitti aut recusari potest, admissa in jure, speciale habet nomen satisfactionis, quæ interdum solutioni strictiùs sumptæ opponitur. L. *Satisfactio*. D. de solut. Atque hinc vera causa petenda est, cur pœnæ corporalis vicarius ipso facto reum, solvendo pœnam, nequeat liberare: hoc enim accidit primò & per se, non quia alius solvit, (id quippe liberationem non impedit, dum ea sit solventis voluntas) sed quia solvit aliud quàm quod est in obligatione. Est enim in obligatione afflictio ipsius qui deliquit: unde dici solet, noxam caput sequi: quod in aliis quoque obligationibus ad factum merè personalibus videre est, ut in sponsalium contractu, & in obligatione operarum officialium, L. *opera*. D. de operis libert. In his enim omnibus, si alius solvat, ipso facto liberatio non sequetur, quia simul aliud solvitur. Quare ut ex pœna unius alteri liberatio contingat, actus quidam rectoris debet intercedere: Lex enim ipsum qui deliquit puniri imperat. Hic actus respectu legis est relaxatio sive dispensatio, respectu debitoris remissio. Liberatio verò citra solutionem, aut fit substitutione novæ obligationis, aut omnimodà ejus peremptione. Substitutione novæ obligationis quæ fit liberatio, novatio dicitur, & si persona debentis mutetur, delegatio. Illa autem liberatio, quæ citra ullam solutionem debitum planè perimit, si circa creditum verbis quibusdam solennibus peragatur, in Iure Civili acceptilatio dicitur. Circa pœnam autem nomen proprium (quod solutionem qualemcunque & quantamcunque necessariò excludat) non habet, sed communi nomine

vocatur, gratia, venia, indulgentia, abolitio. Bis ergo fallitur Socinus, cùm ad eam remissionem quam nobis Deus concedit, desumptam ex jure vocem acceptilationis applicat. Primùm enim illa vox, etiam cùm solutio nulla antecessit, ad jus crediti aptari potest, ad pœnas nec potest, nec solet. Nemo enim unquam legit ab ullo veteri scriptore indulgentiam criminum acceptilationem vocari. Nam accepto fertur ea res quæ accipi potest. At pœnam corporalem rector revera exigit, sed non accipit, quia nihil ex pœna ad ipsum propriè pervenit. Deinde verò acceptilatio opponitur qualicunque solutioni: unde figuratè definitur, solutio imaginaria. At Christus λύτρον [*redemptionem*] dedit vitam suam pro nobis, Matth. xx, 28. Et pretio empti, hoc est, solutione aliquâ liberati sumus, 1 Cor. vi, 20, & vii, 23, de quo infra latiùs. Non est ergo hîc acceptilatio: non est etiam solutio rei ipsius debitæ, quæ ipso facto liberet; nostra enim mors & quidem æterna erat in obligatione; non est etiam novatio aut delegatio: neque enim post nos liberatos aliud simile debitum aut debitor alius succedit: sed est remissio antecedente satisfactione; quæ inter se pugnare malè arbitratur Socinus, cùm contra, omnis satisfactio (hoc est solutio recusabilis) ideo admittatur, ut remissioni sit locus. Cùm verò dicimus satisfactionem antecedere, id intelligendum est aut actu ipso, ut in peccatis Christianorum contingit, aut in decreto certo & irrevocabili, ut in peccatis sub Lege commissis & remissis. Quod enim Deus facere decrevit, pro jam facto habetur, & dum debitum verè solvatur, nihil refert quo tempore id fiat, præsertim apud eum, qui omnia quæ certò futura sunt compertissima habet, & ea tanquam præsentia perpetuò videt atque intuetur, quæ est ipsius Socini confessio (lib. ii, cap. xxvi). Quæ ergo adfert Socinus, ut probet non posse satisfactionem sequi post remissionem, aut omnino simul contingere, neque verò hîc ullam esse novationem aut delegationem, item liberationem esse aliquam posse, ubi non sit remissio, frustra dicuntur, neque ad nostram quæstionem pertinent. Illud verò quod dicit, satisfactione omnino & statim tolli debitum, ad rem quidem pertinet, sed verum non est, nisi satisfactio contra juris usum sumatur pro ipsius rei quæ debetur, ab ipso qui debet, factâ solutione: de qua nos non agimus. At ubi alius solvit pro debitore, & ubi aliud solvitur quàm quod debebatur, hîc ad liberationem duplex actus voluntatis requiritur. Nam & qui solvit hoc velle debet ut debitor liberetur, alioqui non contingit liberatio, ut supra ostendimus, & alterius rei pro altera solutionem debet creditor aut rector velle admittere. Quare cùm unusquisque actui ex sua voluntate pendenti legem possit imponere, sicut id quod purè debetur, novari potest sub conditione. L. *quoties*. D. de Novat. ita etiam possunt, is qui solvit pro alio, & is qui rei alterius pro altera solutionem admittit, paciscì, ut aut statim sequatur remissio, aut in diem, item aut purè, aut sub conditione. Fuit autem & Christi satisfacientis, & Dei satisfactionem admittentis hic animus ac voluntas, hoc denique pactum & fœdus, non ut Deus statim ipso perpessionis Christi tempore pœnas remitteret, sed ut tum demum id fieret, cùm homo verâ in Christum Fide ad Deum conversus, supplex veniam precaretur, accedente etiam Christi apud Patrem advocatione sive intercessione. Non obstat hîc ergo satisfactio, quò minùs sequi possit remissio. Satisfactio enim non jam sustulerat debitum, sed hoc egerat ut propter ipsam debitum aliquando tolleretur.

Voci remissionis, per se inefficaci, fulcrum addit Socinus ex parabola, Matth. xviii, 22, 23, & sequent. idque duplici argumento: primum, quod Deus comparetur Regi pecuniam debitam servulo remittenti, nullâ additâ cujusquam satisfactionis mentione: deinde, quod nos tacitè jubeamur idem facere quod Deus: minimè verò nos oporteat ita in nos delinquentibus ignoscere, ut pœnas ab amicis ipsorum expetamus. Sed facilis est responsio, comparationem ultra id tendi quo respicit: quod in omni argumento à similitudine ducto vitiosum est. Confert se Christus furi, nos verò quæstori de alieno largienti: non quod aut ipse rem alienam subtrahat invito domino, aut quod nos idem facere oporteat: sed se quidem furi, quod superveniat improvisus; nos verò quæstori isti, quod nos de nostro facere oporteat id quod ille fecit de non suo. Sic in ista parabola Matth. xviii, commendatur nobis benignitas in proximum, quia Deus in nos benignus sit. In hoc conveniunt Rex ille in parabola & Deus, quòd benigni sint in eos qui longè infra se sunt positi. Hanc benignitatem Deus testatur pœnas remittendo: Rex ille remittendo pecuniam debitam. Vt aliud debendi genus, ita & aliud remittendi. Disconveniunt quidem in eo Rex & Deus, quod Rex citra satisfactionem, Deus non citra satisfactionem remittit: sed in eo sita non est comparatio. Ratio quoque est alia. Nam de credito, quod jus ad utilitatem creditoris comparatum est, statuendi quisque habet liberrimam potestatem: & quò minùs exigit, eò est liberalior: exigendo autem nullum actum virtutis exercet. At de pœna, quæ ad bonum commune, & ad ordinem pertinet, habet quidem rector potestatem, sed quæ in infinitum non exeat. Et cùm pœnam exigit, virtute quadam utitur, quæ dicitur justitia ἀνταποδοτικὴ [*retributiva*], ut supra ostendimus. Ad alteram verò comparationem quòd attinet, quæ inter Deum & nos in parabolæ ἐπιμυθίῳ [*adfabulatione*] instituitur, nihil aliud inde inferri potest, quàm æquum non esse ut duriores simus in parem, quàm Deus tantò superior est in nos miseros homunciones. Hinc sequitur, non debere nos magis vindictam expetere quàm pœnam Deus expetat. Deus autem nos à pœna liberavit: debet ergo & nobis abesse vindictæ cupiditas. Quomodo autem Deus istam liberationem peregerit, ibi non dicitur, nec ad institutum pertinet. In eo enim non similitudo est, sed dissimilitudo. Deus enim judex est; nos privati. Iudici convenit sollicitum esse de exemplo: privatos ea cura non spectat. Iudicis officio continetur puniendi potestas: eadem privatis adempta est. Quòd si nimium prematur ista comparatio (ut fit à Socino) sequeretur homines quoque Iudices non debere à sontibus ullis pœnas exposcere.

Remissio-

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Remissionis vocem non satis esse validam ad omne genus solutionis sive satisfactionis excludendum Socinus aliquatenus agnoscens, aliquanto plus subsidii sperat ab altera voce χαρίζεσθαι [*condonare*], quam in hoc argumento Paulus ter usurpat, Col. II, 13, & III, 13, & Ephes. IV, 32, cujus vocis non aliam esse vim supra indicavimus, quàm ut aliquod beneficium præsertim verò indebitum ea indicetur. Quod verò Socinus ut certissimum ponit, ad ejus vocis significationem hoc quoque requiri, ut quisquam sibi aliquid adimat, suoque se commodo privet, id planè verum non est. Vt enim omittam omnia illa, quæ περὶ τῶν χαρισμάτων τοῦ Θεοῦ [*de donis Dei*] passim in Scripturis occurrunt, sicut inter alia, exempli causâ, cùm nobis dicitur χαρισθῆναι [*donatum esse*] in Christum credere, & pro Christo pati; Iesus cæco ἐχαρίσατο τὸ βλέπειν [*visum gratificatus est*]. nunquid id cùm faceret ullo se privavit commodo? Hominem insontem in gratiam cujusquam qui condemnat, is illum ipsum hominem dicitur alteri χαρίζεσθαι [*condonare*], Actor. XXV, 11, & 16, qui tamen proprius damnantis non erat. Paulus Apostolicæ animadversionis severitatem in reum incesti distrinxerat non ipse læsus, neque ullo suo commodo: hanc remittens χαρίζεσθαι [*condonare*] se dicit, II Cor. II, 10. Corinthios quoque admonens, ut eundem hominem in pristinæ amicitiæ jus admittant, hoc quoque χαρίζεσθαι [*condonare*] appellat, ibid. 7, & 10. Ex his aliisque plurimis tum Novi Testamenti, tum aliorum quoque Scriptorum locis liquidò apparet, ad vocis χαρίζεσθαι [*condonare*] significationem sufficere, ut ad patientem aliquid commodi non debiti perveniat, etiamsi agenti nihil decedat. Accedit quod supra ostendimus, rectorem in pœna nihil proprium atque privatum à se abdicare: idque in hoc argumento eò est manifestius, quia non Deo tantùm tribuitur τὸ χαρίζεσθαι [*condonare*], sed & Christo, Ephes. IV, 32. at peccati injuria propriè in Deum fertur, ita ut si eo nomine Deus remittens peccata dicendus sit suum sibi adimere, idem tamen de Christo quâ mediatore dici nequeat. Neque magis verum est quod ex illo ante posito deducit Socinus, nempe τὸ χαρίζεσθαι [*condonare*] pugnare omnino cum satisfactione quâvis. Neque enim pugnat cum ea quæ & liberè admittitur cùm posset repudiari, & ad quam is qui beneficio afficitur, nihil ipse contribuit: quorum utrumque accidit in Christi pro nobis satisfactione. De Latina voce *condonare*, cùm eo sermone nihil scribi curaverit Spiritus Sanctus, frustra solliciti simus. Quod si tamen hæc quoque in Sacris Literis appareret, tamen cùm in pœna donatio propriè dicta locum non habeat, neque inusitata sit ejus vocis translatio, nihil hinc quoque inferri posset contra satisfactionem, quando condonari, quemadmodum & remitti aliquid rectè dicitur, etiam ubi solutio accedit, sed talis quæ sine actu voluntatis vim non habeat pariendæ liberationis. Nam & Principes cùm capitalium criminum reis veniam concedunt, solent & mulctæ aliquid, & publicam quandam culpæ deprecationem illis indicere. Neque tamen eo minùs condonare dicuntur crimina. Quanto ergo justiùs ea vox hîc usurpari poterit, ubi requisita satisfactio à nobis non procedit, sed liberatio contingit planè gratis quoad nos, etsi non gratis absolutè: quod Scriptura indicat, cùm justificatos nos dicit gratis, & confestim addit διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ [*per redemptionem quæ est in Christo Iesu*], & quæ sequuntur, Rom. III, 24. Certè cùm Scriptura non uno loco redemptos nos dicat, & quidem pretio, & Christum se, aut carnem suam dedisse ad nos liberandos, harum vocum vim omnem evertere, condonationis τὸ ῥητὸν [*Verbum*], supra quàm usus vocis desiderat, urgendo, æquitas nulla patitur.

Ad aliud verò Socini argumentum, quod ab imperata nobis Dei & Christi ἐν τῷ χαρίζεσθαι [*in condonando*] imitatione depromitur, nihil aliud opus est responderi, quàm quod ad parabolam, Matth. XVIII, jam diximus: imitandam nobis proponi rem, non omnem modum rei. Res est ipsa benignitas, etiam post peccatum; & ex hac sequens remissio, sive (si ita loqui libet) condonatio: modus diversus: in Deo antecedente satisfactione: in nobis sine illa: neque mirum, cùm Iudex sit Deus, nos privati. Quod si quis rem subtiliùs intueatur, reperiet fortè, ne ab ea quidem quæ nobis præcipitur, condonatione, omnem omnino satisfactionem removeri, sed eam duntaxat, quæ pro ratione personæ, paris scilicet, non superioris, modum superet. Nam ipsa culpæ confessio & deprecatio (quam expeti non vetat Christus, Lucæ XVII, 4) adeo à satisfactione non abhorret, ut hoc ipsum Latini elegantiores, proprio quasi vocabulo, satisfacere appellent. Sic & Paulus vocem χαρίζεσθαι [*condonare*] de Corinthio usurpat, cùm tamen præcessisset ἐπιτιμία ὑπὸ τῶν πλειόνων [*objurgatio quæ fit à pluribus*], II Cor. II, 6. Et proximis post Apostolos sæculis scimus lapsis publicè pacem (quam vocabant) Ecclesiæ non datam, nisi post quosdam demissionis actus publicos, quos propterea satisfactiones vocabant.

Ducta à liberalitate ratio fragili fundamento innititur. Nam ut ante ostendimus, ea virtus, quâ Deus in remittendis peccatis utitur, non est liberalitas, sed clementia, quam Seneca rectè definit lenitatem superioris adversùs inferiorem in constituendis pœnis: Cicero nomen generis pro specie ponens, hanc ipsam clementiam lenitatem vocavit, eamque definiit, justitiam positam in moderatione animadvertendi; justitiæ nempe voce tam latè sumptâ, ut & pietatem, & fidem, & amicitiam complectatur. Hæc ergo clementia ad eam virtutem pertinet, quam Aristoteles in Ethicis vocat πραότητα [*mansuetudinem*]. Est enim clementia τοῦ ἄρχοντος πραότης [*Principis mansuetudo*]. Multùm autem disjuncta sunt πραότης [*mansuetudo*] & ἐλευθεριότης [*liberalitas*]. Scriptura hanc Dei clementiam nomine aliquanto generaliori vocat χρηστότητα [*beneficentiam*], Rom. II, 4. & XI, 22. Tit. III, 4. ἐλευθεριότητα [*liberalitatem*] autem nunquam. Imò quod ampliùs est, vox ἐλευθεριότης sive *liberalitatis* ne in aliis quidem rebus quæ dari & accipi solent, de Deo usurpatur; sed hæc quoque virtus charitas potiùs Dei dicitur; quia liberalitatis propriè est ita dare aliquid, ut danti pereat. Quòd autem Socinus magnâ sermonis intemperantiâ perpetuam Ecclesiæ sententiam

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impietatis damnat & sacrilegii, ideo quòd ipse, ut dicit, duplicem agnoscat Dei liberalitatem, nos autem simplicem duntaxat, in ea re magnam veritati injuriam facit. Nam duplicem Dei non liberalitatem (ea enim vox ab hoc argumento aliena & Scripturæ inusitata est) sed beneficentiam, nostra quoque sententia agnoscit, & quidem majorem multò, quàm ista nuper nata Socini opinió. Prior est beneficentia, quòd cùm Deus magno odio contra peccatum incitaretur, posset que tam nobis parcere omnino nolle, quàm peccatoribus Angelis parcere omnino noluit; tamen ut nobis parceret, non modò solutionem talem, quam admittere non tenebatur, admiserit, sed ipse quoque ultro eam repererit. Hoc certè beneficium multò est majus atque illustrius, quàm si Deus planè judicans nihil referre, exemplum statueretur aliquod necne, peccata nostra reliquisset impunita, quod vult Socinus. Non ergo clementia Dei pœnæ solutione evertitur, cùm talem solutionem admittere multoque magis invenire ex sola clementia processerit. Altera beneficentia est, quod Filium suum sibi charissimum, imaginem sui, & (si ita loqui licet) alterum se, morti dederit, non tantùm ut doctrinæ veritati testimonium redderet, & sic ad resurrectionem perveniret (intra quæ sistit se Socinus) verùm vel imprimis ut eam solutionem sive satisfactionem perageret, pœnas peccatorum nostrorum ferendo: in qua profectò parte fateri debet Socinus, multo se Christo minus debere velle quam nos debeamus; imò & Dei charitatem à nobis majorem prædicari, vel hoc evincat, quod beneficia non ex solo impendio, sed præcipuè ex utilitate, quæ ex impendio ad beneficio affectum manat, par est æstimari. Nos autem præter utilitates quas nobiscum Socinus confitetur, unam eximiam, quam ille abnegat, grato animo agnoscimus. Neque dicimus à Deo impensum esse Filium, ut ipse Deus suum reciperet, ac sic Deum sordidum facimus, quod nobis exprobrat Socinus, sed ideo id factum à Deo dicimus, ut peccati meritum, suumque adversùs peccata odium palam testata faceret, & simul, quantum ejus nobis parcendo fieri poterat, rerum ordini, legisque suæ autoritati consuleret. Neque illud minùs iniquum, &, ut ipsius voce utar, immane est, quod à nobis immanem Deum dicit statui. Nam finis iste satisfactionis superadditus nihilo graviores Christi perpessiones facit: quas sine ulla crudelitate ipsi à Deo inflictas Socinus cogitur fateri: imò quò fines sunt plures, eò à crudelitatis specie longius absceditur. Nam crudelis est qui frustra, aut levi de causa aliquem torquet. Adde jam quod finis hic satisfactionis sive pœnæ ferendæ multo apertiùs, imò multo etiam certiore nexu cum morte Christi cohæret, quàm isti fines quos agnoscit Socinus. Nam testimonium doctrinæ satis atque abunde præbere poterant miracula: gloria quoque cœlestis conferri Christo, non interveniente morte, facilè potuit: at pœnæ luendæ mors, talis præsertim, propriè accommodata est, & pœna ipsa pariendæ liberationi.

Quanquam verò hactenus ostendimus Christi pœnâ Deo satisfactum, negare tamen nolumus vim satisfactionis esse etiam in ipsa Christi actione. Solet enim sæpe etiam actio grata admitti velut in pœnæ compensationem. *Beneficium superveniens*, inquit Seneca, *injuriam apparere non patitur*: De benef. lib. VI, cap. V, quo loco ostendit reddere esse rem pro re dare, & solutione non idem solvi, sed tantundem. Quamvis autem beneficium accipere Deus ἀνενδεὴς [*nullius rei indigus*] non potest, ipsius tamen summa bonitas qualecunque obsequium quasi pro beneficio accipit. Sic Achabus pœnam temporalem lucrifecit Deum suppliciter venerando. Neque tantùm sua actio alicui ad impunitatem solet prodesse, sed & alterius, quicum ipse conjunctus est. Sic posteris Davidis propter ipsum Davidem pœna remissa est, II Reg. VIII, 19. non tantùm ob promissiones Davidi factas, verùm etiam quia Davidis actiones Deo benignè eas æstimanti placuerant, I Reg. XI, 13. II Reg. VIII, 19, & XX, 6. Sic Æschylum narrat Ælianus à pœna liberatum, quia frater ipsius Amyntas pro patria fortiter fecisset. Sic apud Romanos Tito Quinctio accusato profuit patris Cincinnati memoria. Livius de Appio, *majorum merita in rempublicam commemorabat, quo pœnam deprecaretur. Plautio Laterano* (inquit Tacitus) *mors remittitur ob patrui egregium meritum.* Et in universum Salustius: *Si deliquêre, vetus nobilitas, majorum facta fortia præsidio adsunt.* Cicero: *Oportebit eum, qui sibi ut ignoscatur postulabit, majorum suorum beneficia, si qua extabunt, proferre.* Quintilianus: *Periclitantem commendant merita majorum.* Ioseph. παρακλησιν εἶναι δεῖ τῆς τῶν ἐκγόνων ἁμαρτίας τὰς τῶν πατέρων ἐυπιδίας [*oportet majorum beneficia deprecationem pœnæ posterorum peccato debitæ esse*]. Sicut autem opera temporaliter bona valent ad temporalem impunitatem, ita Christi opus perfectè & spiritualiter bonum ad liberationem à pœna æterna valuit. Quò illud spectat: *Per obedientiam unius, justi constituuntur multi*, id est, justificantur, [a] habentur quasi insontes, Rom. V, 19. Et alterum: *Propter nomen ejus* (Christi scilicet, solius enim Christi, non autem Dei mentio præcesserat, fatente Socino, ac præterea hoc ipsum evincit similis sententia. Actor. X, 43). *remittuntur nobis peccata*, I Ioh. II, 12. Certum enim est hac phrasi *propter nomen alicujus*, denotari causam impulsivam: neque ullo Scripturæ loco diversum Socinus evicerit. Quod verò de satisfactione jam diximus, eam primò quidem pœnæ, deinde verò ipsi etiam actioni obsequiosæ tribui, idem de placatione Dei, de redemptione nostra, & de expiatione intelligi debet, ad quæ explicanda jam accingimur.

CAPVT VII.

De placatione & reconciliatione per Christi mortem factâ.

NEquis arbitretur de sola voce disputationem institutam, satis cavit ipse Socinus, cùm passim profitetur, à se non vocem nudam satisfactionis, sed rem ipsam eâ voce expressam oppugnari. Itaque hæc omnia, Christus morte suâ nobis Deum recon-

[a] Contra Soc. lib. II, cap. XXV.

reconciliavit. Christus nos è manibus justitiæ Divinæ sanguinem suum redemptionis nostræ pretium illi dans, liberavit. Christus scelera nostra suâ obedientiâ compensavit. Christus ut remissionem peccatorum nobis Deus largiretur, dignè commeritus est. Christus vitæ jacturâ Dei iram nobis placavit, non minùs quàm ipsam satisfactionis vocem repudiat (lib. II, cap. XXVI). Neque tamen si de voce instituta esset disputatio, æquum foret Ecclesiam Scripturas interpretandi libertate fraudari, in qua hoc quoque est comprehensum, ea quæ aut Prophetæ Hebraïcis, aut Apostoli Græcis vocibus, Hebraïsmum plerumque aut Syriasmum redolentibus, elocuti sunt, in alios sermones quàm commodissimè transferre, aut quæ ad idem argumentum pertinentia diversis locis tradidit Scriptura perspicuo verborum compendio in summam redigere. Sic quod Scriptura dixit ob peccata morti traditum Christum, & peccata, id est, peccatorum pœnas tulisse, fusumque sanguinem ad remissionem peccatorum, Latinè & significanter exprimitur satisfaciendi vocabulo. Nam ea dictio in Iure & usu communi significat facti alicujus aut rei exhibitionem, ex qua non quidem ipso facto, sed accedente voluntatis actu liberatio sequatur; soletque non tantùm in pecuniariis debitis, sed & in delictis hoc sensu usurpari: quod linguæ ex Romana depravatæ appellant, aliquem contentare. Vt autem appareat idem valentes locutiones, imò illas ipsas, quas rejicit Socinus, in Sacris Literis reperiri, ad ea quæ supra in prima sententiæ hujus explicatione ex Sacro Codice deprompta sunt, addemus alia quædam testimonia, eaque referemus ad classes quatuor. Prima classis erit earum locutionum, quæ iræ aversionem designant. Altera earum, quæ liberationem per redemptionem seu pretio dato factam indicant. Tertia earum, quæ subrogationem innuunt. Quarta earum, quæ morti Christi vim adscribunt sacri expiatorii.

Ad primam classem ut accingamur, notissimum est iram alicujus avertere, id dici Græcè ἱλάσκεσθαι, εἰρηνοποιεῖν, καταλλάσσειν, ἀποκαταλλάσσειν, Latinè *placare*, *pacare*, *conciliare*, aut *reconciliare*, item *propitiare*. Tum actus ipse, tum id quo propriè actus peragitur, Græcis ἱλασμὸς, Latinis *placamen* dicitur. In Deo ira, ut supra diximus, appellatur ἀνθρωποπαθῶς [*per adfictionem humanarum passionum*], puniendi quasi affectus; quam Apostolus ait retegi sive revelari cœlitùs in omnem impietatem atque injustitiam hominum, ut qui veritatem in injustitia detineant, hoc est, cognitis Dei mandatis reluctentur. Nemo autem excipitur, cùm omnes simus naturâ filii iræ, hoc est, iræ Divinæ obnoxii. Hæc ira super quosdam manet, Ioh. III, 36. Super quos non manet, ab iis avertitur. Hanc aversionem Christus suâ morte impetrat, ideoque placamen rectissimè dicitur. Sic eum bis appellat Iohannes Apostolus, cùm dicit: *Si quis peccarit, advocatum habemus apud Patrem, Iesum Christum illum innocentem: Et ipse est* ἱλασμὸς [*placamen*] *pro peccatis nostris: neque verò pro nostris tantùm, sed & pro peccatis totius mundi*, Epist. I, cap. II, vers. 1, 2. Item, *In eo sita est dilectio, non quod nos Deum dilexerimus, sed quod ipse dilexerit nos, & Filium suum miserit* ἱλασμὸν [*placamen*] *pro peccatis nostris*, cap. IV, 10. Cum quo loco conferendus est iste Paulinus: *Commendat Deus suam charitatem, quod cùm peccatores adhuc essemus Christus pro nobis est mortuus*, Rom. V, 8. Vterque enim tam Paulus quàm Iohannes eodem argumento probant, non priores nos dilexisse, sed dilectos à Deo: & quod Paulus dicit mortuum esse, hoc Iohannes vocat placamen esse factum. Addendus præterea locus ille Pauli: *Iustificamur gratis per redemptionem in Christo Iesu, quem Deus proposuit* ἱλαστήριον [*placamentum*] *per Fidem in sanguine ipsius* (Rom. III, 24, 25). Factus est ergo Christus ἱλασμὸς [*placamen*] sive ἱλαστήριον [*placamentum*] in sanguine suo: quod quid est aliud, quàm id ipsum quod negat Socinus, placatum à Christo Deum? Nam quod ἱλασμὸν apud Iohannem *expiationem* interpretatur (lib. II, cap. XX), expiationis autem voce peccati destructionem intelligit, id facit nulla de causa, nullo munitus exemplo: ἱλάσκειν apud Græcos Scriptores omnes, Poëtas, Historicos, alios, est *placare*, soletque construi cum accusativo designante personam, cujus ira avertitur. Nec aliter apud LXX interpretes, & Luc. XVIII, 13 usurpatur. Vno dumtaxat loco, qui est Heb. II, 17. dicitur Christus summus Sacerdos constitutus εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ [*ut repropitiaret peccata populi*]: ubi est enallage ex Hebraïsmo veniens ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας [*repropitiare peccata*], cùm usitatè dici debuerit ἱλάσκεσθαι Θεὸν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν [*repropitiare Deum pro peccatis*]: ita Hebræi כפר usurpant; ἐξιλάσκεται ἁμαρτίας [*expiat peccata*] in Ecclesiastico. Ευιλαβεῖν πάσαις ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις [*propitiari omnibus peccatis*] Psal. CIII, 3. Significat ergo ibi expiationem, sed eam quæ fit placando. Alioqui hic vocis usus nihil haberet commune cum natura vocis ac perpetua ejusdem significatione. Quare talem expiationem, qualem Socinus (lib. II, cap. XVI) comminiscitur, id est, peccati destructionem, quæ fit sine placamento, ista quidem vox ἱλάσκεσθαι [*placare*] & inde derivata ἱλασμὸς [*placamen*], denotare non potest; ἱλαστήριον [*placamentum*] autem apud Paulum interpretatur Socinus id, in quo se Deus placatum ostendit. Non negamus posse hanc significationem voci congruere, ac tali aliquâ ratione tegmen Arcæ apud scriptorem ad Hebræos vocari ἱλαστήριον [*placamentum*]. [a] Sed cùm ejus terminationis vocabula propriè vim quandam effectivam, impropriè verò declarativam indicent; à proprietate nos hîc discedere nulla ratio patitur. Apparet enim Christum ita apud Paulum dici ἱλαστήριον [*placamentum*], ut apud Iohannem ἱλασμόν [*placamen*]. At ἱλασμὸς omnino significat *placamen*, non placationis testimonium: quare Scripturâ Scripturam intepretante, vox quoque ἱλαστηρίου [*placamenti*] de Christo activè, non declarativè exponenda est. Accedit quod hoc ipsum ostendit vox adjuncta *sanguinis*, cui placandi vis tribuitur: quia χωρὶς αἱματεκχυσίας οὐ γίνεται ἄφεσις [*sine sanguinis effusione non fit remissio*] Hebr. IX, 22). Trita sunt,

Sanguine Placastis *ventos & virgine cæsa;*

Et similia apud Poëtas, de quibus infra accuratiùs agendi erit locus.

a contra Socin. lib. II, cap. II.

Simi-

[a] Similis placandi voci est vox καταλλάσσειν & ἀποκαταλλάσσειν, *conciliare* sive *reconciliare*, quam in hoc ipso argumento usurpat Paulus, Rom. v, 10, & 11. & 11 Cor. v, 18. & Ephes. ii, 16. & Coloss. i, 20. Opponit Socinus scriptum esse, non Deum nobis conciliatum, sed nos Deo, idque idcirco quia non Deus nobis iratus, ideoque placandus, sed nos à Deo aversi fuerimus. Verùm quod sibi sumit, eum reconciliari qui infesto sit animo, non autem ipsi alterum, id minimè verum est. Nam reconciliandi vox, ut & pacandi vox, promiscuè utrivis parti, tum quæ infensa est, tum quæ neutiquam, aut minùs infensa est, modò dativum, modò accusativum assignat. Idem ergo valet nos Deo conciliari & Deum nobis. Sophocles Ajace:

Ἀλλ' οἴχεται τοι πρὸς τὸ κέρδιστον τραπεὶς
Γνώμης, θεοῖσιν ὡς καταλλαχθῇ χόλου.
[*Sed optimam conversus ad sententiam*
Ajax diis placandus iratis abit].

Vbi Chorus id exprimit, quod ante Ajax dixerat,

Ἀλλ' εἶμι πρός τε λουτρὰ καὶ παραλίους
Λειμῶνας, ὡς ἂν λύμαθ' ἁγνίσας ἐμὰ,
Μῆνιν βαρεῖαν ἐξαλλάσσωμαι θεᾶς.
[*Verum ad lavacra vado, & littus maris*
Februa mearum sordium ut faciam probè,
Iram deæ fugiens mihi gravissimam].

Videmus hîc manifestè καταλλάσσεσθαι θεοῖς, *Diis conciliari*, idem esse quod iram ipsorum effugere. Et sanè de hac reconciliatione, hoc est, Divinæ iræ aversione, aut certè etiam de hac agi nemo negabit, qui locos ipsos modò citatos diligentiùs inspexerit.

Nam Rom. v, Paulus suo more bis idem exprimens, quod ante dixerat, *pro impiis & pro peccatoribus mortuum esse Christum*, vers. 6, & 8. mox his verbis enuntiat, *cùm hostes essemus reconciliatos nos Deo per mortem Filii ipsius*, vers. 10. Esse autem hoc beneficium prius ipsa conversione ex opposito membro apparet, si hæc, inquit, ita se habent, *multò magis nunc justificati per ipsum, ab ira servabimur*, vers. 9. Item, *multò magis reconciliati servabimur in vita ipsius*, vers. 10. A majori procedit Apostolica argumentatio. Si tam bonus erga nos necdum conversos Deus fuit, quis futurus erga conversos? Non potest hîc vox conciliationis in membro priore conversionem denotare. Singulare enim aliquid in Christo Apostolus notat. Tale autem non est, peccatores convertere: neque enim convertuntur unquam nisi peccatores: sed rarum planeque singulare est pro peccatoribus mori, & conciliare per mortem peccatores; cùm paucissimi semper fuerint, qui pro amicis viris bonis mortem oppeterent, vers. 7. Deinde conversio rectiùs vitæ Christi gloriosæ, quàm morti fertur accepta: at reconciliatio ista morti tribuitur distinctæ atque discriminatæ à vita gloriosa, ut ostendit dictionis τὸ ἀντίστοιχον [*oppositum*]. Præterea ex posteriore beneficio quale sit prius datur intelligi. Posterius quod conversis contingit, est pacem habere apud Deum, vers. 1. *servari ab ira Dei*, vers. 9, & 10. Hoc ipsum appellat Apostolus accipere reconciliationem, vers. 11. Quid hîc est aliud accipere reconciliationem quàm accipere remissionem peccatorum? ut Scriptura loquitur, Act. x, 43, & xxvi, 18. At conversionem accipere ignotum est loquendi genus. Si ergo in posteriori membro accipere reconciliationem est accipere peccatorum reconciliationem, ipsoque effectu ab ira sive à pœna liberari, in priore quoque membro reconciliari significationem habere debet ἀνάλογον [*æquipollentem*]: ut prius beneficium sit jus ad rem, posterius ejusdem rei exhibitio. Adde his omnibus, quòd non possit, nisi incommodè aut ineptè etiam dici charitas Dei ex eo colligi, quia nos ab odio Dei discesserimus. Nam etiamsi de conversionis nostræ beneficio agere voluisset Apostolus, erat id aliâ planè voce exprimendum, quæ non nostram, sed Dei actionem significaret. Nostrâ verò interpretatione nihil planius, nihil Apostoli proposito convenientius. Quod autem Socinus objicit, satisfactionis mentionem non esse hîc appositam, imo charitatis laudem per eam imminui, vanum est. Non enim satisfactionis fit mentio quatenus pœna est, sed quatenus modus nos liberandi. Neque potest, ut supra probavimus, ullâ ratione manifestiùs ostendi Dei charitas adversùm homines, quàm quod iratus, id est, pœnas expetens, nostræ tamen impunitati viam, Christo in id impenso, invenerit.

In loco 11 Cor. v, circa finem, ut in illo ad Romanos, duplicis invenitur reconciliationis mentio. Prior reconciliatio est quâ Deus omnia, sive mundum sibi reconciliavit per Christum, sive in Christo, vers. 18, & 19. Posterior est ad quam Apostoli, ut ministri reconciliationis, quibus impositus est reconciliationis sermo, homines adhortantur Dei ac Christi nomine, vers. 18, 19, 20. Prior ergo illa non potest esse ipsa conversio; est enim antecedens & materia præcipua ejus sermonis per quem fit conversio. Deinde Paulus ipse ostendit eam consistere in non imputatione peccatorum, id est, in decreto non imputandi. Non imputare autem peccata & remittere idem valent, Rom. iv, 6, 7, 8. Quomodo autem hoc non imputandi decretum in Christo fundatum est? Dicet Paulus: *Eum enim qui peccatum non noverat pro nobis Deus peccatum fecit.* 11 Cor. v, 21. Quod objicit Socinus, non imputationem peccatorum pugnare cum isto reconciliandi modo per satisfactionem, caret ratione. Nam, ut supra explicatum est, præcedit satisfactio; sequitur deinde remissio sive non imputatio: ut jam taceam non absolutè dici, Deum non imputare peccata, sed non imputare ipsis, hoc est, peccatoribus. Posse autem & huic peccatum remitti sive non imputari peccatum, & alteri ob exemplum imputari, sive alterum eo nomine affligi atque puniri, tum ex multis, quæ supra allegavimus, tum imprimis ex eo quod Davidi contigit, satis apparet. Neque verò quia non verbis ἀμέσως [*immediatè*] cohærent, *Non imputans peccata.* Et, *Eum qui non noverat peccatum, peccatum fecit*; ideo non ad eandem rem ista pertinent. Conjunguntur enim ista inter se per voculas συνδετικὰς [*copulativas*] καὶ [*&]* & γὰρ [*enim*]. Neque ullus novus, & ab hoc argumento alienus sermo intercedit: sed hoc dicitur, Deum beneficii à se præstiti legatos & ministros fecisse Apostolos: in hoc scilicet missos per orbem terrarum,

a contra Socin. lib. I, cap. VIII.

rum, ut ejus beneficii fidem hominibus prædicatione suâ insererent. Ei autem fidei faciendæ argumentum validissimum est, à traditione Christi in mortem. Minimè enim credibile est, voluisse Deum filium charissimum & innocentissimum tam graviter affligi, nisi egregio aliquo fine sibi proposito. Hic autem finis, proprius inquam & cum isto facto proximè cohærens, Scripturâ ubique & ipsâ ratione aliquatenus κατ' ἐπαγωγὴν [*per inductionem*] testante, alius esse vix potest, quàm impetrandum jus veniæ per antecedentem satisfactionem. Illud verò, *Rogamus pro Christo, reconciliamini Deo*, vers. 20. quanquam ex vocis natura potest significare, aut odium in Deum abjicite, aut accipite remissionem peccatorum, (per pœnitentiam scilicet, ut ostenditur Marc. I, 4. Luc. III, 3. Act. III, 19, & V, 31) ex rei tamen natura de qua agitur, posteriorem sensum rectiùs admittit. Neque enim solet infirmior rogari, ut potentiorem in gratiam recipiat: & illa Pauli verba exprimunt ipsum reconciliationis ministerium, quam reconciliationem jamjam non-imputatione peccatorum descripserat. Sic Christus ipse missum se dixit κηρύξαι αἰχμαλώτοις ἄφεσιν [*prædicare captivis remissionem*], Luc. IV, 18. & Apostolis præcipit κηρύσσειν ἐν ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν [*prædicare in nomine ejus remissionem peccatorum*], Luc. XXIV, 47. Sic ipse Paulus dicit se καταγγέλλειν ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν [*annuntiare remissionem peccatorum*], Act. XIII, 38.

Ephes. II, 16. scribitur de Christo, ἵνα ἀποκαταλλάξῃ τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους (Iudæos & Gentes) ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι τῷ Θεῷ [*ut reconciliet ambos in uno corpore Deo*]. Hîc dativus Θεῷ [*Deo*] non potest regi nisi à verbo ἀποκαταλλάξῃ [*reconciliet*]. Socini autem interpretatio, ut *Deo* hîc per se subsistat, aut reconciliare Deo sit reconciliare ipsos inter se ut Deo serviant, distorta est, dura & sine exemplo. Neque valet argumentum inde ductum, quòd eo loco Paulus propriè agat de pace facta inter Iudæos & Gentes: neque enim sequitur ab hoc argumento alienam esse mentionem pacis quæ utrisque cum Deo comparata est. Duo enim diversa quæ junguntur, ita junguntur inter se, ut priùs ac potiùs jungantur ipsi vinculo: neque enim junguntur inter se nisi per & propter vinculum. Amici ergo facti inter se Gentes & Iudæi per amicitiam cum Deo. Ac mirum est hoc non agnoscere Socinum, cùm dicat ipse Col. I, 20, 21, 22. Apostolum instituto sermone de parta inter creaturas concordia, statim καὶ ἀμέσως [*& immediatè*] subjicere mentionem reconciliationis ejus, quâ homines amici Deo sunt facti, & quidem interjectâ voce καὶ [*&*], quæ non solet res nullo modo cohærentes connectere. Vnde manifestum est esse hæc inter se conjuncta, ita ut rectè Paulus, isto quo de agimus ad Ephesios loco, reconciliationem hominum cum hominibus ad reconciliationem hominum cum Deo, tanquam effectum ad causam suam, retulerit. Illud addendum est, nominari eo ipso in loco sanguinem Christi, tanquam per quem effecta sit reconciliatio. At sanguini Christi passim Scriptura subjungit, tanquam effectum maximè proprium, peccatorum remissionem, Matth. XXVI, 28. Ephes. I, 7. Coloss. I, 14. Hebr. IX, 22. Rom. III, 24, 25. Rom. V, 9. I Ioh. I, 7. I Pet. I, 2. Apoc. I, 5. per vim scilicet placatricem, I Ioh. II, 2. & IV, 10.

Isti ad Ephesios loco persimilis mihi videtur is cujus jam injecta est mentio, ad Col. I, 20. planè ut ad explicationem istius hunc potiùs adferendum existimem quàm illum Ephes. I, 9, 10. Plurima enim congruunt; quod illic separatim dicitur *per sanguinem & per crucem*, hîc dicitur conjunctim *per sanguinem crucis*. Ibi est ποιῶν εἰρήνην [*faciens pacem*], hîc εἰρηνοποιήσας [*pacificans*]: ibi, *ut reconciliaret ambos Deo*; hîc, *reconciliare omnia in seipsum*, hoc est, in Deum. Hoc interest, quod ibi duntaxat mentio fiat de hominibus inter se conciliatis, quia conciliati erant Deo, hîc verò de hominibus conciliatis, & inter se & cum Angelis, ideo quia homines conciliati erant Deo. Εἰς αὐτὸν, omnino est *in sese*, Deum scilicet, ut & Syrus interpretatur לה, hoc est, *sibi*. Nam si hoc vellent istæ voces, quod Socinus vult, *in unum*, scribendum fuerat εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ, aut saltem εἰς αὐτὸ, non εἰς αὐτὸν [*in sese*], aut εἰς αὐτὸν [*in eum*] quod ad personam certam necessariò refertur. Neque novum est præpositionem IN cum accusativo poni vice dativi, cùm apud Hebræos frequentissima sit particularum ב & ל permutatio. Quid quod ipso Socino fatente, usitata est apud Græcos phrasis καταλλάττειν τινὰ πρὸς ἕτερον [*reconciliare aliquem ad alium*]. At εἰς [*in* cum accusativo] in Apostolico sermone poni vice τοῦ πρὸς [*ad*] negare nemo poterit, qui vel paucos locos diligenter inspexerit, quales sunt Matth. XV, 24. Act. XVI, 40. Ephes. III, 19. earundemque vocum commutatio in profanis quoque Scriptoribus non raro occurrit. Quare verisimile non est, quod vult Socinus, hoc commate de sola agi creaturarum inter se conciliatione: sequenti autem commate de conciliatione hominum cum Deo. Contra enim quod universim dicitur vers. 20. id 21. ad Colossenses speciatim applicatur: quod notat vox καὶ ὑμᾶς [*& vos*], hoc est, *quin vos etiam*, sive *vos quoque ipsos*. In hoc verò commate non id dicitur quod ait Socinus, reconciliationem factam nos inculpatos reddendo: sed reconciliatos nos ut redderemur inculpati. Socinus ex fine modum fecit, sanè prælicenter. Passim indicat Scriptura remitti nobis peccata, ut in posterum sanctè vivamus tanto beneficio obligati, Luc. I, 74. Et notandum in hoc quoque commate corporis Christi fieri mentionem, quod quidem pro nobis fractum est, in remissionem peccatorum, I Cor. XI, 24. Matth. XXVI, 28. & mortis, cui similiter remissionem tanquam effectum passim tribui jam ante ostendimus. Quod autem addit Apostolus, reconciliatos nos esse cùm alienati & inimici mente essemus, simile est ei quod alibi dixit, Christum pro nobis, cum peccatores & impii essemus, mortuum esse, Rom. V, 6, 8. Quare hîc quoque de eodem agi beneficio eô justius creditur, quia initium, quo in hunc sermonem Apostolus devenerat, hoc fuit, habere nos in Christo redemptionem, peccatorum scilicet remissionem. Et profectò non potest rectiùs intelligi, quantum nos Deus amaverit & Christus, quantumque nos Deo & Christo debeamus, quàm si consideremus nobis sub ira adhuc Dei constitutis, & peccatorum reis, remissionem peccatorum primò impetratam, deinde &

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applicatam; quæ duo plerumque conjungit Scriptura. Quod autem alio loco dicit Socinus (lib. I, cap. VII), oportuisse Deum nobis esse placatissimum minimeque iratum, antequam Christus mitteretur ad fœdus pangendum: id quàm sit à vero alienum alibi ipse videtur agnovisse, cùm Deum statuit (lib. I, cap. VIII) eo ipso momento, cùm ad amicitiam redintegrandam nobis conditiones offerret, fuisse animo non placato, sed placabili. Et profectò hoc ipsa dictat ratio. In omnibus enim conditionatis conditionalia priora sunt absolutis. Neque verò conditio offerri, sed & impleri debet, antequam sequatur actus absolutus. Quare pacem apud Deum habere nos dicit Scriptura, postquam per Fidem sumus justificati, Rom. V, 1. Antea sumus iræ filii, Ephes. II, 3. peccata enim nostra causa sunt separationis, hoc est, Deum à nobis aversum faciunt, Esai. LIX, 2. Hæc ira excludit pacem sive amicitiam: non autem qualemcunque dilectionem generaliter dictam: ut apparet Ioh. III, 16. & I Ioh. IV, 10. Et sanè peccata remitti hominibus ante pœnitentiam, ne Socinus quidem sentit: placatus autem actu, aut quâ voce Socinus utitur, placatissimus, dici non potest qui adhuc imputat peccata. Quæ res ut clariùs intelligatur, distinguenda sunt omnino tria, ut ita dicam, momenta Divinæ voluntatis. Primum est ante Christi mortem positam, aut reipsa aut in Dei decreto & præscientia. In hoc momento iratus peccatori est Deus, sed ita ut non aversetur omnes iræ deponendæ vias ac rationes. Secundum momentum est positâ jam Christi morte: in quo Deus jam non constituit tantùm, sed & promittit iram se depositurum. Tertium est, cùm homo verâ Fide in Christum credit, & Christus ex fœderis formula credentem Deo commendat. Hîc jam Deus deponit iram, hominemque in gratiam recipit. Cùm verò verba activa & passiva iisdem respondentia duplicem soleant habere significatum, aut ut intra vim atque efficaciam consistant, aut ut effectum (scilicet ultimatum) simul includant, sequitur, in primo momento neutrum horum locum habere; itaque ejus respectu Deum dici posse tantùm placabilem: in secundo & tertio rectè dici eum placari, distinctis duobus quos jam indicavi sensibus. In priore sensu dicitur, *Deus mundum sibi in Christo conciliasse*, II Cor. V, 19: &, *Nos Deo reconciliati cùm hostes essemus*, Rom. V, 10. In posteriore illud, *conciliamini Deo*, II Cor. V, 20: & *reconciliationem accepimus*, Rom. V, 11. Eademque vocum redemptionis & expiationis, & ejus locutionis, quâ Christus interdum pro omnibus, interdum pro aliquibus mortuus dicitur, est ratio. Illud postremò notandum est, vocem reconciliationis non excludere satisfactionem sive præstationem omnem & impendium. Nam apud Livium est, *Vt eo munere reconciliaret sibi civium animos*: & alibi passim similia occurrunt: ut eo quidem nomine nihilo minus reconciliator noster Christus dici debeat: quod ipsum quoque monstrat Scriptura, cùm reconciliationi addit mentionem sanguinis.

CAPVT VIII.

De redemptione nostra per Christi mortem facta.

AD[a] secundam testimoniorum classem, quæ de Redemptione est, ut veniamus, ante omnia ponendum est extra controversiam, redemptionem similesque voces in Sacris Literis aptari ad liberationem nostram à pœna commerita, quod ita esse apparet Gal. III, 13. Rom. III, 24. & præcipuè Ephes. I, 7. & Coloss. I, 14. neque diffitetur Socinus. Quin & illi loci, qui nos ab iniquitate & vana conversatione dicunt redemptos, ut Tit. II, 14. & I Petri I, 18. eôdem pertinent, cùm peccatum pro peccati pœna poni sit receptissimum: idque in loco ad Titum addita vox καθαρίζειν, id est, *expiare*, quàm infra (cap. X) explicabimus, & in Petri loco *agni*, hoc est, victimæ mentio apertum faciunt. Hanc redemptionem morti Christi tanquam causæ adscribi, cùm passim testetur Scriptura, ut Ephes. I, 7. Rom. III, 24. Hebr. IX, 12. ne id quidem inficiari potuit Socinus. Sed quomodo causa redemptionis sit mors Christi, id est, de quo quæritur. Nos enim ideo causam redemptionis esse mortem Christi dicimus, quòd ea Deum moverit, ut nos à pœna liberaret: idipsum verò negat Socinus. Quanquam verò si quid esset ambigui in his testimoniis, in quibus redemptionis fit mentio, satis esset iis interpretandis alia ejusdem argumenti loca afferre, qualia multa citavimus, quæ Christum ob peccata nostra mortuum, pœnas pro nobis tulisse, & sic impetrasse nobis peccatorum remissionem, Deo scilicet per ipsius mortem placato, non obscurè significant, confidimus tamen eandem sententiam satis apertè ex iis etiam locis, quæ redemptionis vocem similesque alias usurpant, posse comprobari. Duplex autem in Scriptura φράσις [*locutio*] occurrit, altera, quæ delictorum redemptionem nominat, altera quæ nostram, diverso loquendi genere, at significatu eodem.

Prior illa φράσις [*locutio*] Hebr. IX, 15, ubi Christi mors dicitur peracta εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν παραβάσεων [*in redemptionem delictorum*]. Hoc autem loquendi genere ἀπολυτρῶν τὰς παραβάσεις, aut Latinè, *culpas*, *delicta*, *crimina redimere*, non tantùm significari causam moventem ad liberandum, sed talem etiam, quæ compensationem aut satisfactionem includat, tam manifestum est, ut fateri id quoque debuerit Socinus. Cùm hæc ergo istius locutionis usitatissima sit significatio, non licet inde nobis recedere, nisi duo probentur, interdum, etsi minùs frequenter, aliud eâ locutione significari, & causam hîc esse justam, cur infrequentior significatio frequentiori præferri debeat. Horum neutrum à Socino probatur. Nullum enim adfert locum aut sacri aut profani Scriptoris, ubi ἀπολυτρῶν τὰς παραβάσεις, *redimere peccata*, *culpas*, *offensas*, aliud quidpiam ab eo quod diximus, designet. In gnoma Salomonis, Prov. XVI, 6, est vox Hebræa כפר, quæ voci Græcæ ἀπολυτρῶν [*redimere*] propriè non respondet: quod ipsum quoque Socinus agnoscit, cùm ait expiationem potiùs quàm redemptionem câ

[a] Contra Soc. lib. II, cap. I, II, III.

eâ voce designari. Addi potest nativam maximè significationem ejus vocis esse, *obtegere*, atque inde ad alia similitudine quadam produci. Neque verò sequitur, si vox כפר, quæ apud Hebræos, ut multæ aliæ, ob primitivarum vocum in ea lingua penuriam, est πολύσημος [*multa significans*], ita ut cùm alia, tum ἀπολυτρῶν [*redimere*] quoque possit significare, ideo & vicissim Græcum ἀπολυτρῶν omnes habere significationes quas habet כפר, cùm vocis ἀπολυτρῶν simplex sit usus apud Græcos origini suæ respondens, alias autem significationes vocis כפר aliæ Græcorum voces exprimant. Apud Danielem IV, 24 est vox Hebræa פרק, quæ voci Græcæ ἀπολυτρῶν minimè ἰσοδυναμεῖ [*æquepollet*]: sed & propriè & frequenter significat *conterere*, *frangere*, *avellere*: & propter hoc postremum, etiam *liberare*. Quanquam etiamsi redimere hoc loco cum veteribus interpretemur, nihil nos coget hanc vocem sumere extra eam quam defendimus significationem. Movetur enim Deus pœnitentiæ fructibus ut inhibeat pœnas temporales, ut antea quoque notatum est.

Altera verò locutio, quæ personam redemptam indicat, sæpissimè in Sacris Literis nostro argumento accommodata invenitur, ut Rom. III, 24. Ephes. I, 7, & alibi. In Græco est verbum λυτρῶν & ἀπολυτρῶν [*redimere*], & hinc verbale λύτρωσις & ἀπολύτρωσις [*redemptio*]. Quæritur, hic actus Christo propriè, an impropriè tribuatur. Redemptionem, hoc est, ἀπολύτρωσιν (nam alioqui vox redimendi Latinis est πολύσημος [*multa significans*]) propriam, definit Socinus, liberationem captivi è manibus detinentis pretio detinenti dato: nimis angustè. Nam vocis & natura & usus non ad captivitatem solam restringitur, sed ad omne genus incommodi, ut & liberationis vocabulum. Rectiùs ergo definias; Ἀπολύτρωσις, sive *redemptio*, est liberatio alicujus ab incommodo, λύτρῳ [*pretio*] intercedente. Sic Maro redemptionis vocem propriè usurpavit, cùm dixit,

* *Si fratrem Pollux alternâ morte redemit.*

Liberatur Castor à morte perpetua λύτρῳ [*redemptionis pretio*] intercedente, morte fratris alterna. Impropriè verò ἀπολύτρωσις & *redemptio* qualemcunque liberationem significat, etiam cui λύτρον [*pretium*] non intercedit. Sed ut Socinus fatetur, & jura nos docent, non est nisi gravibus de causis recedendum à verborum proprietate. In dubio ergo ἀπολύτρωσις [*redemptio*] intelligenda est fieri λύτρῳ [*pretio*] intercedente. Sed nunc ne dubitandi quidem est locus, cùm Scriptura ipsum λύτρον [*redemptionis pretium*] apertè nominet. *Venit enim Filius hominis dare animam suam* λύτρον [*redemptionis pretium*] *pro multis*, Matth. XX, 28. Marc. X, 45. cum quibus locis illi conjungendi sunt, qui per mortem, aut in sanguine factam testantur redemptionem, ut Hebr. IX, 12. Hi loci cùm validè Socino refragarentur, nihil aliud comminisci potuit, quam ut diceret (lib. II, cap. II) λύτρον sive *pretium* hîc dici impropriè. Propriè autem dictum λύτρον seu *pretium* definit, id quod à detinente accipitur. Hîc primum id quod modò diximus repetendum est, non debere deseri proprietatem, nisi res urgeat; at causas comminiscendæ improprietatis Socinus si quas attulit, eas à nobis, cap. IV, V, & VI, solutas confidimus. Nam Mosis cum Christo instituta collatio, responsione vix indiget, cùm omnis similitudo certos habeat terminos, quos extra protendi nequeat. Comparantur illi, quâ liberatores, non ob liberandi modum. Neque magis ex eo sequitur, Christum satisfaciendo nos non liberasse, quia Moses id non fecerit, quàm Christum nos liberasse per hostium mortem, quia id fecerit Moses. Quod si ad modum quoque liberandi comparatio pertineret, ea ut rectiùs procederet, dicendum esset, Christum nos liberasse miraculis, (ut Moses) non autem suâ morte, suoque sanguine, quod Mosi nec adscribitur, nec adscribi potest. Sed præcipuum est, quod vox λύτρον [*pretii*], de cujus vi hîc agimus, liberationi per Christum partæ additur à Scriptura, liberationi per Mosen partæ nusquam additur. Quid quod ne ex Socini quidem sententia modus liberandi idem est? Nam Moses, Iosue & alii liberarunt, non aliquid faciendo circa liberandos (quod Christo Socinus tribuit) sed amovendo eos qui libertati obstabant, hostes scilicet. Retinenda est ergo ἡ κυριολογία [*propria locutio*]: definitione tamen Socini nonnihil correctâ: ut propriè λύτρον sit res aut factum, quo movetur quispiam ut aliquem incommodo alioqui affecturus, eo liberari patiatur. Quod λύτρον definimus factum aut rem, in eo nobis cum Socino non disconvenit, qui fatetur propriè dici λύτρον sive *pretium*, non pecuniam modò, sed omne id quo alteri satisfit. Sed immeritò ille λύτρον [*pretium*] ad solam captivitatem restringit, cùm & servituti, & exilio, & morti, & omni incommodo, à quo liberari possumus, ea vox conveniat. Nam & origo, λύω [*libero*] scilicet ad ea quoque pertinet, & communis usus non refragatur. Illud quoque non probamus, quod λύτρον [*pretium*] propriè dictum omnino velit ab aliquo accipi. Nam si vox accipiendi rigidè sumatur, ut in definitionibus fieri solet, aptari factis non potest, sed rebus solis. At factis quoque potest satisfieri & liberatio impetrari. Atque hoc præcipue apparet in ea liberatione, quæ fit per pœnæ translationem. Pœnam enim propriè non accipi à quopiam, ex iis apparet quæ supra dicta sunt, ubi ostendimus in pœna neminem esse propriè & naturaliter creditorem. Præterea acceptionis vox propriè sumpta, si non dominii translationem, certè utilitatem aliquam accipientis indicat. At in pœna non spectatur propria utilitas punientis, sed bonum commune & ordo rerum. Acceptor ergo hîc nullus est, nisi libeat admodum impropriè acceptorem dicere judicem, tanquam juris & æqui ac boni communis curatorem. Λύτρον [*pretium*] nihilominus propriè locum habet, & in pœna. Ita Zaleuci oculus λύτρον [*pretium*] fuit oculi filii: & in decimatione qui puniuntur λύτρον sunt totius legionis. Latini veteres, quorum lingua tota Græcæ erat depravatio, literâ unâ interpositâ, λύτρον *lustrum* dixere, & λυτρῶν *lustrare*. Ita Ennius quod Græcè est Ἕκτορος λύτρα, Latinè Hectoris lustra inscripsit. Vt & Scaliger docuit ad 466 catalecta. Lustrare ergo urbem est eam à pœna liberare per lustrum, hoc

est, per pœnam succedaneam, quod & piaculum dicitur. Appianus Civilium lib. v. περιφέρουσιν ἀνὰ τὸν στόλον τὰ καθάρσια, συμπαρεπλεόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν στρατηγῶν, καὶ ἐπευχομένων ἐς, τὰ ὃ τὰ καθάρσια, ἀντὶ τοῦ στόλου τὰ ἀπαίσια τρεπῆναι [*circum classem lustramina circumferunt, navigantibus unà Ducibus, comprecantibusque ut in ea lustramina à classe avertantur infausta omina*]. Sic ex fatua gentium opinione, Decii lustrarunt Romanum exercitum: Thebas olim Menœceus, de quo mater apud Papinium,

Lustralemne feris ego te, puer inclyte, Thebis,
Devotumque caput, vilis ceu mater alebam?

Ad quem locum Luctatius, aut quisquis ille est scholiastes vetus: *Lustrare civitatem humanâ hostiâ Gallicus mos est.* Lustrare dixit, quod Cæsar dixerat placare deorum immortalium numen. Est ergo idem in pœnis *placamen* & *lustrum*, Græcè ἱλασμὸς & λύτρον: quæ ut Pagani in re falsò credita, ita in re verè credita Apostoli sensu eodem usurpant. Itaque in Epistola ad Hebræos pro eodem ponuntur λύτρωσις [*redemptio*] & καθαρισμὸς [*expiatio*], ut apparet cap. IX, vers. 12, 14, 15, 22, 23. Neque verò ex eo tantùm infertur, λύτρον [*pretium*] in hoc argumento sumendum propriè, quia nulla efficax ratio nos cogit ad improprietatem descendere, sed hinc etiam multo magis, quòd neque ex profano, neque ex sacro Scriptore locus ullus profertur, in quo λύτρα [*pretii*] significatio extra descriptionem à nobis positam porrigatur. Vide Esaïæ XLIII, 3. E Græco locum nullum profert Socinus, ex Hebræo unum duntaxat, Prov. XIII, 8. in quo est כפר. Sed præterquam quod latiùs potest patere כפר quàm λύτρον, quia λύτρον est à λύειν, quod *liberare* significat, cùm כפר, ut supra diximus, verbum sit πολύσημον [*multa significans*], non potest ullo argumento probari isto in loco voce כפר aliud designari, quàm id quod nociturum movere potest ne noceat, sive ille potentiam & affectum nocendi tantùm habeat, sive insuper jus etiam & potestatem. Simile enim est Salomonis istud; כפר, aut si ita placet, λύτρον [*redemptio*] *viri sunt divitiæ ejus*; isti sententiæ apud Iobum II, 4. *quicquid habet aliquis, id pro vita sua daturus est.* Est enim hic inter cætera divitiarum usus, quòd multorum iram aut justam aut injustam possunt placare, atque ita noxam imminentem avertere; juxta illud,

Munera, crede mihi, Placant *hominesque Deosque.*

Ac planè est in ista gnoma commodorum, quæ secum fert utraque fortuna, elegans comparatio: Dives habet quô placet iratum; Pauper iræ alienæ minùs est obnoxius. Quod si maximè verum esset, λύτρον accipi posse pro qualicunque *impendio*, etiam quoad liberandum nemo moveatur, (quod nullo exemplo probatum est) tamen vox ἀντιλύτρου [*redemptionis*], quâ Paulus utitur, I Tim. II, 6, significantior est, quàm ut tam frigidam interpretationem admittat. Vox enim ἀντὶ, in compositione aut *contrarietatem*, aut *commutationem* significat. Hîc contrarietas locum non habet: significatur ergo compensatio. Neque aliâ formâ Græcè dicuntur ἀντίψυχοι [*vicem animæ præstantes*], qui pro altero morti se devovent, ut ipsum liberent. Sic ἀντίλυτρον est tale λύτρον [*pretium*], in quo liberator simile quiddam subit ei malo, quod ei imminebat, qui liberatur: estque egregia ejus vocis quasi περίφρασις [*circumlocutio*], Galat. III, 13, *Christus* ἐξηγόρασεν, *redemit nos ab exsecratione, factus pro nobis exsecratio*: de cujus loci sensu supra egimus. Ad hæc accedit, quòd sanguinem Christi Petrus auro & argento comparat, tanquam majus quiddam eo ipso quâ pretium est, I Petri I, 18, 19. Solent autem aurum & argentum esse verè pretium, non figuratè: quare & sanguis æquè aut multò etiam magis verè sit pretium, necesse est. Est autem pretium id cujus impendio res aut jus aliquod acquiritur: eaque est pretii natura, ut sui valore aut æstimatione alterum moveat ad concedendam rem, aut jus aliquod, puta impunitatem. Addi his possunt illi loci, qui ostendunt à Christo datam carnem suam, aut seipsum, pro vita mundi, & ut nos liberaret, Ioh. VI, 51. Tit. II, 14. Est enim hæc phrasis, dare aliquid propter aliquid, vero pretio accommodatissima.

Socinus hæc, aliaque loca plura, in quibus mors aut sanguis Christi pretium liberationis nostræ vocantur, aliter eludere non potest, quàm ut dicat, esse quidem effectum mortis Christi liberationem nostram à pœnis (de liberatione enim à servitute peccati hîc agendi non est locus) sed quoad nos, non quoad Deum; id est, non Deum per eam adduci ut nos liberet, sed nos ut ad liberationem perveniamus. Sed hoc effugium tum ea quæ diximus, tum alia multa ei præcludunt. Primùm enim vox λύτρα [*pretii*], multoque magis ἀντιλύτρα [*redemptionis*], ejus sunt naturæ, ut rem denotent, cujus prior sit effectus circa liberatorem, quàm circa liberatum. Deinde, quanquam emere interdum sumitur pro acquirere simpliciter, ut vendere pro mancipare, tamen addita voci emptionis vox pretii (ut I Cor. VI, 20. & VII, 23) propiorem similitudinem requirit. Est enim pretii maximè proprium, ut ab aliquo tanti æstimetur, quanti res. Præterea Apostolus ἀπολύτρωσιν [*redemptionem*] exponit per ἱλαστήριον [*placamentum*], Rom. III, 24, 25. Est autem ἱλάσκειν [*placare*] actus, qui versatur circa liberatorem priùs, quàm circa liberandum. Et alibi Hebr. nempe IX, 12, & seq. λύτρωσις [*redemptio*] exponitur per καθαρισμὸν, id est, *expiationem*: de cujus vocis vi postea agemus. His adde, quod cùm effectus alicui rei tribuitur admodum frequenter, atque ita ut nusquam inveniatur tributus rebus aliis (quemadmodum effectus redemptionis ad mortem & sanguinem Christi refertur, Gal. III, 13. Matth. XX, 28. Marc. X, 45. Tit. II, 14. Hebr. IX, 15. Apoc. V, 9. & XX, 28. Rom. III, 24. Ephes. I, 7); tum necesse est finem proprium magis & propinquum, quàm communem & remotum intelligi. At circa nos effectus liberationis & multis gradibus est remotus à morte Christi & adeo non proprius, ut aliis rebus, quibus adscribi non solet, multo magis conveniat. Quicquid enim Socinus de nexu liberationis nostræ cum morte Christi loquitur, ita summatim explicari potest. Liberatio (ut ipse sentit) ex sanctimonia vitæ sequitur: sanctimonia ex spe præmii: spes primò ac potissimum ex resurrectione nascitur: morti autem tribuitur, aut quâ via est ad resurrectionem, aut quâ resurrectioni conjuncta ac com-

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comparata ſpem eandem confirmat. Vnde ſequitur, fatente etiam Socino (lib. II, cap. III), multo magis liberari nos reſurrectione Chriſti quàm morte: imò, ſi verum agnoſcimus, mors iſti effectui non niſi per accidens cohæret: quia reſurrectio fidem non facit, niſi quâ eſt pars gloriæ Chriſti: at gloria ſumma Chriſto etiam non mortuo potuit contingere: quòd autem Chriſtus patiendo exemplum nobis quod ſequeremur præbuit, id ad remiſſionem peccatorum, quæ Chriſto non contigit, aptari omnino non poteſt. Quò ergo illa toties repetita mortis mentio in hoc redemptionis negotio? Duo adfert Socinus; primum quia in morte eſt impendium aliquod, quod non eſt in reſurrectione, ideoque mortis mentio redemptioni eſt aptior: deinde quia charitas Dei & Chriſti in morte magis indicatur. Ad primum quod attinet, eodem relabimur. Nam ſi ex morte Chriſti per ſe liberationis noſtræ effectus non eſt conſecutus (quæ eſt ipſius Socini (lib. III, cap. III) claris verbis edita profeſſio) nihil opus erat Chriſtum & Apoſtolos aut redemptionis aut pretii meminiſſe, præſertim toties; cùm liberatio aliis verbis commodiùs poſſet explicari. Altera verò illa conſideratio, ut ad illas pertineat ſententias, quæ charitatem Dei commemorant, ad alias certè quæ non hoc agunt, & ad ipſam redemptionis vocem explicandam parum commodè adfertur. Omitto jam, quod ne oſtenditur quidem charitas eâ re, quod boni noſtri non tam cauſa fuerit, quàm nuda occaſio. Putat ſe Socinus noſtram ſententiam premere cùm dicit, ita de redemptione per Chriſti mortem facta agere Scripturam, ut quiddam apertum ante oculos ponat, non autem ut occultam quandam indicet virtutem, qualem eſſe eam putat, quam nos ex Scriptura deducimus: ſed hoc cùm dicit nos non vulnerat, & in ſe potiùs telum ſubminiſtrat. Eâ enim quæ ſunt Dei, quis novit, niſi Spiritus Dei, & cui ille voluerit revelare? 1 Corinth. II, 10, 11. At mortem Chriſti in hoc à Deo procurari, ut de ipſo pœnæ peccatorum noſtrorum exigerentur, & ipſe λύτρον [*pretium*] noſtrum fieret, dixerat multò ante Eſaïas, dixerat Chriſtus ipſe, nec aliud adumbrarant ſancti ritus in priſco fœdere: ita ut qui ad iſta attenderet, non poſſet Dei circa hoc negotium voluntatem ac decretum ignorare; ut jam taceam, ipſam quodammodo naturam loqui, mortem eſſe peccati ſtipendium. Hac Dei voluntate ex oraculis cognitâ, colligitur deinde ingens Dei erga nos charitas, ut Iohannes indicat 1 Epiſt. IV, 10. & Paulus, Rom. V, 8. Nec aliud eſt quod voce μαρτυρία [*teſtimonii*] indicatur, 1 Timoth. II, 6. ut ex his quæ antecedunt verſ. 4. promptum eſt cognoſcere. Et hæc quidem ſine ullo quærendi labore ipſa verba Sacræ Scripturæ ſimpliciter intellecta ſecum ferunt: cùm iſtam liberationis ex morte conſequentiam, quam per tot gradus, ac tam variè deducit Socinus, adeo ex ipſis Scripturæ verbis nemo poſſit colligere, ut ne ex Socino quidem facilè poſſit intelligi, quem eſſe in iſtis locutionibus proprium Scripturæ ſenſum velit.

Probata ergo eſt à nobis vera redemptio, ſicuti modo probata eſt vera placatio. Vtrovis autem horum probato, probatum eſt id quod intenditur, nos ſcilicet liberatos pœnâ Chriſti, quam ob peccata noſtra pependerit: non quòd omnis redemptio, aut reconciliatio talis ſit, ſed quòd ſubjecta materia aliam non admittat. Inane ergo eſt, & abs re alienum, quod aliquoties dicit Socinus, tum placari aliquem poſſe, etſi nihil præſtetur, tum redimi aliquem verè poſſe, qui nihil debeat, ac proinde citra ſolutionem. Nos enim de ea agimus placatione & redemptione, quam rei alicujus præſtatione, morte ſcilicet fieri Scriptura indicat, & de redemptione, quâ nos à pœna commerita liberari eadem Scriptura teſtatur. Talis autem præſtatio, quæ debitorem pœnæ à pœna liberet, & rectè & propriè ſatisfactio appellatur: quod videns Socinus, ut ſatisfactionem tolleret, placationem quoque & veram redemptionem ſuſtulit.

Libet hîc obiter in alia quædam animadvertere, quæ non quidem dum argumentum tractat redemptionis, ad hoc tamen argumentum pertinentia, alibi diſſeruit (lib. I, cap. VII). Μεσίτης [*Mediatoris*] vocem in Sacris Literis nihil aliud vult ſignificare quàm Dei interpretem. Mihi aliud planè perſuadent loci duo: alter 1 ad Tim. II, 5, ubi unus dicitur Μεσίτης [*Mediator*] Dei & hominum Ieſus Chriſtus, qui ſe dederit ἀντίλυτρον [*redemptionis pretium*] pro omnibus. Alter verò Heb. IX, 15, ubi novi fœderis Μεσίτης [*Mediator*] dicitur Chriſtus, ut morte intercedente ad redemptionem transgreſſionum vocati, vitam æternam adipiſcerentur: quibus meritò addatur tertius Heb. XII, 24. de quo infra agetur. Apparet hîc τὸ μεσιτεύμα [*interceſſionem*] ſtatui in ipſa redemptione, aut etiam in iſta. Neque vox repugnat. Nam ad Μεσίτης [*Mediatoris*] officium non minùs pertinet hominum vice apud Deum fungi, quàm Dei vice apud homines. Neque apud inerudito tantùm, ſed & apud eos, qui elegantiùs loquuntur, Μεσίτης [*Mediator*] dicitur is, qui placat aliquem. Vnde Suidas eam vocem voce εἰρηνοποιὸς [*pacificantis*] interpretatus eſt.

Alibi dicit Socinus (lib. III, cap. IV), perſonæ dignitatem nihil facere ad pœnæ æſtimationem, atque adeo Divinam Chriſti naturam & ſummam ipſius perfectionem ad pœnæ valorem nihil afferre ponderis. Nos verò aliter credimus: nempe pœnam hanc inde fuiſſe æſtimandam, quòd is qui pœnam ferebat, erat Deus, etſi eam non ferebat quâ Deus. Huc enim ſpectat illa locutio, quâ Deus dicitur acquiſiviſſe Eccleſiam *proprio* ſanguine, Actor. XX, 28. Quomodo & alibi Dominus gloriæ crucifixus dicitur, 1 Cor. II, 8. Perſonæ quoque totius, hoc eſt, Chriſti dignitas, non parum ad hanc æſtimationem contribuit: ideo ἐμφαλικῶς [*efficaciter*] in Scriptura dicitur ſanguis Domini, 1 Corinth. XI, 27. ſanguis Chriſti, Hebr. IX, 14. ſanguis Ieſu Chriſti filii Dei, 1 Ioh. I, 7. Venit in eandem æſtimationem & perfectiſſima Chriſti innocentia ac ſanctitas. Hinc pretioſus dicitur ſanguis, utpote agni inculpati, 1 Petri I 19. alluſione factâ ad morem, non Hebræis tantùm, ſed & Gentibus receptum, ut ſacris adhiberentur pecudes candore omnique corporis formâ præſtantes, quæ quòd à toto grege eximerentur, inde vocabulo nato in ſacris, ſed mox

ad profana translato, eximiæ dicebantur. Eôdem & ista pertinent: *Iustificabit servus meus justus multos*, Esaïæ LIII, 11. *Eum qui peccatum non novit, fecit peccatum*, II Cor. V, 21. Quod autem Socinus argumentatur, quia Divinitas ipsa non patiatur, ideo hanc in pœnæ considerationem non venire, perinde est ac si dicas, nihil referre privatum an Regem, item ignotum, an patrem verberes, quia verbera in corpus dirigantur, non in dignitatem aut cognationem; cui crasso errori jamdudum occurrit Aristoteles Ethic. Nicomach. lib. V cap. VIII. εἰ ἀρχόντα ἐπάταξεν, ὃ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι [*si quis eum qui magistratum gerat pulsaverit, non modò verberandus, sed etiam castigandus est*]. Commune etiam judicium à Socino dissentit. Nam populi, quorum instituta maximè laudantur, pœnas æstimarunt ex personarum dignitate, & attributis aliis. Quare ex Romanorum legibus, quas constat æquitatis esse plenissimas, pœnæ variantur pro conditione personarum, atque ea vera æqualitas creditur, si inæquales inæqualia patiantur. L. *Moris*. §. *ista*. L. *in servorum*. & L. *Aut facta*. §. *persona*. L. *Capitalium*. §. *ult*. D. de pœnis. L. I, §. ult. & L. *Qui cædem*. D. Ad L. Corneliam de sicariis. L. ult. §. I. D. de incendio. L. III. D. de Privil. vet. L. ult. D. de sepul. viol. L. I & ult. D. de furib. balneariis. Neque aliter statuisse gentes alias sapientiæ nomine celebratas, ab his qui de Republica scripserunt, abundè demonstratum est, probantque id ipsum juris Romani interpretes.

CAPVT IX.

Quid sit Christum pro nobis esse mortuum.

IN [a] tertia classe posuimus ea testimonia, quæ subrogationem indicant, ut cùm Christus dicitur pro omnibus mortem gustasse, Hebr. II, 9. mortuus pro populo, Ioh. XI, 50. passus pro nobis, I Pet. II, 21. pro nobis impiis & peccatoribus mortuus, Rom. V, 7, 8. Vnus pro omnibus mortuus, II Cor. V, 14. Receptum est in omni lingua, ut cùm aliquis aliquid fecit aut passus est vice ac loco alterius, id pro illo passus aut fecisse dicatur. Sic apud Terentium est: *Pro illo te ducam: Ego pro te molam*. Apud Virgilium,

— meliorem animam pro morte Daretis
Persolvo. — — Item,
Vnum pro multis dabitur caput. — —

Neque hæc phrasis personis tantùm accommodatur, sed & rebus: dicitur enim hoc pro illo dari, poni, haberi, quod ejus vice ac loco datur, ponitur, aut habetur (חלף Arabibus & Syris). Declinat hanc interpretationem Socinus ambiguitate voculæ *pro*, quæ sæpe utilitatem duntaxat alterius significat: quod de Latina voce verum est, ut & de Græca ὑπέρ. Sed vocula ἀντὶ [*pro*], quæ reperitur apud Matth. XX, 28, & Marci X, 45, hanc significationem planè repudiat: & commutationem requirit. Sic dicitur reddi κακὸν ἀντὶ κακοῦ [*malum pro malo*], I Petr. III, 9. Rom. XII, 17. ὀφθαλμὸς ἀντὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ, ὀδοὺς ἀντὶ ὀδόντος [*oculum pro oculo, dentes pro dente*], Matth. V, 38. Sic dari ὄφις ἀντὶ ἰχθύος [*pro pisce serpentem*], Luc. XI, 11. τὰ πρωτοτόκια ἀντὶ βρώσεως μιᾶς [*jus primogenituræ propter unam escam*], Hebr. XII, 16, κόμη ἀντὶ περιβολαίου [*coma pro velamine*], I Corinth. XI, 15. Quoties verò personis applicatur ea particula, significat alterum successisse in alterius locum. Sic Archelaus in Iudæa regnasse dicitur ἀντὶ Ἡρώδου τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ [*pro Herode patre suo*], hoc est, ipsi in regnum successisse, Matth. II, 22. Sic Petrus jubetur dare stateren pro se & Christo, Matth. XVII, 27, quia ipse unus in ea actione duorum vicem sustinebat. Neque aliter apud profanos Scriptores εἷς ἀντὶ πολλῶν [*unus pro multis*], & similia. Constrictus hîc Socinus negare non audet, illo ἀντὶ πολλῶν [*pro multis*], commutationem quandam indicari; sed miserè effugium quærit. Cùm de redemptione agitur, inquit, locus est isti præpositioni ἀντὶ [*pro*], etiamsi captivus nihil pro redemptione debeat. Verum hoc est, sed præter rem. Non enim ex voce ἀντὶ directè inferimus solutionem: sed inde colligimus vice nostrâ Christum mortuum, hoc est, nisi Christus esset mortuus, nos fuisse morituros, & quia Christus mortuus est, nos non morituros morte æternâ. Omnino enim vox ἀντὶ [*pro*] juncta personæ, & verbo δοῦναι [*dare*], requirit ut persona in genitivo indicata idem in genere aut specie datura fuerit quod nunc alius dedit. Neque refert, jure ne, ut in nexo ob debitum, an injuriâ, ut in capto à prædonibus. Hoc verò posito, futurum scilicet ut nos morte afficeremur, ni mortuus esset Christus, solutio deinde rectè colligitur ex ipsa rei natura. Aut enim injuriâ eramus morte afficiendi, aut jure: non injuriâ: mortem enim commeriti eramus; jure igitur. Si jure, eramus igitur mortis debitores. Ab hoc debito liberationem nobis Christus impetravit aliquid dando. Dare autem aliquid, ut per id ipsum alter à debito liberetur, est solvere aut satisfacere. Commutationem ergo illa locutio δοῦναι ἀντὶ πολλῶν [*dare pro multis*] veram indicat, ut semper: non metaphoricam, quam Socinus sine exemplo comminiscitur.

Ad alteram verò præpositionem ὑπὲρ [*pro*] quod attinet, primùm notandum est illam quoque non quidem semper, at sæpe idem valere quod ἀντί. Optat Paulus ἀνάθεμα [*anathema*] esse ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν [*pro fratribus*], hoc est, vice Iudæorum, quos alioqui perseverantes in incredulitate sciebat futuros ἀνάθεμα [*anathema*], Rom. IX, 3. Apostoli ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ πρεσβεύουσι [*pro Christo legatione funguntur*], hoc est, legati sunt ipsius Christi vice, II Cor. V, 20. Quare cùm ἀντὶ necessariò *commutationem* designet, ὑπὲρ autem pro eodem poni nonnunquam soleat, quid vetat vocem notationis dubiæ ex certa interpretari, præsertim cùm eodem de argumento agitur? Imprimis verò eam interpretationem videtur requirere locus ille II Cor. V, 14. *Si unus pro omnibus mortuus, omnes ergo mortui*. Deinde verò etiamsi non vox per se ambigua ὑπὲρ iis in locis esset usurpata, sed apertè esset dictum, Christum bono nostro mortuum, hoc ipso tamen commutatio illa non excluderetur, imò collatis aliis locis includeretur potiùs. Nam & qui in hoc moritur, ut eo ipso alterum à morte liberet, ejus bono moritur. Neque potest hic sensus rejici,

[a] Contra Soc. lib. II. cap. VIII.

quia

quia alicubi Christi factum nobis in exemplum proponitur. Nam ad exemplum sufficit generalem quandam esse similitudinem, etsi differentia sit in modo speciali, cujus tamen mentio fit interdùm rei certiùs denotandæ gratiâ. Quod manifestò liquet ex Petri adhortatione, 1 Petr. 11, 19, & sequent. Vult nos patientes esse in tolerandis afflictionibus, quas insontes patimur. Adfert Christi exemplum: *qui*, inquit, *& ipse passus est*. Satis hoc erat ad comparationem: sed addidit, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν [*pro nobis*], quod ad comparationem non pertinet, sed rem ipsam, hoc est, Christi passionem clarè designat. Commune ergo est patientia; modus ille differt. Alioqui frustra Paulus quæreret, an Paulus pro fidelibus esset crucifixus, 1 Cor. 1, 13. Poterat enim & ipse pro Ecclesia, hoc est, in usum Ecclesiæ crucifigi, sicut pati se dixit pro Ecclesia, Col. 1, 24; & postea magno Ecclesiæ bono ipse gladio percussus est, Petrus, aliique Apostoli crucifixi. Sed eo modo, quo Christus crucifigi, pœnas vice nostrâ ferendo, nec Paulus poterat, nec alius quisquam. Vox ergo illa *pro* peculiare hîc aliquid denotat, quod Apostolis communicari non potest. Posset autem, si mortis Christi utilitas gradu tantùm à morte Apostolorum, non etiam fine proprio segregaretur. Sic in epistola ad Hebr. 11, 10 exemplum in eo est, quod Christus per passiones ad gloriam pervenit: modus specialis in eo, quod Christus passus est ὑπὲρ πάντος [*pro omnibus*] vers. 9. Vt autem illis in locis patientia, ita aliis in locis charitas nobis commendatur eodem Christi exemplo: modus autem specialis factum Christi apertius designat. Quanquam si eos locos penitiùs expendere libeat, videbimus, non tam actum mortis quam periculum mortis illic respici. Nam τιθέναι ψυχὴν [*ponere animam*], quo solus Iohannes utitur x, 11, 15, & 1 Ioh. 111, 16, ut & Ioh. xiii, 37 & 38, item Ioh. xv, 13, non est ibi propriè amittere vitam, sed eam quasi oppignerare, hoc est, mortis periculum subire. Atque ideo illis locis, etiam id quod nobis præscribitur, non solam utilitatem alienam, sed & commutationem quandam continet, eo nimirum sensu, quem Horatius illis versibus expressit:

Paratus omne Cæsaris periculum
Subire, Mæcenas, tuo.

In Cajaphæ autem dicto Ioh. xi, 50, non tantùm qua ignaro vaticinium excidit, sed & ex ipsius sententia vera quædam substitutio indicabatur. Fingebat enim ille inevitabile excidium Iudæorum, si Christus vivere permitteretur: & contra, si Christus occideretur, incolumitatem certam ob hoc ipsum obtinendam: verè ergo mortem Christi excidio alioquin imminenti substituere voluit. Atque ita idem in genere Christo voluit accidere, cum eo quod alioqui populo erat eventurum; & mortem Christi liberationis populi causam propinquam & per se idoneam credidit. Quod perinde est ac si dicas: loco populi alioqui (hoc est, sub contraria conditione) perituri, perire Christum voluit. Notandum hîc obiter, Cajapham mortis Christi effectum primum non circa Iudæos posuisse, quorum liberationi consulebat, sed circa rectores Romanos, quorum iram volebat effugere: ita ut si verum est quod urget Socinus, eam sumendam verborum Cajaphæ interpretationem, quæ simul & Spiritûs Sancti & ipsius menti respondeat, omnino illud mori pro populo, incolumitatem ab altero impetrandam significet: ille autem alter ex mente Spiritus Sancti nemo esse potest, nisi Deus: unde sequitur, actum hunc Christi priùs circa Deum, quàm circa homines versari, quod præfractè abnuit Socinus. Ea autem quæ de commutationis significatione in particula *pro* à nobis hactenus dicta sunt, ex sacrificii expiatorii natura multum illustrantur. Nam in iis dari sanguinem pro anima Scriptura & communis Gentium opinio testatur: quod jam nunc apertum fiet.

CAPVT X.

De expiatione facta per mortem Christi.

REstat quippe classis ultima testimoniorum, quæ Christi mortem factum expiatorium esse significant: quæ quia Socini artificio (lib. 11, à cap. 1x, ad cap. xxiii) plurimis nebulis involuta sunt, postremo loco reservavimus, ut ex his quæ antedicta sunt, aliquid lucis acciperent. Constat nobis & Socino de voce: Christi mortem fuisse sacrificium expiatorium sive victimam pro peccato, id ipsum clarè testante Divina ad Hebræos Epistola, imprimis cap. 1x. Sed de ejus vocis vi propriâ aliter Socinus, aliter sentit Christi Ecclesia. Dissensus breviter ac perspicuè sic explicabitur, si dicamus, juxta Socinum expiationis effectum primò ac propriè versari circa peccata futura; quia Fidem ingenerando mors Christi nos à peccatis abstrahat: quoad peccata verò præterita nonnisi secundariò, & eatenus quoque omnem hanc actionem circa nos versari, non circa Deum, hoc est, non Deum moveri ad remittendum, sed nos parari ad accipiendam remissionem, per vitæ scilicet emendationem: juxta sensum verò Ecclesiæ, qui Scripturis congruit, expiationis effectum propriè versari circa peccata præterita, & actionem primam esse circa Deum, qui ad remittendum moveatur. Actionem primam esse circa Deum, non circa homines, probatur ex natura sacerdotii. Sacerdos enim ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων καθίσταται τὰ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν [*pro hominibus constituitur in iis quæ sunt ad Deum*] Hebr. v, 1. non autem ὑπὲρ Θεοῦ τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον [*pro Deo in iis quæ sunt ad hominem*], quod est Prophetæ. Cùm autem sacrificium, præsertim expiatorium, sit actus Sacerdotis quà talis, (statuitur enim in id Pontifex, ut offerat θυσίας ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν [*sacrificia pro peccatis*,] Hebr. v, 1. viii, 3) sequitur sacrificium esse eorum, quæ fiunt pro homine apud Deum.

Sed tota res manifestior fiet collatione sacrificiorum Legis veteris cum hoc sacrificio, cujus collationis autor est nobis Scriptor Epistolæ ad Hebræos, & alibi Prophetæ atque Apostoli. Lex vetus dupliciter spectatur: aut carnaliter, aut spiritualiter. Carnaliter, quâ instrumentum fuit πολιτείας [*Reipublicæ*] Iudaïcæ. Spiritualiter quâ σκιὰν εἶχε τῶν μελλόντων [*umbram habebat futurorum*]: Hebr. x, 1. [a] Quod ad priorem considerationem attinet, sacrificia Legis expiatoria

[a] contra Socin. lib. 11, cap. 1x.

expiatoria sanctificabant ad carnis puritatem, Hebræor. IX, 13, quod quale sit explicabimus. Lex Dei hanc habuit sanctionem: *Execrabilis est quisquis non manserit in omnibus verbis Legis*, Deut. XXVII, 26. Gal. III, 10. Reus ergo pœnæ erat quisquis vel minimum à Lege deflexisset, ut ostendit Iac. II, 10. Pœna hæc juxta carnalem sensum erat mors violenta: quod ex contrario liquet, quia Legem implenti vita promittitur, Levit. XVIII, 5. Gal. III, 12. Sicut autem in omni Republica rectè instituta Rex pœnas exigit per judices suos, & hi si cessent, per se ipsum: ita & in Hebraïca Republica, quam θεοκρατίαν [*Dei imperium*] rectè dixit Iosephus, (quia Deus erat Rex ejus, Iudic. VIII, 23. 1 Samuel. VIII, 7). Deus ordinariè pœnas Legis per judices exigebat: ita tamen ut ipsemet exigeret pœnas easdem, si judices in officio cessarent *Populus*, inquit, *obruunto eum lapidibus, aut ego opponens iratam faciem viro illi exscindam illum*, Levit. XX, 3. Neque hoc tantùm comminatus est, sed & præstitit sæpe, ut multis exemplis veteris Testamenti apparet. Sed quia Legislatori licet suam legem, præsertim pœnalem, nonnihil relaxare, Deus Rex Hebræorum in quibusdam delictis victimas expiatorias admisit vice ipsius peccatoris, & per illas ac non aliter peccatorem à mortis pœna liberare voluit. Temerè jurans mortem merebatur ex Lege Exod. XX, 7. sed per victimam expiari poterat, Levit. V, 5. *Expiabit eum Sacerdos*, inquit Lex, *& remittetur ei*, Levit. V, 6, 13. Sic qui fidem depositi aut societatis fefellisset, aut alium dolo decepisset, aut furatus esset quippiam, reus erat, inquit Lex, Levit. VI, 4. Ex edicto nimirum, quod extat Exodi XX, 15, 16, 17. Sed idem reus præter damni restitutionem, ad quam tenebatur læso, victimâ datâ expiabatur, & remittebatur ei quod fecerat, Levit. V, 26. Et passim conjunguntur ista, expiatio & remissio, Num. XV, 28. Levit. IV, 20. V, 13, 18, 26. In quibusdam ergo delictis quod ad pœnam carnalem attinebat, admittebatur placamen, redemptio, satisfactio, compensatio denique mortis bestiæ cum morte hominis alioqui debitâ. In universum autem pro delictis omnibus Lex talem relaxationem pœnæ carnalis non admittebat: quò respiciens Paulus, dixit per Iesum remissionem peccatorum (spiritualem scilicet) annunciari: & credentem justificari in ipso ab omnibus à quibus Iudæi in lege Mosis justificari (etiam carnaliter) non potuerant, Actor. XIII, 38. quod ita explicat Scriptor sanè vetustus responsionum ad Orthodoxos, quæ Iustino solent adscribi; Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πλημμάτων γεγενημένων εἰς βλάβην πολιτείας (gravem scilicet & minùs tolerabilem) ἢ ζωῆς ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τοιούτων πλημμάτων οὐ δίδωσι (ὁ νόμος scilicet) συγχώρησιν, οὔτε διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος, οὔτε διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀλόγων θυσίας, ἀλλὰ δικαίαν τε καὶ ἀξίαν ἀμοιβὴν δίδωσι τοῖς πλαίουσι διὰ τοῦ ἴσου τῆς ἀντιπαλήξεως. Ψυχὴν, φησὶν, ἀντὶ ψυχῆς, ὀφθαλμὸν ἀντὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ, ὀδόντα ἀντὶ ὀδόντος· ὅπου δὲ τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἀνταποδόσεως ἐστιν ἀπρεπὲς, ἐκεῖ τὸν διὰ πυρὸς, ἢ λίθου, ἢ ξίφους θάνατον ἀνταποδίδωσι τοῖς πλαίουσι. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ θυγατέρα τοῦ ἱερέως πορνεύουσαν διὰ πυρὸς ἀναλίσκει· τῷ δὲ τοῦ λαϊκοῦ ἀνδρὸς, λιθοβολεῖ· τῷ δὲ ὕπανδρον διὰ ξίφους. Καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἰσχὺς τῷ νόμῳ ὁκ φιλανθρωπίας ἀφ' βαπτισμῶν τε καὶ θυσιῶν σῶσαι τῶν πιστῶν τινά [*In delictis verò aliis, quæ consuetudini civili damnum* (grave scilicet, & minùs tolerabile) *aut vitæ hominum adferunt, veniam non dat*, (Lex scilicet) *neque per Baptismos, neque per irrationalium victimarum oblationes: sed justam atque dignam per jus æquum talionis delinquentibus refert compensationem: Animam, inquit, pro anima, oculum pro oculo, dentem pro dente. Vbi verò æquum retributionis jus minùs convenienter administrari potest, ibi peccantibus igne, vel saxo vel ferro, mortis infertur supplicium. Nam filiam Sacerdotis fornicantem igne comburit; popularis autem viri lapidibus enecat; nuptam verò gladio percutit. Neque aliquam habet lex potestatem, ut ejusmodi criminis reum quenquam per benignitatem Baptismo, lustrationibus, & rebus Divinis faciendis, salvet*]. Neque malè observarunt Hebræorum Magistri ad Psalm. LI, 18. Davidem pro homicidio atque adulterio victimam non polliceri, quia Lex nullam pro istis delictis expiationem prodiderat. Quod autem supra diximus, in expiatione mortem pecudis morti hominis subrogari, id ipsum manifestum quoque est ex eo, quod Deut. XXI. constituitur, ut homicidâ non reperto, populus expietur pecude cæsâ: ubi & expiandi vox explicatur: *Expia populum tuum Deus, & ne imputes sanguinem innocentem*, vers. 8. Alioqui verò non poterat terra expiari à sanguine effuso, nisi per sanguinem effusoris, ut ait Lex, Num. XXXV, 33. Huic loco addatur alter Levit. XVII, 11, *Anima cujusque carnis in sanguine; ego verò destinavi vobis eum in altari, ad expiationem faciendam pro animis vestris. Nam sanguis est qui pro anima expiationem facit.* Item tertius Levit. X, 17, ubi victima dicitur eorum iniquitates portare, cujus phraseos vim alibi explicavimus. Hanc subrogationem Socinus (lib. II, cap. X, & XIII) non vult agnoscere, neque fateri per victimas ullo modo Deum motum, ne peccata puniret. Idque ut probet, duo hæc adfert; non potuisse errata hominum in bestiis puniri, quia nulla inter homines & bestias sit speciei communio: neque Deo dari quicquam posse, qui est omnium Dominus: quorum prius falsum est: nam quemadmodum differentia individualis (ut loquuntur) non impedit, quo minùs alter possit luere pœnas peccati alieni, modò ipsa mali inflictio per se injusta non sit (ut supra ostensum est) ita nec speciei diversitas impediet, quo minùs bestia, quæ alioqui etiam justè poterat occidi, impendatur exemplo, ut in ipsius morte appareat, quid homo sit commeritus. Neque conjunguntur homo & bestia solo genere animantis, verùm eâ quoque relatione, quæ est inter possessorem & rem possessam. Est enim bestia in universum sub humano dominio: & specialiter expiandus de suo dare victimam jubebatur, Levit. V, 6, 7. Alterum verò nihil ad rem pertinet. Neque enim sequitur, Si Deo nihil accedit per sacrificium, ideo Deum sacrificio non moveri. Hoc ipso enim εὐαρεστεῖται Θεὸς [*placatur Deus*], quod homo re sibi concessâ in honorem Divini numinis semet ipse defraudat: solere autem satisfieri ut per pœnam, ita per aliquam actionem gratam ac placentem, alibi commonstratum est. In victimis

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victimis sanè non rem solam spectari, sed & offerentis animum, cùm Sacra Scriptura indicat, tum Gentes ipsæ crediderunt. *Ne in victimis quidem*, inquit Seneca, *licèt opimæ sint auroque præfulgeant, deorum est honos, sed piâ ac rectâ voluntate venerantium.* Vnde & de Christi morte agens Scriptura, modò charitatis, modò obedientiæ facit mentionem. Ex his quæ diximus, perspicuum jam est, quomodo victimæ pro peccato in Veteri Federe peccata expiarint, nimirum Deum movendo, ut pœnam carnalem remitteret, idque per satisfactionem quandam: quod autem typi præstiterunt carnaliter, hoc ὁ ἀντίτυπος [*exemplar*] Christus præstat spiritualiter, & quod typi in quibusdam duntaxat delictis, id Christus in omnibus, Deum scilicet movendo, ut spiritualem pœnam remittat, idque per satisfactionem perfectissimam. Plus enim, non minus semper est in re typo designata, quàm in typo; ut ratio monstrat. Commune est sacrificio expiatorio legali & sacrificio Christi illud, quòd sine sanguinis effusione non fit remissio, Hebr. IX, 22. Hanc impetrationem remissionis per sanguinem ibidem Divinus Scriptor appellat modò ἁγιασμὸν [*sanctificationem*] 13, modò καθαρισμὸν [*expiationem*] vers. 14, 22, & 23. Sed in Veteri Lege victimæ erant pecudes, vers. 12. in hoc nostro Christus ipse non Sacerdos tantùm, sed & victima, vers. 14, & 24. legalis illa expiatio hujus cœlestis sive spiritualis ὑπόδειγμα 23, & ἀντίτυπον [*exemplar*] 24. quomodo? quia illa præstabat carni munditiem, 14, id est, reatus ablationem, non autem spiritui sive conscientiæ 9. hæc autem ipsi conscientiæ 14. Quia quod in Veteri Lege erat mors temporalis, hoc in Novo Federe est mors æterna, Hebr. X, 29. ac proinde illic liberatio erat temporalis, hîc verò αἰώνιος λύτρωσις [*æterna redemptio*], Hebr. IX, 12. Quare sicut eodem loco ab effectu legalis victimæ ad effectum hujus per spiritum oblatæ argumentum producitur, *Quantò magis*, &c. vers. 14. sic & nobis licet hunc in modum certissimè argumentari, Victima legalis reatum carnalem sustulit, Deum movendo ad remissionem; Ergo multò magis reatum spiritualem, Deum itidem ad remissionem movendo, tollit oblata per spiritum victima.

Eódem respiciunt loci, in quibus Christus *Agnus* dicitur. Neque multum ad rem faceret, etiamsi non soliti essent in Lege agni pro peccato immolari. Nam etiam sic licuisset viris sanctis pro pecude pecudem alteram nominare, ut simul & in generali pecudis significatione comparatio consisteret, & tamen agno potiùs, quàm ariete aut capra, nominato innocentia victimæ exprimeretur. Ideo enim & Petrus addidit ἀμώμου καὶ ἀσπίλου [*immaculati & incontaminati*], 1 Pet. I, 19. potuitque simul & quodam verborum compendio respici ad vaticinium Esaiæ LIII, 7. in cujus interpretatione Græca erat vox ἀμνοῦ [*agni*], ut apparet Actor. VIII, 32. [a] Verùm insuper liquet agnum in contaminationibus expiandis fuisse usurpatum, Levit. XIV, 12. Num. VI, 12. quæ quidem contaminationes in Lege Veteri peccato eousque æquabantur, ut & peccati nomen acciperent. Vnde & agnus ille in reatum sive delictum offerri utrobique dicitur: & altero loco disertè additur, *quia peccavit circa cadaver*, Num. VI, 11. Effectus quoque idem aliquatenus. Nam contaminati non admittebantur ad societatem πολιτείας [*Reipublicæ*] Iudaïcæ, nisi per talem expiationem. Quin & Paschalis victima (quam plerumque agnum fuisse constat, Exod. XII, 5) in prima institutione aliquid habuit expiatorii. Ait enim Deus se respicientem ad ejus sanguinem aversurum ab Hebræis id exitium quod alioqui cum Ægyptiis (quorum imitatione se contaminaverant) habituri erant commune, Exod. XII, 13. Hebr. XI, 28. Cyrillus Alexandrinus libro quod unus est Christus: *Quod quidem etiam in Mosaïcis libris optimè veluti in umbris delineatum fuisse veteribus comperias. Ovis enim mactatio Israëlitas à morte atque interitu exemerat, & interfectorem placavit. Atqui res hæc Christi typus ac figura erat &c.* Sed & pro peccato, putà, temerarii juramenti, agnam offerri solitam ostendit Lex, Levit. V, 4, 6. Agnus autem cùm dicitur Christus, sacrificium notari non tantùm Petrus ostendit, *redemptos nos* dicens *agni sanguine*, 1 Pet. I, 18, 19. sed & Iohannes in Apocalypsi multis locis, atque inter cæteros ubi *mactatum* eum dicit, Apoc. V, 6, 9, 12, & XIII, 8. Sacrificium autem aliud quàm pro peccato intelligi non potest, quia Petro teste, fuit redemptorium. Tale est solum sacrificium pro peccato. [a] Vnde plus quàm manifestum est, cùm dixit Baptista *Christum esse Agnum qui auferret Mundi peccata*, Ioh. I, 29. de peccatis ibi præteritis agi, non de futuris; & de auferendo reatu per remissionis impetrationem apud Deum, non autem per Fidei ingenerationem. [b] Neque verum est, quod dicit Socinus, solum Sacerdotem summum Christi, solamque anniversariam expiationem (aut certè sola quæ pro populo fierent sacra) sacrificii ipsius figuram gessisse: quanquam enim in summo Sacerdote, & illo solenni sacro figura quædam fuit excellentior, quam propterea singulari curâ Spiritus Sanctus in epistola ad Hebræos persequitur, negari tamen non potest, quin & Sacerdotes alii, & sacra alia expiatoria obscuriùs eôdem respexerint. Monstrat hoc eadem illa epistola cap. IX, 13, ubi omnis carnalis per victimas purificatio cum spirituali per Christum purificatione confertur, multoque magis vers. 22, & sequentibus, ubi cùm dictum esset universaliter, omnia fermè in lege sanguine purgari, neque aliter quàm fuso sanguine contingere peccatorum remissionem, subjungitur deinde, ἀνάγκη οὖν τὰ μὲν ὑποδείγματα τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς τούτοις καθαρίζεσθαι [*necesse est ergo exemplaria cœlestium his mundari*]. Sic & cap. X, 11. quotidiana sacrificia cum Christi sacrificio comparantur: cujus loci sententiam evertit Socinus (lib. II, cap. XVI), *quotidie* exponens *quotannis*, nullo exemplo. Nam quòd locum Hebr. VII, 27. adfert huic interpretationi firmandæ, frustra est, cùm falsò sumat Sacerdotem in solo anniversario sacrificio pro se offerre debuisse. Contrà enim offerre pro se debuit, quoties peccati sibi erat conscius, Levit. IV, 3. Paschale quoque sacrificium sacrificii à Christo peracti figuram fuisse, ostendit, Ioh. XIX, 36. & Paulus 1 Cor. V, 7.

a contra Socin. lib. II, cap. IX.

a contra Socin. lib. II, cap. XVII. b contra Socin. lib. II, cap. IX.

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Quanquam autem hæc sufficere poterant, libet tamen ex communi Gentium notitia, aut potiùs ex vetustissima traditione per omnes terras diffusa, sacri expiatorii naturam paulò uberiùs explicare. Quin ante legem Mosis sub statu legis naturalis qui dicitur, sacrificia fuerint, dubitari non potest, quorum ritus à Deo traditos hi, qui diluvio superfuere, per terras omnes dispersi ad posteros transmiserunt: mansitque aliquamdiu non tantùm apud Semi, sed & apud Iapheti, (fortè & Chami) posteros incorrupta religio, donec plurium ideoque falsorum Deorum cultus in ejus locum succresceret: sed tunc quoque Deo mutato mansere ritus & cæremoniæ à pio usu ad impium translatæ, magnum adversùs ipsos testimonium acceptæ veritatis, sed per injustitiam detentæ, ut inquit Apostolus; Rom. 1, 18. Persuasissimum ergo habebant Gentes istæ, delictis hominum offendi & irasci Deos. Ex hac ira sequi solere magnas calamitates, quà privatas, quà publicas. Videatur egregius Plutarchi libellus περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν βραδέως τιμωρουμένων [*de his qui serò à Numine puniuntur*], in quo si pro Diis Deum rescribas, plurima invenies digna, quæ à Christiano dicantur. Ira ista colligebatur ex causis aut effectis. Ex causis, si qua facinora ad notitiam pervenissent. Ex effectis, portentis, prodigiis, signis cœlestibus. Videatur Cicero de Haruspicum responsis. Lucanus 1. Pharsaliæ. Historici Græci, Romanique passim. Iram tamen hanc sperabant averti posse quibusdam victimis. His dicebatur placari Numen, reus ipse, aut homo, aut populus purgari sive antiquo verbo februari, peccatum ipsum piari atque lustrari.

Quare eadem sacrificia dicebantur ἱλαστικὰ, ἁγνιστικὰ, καθαρτικὰ, Latinè *placamina*, *februa*, *piamina*. Vox ἱλάσκεσθαι [*placare*] ad victimas ab Homero, aliisque sæpissimè aptatur. Ἁγνίζειν τὴν πόλιν καθαρμοῖς [*purificare civitatem expiationibus*] est apud Plutarchum in Romulo: hoc ἁγνίζειν [*purificare*], ἁγίζειν quoque & ἁγιάζειν [*sanctificare*] dicitur. Apud Herodotum lib. 1, Phryx Adrastus homicidio pollutus καθαρσίου ἐδέετο, *opus habuit sacro expiatorio*: Cræsus ipsum ἐκάθηρε, *expiavit*. Similem autem dicit esse κάθαρσιν, *expiandi rationem*, apud Lydos & Græcos. Apud Hermogenem est, μηδὲ καθηρόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀσεβημάτων [*neque à sceleribus expiatus*]. Plato 11 de Rep. pro eodem ponit λύσεις [*liberationes*] & καθαρμοὺς ἀδικημάτων [*expiationes scelerum*]. Plutarchus in Romanis καθάρσια interpretatur ἀποτρόπαια, hoc est, *averrunca*, *iram Divinam avertentia*. Placandi voce apud Virgilium aliosque in sacris nihil frequentius: cujus vim Horatius ita expressit,

Mactatâ veniet mitior hostiâ.

Livius sæpe: *Pacem Deos exposcere*. Plinius pecori gratiam esse ait in Deorum placamentis. Ovidius Fastorum primo per victimas ait homini Deos CONCILIARI: quam vocem cum placandi voce idem valere supra ostendimus. *Purgare* & *purificare* ex Græco ἁγνίζειν translatum inde sumitur, quòd reatus immunditia quædam videtur. Purificandi vox est apud Suetonium & Plinium. Purgare mœnia lustro, dixit Lucanus; sed receptius est lustrare: de cujus origine supra diximus. Sic exercitum suovetaurilibus lustrare est apud Livium. Ovidius per expurgare exposuit XIII, Met.

——— *Ego lustror ab illis,*
Expurgante nefas novies mihi carmine dicto.

Servius apud Virgilium, *Lustramurque Iovi*, III, Æn. exponit, purgamur, piamur. Victimas putabant λύτρα τῆς σφῶν ψυχῆς ἀντίψυχα ὥσπερ ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς [*Lustra suarum animarum vicem præstantia tanquam animam pro animâ*] sic Euseb. Apod: lib. 1. Moses docet ἀντὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς τὸ τῶν σφαγιαζομένων ζώων αἷμα ἐξιλάσκεσθαι [*pro anima humana sanguinem mactatorum animalium placare*], ideo qui offerebat, caput tenebat victimæ. Seneca in Troadibus, lustrale sacrum, explicat ipse, quo piantur rates. Et Papinius Menœcea dixit, caput lustrale, quod sic exponit,

Terrigenam cuncto patriæ PRO SANGVINE *poscunt*:

Item,

——— *Date gaudia Thebis*
Quæ pepigi, & toto quæ SANGVINE *prodigus* EMI.

Lustrale ergo sacrum est, quod sanguinem emit, hoc est, redimit sanguine: quod pertinet ad ea comprobanda, quæ de redemptione superiùs à nobis sunt disputata. Notandumque imprimis, sæpissimè, cùm de sacris expiatoriis agitur sanguinis fieri mentionem, quia ex vetustissima Dei lege Noacho data Gen. IX, 4. atque inde ad populos omnes propagata, sanguis est vice animæ, ac propterea animæ nomine appellatur: Hinc illud Virgilii,

Sanguine quærendi reditus, animâque litandum.

Quæ verba explicans ex Trebatio Macrobius eas hostias ait animales fuisse appellatas. Adde Arnobium VII, adv. Gentes: Servium ad II. Æneidos. Piari propriè dicuntur ipsa peccata, hoc est, lui: sive solvendo pœnam debitam, sive aliud quod pœnæ debitæ in locum succedit. Vt ecce apud Virgilium,

——— *Et culpam miserorum morte piabunt:*

Hoc est, efficient ut luantur. Plinius, *Luxum populi expiare solent bella*. Cicero, *Tua scelera Dii immortales in nostros milites expiaverunt*. Apud eundem sæpe est scelera supplicio expiare: & apud Salustium, cædem cæde, sanguinem sanguine expiare: imò & supplicii vox primùm in sacris fuit, unde ad pœnas translata est. [a] Sed in sacrificiis piare, est luere per successionem rei alterius in locum pœnæ debitæ. Hinc Plautus Epidico:

Men' piacularem oportet fieri ob stultitiam tuam,
Vt meum tergum stultitiæ tuæ subdas succedaneum.

Hinc auctor distichorum, quæ Catonis nomen præferunt, ait,

Cum sis ipse nocens, moritur cur victima PRO TE?

Vbi, pro te, est tuo loco. Atque ibidem eos, qui victimas offerunt, ait morte alterius suam salutem sperare. Hinc piacula propriè ipsa sacrificia: *Ea prima piacula sunto*, Virg. VI. *Teque piacula nulla resolvent*, Horatius: quæ & piamina Ovidio,

Februa Romani dixere piamina Patres:

Cujus vocis vim ipse mox exprimit, *quo crimina nostra piantur*: Et piamenta Plinio. Impropriè piacula crimina, propter quæ piacula debentur, ut rectè Servius ad illud Virgilii,

Distulit in seram commissa piacula mortem.

a Contra Socin. lib. II, cap. XIII.

Quan-

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Quanquam autem, ut diximus, piare propriè est luere, ideoque de ipsa pœna aut peccato, id est, reatu & debito, propriè dicatur, cœpit tamen sumi pro significationis propinquæ vocibus, placare & lustrare. Sic Cereris numen expiandum, dixit Cicero. Sic Livius: *Vt cædes manifesta aliquo piaculo lueretur, imperatum est patri, ut filium expiaret*, id est, lustraret. Sic Seneca in Troadibus dixit, piare rates, id est, classem lustrare. Prodigia quoque piare, dixit Tacitus, pro facinoribus ob quæ orta ira prodigiis indicabatur. Locus est ubi de Iudæis agit: *Evenerant prodigia, quæ neque hostiis, neque votis piare fas habet gens superstitioni obnoxia, religionibus adversa.* Vbi obiter notari potest, quod supra diximus, non esse ad quamvis iram Divinam placandam in Lege Iudæorum piamenta prodita. Ex his manifestò apparet, sacra lustralia, sive piamenta, pertinuisse ad placandum numen, & sic impetrandam impunitatem ante commissorum: quod Plinius ita exprimit, *Vetus priscis temporibus opinio obtinuit, februa esse omnia, quibus malefactorum* CONSCIENTIAE PURGARENTUR, DELERENTURQUE PECCATA. Neque verò omittendus est insignis de expiatoriis sacrificiis Porphyrii locus: Πάντες γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ὁμολόγησαν οἱ θεόλογοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἀπτέον ἐν τοῖς ἀποτροπαίοις θυσίαις τῶν θυομένων, καθαρσίοις τε χρηστέον· μὴ γὰρ ἴοι τις εἰς ἄστυ, μήδ' εἰς οἶκον ἴδιον, μὴ πρότερον ἐσθῆτα καὶ σῶμα πάσαμοῖς ἢ πηγῇ ἀποκαθήρας, φασὶν [*Omnes enim in eo consentiunt Theologi, in sacris piacularibus non tangendas à sacrificantibus victimas, & purificatione utendum; neque enim, ajunt, quis in urbem eat, aut domum redeat, nisi priùs & vestem & corpus omne aquâ flumineâ aut fontanâ abluerit*]. Quod ait convenire Theologis, iis qui attigerint victimas expiatorias lavanda esse vestimenta, planè cum Lege per Mosen Hebræis tradita congruit, ut apparet Levit. XVI, 26, & 28. Quia verò Gentes istæ non ignorabant naturæ ductu, quò majus esset quod daretur Deo, eò faciliùs posse veniam impetrari, præsertim si ἀντιλύτρῳ [*redemptionis*] cum eo quod redimeretur, aliqua esset æqualitas, ideo à pecudum mactatione in piaculis faciendis ventum est ad mactationem hominum. Causam explicat Cæsar de Gallis agens: *Pro vita hominum nisi vita hominis reddatur, non posse Deorum immortalium numen* PLACARI *arbitrantur.* Primi omnium hoc factitasse reperiuntur Cananæi, hoc est, Phœnices. Nam de his in Sacris Literis legimus, solitos eos Molochum placare liberorum suorum mactatione: is Molochus fuit Saturnus, ut Hebræorum Magistri rectè explicant. Phœnicum Historiam à Sanchuniathone conscriptam plenam fuisse ejusmodi sacrificiorum narrationibus, narrat is, qui apud Interpretem Philonem Byblium legit, Porphyrius. Pars horum fuerunt Tyrii, apud quos antiquitus usitatum, ut ingenuus puer Saturno immolaretur: narrat Curtius lib. III. Idem rectè notat, Carthaginenses, colonos Tyriorum, id sacrum à conditoribus accepisse: de quibus est illud Ennii;

Ille suos Divis mos sacrificare puellos.

Narrat idem de Pœnis Diodorus, & Iustinus his verbis: *Homines ut victimas immolabant, & impuberes aris admovebant* PACEM *Deorum* SANGUINE *eorum exposcentes*, lib. XVIII. Silius Italicus solitos eos dicit, *Poscere cæde Deos* VENIAM. Lactantius ex Pescennio Festo narrat, Carthaginienses, IRATUM sibi DEUM putantes, ut PIACULUM SOLVERENT, immolasse ducentos Nobilium filios. Meminit & Minutius Felix; & Tertullianus Apologetico, qui Saturnum propterea appellatum ait tumulum filiorum, & Plutarchus libello de superstitione. In Ægypto quoque homines, & quidem formæ exquisitæ sacrificatos fuisse antiquitus, scripsit Manethos, addidit-que, servatum morem ad Amosis tempora, qui pro hominibus cæreas imagines substituerit. Et de Heliopoli traditum, diligenter ibi inquisitum, an mundi essent, qui mactandi destinabantur. In Cypro similiter homo mactatus ad Diphili Regis tempora, qui bovis immolationem subrogavit. Idem factum olim in Rhodo, Chio, Tenedo, Salamine: item Laodiceæ: & apud Arabas Dumathios. Persæ vivos defodiebant. De Albanis hoc specialiter proditum, solere ab ipsis immolari eum, quem crederent sanctimoniâ maximâ pollere. Iones, teste Pausania, virginem & puerum immolabant, ut iratam Dianam placarent. De Blemyis, Massagetis, Tauris, Neuris, & in universum de Scythis, similia legimus: quæ pro Asia, Africaque possunt sufficere: quibus addi potest, eundem ritum repertum tum in veteri India (de qua idem jam olim Mela tradiderat) tum in Americano orbe ab his, qui illas oras notitiæ hominum reddiderunt. In Canariis quoque Insulis non diu esse, cùm id fieri est desitum. Ad Europam ut veniamus, olim in Creta Saturno pueros, Lacedæmone hominem Marti immolatum, Ister & Apollodorus tradiderunt. Quin Græcis communiter omnibus morem fuisse eundem Phylarchus tradidit, Plinio assentiente, exstantque exempla etiam belli Persici temporibus. Romæ etiam quotannis mactati Græcus & Græca, Gallus & Galla: Latiaris quoque Iuppiter humanâ victimâ colebatur: nec minùs Diana Aricina; olimque usitatissima fuisse per Italiam & Siciliam id genus sacrificia, narrat Plinius: neque Româ abrogata ante annum Vrbis sexcentesimum quinquagesimum septimum. Nec aliam habent originem Deciorum devotiones, quibus antiqui, ut Cicero ait de Natura Deorum tertio, PLACATOS Deos censebant: Livius vocat Decios piacula omnis Deorum IRAE: item piacula LUENDIS periculis publicis. (Vide locum Appiani supra pag. 328). Lucanus,

LUSTRALES *bellis animas.* ——

Nec omittendus insignis Iuvenalis locus:

Plebeia Deciorum animæ, plebeia fuerunt
Nomina: PRO *totis legionibus hi tamen, &* PRO
Omnibus auxiliis, atque omni plebe Latina
SUFFICIUNT DÎS *infernis, Terræque parenti:*
PLURIS *enim Decii, quàm qui servantur ab illis.*

Quo in loco primùm is conspicitur usus particulæ *pro*, quem nos supra frequentem admodum esse indicavimus, & hujus argumenti quasi proprium, ut idem sit quod, loco alterius. Apparet deinde, creditum à Romanis, sacrificii æstimationem ab ejus, qui mactatur, dignitate augeri. Postremò ex collatione Autorum manifestum fit, ista ἰσοδυναμεῖν [*æque pollere*]: Deum placari aliquâ victimâ: Deorum

rum iram expiari: aut animam cujuspiam diis sufficere pro aliorum animis. Gallorum mos ex Cæsare notissimus, de quo supra attigimus: quem mansisse ait Plinius ad Tiberii principatum (vide de Massiliensibus notas ad Salvianum): de iisdem Cicero, *Galli humanis hostiis deos* placant. Placare deos, dixit Cicero, ut & Cæsar: Luctatius, lustrare civitatem. Idem Cæsar interpretatur, pro vita vitam reddere. Sic Thraces Zamolxin, sic Germani Mercurium, deosque alios colebant: de quibus ita Lucanus:

Et quibus immitis Placatur *sanguine diro*
Teutates. — — — —

In Britannia quoque celebrata hujus generis sacra, Tacitus & Plinius prodiderunt. Procopius ad sua, hoc est, ad Iustiniani usque tempora idem factitatum scribit in Thule insula. Alias verò per gentes non exolevisse eum morem ante Adriani imperium, Porphyrius scriptum reliquit. De Massiliensibus specialiter memoriæ est proditum, quoties pestilentiâ laborarent, solere pauperem ali publicis sumptibus, qui verbenis ornatus & sacris indutus vestibus, per urbem duceretur cum execrationibus, ut in ipsum omnia civitatis mala recederent: & sic diis immortalibus immolaretur. Queis omnibus in unum collectis, videbimus haud immeritò de his sacris Plinium exclamasse: *Adeo ista* toti *Mundo consensere quanquam discordi & sibi ignoto.* Et hæc quidem de humanis victimis obiter dicta sunto: in quibus non ideo tantùm peccarunt Gentes, quod diis falsis sacra fecerunt, verùm etiam, quòd Divinum numen istâ ratione colendi mandatum nullum habebant, quale Abrahamus habuit. Cæterùm mos ille Gentium in expiandis peccatis hominum aut pecudum mactatione, non parum affert lucis ad intelligendam ipsam sacrificii expiatorii naturam, & vocabula propria ejus argumenti. Eoque minùs sperni potest hic labor, quòd dicat Socinus (lib. 11, cap. 1x), Baptistam, cùm Christum Agnum Dei appellavit, ad sacrificia in universum respexisse, quibus non solùm apud Hebræos, sed & apud Gentes peccata expiari credebantur. Neque verò dubitandum est, cùm in hoc ipso sacrificii expiatorii argumento voces Græcas καθαρίζειν [*mundare*] & ἁγιάζειν [*sanctificare*] sæpissimè usurpat Divinus Scriptor ad Hebræos, quin eo sensu usurpaverit, quem Græca lingua receperat.

Vnde jam promptum est intelligere, quid illud significet, quod Christus sacrificium pro peccato sive expiatorium dicitur. Nam cùm tres interpretationes afferat Socinus (lib. 11, cap. xvi & xvii): primam, quòd Christi mors Fidem nobis ingenerando nos à peccatis in posterum retrahat: alteram, quòd mors ipsa antecedens sit quiddam ad peccatorum remissionem consequendam: tertiam (lib. 11, cap. xx), quòd ipsi remissioni aut decreto de ea facto testimonium quasi præbeat: ex his tribus sola secunda huc pertinet: non quòd non alia quoque illa Christus fecerit, & quidem multò quàm Socinus opinatur efficaciùs, sed quia ista ad sacrificium pro peccato non pertinent. Similitudinem enim legalium sacrificiorum pro peccatis (quibus conjungi possunt similia sacrificia Gentium non secundum rem, sed secundùm Gentium opinionem considerata) & sacrificii à Christo peracti fatetur Socinus (lib. 11, cap. x) consistere in ipsa expiatione. At sacrificia illa non abstrahebant à peccato, præsertim fidem alicujus rei faciendo: neque etiam remissioni peractæ, aut certo decreto testimonium præbebant, sed, ut ipse Socinus agnoscit, erant aliquod antecedens requisitum ad remissionem: quod ostendunt illa legis verba: *Expiabit & remittetur.* In hoc ergo versatur comparatio, planeque necesse est idem significare expiationem cùm sacrificiis legalibus, & cùm Christo applicatur, quia utranque deducit Scriptor ad Hebræos ex eodem decreto, nempe ut sine sanguinis effusione remissio non fiat, sed expiatio fiat in sanguine, Hebr. 1x, 22. Non obstat, quod dicatur ad Hebr. x, 4, fieri non posse ut sanguis taurorum & hircorum tollat peccata: repetendum enim est ex superiori κατὰ τὴν συνείδησιν [*juxta conscientiam*], ut manifestò apparet, si cum hoc loco similes conferas cap. 1x, vers. 9, & 14. Sanguis pecudum tollebat peccata, id est, reatum temporalem, non autem tollebat reatum spiritualem; ut supra ostensum est.[a] Neque in Apocalypsi illud λούσαντι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν [*qui lavit nos à peccatis nostris*] 1, 5, sine insigni detorsione interpreteris, qui lotos nos declaravit, aut 1 Iohan. 1, 7, ubi est, Sanguis Christi καθαρίζει ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας [*emundat nos ab omni peccato*], exponere licet, mundos nos esse declarat. Repugnat enim manifestè & verborum proprietas, & perpetuus Scripturæ usus in hoc argumento. Immunditiæ nomine significari passim reatum, fatetur Socinus. Hinc καθαρίζειν [*mundare*] & ἁγιάζειν [*sanctificare*], est eum reatum tollere, sive efficere remissionem, ut ipse Scriptor ad Hebræos exponit vocem καθαρίζειν [*mundare*], 1x, 22. Christus per se ipsum fecit hunc καθαρισμὸν [*hanc mundationem*], Hebr. 1, 3. Christus καθαρίζει [*mundat*] conscientiam ab operibus mortuis, Hebr. 1x, 14, hoc est, ipso Socino (lib. 11, cap. xv) interprete, à reatu & pœna, pœnæque timore conscientiam liberat. In veteri quoque Testamento נטה eundem habet sensum, Psalm. 11, 9. Quod autem his in locis est καθαρίζειν [*mundare*], hoc ipsum simili ratione dicitur ῥαντίζειν [*aspergere*] x, 22, & λούειν, hoc est, *lavare*, vers. eodem: quò respicit etiam vaticinium Zach. xiii, 1. Cur ab hoc sensu discedatur duobus illis locis Apostoli Iohannis, ratio planè nulla est. Non enim, si Iesus testis fidelis dicitur, Apoc. 1, 5, ideo *lavare*, illud ad testimonium referri debet. Non enim cohærent ἀμέσως [*immediatè*], illud, μάρτυρ ὁ πιστὸς [*testis fidelis*], & ἔλυσεν [*lavit*], sed intercedit mentio primogenituræ mortuorum, regni, deinde charitatis: ut vel cæco appareat, multa officia ac beneficia Christi ad illustrandam ipsius dignitatem unà conjungi.[b] In Epistola autem Iohannis omnino absurdum est καθαρίζειν [*mundare*] de declaratione mundationis, non de ipsa mundatione interpretari, cùm paulo post jungantur ἀφιέναι [*remittere*] & καθαρίζειν [*mundare*], v, 9. Argumentatur Apostolus à conjunctis: Si in luce ambuletis, habetis mundationem, hoc est, remissionem per sanguinem

[a] Contra Soc. lib. 11, cap. xvii. [b] Contra Soc. lib. 11. cap. xiii.

guinem Christi: quia nemini in luce ambulanti imputantur peccata. Baptistæ verò prædicatio, Christum agnum nominantis qui mundi peccata tollat, cùm sacrificia expiatoria respiciat tum Hebræorum, tum Gentium, agnoscente Socino (lib. II, cap. IX), planè non permittit nos, Tollere peccata, aliter interpretari, quàm reatum tollere. Hoc enim faciebant expiatoria sacrificia, non autem abstrahebant à peccando. Neque aliud est εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἁμαρτίας [*ad destitutionem peccati*], Hebr. IX, 26, quàm πρὸς τὸ καθαρίζειν ὑμᾶς [*ut vos mundaremini*], πρὸς τὸ γένεσθαι ἡμῖν ἄφεσιν [*ut nobis fieret remissio*], ut ex vers. 22 apparet. Illa autem ἀθέτησις ἁμαρτίας [*destitutio peccati*] facta est διὰ τῆς θυσίας αὐτοῦ [*per hostiam ejus*], d. vers. 26.

Quanquam verò Socinus quosdam locos vero sensui conatur eripere, tamen, multis aliis convictus, agnoscit indicari in Christi sacrificio expiationem factam, quæ antecedat remissionem peccatorum, tanquam requisitum aliquod. Attamen negat Deum isto sacrificio moveri ut remittat, sed nobis fidem quandam ait ingenerari, quâ, perducti ad emendationem vitæ, porro remissionem peccatorum consequamur: in quo primùm parum meminit ejus quod dixerat (lib. II, cap. X), figuram cum figurato congruere debere in eo in quo fit collatio. Neque ejus quod ostendit Scriptura, illud πάντα καθαρίζεται ἐν αἵματι [*omnia in sanguine mundantur*], eodem modo ad legalia sacrificia, & ad Christum pertinere, Hebr. IX, 22. Sacrificia autem legalia planè talem fidem non ingenerabant. Neque tolerabilis est illa vocis expositio, expiare, esse aliquid facere, quod ad remissionem requiratur. Contra enim voces istæ omnes καθαρίζειν [*mundare*], ἁγιάζειν [*sanctificare*], & similes quibus utuntur Apostoli, suapte natura & usu perpetuo non solùm ordinis antecessum, sed & efficaciam quandam designant. Alia quoque evertendæ huic à Socino repertæ interpretationi certissima argumenta nobis Scriptura suppeditat. Dicit enim opus fuisse novo Sacerdote ex ordine Melchisedech, Hebr. VII, 11. At fidem in Deum prædicare, imò & prædicationem hanc morte confirmare potuerant etiam Levitici Sacerdotes. Quare si nihil præterea efficit Christi Sacerdotium (quod vult Socinus) sequitur eo opus non fuisse. Præterea hoc ipsum, Christum esse mortuum pro peccatis nostris, ad salutem creditur, I Cor. XV, 2, 3. Non ergo Christi expiatio ad hoc, primò, comparata est, ut ad credendum adducat aliquem, cùm ipsa sit inter credenda: [a] quod enim ad fidem duntaxat alicujus rei faciendam inservit, id à re credenda diversum sit, necesse est. Præterea post insitam demum Fidem expiatio Christi in nobis effectum habet. Christus enim Pontifex est constitutus ad expianda peccata populi sui, id est credentium, Hebr. II, 17. Non potest ergo, expiare, esse ad Fidem perducere.

Accedat illud ad Hebræos XII, 24, ubi sanguis Christi purgatorius dicitur melius loqui, quàm sanguis Abel. Sanguis Abel clamabat ad Deum pro vindicta. Sanguis Christi clamat ad Deum pro remissione. Negat Socinus placari Deum sacris expiatoriis. At contrarium testantur Scriptores supra à nobis allegati, qui placandi vocem ad exprimenda ea sacra usurpant: unde & illa nata est phrasis dicto loco ad Hebræos posita, ἱλάσκεσθαι ἁμαρτίας, *placare peccata*, id est, placando Deum peccata expiare. Satisfactionem nullam Socinus in sacris expiatoriis agnoscit. Atqui vox ipsa piandi sive expiandi nihil aliud propriè significat quàm luere; passimque autores à nobis citati, cùm expiare volunt περιφράζειν [*circumloqui*], dicunt dare sanguinem pro sanguine, vitam pro vita, animam pro anima: sanguine aliquid emere, morte alterius salutem consequi. Neque voces Hebrææ hinc dissident. [b] Nam כפר non modò est *tegere*, sed & *redimere*, Exodi XXI, 30. Psalm. XLIX, 8: & *placare* Gen. XXXII, 29: atque inde porro expiare. חטא est *luere*, Gen. XXXI, 39: unde & hoc cœpit ad expiationem significandam usurpari. Tribuitur autem expiatio primò victimis, ut apparet Hebr. IX, 13, & 23; deinde Sacerdoti propter victimas quas exhibet, ut sæpe in Levitico: postremò etiam Deo istam luitionem admittenti. Sicut autem redimendi vox impropriè pro quavis liberatione cœpit usurpari, ita & expiatio dici cœpit ob similem effectum, etiam ubi luitio nulla intercedit. Psalm. LI, 9. Christo autem expiatio tribuitur ut victimæ, ideoque additur vox sanguinis: sanguis autem in victimis, ut supra probatum, datur vice animæ peccatoris. Vnde non potest hîc non propriè sumi vox expiationis. His adde, quod si verum esset, quod vult Socinus, expiationem multo magis fieri per resurrectionem ac ascensionem in cœlos, quàm per mortem & fusionem sanguinis, (quia illa aptiora sint persuadendæ nobis fidei quàm mors ipsa) saltem aliquo Scripturæ loco istis actibus expiatio tribueretur: quod nusquam fit.

Falsum est quod ait Socinus (lib. II, cap. XX), patefactioni Divinæ voluntatis *expiationem* aut καθαρισμὸν tribui: neque hoc evincunt loca allegata. Nam Hebr. I, 3. Christus omnia verbo suo portare dicitur, quia illius imperio omnia parent: sicut vox ῥῆμα [*verbum*] eodem sensu invenitur cap. XI, vers. 3, & Lucæ V, 5. capite verò X, vers. 26, & 29, non pro eodem ponuntur cognitio veritatis; & sanctificatio per sanguinem, sed plura beneficia conjunguntur, ut eo spectabilius sit crimen hominis ingrati. Adjicitur quidem aliquando sanguini, fœderis mentio (lib. II, cap. XIII, & passim): sed sæpius multo τῆς θυσίας [*sacrificii*], quare ea sumenda est interpretatio, quæ ista conjungat. Hoc autem fiet, si fœderis illam spectemus partem, quâ Christus stipulatus est, si mortem subiret, fore ut remitterentur peccata in se credentibus, Deus autem id ipsum promisit, ut apparet Esaïæ LIII, 10.

Quòd verò Christus dicitur in cœlo offerre sanguinem, hoc est, Patri mortem suam ostendere, & quasi ejus Deum ἀναμιμνήσκειν [*memorem reddere*], quod insuper interpellare pro nobis legitur, hæc expiationem in cruce peractam non tollunt. Expiatio enim in cruce peracta, Deum movet ad remittendum & jus nobis acquirit, sed sub certa conditione & modo:

a Contra Soc. lib. IV, cap. X.

b Contra Soc. lib. II, cap. XII.

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modo: in quibus comprehenditur ex parte Christi interpellatio, ex parte nostra Fides vera, ut explicatum est, cùm de satisfactione ageretur. Pugnat autem cum Scriptura Socinus (lib. II, cap. XIII, & cap. XV) manifestè, cùm expiationem negat esse factam antequam Christus cœlum ingrederetur. Passim enim Scriptura τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν, τὸ καθαρισμὸν, τὸ ἁγιασμὸν, τὴν ἀθέτησιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας [*redemptionem, expiationem, sanctificationem, destitutionem peccati*] tribuit morti, eaque ipsa jam peracta indicat [a]: Oblatio verò in cœlo quidem facta est, sed ita ut nec morti in terris peractæ eum titulum denegare debuerit Socinus contra clara verba Pauli Ephes. V, 2, ubi Christus se dicitur tradidisse pro nobis προσφορὰν [*oblationem*]. Solam verborum seriem inspexisse, ipsius interpretationem abundè refutasse est. Ibidem meritò conjunguntur προσφορὰ [*oblatio*] & θυσία [*sacrificium*]. Peragi autem θυσίαν [*sacrificium*] tunc cùm morti datur hostia, omnes Græcorum, omnes Latinorum libri indicant: unde evenit, ut mactare tum sacrificare significet, tum etiam, à sacrificiis ad alia porrectâ significatione, quovis modo interficere. Hinc Ammonius θύειν καὶ σφάττειν [*mactare & interficere*] distinguit, ut appellationes generis & speciei: θύεται μὲν γὰρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τιμῇ θεοῦ, σφάττεται δὲ τὸ δὶ ἡντιναοῦν αἰτίαν φονεύσαι [θύεται *enim est in honorem Dei*, σφάττεται *verò in quamcunque causam occidere*]. Et Plutarchus Gallis & Scythis ait creditum, θεοὺς εἶναι χαίροντας ἀνθρώπων ΣΦΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΩΝ αἵματι, καὶ τούτῳ πλειστάκις ΘΥΣΙΑΝ [*Deos* MACTATORUM *hominum sanguine delectari, & hoc perfectissimum esse* SACRIFICIUM]. Est ergo θυσία ἐν τῷ σφάττεσθαι, *in mactatione sacrificium*. Neque aliter in hoc argumento loquitur Scriptura. Iussus Abraham offerre filium, Gen. XXII, 2. parat eum occidere, vers. 10. atque adeo, quia mactationem, etsi non manu, animo jam peregerat, obtulisse filium dicitur, Hebr. XI, 17. Est & ubi θύειν simpliciter & extra sacrificium *mactare* significat, ut Ioh. X, 10. Et Iohanni Christus dicitur ἀμνὸν ἐσφαγμένον, *agnus ille mactatus* sive *occisus*, Apoc. V, 6, 12. XIII, 8. quod Paulus sic enuntiat, πάσχα ἡμῶν ἐτύθη Χριστὸς [*Pascha nostrum immolatus est Christus*], 1 Cor. V, 7. non solebat autem Pascha in aditum inferri: est ergo ἐτύθη [*immolatus est*] idem quod ἐσφαγιάθη [*occisus est*], ut πάσχα [*pascha*] idem quod ἀρνίον [*agnus*]. Et apparuit Christus in cœlo apud Patrem διὰ τῆς θυσίας [*per hostiam*], Hebr. IX, 26. præcessit ergo sacrificium, secuta est apparitio. Sic alibi in eadem epistola dicitur Christus in sanctuarium cœleste intrasse per sanguinem suum, αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὑρόμενος, id est, *repertâ æternâ redemptione*, Hebr. IX, 12. & sedisse ad dextram Divini solii καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν, *factâ peccatorum nostrorum expiatione*: Hebr. I, 3. quibus in locis voces anteacti temporis ostendunt factam redemptionem aut expiationem, priusquam Christus cœlestem regiam intraret [b]. Quanquam ergo Christus ejusmodi est Pontifex, qui non in terra manere, ut Sacerdotes Levitici, Hebr. VIII, 4. sed cœlum penetrans ipso cœlo celsior debuit evadere, Hebr. IV, 14. VII, 26. quippe cujus Sacerdotium debuit esse æternum & ἀπαράβατον [*perpetuum*] VII, 24. verus tamen Sacerdos fuit & vera victima, jam tum cùm in terris morti se traderet. Ideoque dicitur venisse in mundum, Hebr. X, 5, (hoc est, in orbem terrarum, ipsâ Scripturâ interprete, Ioh. XVIII, 37. 1 Timoth. I, 15), ut voluntatem Dei faceret, vers. 7, & 9. hoc est, ut corpus suum à Deo aptatum, id est, sanctificatum, vers. 5. offerret Deo, vers. 10. pro peccatis, vers. 8, & 12. Quo loco observandum simul est, sanctificatos nos dici oblatione ἐφάπαξ [*semel*]: cùm interpellet Christus toties, quoties opus est nobis: ita ut hîc non interpellatio, sed mactatio sit intelligenda. Est ergo duplex, ut Legalium quarundam victimarum, ita Christi oblatio: prior mactationis, altera ostensionis. Legalium victimarum prior peracta in templo, altera in ipso penetrali: Christi prior in terris, posterior in cœlo: prior tamen illa, non sacrificii præparatio, sed sacrificium: posterior non tam sacrificium, quam sacrificii facti commemoratio. Quare cùm apparitio & interpellatio non sint actus propriè sacerdotales, nisi quatenus peracti sacrificii virtute nituntur, sacrificium illud qui tollit, ne sacerdotium quidem Christo verum relinquit, contra manifestam Scripturæ autoritatem, quæ distinctam à Prophetica & Regia Pontificiam dignitatem Christo assignat: non figuratè dictam, sed maximè veram, quippe cùm sacerdotium ipsius Levitico sacerdotio, quod verum fuit sacerdotium, opponatur, ut ejusdem generis species perfectior, alteri speciei minùs perfectæ: neque rectè inferri potuerit, necesse fuisse ut haberet quod offerret Christus, Hebr. VIII, 3. nisi ex veritate ejus, in quod constitutus erat, sacerdotii, d. vers. 3. Sed profectò minimè mirum est, si qui Christo gloriam naturalem, hoc est, veri nominis Deitatem, sustulerunt, iidem & officia ipsius imminuunt, & beneficia ipsius præcipua recusant agnoscere. Tibi Domine Iesu ut vero Deo, ut vero Redemptori, ut vero Sacerdoti, ut veræ pro peccatis victimæ, cum Patre & Spiritu, uno tecum Deo, sit honos & gloria.

a Contra Socin. lib. II, cap. XXI.

b Contra Socin. lib. II, cap. XXIII.

FINIS.

TESTI-

TESTIMONIA VETERVM.

Justinus ad Diognetum : Αὐτὸς τὸν ἴδιον υἱὸν ἀπέδοτο λύτρον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. ὦ τῆς γλυκείας ἀνταλλαγῆς [*Proprium ipse Filium pretium redemptionis pro nobis dedit. O dulcem permutationem*] !

Auctor expositionis Fidei, quæ Justino tribuitur. Διὰ μὲν τῆς ἁγίας πολιτείας ἀφανίζων τὸ παράπτωμα, διὰ δὲ τοῦ μὴ χρεωστουμένου θανάτου καταργῶν τὸ ὀφειλόμενον [*per sanctissimam vitam delens peccatum, per mortem autem indebitam, debitum exstinguens*].

Justinus Respons. ad Orthodoxos ad quæst. XCIX. ὅτι ὡς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν ὅτως προσφέρε τῷ Θεῷ ὁ τὸ αἷμα τῶν ἀλόγων προσενέγκας, μαρτυρεῖ ἡ θεία γραφή [*Brutorum autem sanguinem oblatum pro eo fuisse, quasi offerentis anima offerretur, testantur Sacræ Literæ*].

Irenæus lib. V, *cap.* I, Neque enim carnem ac sanguinem, quibus nos redemit, verè habuisset, nisi veterem Adami fictionem in sese instaurasset.

Quem locum ex Irenæo Græcè citat Theodoretus Dialog. II, *cap.* XXVI, Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ἀληθῶς σάρκα καὶ αἷμα ἐχηκώς, δι' ὧν ἡμᾶς ἐξηγόρασε [*Neque enim verè carnem & sanguinem habuisset, per quæ nos redemit*].

Tertullianus adversùs Judæos cap. XIII, Christum oportebat pro omnibus gentibus fieri sacrificium, qui tanquam ovis ad victimam ductus est, & velut agnus coram tondente se sine voce, sic non aperuit os suum.

Origenes in Leviticum homil. III *penè initio*, Si quis bene meminerit eorum quæ dicta sunt, potest nobis dicere, quia sacrificium quod Pontificem pro peccato diximus obtulisse, figuram Christi tenere posuimus, & conveniens non videbitur vero Christo, qui peccatum nescit, ut pro peccato dicatur obtulisse sacrificium, licet per mysterium res agatur : & idem ipse Pontifex, idem ponatur & hostia. Vide ergo si & ad hoc possumus hoc modo occurrere, Quia Christus peccatum quidem non fecit, peccatum tamen pro nobis factus est, dum qui erat in forma Dei, in forma servi esse dignatur, dum qui immortalis est moritur, & impassibilis, patitur, & invisibilis, videtur, & quia nobis hominibus vel mors vel reliqua omnis fragilitas in carne ex peccati conditione superducta est : ipse etiam qui in similitudinem hominum factus est & habitu repertus ut homo, sine dubio pro peccato quod ex nobis susceperat, quia peccata nostra portavit, vitulum immaculatum, hoc est, carnem incontaminatam obtulit hostiam Deo.

Origenes homil. IV *in Numeros.* Si non fuisset peccatum, non necesse fuerat Filium Dei agnum fieri, nec opus fuerat eum in carne positum jugulari, sed mansisset hoc, quod in principio erat, Deus Verbum. Verùm, quoniam introiit peccatum in hunc mundum, peccati autem necessitas propitiationem requirit, & propitiatio non fit nisi per hostiam, necessarium fuit provideri hostiam pro peccato.

In Matth. cap. XVI, *Tract.* II, Homo quidem non potest dare aliquam commutationem pro anima sua, Deus autem pro animabus omnium dedit commutationem pretiosum sanguinem Filii sui. Nec enim empti sumus corruptibili argento vel auro, sed pretioso sanguine agni immaculati.

In epist. ad Rom. lib. II, *cap.* II, Fatemini sine dubio verum esse quod scriptum est in epistola Petri : Quia redempti sumus non corruptibili pretio argenti & auri, sed pretioso sanguine unigeniti. Si ergo pretio empti sumus, ut etiam Paulus adstipulatur, ab aliquo sine dubio empti sumus, cujus eramus servi, qui & pretium poposcit quod voluit, ut de potestate dimittat quos tenebat. Tenebat autem nos Diabolus, cui distracti fueramus peccatis nostris. Poposcit ergo pretium nostrum, sanguinem Christi. Verùm donec Iesu sanguis daretur, qui tam pretiosus fuit, ut solus pro omnium redemptione sufficeret, necessarium fuit eos, qui instruebantur in lege, unumquemque pro se velut ad imitationem quandam futuræ redemptionis sanguinem suum dare : & propterea nos, pro quibus completum est pretium sanguinis Christi, non necesse habemus pro nobis ipsis pretium, id est, sanguinem circumcisionis offerre.

Origenes contra Celsum lib. I, An non videbant, *inquit*, Discipuli, ὅτι ὁ χθὲς καὶ πρώην σταυρωθεὶς, ἑκὼν τοῦτον τὸν θάνατον ὑπὲρ τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους ἀνεδέξατο, ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν ὑπὲρ πατρίδων, ἐπὶ τῷ σβέσαι λοιμικὰ κρατήσαντα καταστήματα, ἢ ἀφορίας, ἢ δυσπλοίας ; εἰκὸς γὰρ, εἶναι ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων, κατά τινας ἀπορρήτους καὶ δυσλήπτους τοῖς πολλοῖς λόγους, φύσιν τοιαύτην, ὡς ἕνα δίκαιον, ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀποθανόντα ἑκουσίως, ἀποτροπασμοὺς ἐμπιεῖν φαύλων δαιμονίων, ἐνεργούντων λοιμοὺς ἢ ἀφορίας ἢ δυσπλοίας, ἤ τι τῶν παραπλησίων. Λεγέτωσαν οὖν οἱ βουλόμενοι ἀπιστεῖν τῷ Ἰησοῦν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων ἀποθανηκέναι τρόπῳ σταυροῦ, πότερον οὐδὲ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς παραδέξονται καὶ βαρβαρικὰς πολλὰς ἱστορίας περὶ τοῦ τινὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ πεθνηκέναι καταθαρρήσαντας τῶν παρακαταλαβόντων τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη κακῶν · ἢ ἐκεῖνα μὲν γεγένηται, οὐδὲν δὲ πιθανὸν ἔχει ὁ νομιζόμενος ἀνθρωπος πρὸς τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ἐπὶ καθαιρέσει μεγάλου δαίμονος, καὶ δαιμόνων ἄρχοντος, ὑποτάξαντος ὅλας τὰς ἐπὶ γῆν ἐληλυθύας ἀνθρώπων ψυχάς [*hunc non ita pridem crucifixum sponte eam mortem pro humano genere subiisse ? non absimiliter his, qui sponte se morti devoverunt ad averruncandam grassantem in sua patria pestilentiam, aut agri sterilitatem, tempestatemve arcentem navigationibus ? ita enim naturâ comparatum videtur occultis quibusdam & indeprehensibilibus rationibus, ut unius justi mors, sponte suscepta pro salute populi,*

avertat

avertat malorum dæmonum vim sævientem pestibus, sterilitatibus, tempestatibus vel similibus malis. Respondeant igitur, qui nolunt credere Iesum pro humano genere in cruce mortuum, utrum abrogaturi sint fidem etiam Græcorum, Barbarorumque multis historiis, prodentibus de aliquot, qui ultroneâ morte obitâ pro Republica totos populos totasque gentes liberarint à calamitatibus? an illa quidem facta sunt, nec tamen est verisimile eum, qui homo sit habitus, mortuum ut profligaretur magnus dæmon, princeps cæterorum dæmonum, subjugator animarum omnium qui unquam in terris visi sunt hominum]?

Mox, Οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις γενόμενοι, καὶ ἰαθέντες ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Σωτῆρος πεπονθέναι ταῦτα λέγουσι, [*Hi qui dudum in peccatis fuerant, Servatoris passione sanati, hæc dicunt*] *apud Esaïam* LIII.

Μὴ γνόντα αὐτὸν ἁμαρτίαν, ὡς καθαρὸν παρέδωκεν ὑπὲρ πάντων τῶν ἡμαρτηκότων ὁ Θεός. [*Cùm peccatum non nosset, tradidit eum, utpote purum, Deus pro omnibus qui peccaverant*].

Cyprianus Epist. VIII. *ad Clem. & plebem*, Orabat ille pro nobis cùm peccator ipse non esset, sed nostra peccata portaret.

Idem Epist. LXIII *ad Cæcilium* §. 9, Nos omnes portabat Christus, qui & peccata nostra portabat.

Idem lib. ad Demetrianum §. 22, Hanc gratiam Christus impertit, hoc munus misericordiæ suæ tribuit, subigendo mortem trophæo crucis, redimendo credentem pretio sanguinis sui, reconciliando hominem Deo Patri, vivificando mortalem regeneratione cœlesti.

Idem, sive alius potius Scriptor libri de cardinalibus Christi operibus ad Cornelium Papam, serm. VII, *qui est de ratione Circumcisionis*, Tantæ dignitatis illa una Redemptoris nostri fuit oblatio, ut una ad tollenda mundi peccata sufficeret, qui tanta auctoritate in sancta introivit in sanguine proprio, ut deinceps nulla supplicantium postulatio sanguine indigeret alieno.

Idem serm. XVI, *qui est de adscensione Christi*, Qui pro nobis triginta argenteis appretiatus intelligi voluit, quanta fuerit in pretio, quod pro eo datum est & in eo, quod ipse dedit pro mundo, dissimilitudo, cùm ipse exiguo argento emptus & venditus, tanto pretio damnatos redimeret: ut dubium esse non possit, quin pretii magnitudo superaret negotium; nec æquari posset damnum, quod omnino damnatio justa meruerat, obedientiæ Christi, quæ gratis usque ad mortem progressa est, & ultro solvit quod non debebat.

Lactantius de beneficiis Christi,

Quisquis ades mediique subis in limina templi,
Siste parùm, insontemque tuo pro crimine passum
Respice me, &c.

Et mox,

Te propter, vitamque tuam sum virginis alvum
Ingressus: sum factus homo atque horrentia passus
Funera, &c.

Eusebius Cæsariensis lib. X *de demonstratione Euangel. in præfat.* Ἔδει γὰρ τὸν ἀμνὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγάλου ἀρχιερέως ἀναληφθέντα, ὑπὲρ τῶν λοιπῶν συγγενῶν ἀμνῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ πάσης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἀγέλης, θυσίαν τῷ Θεῷ προσαχθῆναι. Ἐπειδὰν γὰρ δι' ἀνθρώπου ὁ θάνατος, καὶ δι' ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἀνάστασις, ἡ ἐκ νεκρῶν. [*Oportebat enim agnum Dei, qui à maximo Pontifice assumtus fuerat, pro reliquis cognatis agnis, & pro omni humano grege, Deo victimam offerri. Nam quoniam per hominem mors, per hominem etiam resurrectio à mortuis*].

Idem lib. X, *cap.* I. Καὶ καθ' ὁ πάσχοντος ἑνὸς μέλους, συμπάσχει πάντα τὰ μέλη, οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν μελῶν πασχόντων καὶ ἁμαρτανόντων, καὶ αὐτὸς κατὰ τοῦτο τῆς συμπαθείας λόγους· ἐπειδήπερ εὐδόκησε Θεοῦ λόγος ὢν, μορφὴν δούλου λαβεῖν καὶ τῷ κοινῷ πάντων ἡμῶν σκηνώμαλι συναφθῆναι· τοῦτο τῶν πασχόντων μελῶν πόνους εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναλαμβάνει, καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας νόσους ἰδιοποιεῖται, καὶ πάντων ἡμῶν ὑπεραλγεῖ καὶ ὑπερπονεῖ, κατὰ τοὺς τῆς φιλανθρωπίας νόμους. οὐ μόνον δὲ ταῦτα πράξας ὁ ἀμνὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κολασθεὶς καὶ τιμωρίαν ὑποσχὼν, ἣν αὐτὸς μὴ ὤφειλεν, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς τὸ πλήθους ἕνεκεν τῶν πεπλημμεληκότων, ἡμῖν αἴτιος τῆς τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἀφέσεως κατέστη, ἅτε τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀναδεξάμενος θάνατον, μάστιγάς τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ ἀτιμίας ἡμῖν ἐπιφερομένας εἰς ἑαυτὸν μεταθεὶς, καὶ τοῦ ἡμῖν προσεπιμεμφόμενον κατέρραν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἑλκύσας, γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατάρα. Καὶ τί γὰρ ἄλλο, ἢ ἀντίψυχον; Διὸ φησὶν ἐξ ἡμετέρου προσώπου τὸ λόγιον, τῷ μόλωπι αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς ἰάθημεν, καὶ Κύριος παρέδωκεν αὐτὸν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἡμῶν. [*Atque ut, dum unum membrum patitur, simul omnia cum eo membra patiuntur, ita multis patientibus & peccantibus membris, ipse quoque, tanquam qui unà pateretur* (*quandoquidem, cùm Dei Verbum esset, ei placuit & formam servi accipere, & communi omnium nostro domicilio copulari*) *patientium membrorum labores in se ipse assumpsit, & nostros morbos suos fecit, & pro suo in homines amore pro omnibus nobis & dolores & labores sustinuit. Cæterùm non his modò rebus Dei Agnus, verùm etiam pro nobis tormenta passus, supplicioque affectus, quô ipse quidem dignus minimè erat, sed nos ipsi propter multitudinem peccatorum, ut peccata nobis dimitterentur, auctor exstitit: utpote, qui pro nobis & mortem subierit, & verbera & probra & contumelias, quibus nos digni eramus, in se transtulerit, & exsecratio pro nobis factus, exsecrationem, quam nos ferre damnati eramus, ad seipsum attraxerit. Et quid verò aliud ille, quàm pro animis nostris pretium? Itaque ex persona nostra Oraculum ait, Livore ejus nos sanati sumus, &, Dominus tradidit eum peccatis nostris*].

Eusebius de demonstratione Euangelica lib. I, *cap.* X. Καὶ ἐπεῖδεν ὁ Θεὸς ἐπὶ Ἄβελ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δώροις αὐτοῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ Κάιν καὶ τοῖς θυσίαις αὐτοῦ οὐ προσέχειν. ἔνθα δὴ ἐπιστήσεις, ὡς μᾶλλον ὁ ζωοθυτήσας ἀποδεκτὸς εἴρηται παρὰ τὰ ἀπὸ γῆς προσαγόντα τῷ Θεῷ τὴν θυσίαν· καὶ Νῶε δὲ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν κτηνῶν τῶν καθαρῶν καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν πτηνῶν καθαρῶν ἀνήνεγκεν ὁλοκαρπώσεις ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον, καὶ ὠσφράνθη Κύριος ὀσμὴν εὐωδίας. ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀβραὰμ θύσας ἀναγέγραπται· ὥστε, καὶ τὴν τῆς θείας γραφῆς μαρτυρίαν, πρώτην ἁπάντων τὴν διὰ ζώων θυσίαν ἐπινενοῆσθαι τοῖς πάλαι θεοφιλέσι. Τούτου δὴ τὸν λογισμὸν ἡγούμαι εἶναι οὐ τὸν τύχοντα, οὐδ' ἀνθρωπίνως κεκινημένον, καὶ θείαν δι' ἐπίνοιαν ὑποβεβλημένον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἑώρων, ἅτε τὸν τρόπον εὐσεβεῖς καὶ Θεῷ προσωκειωμένοι, θείῳ τινὶ πνεύματι τὰς ψυχὰς πεφωτισμένοι, μεγάλης αὐτοῖς θεραπείας δεῖν εἰς ἀποκάθαρσιν τῶν θνητῶν πλημμελημάτων, λύτρον τῆς αὐτῶν σωτηρίας, τῷ καὶ ζωῆς καὶ ψυχῆς χορηγῷ προσφέλεσθαι ἠγοῦντο· ἔπειτα μηδὲν κρεῖττον καὶ τιμιώτερον τῆς οἰκείας ψυχῆς καθιερῶν

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καθιερεῦν ἔχοντες, ἀντὶ ταύτης τίως τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων προσῆγον θυσίαν, τῆς σφῶν ψυχῆς ἀνάψυχα προσκομίζοντες. ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτο πλημμελεῖν δοκοῦσι ἀδικεῖν ἡγούμενοι, ὅτι μηδὲ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λογικῇ καὶ νοερᾷ δυνάμει προσφατωλησίαν εἶναι τῶν ψυχῶν ἀλόγων ἐπαιδεύοντο, δοκοῦν ἄλλο τι εἶναι αὐτῶν ἢ τὸ αἷμα αὐτῶν μεμαθηκότες, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ αἵματι ζωικῶν δυνάμιν. ὁ καὶ παρέχειν αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ ψυχῶν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς ἀναφέρουσας τῷ Θεῷ. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ Μωσῆς λαμπρότατά που προσαφεῖ λέγων, ψυχὴ πάσης σαρκὸς αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἐστιν· καὶ ἐγὼ δέδωκα ὑμῖν τὸ αἷμα ἐπὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου, ἐξιλάσκεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὑμῶν. τὸ γὰρ αἷμα αὐτῶν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς ἐξιλάσεται. διὰ τοῦτο εἴρηκα τοῖς υἱοῖς Ισραὴλ, πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐξ ὑμῶν οὐ φάγεται αἷμα. πρόχειρος γοῦν ἐπιμελῶς ἐν τούτοις, ὅτως εἴρηται τὸ, ἐγὼ δέδωκα ὑμῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου ἐξιλάσκεσθαι περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν. τὸ γὰρ αἷμα ἀντὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξιλάσεται. σαφῶς γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς τὸ τῶν σφαγιαζομένων ζώων αἷμά φησιν ἐξιλάσκεσθαι. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ περὶ τῶν θυσιῶν νόμος ὑποβάλλει νοεῖν τῷ τεθεωρημένῳ σκοπούνι. πάντα γοῦν τὸν θύοντα τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν προστάττει τῇ κεφαλῇ τοῦ θυομένου, προσκομίζειν δὲ τὸ ζῶον τῷ ἱερεῖ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐχόμενον, ὡσανεὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ κεφαλῆς τὸ ἱερεῖον προσφέροντα. λέγει δὲ οὖν ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ· προσλάβει αὐτὸ ἔναντι Κυρίου, καὶ ἐπιθήσει τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅτως ἐφ' ἑκάστου πτήρη θύματος, ἀδεμίας θυσίας ἄλλως ἀναφερομένης. διὰ ὧν ὁ λόγος ὅτι δὴ ἀνάψυχα τοῦ αὐτῶν ψυχῆς προσήγετο τὰ ζωοθυτούμενα. [*Et respexit Deus ad Abel, & ad munera illius: ad Cain verò, & ad sacrificia ejus non attendit. Vbi jam illud considerabis, quòd Deo acceptior dictus sit qui animalia sacrificaverit, quàm is qui ab agro sacrificium obtulerit? Etiam Noë protinus de cunctis pecoribus mundis & de cunctis volucribus mundis obtulit victimas super altare: odoratusque est Dominus odorem suavitatis. Abraham quoque sacrificasse scribitur: ut, si Divinæ Scripturæ testimonium sequimur, primum omnium de animalibus sacrificium, priscis Deo amicis viris excogitatum fuerit, quam sanè excogitationem temerè exstitisse, aut humano more exortam, putandum non est, sed divino potius nutu insinuatam. Etenim, cùm morum sanctitate præstarent Deoque penitus addicti essent, & ob eam rem quasi Divino Spiritu illustrati, viderent magno sibi opus esse obsequio, si sua ipsorum humana delicta abluere vellent, pretium pro salute sua ei, qui vitam atque animam præbuisset, se debere putabant: sed cum nihil præstantius, aut pretiosius animâ suâ haberent quod dicarent, pro hac interim brutorum animalium vitam offerebant, quæ suæ ipsorum animæ vicem præstaret; neque se in hoc aut delinquere aut injustè facere arbitrabantur: quippe qui hominum rationalis atque intelligentiâ præditæ animæ neutiquam similem brutorum animam esse didicissent, neque aliud quicquam quàm illorum sanguinem vitalemque in eo vim esse eam edocti essent, hocque unum præbere se, quasi animam Deo pro anima offerentes. Hoc autem ipsum Moyses quodam loco planissimè indicat, ubi ait, Anima omnis carnis sanguis ejus est, & ego dedi vobis sanguinem in altari ad expiandum pro peccatis vestris: sanguis enim eorum pro anima expiabit. Idcirco dixi filiis Israel, Omnis anima ex vobis non comedet sanguinem. Attende igitur diligenter, quomodo in his dictum sit illud, Ego dedi vobis in altari expiare animas vestras, sanguis enim pro anima piaculum erit. Planè enim pro humana anima, mactatorum animalium sanguinem piaculum offerri dicit. Hoc idem etiam lex de sacrificiis monet, si quis modò consideratiùs attenderit: nam capiti victimæ unumquemque, dum sacrificat, manus habere injectas imperat, & ad Sacerdotem animal ipsum adducere capite comprehensum atque detentum, quasi qui pro suo ipsius capite hostiam exhibeat: dicit igitur de unoquoque, Adducet illud ante Dominum, & imponet manus suas in caput muneris; quod sanè in omni victima observatum est, cum aliter nullum sacrificium offeratur. Ex quibus utique verbis sermo Divinus illud intelligi vult humanarum animarum pretium, quæ sacrificarentur animalia, exhiberi solita esse*].

Christus τὸ τοῦ κόσμου καθάρσιον, τὸ τῶν ἁμαρτολῶν ἀντίψυχον [*mundi piaculum & redemptionis pretium pro animabus peccatorum*]. *Infra* ἀντίψυχον ὑπὲρ πάντων ἡμῶν προέμενος ἑαυτόν [*qui se pro omnibus nobis, ut nostrarum animarum vice fungeretur, dedit*].

Antonius Eremita Epist. 11. In quo & creaturarum Genitor visceribus motus pro plaga nostra, quæ sanari non poterat, nisi per solam ipsius bonitatem, misit Vnigenitum nobis, ut per servitutem nostram servitutis assumeret formam, traderetque se pro peccatis nostris. Et peccata quidem nostra humiliaverunt eum, sed livore ejus nos omnes sanati sumus.

Macarius Episcopus Hierosolymitanus lib. 11. *Act. Concil. Nicæni,* Sed venit ipse Salvator omnium, & à nobis debita supplicia in sua carne nomine nostro suscepit.

Athanasius de incarnatione Verbi Dei, Ἐπειδὴ οὖν καὶ τὸ ὀφειλόμενον πᾶσι πάντων ἔδει λοιπὸν ἀποδοθῆναι· ὠφείλετο γὰρ πάντως, ὡς προεῖπον, ἀποθανεῖν, διὰ ὃ μάλιστα καὶ ἐπεδήμησε, τοῦτο ἕνεκεν μὲν τὰς περὶ τοῦ θεότητος αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀποδείξεις, ἤδη λοιπὸν καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων τῶν θυσίαν ἀνέφερεν, ἀντὶ πάντων τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ναὸν εἰς θάνατον παραδιδοὺς, ἵνα τοὺς μὲν πάντας ἀνυπόδικους καὶ ἐλευθέρους τῆς ἀρχαίας παραβάσεως ποιήσῃ· δείξῃ δὲ ἑαυτὸν καὶ θανάτου κρείττονα, ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀναστάσεως τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα ἄφθαρτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος. [*Quandoquidem igitur debitum pro omnibus solvendum erat; debebatur autem, ut jam dixi, ut omnes morerentur, quæ causa illi potissima fuit in hanc vitam veniendi, idcirco Divinitate suâ per opera priùs ostensâ, tum deinde pro omnibus sacrificium obtulit, pro omnibus templum suum morti tradens, quò omnes immunes & liberos à veteri transgressione efficeret, seque declararet mortis victorem, suumque corpus immortale redditum, primitias publicæ omnium resurrectionis exhiberet*].

Et mox: Θανάτου γὰρ ἦν χρεία, καὶ θάνατον ὑπὲρ πάντων ἔδει γενέσθαι· ἵνα τὸ παρὰ πάντων ὀφειλόμενον γένηται. ὅθεν, ὡς προεῖπον, ὁ λόγος, ἐπεὶ οὐκ οἴόν τε ἦν αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν (ἀθάνατος γὰρ ἦν) ἔλαβεν ἑαυτῷ σῶμα τὸ δυνάμενον ἀποθανεῖν, ἵνα ὡς ἴδιον ἀντὶ πάντων αὐτὸ προσενέγκῃ, καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ πάντων πάσχων διὰ τὸν πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπίβασιν, καταργήσῃ τὸ κράτος ἔχοντα τοῦ θανάτου, τουτέστι τὸν διάβολον, καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃ τούτους, ὅσοι φόβῳ θανάτου ἔνοχοι ἦσαν δουλείας. ἀμέλει τοῦ κοινοῦ πάντων σωτῆρος ἀποθανόντος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἔτι νῦν ὥσπερ πάλαι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νόμου ἀπειλὴν θανάτῳ ἀποθνήσκομεν οἱ ἐν Χριστῷ πιστοί. [*Morte enim opus fuit, & mortem pro omnibus inferri necessum erat, ut, quod ab omnibus debitum erat, lueretur: quamobrem (ut dixi) Verbum, quoniam mori non potuit, utpote immortale,*

mortale, corpus sibi sumpsit, quod mori poterat, illudque ut suum pro omnibus obtulit, ut corporis ingressu pro omnibus passus aboleret eum, qui habet mortis imperium, hoc est, diabolum, & liberaret illos, quotquot formidine mortis per omnem vitam servituti erant obnoxii; certè communi omnium Salvatore mortuo pro nobis, non jam ulterius, sicuti olim secundùm Legis comminationem, morte morimur, quotquot in Christo Iesu confidimus.]

Idem ibidem, Καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τοῦ θανάτου τρόπῳ ἡ σωτηρία πᾶσι γέγονε, καὶ ἡ λύσις πᾶσα λελύτρωται· οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ πάντων ζωή, καὶ ὡς πρόβαλον ὑπὲρ τῆς πάντων σωτηρίας ἀντίψυχον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα εἰς θάνατον προέδωκε. [*Atque hoc mortis genere omnium salus comparata, omnisque creatura redempta est: hic est omnium vita, qui, ut ovis, pro omnium salute vicarium succidaneumque suum corpus in mortem tradidit.*]

Idem in pass. & cruc. Domini, Ἀλλ' ἐρῶν τὸ μὴ τῆς κακίας ἀφόρητον, καὶ τὸ θνητὸν γένος οὐχ ἱκανὸν ἀντιστῆναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, οὐδὲ τὴν τιμωρίαν τῶν κακῶν δυνατὸν ὑποδῦναι· ὑπέρ-ῃρε γὰρ πᾶσαν τιμωρίαν ἡ τῆς κακίας ὑπερβολή. ὁρῶν δὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς ἀγαθότητα, ἐρῶν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἱκανότητα καὶ δύναμιν· Χριστὸς γὰρ Θεοῦ δύναμις καὶ Θεοῦ σοφία· κεκινημένος τῇ φιλανθρωπίᾳ, καὶ οἰκείας τὴν ἀσθένειαν ἡμῶν, ἐνεδύσατο ταύτην. αὐτὸς γὰρ, ὡς ὁ προφήτης φησὶ, τὰς ἀσθενείας ἡμῶν ἦρε, καὶ τὰς νόσους ἐβάσταζε. καὶ ἐλεήσας τὸ θνητὸν ἡμῶν, προσεβάλετο τοῦτο· λέγει γὰρ ὁ Παῦλος, ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ. ἰδὼν δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ἡμῶν, τὴν τιμωρίας ἀδύνατον, ἀνεδέξατο ταύτην αὐτός· Χρηστὸς γὰρ γέγονεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατάρα· καὶ ἄνω δὴ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα προβαλλόμενος καὶ ἀμφιασάμενος, δι' ἑαυτοῦ τὰ ἡμῶν προσήγαγε τῷ πατρὶ, ἵνα ὡς αὐτὸς πάσχων ἀόλαβῆ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πάσχοντα καταστοχάσῃ, καὶ μικρὰ μεγάλοις ἀντικαταλλάξῃται. [*Sed cùm videret malitiam intolerabilem, neque mortale genus idoneum esse quod morti resisteret, neque pœnam suorum malorum persolvere posse, (nam excessus malitiæ transcendebat omne supplicium) vidensque simul Patris bonitatem, & se quàm idoneus esset & potens, (Christus enim Dei potentia ac sapientia) motus suit suo erga homines amore & misertus nostræ imbecillitatis, illam ipsam imbecillitatem induit: siquidem ipse (ut Propheta dicit) nostras infirmitates sustulit & languores gestavit; & miserans nostram mortalitatem, eâ ipsa mortalitate circumamictus est: Paulus enim dicit, Humiliavit seipsum usque ad mortem, idque ad mortem crucis. Videnque simul, quàm non ad solutionem pœnæ sufficeremus, illam ipsam pœnam in se transiulit: siquidem Christus factus est pro nobis maledictio: atque ita humana carne amictus & circumindutus, per se quæ nostra erant, Patri obtulit, ut ipse patiens, hominem patientem illæsum redderet, & parva magnis pensaret.*]

Hilarius Pictaviensis in cap. XIV. *Matth. cap.* XIV. Dominus solus passurus pro omnibus omnium peccata solvebat.

Hymno de Epiphania:

Iesus refulsit omnium
Pius redemptor Gentium, &c.
Felix Ioannes mergere
Illum tremiscit flumine,
Potest suo qui sanguine
Peccata mundi tergere.

Optatus Milevitanus De schismate Donatistarum adversùs Parmenianum lib. III, Cùm dicitis, redimite animas vestras: unde illas emistis, ut vendatis? quis est nescio qui Angelus, qui nundinas facit animarum quas ante ejus adventum Diabolus possidebat? Has sanguine suo Christus Salvator noster redemit, Apostolo dicente, Empti estis pretio magno. Constat enim sanguine Christi omnes redemptos.

Victor Antiochenus ad cap. XV. *Marci*, Et cur, inquis, universorum Dominus & opifex nostri causâ homo effectus, tantam ignominiam tantaque supplicia pertulit? Nobis ille assimilatus est, nostrasque in se miserias & cruces suscepit, quò naturam nostram per peccatum collapsam erigeret, & in pristinum dignitatis gradum denuo revocaret. Commoda itaque, quæ per illius cruciatus in nos defluxerunt, sunt permulta: Ipse enim nostra pro nobis debita luit, ipse peccata nostra tulit, ipse nostri causâ & doluit, & gemuit.

Cyrillus Hierosolymitanus Catechesi XIII. Ἔλυσε δὲ πάντας τοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας κατεχομένους, καὶ κόσμον ὅλον ἀνθρώπων ἐλυτρώσατο· καὶ μὴ θαυμάσῃς εἰ κόσμος ὅλος ἐλυτρώθη. ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ φιλὸς, ἀλλὰ υἱὸς Θεοῦ μονογενὴς, ὁ ὑπεραποθνήσκων· καὶ τοιγὰρ ἔχυσεν ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς τοῦ Ἀδὰμ ἡ ἁμαρτία θάνατον ἐνέγκαι τῷ κόσμῳ· εἰ δὲ τῷ παραπτώματι τοῦ ἑνὸς θάνατος ἐβασίλευσεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον, πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ ζωὴ βασιλεύσει; καὶ εἰ τότε διὰ τὸ ξύλον τῆς βρώσεως ἐξεβλήθησαν οὐκ παραδείσου, ἆρα, διὰ τὸ ξύλον Ἰησοῦ νῦν εὐκοπώτερον οἱ πιστεύοντες εἰς παράδεισον οὐκ εἰσελεύσονται; εἰ ὁ πρωτόπλαστος ὑπὸ γῆς ἤνεγκεν οἰκουμενικὸν θάνατον, ὁ πλάσας αὐτὸν ὑπὸ γῆς, ἆρα οὐ φέρει ζωὴν αἰώνιον αὐτὸς ὢν ἡ ζωή; εἰ φινεὲς ζηλώσας τὸν αἰσχροποιὸν, κατέπαυσε τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν ὀργήν· Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἄλλον ἀνελὼν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἀντίλυτρον παραδοὺς, ἆρα τὴν ὀργὴν οὐ λύει τὴν κατ' ἀνθρώπων; [*Liberavit autem omnes sub peccato detentos, & totum genus humanum redemit: Et ne te subeat admiratio, si mundus universus redemptus fuerit; non erat enim nudus homo, sed unigenitus Dei Filius, qui pro eo mortem oppetebat. Potuit equidem unius viri Adam peccatum mundo mortem inferre: si itaque ob unius delictum mors imperium obtinuit in mundum, quomodo non multò magis per unius justitiam vita imperium obtinebit? Et si tunc temporis ob lignum de quo comederant, ejecti sunt è Paradiso; nonne nunc faciliùs per lignum Iesu in Paradisum introituri sunt credentes? Si primus ille de terra formatus generalem attulit mortem, nonne qui eum de terra formavit, vitam adfert æternam, ipse cùm vita sit? Si Phinees ægrè ferens turpe patrantem, iram Dei placavit; Iesus, non alium perdens, sed seipsum in redemptionis pretium offerens, nonne illam adversùs homines iram dissolvit?*]

Basilius homiliâ in Psalm. XLVIII, Εὑρέθη ἓν, ἐμοῦ πάντων ἀνθάξιον, ὃ ἐδόθη εἰς τιμὴν λυτρώσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν, τὸ ἅγιον καὶ πολύτιμον αἷμα τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. [*Vnum inventum est, rebus omnibus præstantius, quod in pretium redemptionis animæ nostræ datum est, sanctus nimirum & pretiosus Domini nostri Iesu Christi sanguis.*]

Gregorius Nazianzenus Oratione XLII, *quæ secunda est in Pascha*, Τὸ μέγα καὶ ἄφυτον (ἵν' ὕτως εἴπω) ὅσον ὑπὲρ τὴν πρώτην φύσιν ταῖς νομικαῖς θυσίαις ἐγκαταμέμικται, καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ μέρους τῆς οἰκουμένης, οὐδὲ πρὸς ὀλίγον, ἀλλὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἀφθονίζον καθάρσιον. [*Magna illa*

illa & sacrificari nescia (ut ita loquar) quantum ad primam ejus naturam attinet, victima, sacrificiis quæ è lege descendunt quasi immixta est; illa, inquam, victima, quâ non aut exigua orbis terrarum portio aut ad breve tempus, sed quâ omnium, qui ubique sunt hominum peccata & in omne præterea ævum abluerentur].

Idem ibidem. Ῥανίδες αἵματος ὀλίγαι κόσμον ὅλον ἀνατωλάτ]ωσι, καὶ γίνονται καθάπερ ὀπὸς γάλακτι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εἰς ἓν ἡμᾶς σωδέωσαι καὶ σωάγωσαι. [*Gutta sanguinis perpaucæ orbem universum refingunt, fiuntque omnibus id quod est lacti coagulum, colliguntque omnes, & quasi congregant*].

Et eadem, Ἔστι τοίνυν ἐξετάσαι πρᾶγμα καὶ δόγμα, τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς παρορώμενον, ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἐξεταζόμενον. τίνι γὰρ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αἷμα, καὶ πρὸς τίνος ἐχύθη τὸ μέγα καὶ προσόφειλόμενον τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἀρχιερέως, καὶ θύματος. κατεχόμεθα μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ, πεπραμένοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, καὶ ἀντιλαβόντες τῆς κακίας τὴν ἡδονήν· εἰ δὲ τὸ λύτρον οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ τοῦ κατέχοντος γίνεται, ζητῶ τίνι τοῦτο εἰσηνέχθη, καὶ δι' ἣν τινα τῶν αἰτίαν. εἰ μὲν τῷ πονηρῷ, φεῦ τῆς ὕβρεως, εἰ μὴ πρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Θεὸν αὐτὸν λύτρον ὁ λῃστὴς λαμβάνει, καὶ μίσθον ὅτως ὑπερφυῆ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τυραννίδος, δι' ὃν καὶ ἡμῶν φείδεσθαι δίκαιον ἦν· εἰ δὲ τῷ πατρὶ, πρῶτον μὲν πῶς; οὐχ ὑπ' ἐκείνου γὰρ ἐκρατούμεθα· δεύτερον δὲ, τίς ὁ λόγος μονογενοῦς αἷμα τέρπειν πατέρα, ὃς οὐδὲ τὸν Ισαὰκ ἐδέξατο πρὸς τοῦ πατρὸς προσφερόμενον. ἀλλ' ἀντηλλάξατο τὴν θυσίαν, κριὸν ἀντιδοὺς τοῦ λογικοῦ θύματος. ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι λαμβάνει μὲν ὁ πατὴρ, οὐκ αἰτήσας, οὐδὲ δεηθείς. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν, καὶ τὸ χρῆναι ἁγιασθῆναι τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ἵν' αὐτὸς ἡμᾶς ἐξέληται, τοῦ τυράννου βίᾳ κρατήσας, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπαναγάγῃ, διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ μεσιτεύσαντος, καὶ εἰς τιμὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦτο οἰκονομήσαντος, ᾧ τὰ πάντα προσχωρῶν φαίνεται. [*Potest ergo hoc disquiri, quod, plerisque neglectum, ego vel præcipuo studio dispicio: Cui enim & quam tandem ob rem effusus est ille, qui pro nobis effusus est, magnus & celebris illius & Dei simul & magni Sacerdotis & victimæ sanguis. Possidebamur enim sanè à malo sub peccato venumdati, acceptâ invicem, quæ vice pretii esset, quanta è malitia percipi solet, voluptate: porrò si pretium, quod cui redimendo impenditur, ad neminem pertinet nisi ad eum qui hunc qui redimitur, possidet; quæro cui hic sanguis solutus sit, & quam ob causam? malo enim si solutus est, ô factum indignè! si non à Deo tantùm latro, sed Deum quoque ipsum redemptionis pretium accipit, mercedemque ita supra fidem magnam, ob quam & nobis parci justum fuit, suæ tyrannidis percipit. Sin Patri solutus est, primùm quomodo? neque enim ab hoc possidebamur: Deinde, quæ est ista ratio, quæ faciat delectari Patrem Filii unigeniti sanguine? cùm præsertim nec Isaacum à Patre oblatum acceperit, imò verò mutaverit victimam, ariete dato pro humana hostia? An potiùs patet, Patrem accipere hoc pretium, non quò id aut flagitârit, aut eô indigeat, sed quòd id ita administrari ex usu fuit, quodque eô; quod in Deo humani fuit, sanctificari hominem oportuit, quò nos ipse eriperet, vi victo tyranno, ad seque reduceret, filio hæc conciliante, & in Patris honorem, cui omnia, ut apparet, concedit, hoc quoque administrante*].

Gregorius Nyssenus ad Olympium Monachum de perfecti nominis forma. Ἀπολύτρωσιν δὲ εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν μαθόντες, τὸ ἑαυτὸν δόντα λύτρον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. τοῦτο διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φωνῆς παιδεύομεθα, τὸ μαθεῖν ὅτι καθάπερ τιμὴν τινὰ τῆς ἑκάστου ψυχῆς προσφερόμενον ἡμῖν, τὴν ἀθανασίαν, κτῆμα ἴδιον τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου παρ' αὐτοῦ διὰ τῆς ζωῆς ἐξαγοραθέντας ἐποίησεν. [*Christum redemptionem esse cùm diximus, qui se, quò nos redimeret, pretium dederit: moneamur hâc voce, ut intelligamus eum, præstita nobis, quasi animæ cuique suæ pretio, immortalitate, quos per vitam à morte redemerit, hos suos fecisse.*]

Ambrosius lib. de Tobiâ cap. x. Ecce venit hujus mundi Princeps & in me suum nihil invenit. Nihil debebat, sed solvebat pro omnibus, sicut ipse testatur dicens, Quæ non rapui, tunc exsolvebam.

Idem lib. de Ioseph Patriarcha cap. iv. Venditus est Ioseph in Ægypto, quia Christus venturus erat ad eos quibus dictum est, Peccatis vestris venditi estis. Et ideo suo sanguine redemit, quos propria peccata vendiderant. Sed venditus Christus conditionis susceptione, non culpæ, peccatique pretio non tenetur, quia peccatum ipse non fecit. Pretio igitur nostro debitum, non suo ære contraxit: chirographum sustulit, fœneratorem removit, exuit debitorem, unus exsolvit, quod ab omnibus debebatur.

Ambrosius de Esau sive de Fuga seculi cap. vii. Deus ideo suscepit carnem, ut maledictum carnis peccatricis aboleret: & factus est pro nobis maledictum, ut benedictio absorberet maledictionem, integritas peccatum, indulgentia sententiam, vita mortem. Suscepit enim mortem, ut impleretur sententia, satisfieret judicato per maledictum carnis peccatricis usque ad mortem. Nihil ergo factum est contra sententiam Dei, cùm sit Divinæ conditio impleta sententiæ. Maledictum enim usque ad mortem, post mortem autem gratia.

Idem lib. ix. *Epist.* lxxi. Veniens Dominus Iesus, peccatum omnibus, quod nemo poterat evitare, donavit & chirographum nostrum sui sanguinis effusione delevit. Hoc est quod ait, Superabundavit peccatum per legem: superabundavit autem gratia per Iesum. Quia postquam totus mundus subditus factus est, totius mundi peccatum abstulit.

Lib. i, *Epist.* ii. Vide ne ista sit hostia salutaris, quam Verbum Deus in se ipso obtulit, atque in suo immolavit corpore. *Et paulò post,* Quod verò ad altare effundit sanguinem, intelligere licet ablutionem mundi, remissionem omnium peccatorum. Etenim sanguinem illum ad altare quasi hostiam effundit ad multorum exhaurienda peccata. Agnus enim hostia est, sed agnus non irrationabilis naturæ, sed Divinæ potentiæ: de quo dictum est, Ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi. Non solùm enim mundavit sanguine delicta universorum, sed etiam Divina potestate donavit.

Idem super Lucam lib. vii. *cap.* xii. Adversarius tanquam captiva mancipia viliori pretio æstimationis addicit. At verò Dominus tanquam speciosa servitia, quæ ad imaginem & similitudinem sui fecit, idoneus operis æstimator, magno pretio nos redemit: sicut Apostolus dixit, Empti enim estis pretio magno. Et bene magno, quod non æstima-

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tur ære, sed sanguine. Quia pro nobis mortuus est Christus, qui pretioso nos sanguine liberavit, &c. Et bene pretioso, quia immaculati corporis sanguis est, quia sanguis est Filii Dei, qui non solùm de maledicto Legis, sed etiam de impietatis morte perpetua nos redemit.

Idem lib. x *super Lucam in illud cap.* XXII. *Peccavi quod tradiderim sanguinem innoxium*: Pretium sanguinis est pretium Dominicæ passionis, Ergo pretio sanguinis emitur mundus à Christo.

Lib. III *de Virginitate sub finem*: Eramus oppignerati malo creditori peccatis: contraximus chirographum culpæ, pœnam sanguinis debebamus. Venit Dominus Iesus, suum pro nobis sanguinem obtulit. *Et mox*: Ergo & tu dignum te gere tali pretio, ne veniat Christus, qui te mundavit, qui te redemit, & si te in peccato invenerit, dicat tibi: Quæ utilitas in sanguine meo? Quid profeci tibi dum descendo in corruptionem?

Lib. I *de Apologia Davidis, cap.* XIII. Præclarè Apostolus ait, Quia donavit nobis peccata Dominus Iesus, delens chirographum decreti, quod erat contrarium nobis, & ipsum, inquit, de medio tulit affigens illud cruci. Delevit sanguine suo atramentum Hevæ, delevit hæreditatis obnoxiæ obligationem.

In Epistola ad Hebræos cap. IX. Sed illius fuit tota Veteris Testamenti corporalis mundatio: nunc autem spiritualis est mundatio sanguinis Christi. Ideo dicit: Hic est sanguis Novi Testamenti in remissionem peccatorum. In illis quidem in superficie adspergebatur, & iterum diluebatur adspersus: neque enim cruentatus semper deambulabat populus. In anima verò non ita est, sed ipsius essentiæ commiscetur sanguis, fontem illum faciens mundum & inenarrabilem pulcritudinem producens. Propter hoc agni occisio fuit & sanguis ejus super liminaribus liberandorum illitus est. Propter hoc etiam omnia sacrificia Veteris Testamenti leguntur, ut hoc unum sacrificium designarent; per quod vera est remissio peccatorum & mundatio animæ in æternum.

Idem, seu potius Scriptor comment. in Epist. Pauli Ambrosio tributorum in I *ad Corinthios cap.* VI. Quia charo pretio empti sumus, propensiùs Domino nostro servire debemus, ne offensus à qua nos redemit, morti nos reddat. Quàm enim charissimo pretio nos emit, ut sanguinem suum daret pro nobis.

Idem in ejusdem Epist. cap. XI. Nos calicem mysticum sanguinis ad tuitionem corporis & animæ nostræ percipimus, quia sanguis Domini sanguinem nostrum redemit, id est, totum hominem salvum fecit. Caro enim Salvatoris pro salute corporis, sanguis verò pro anima nostra effusus.

Idem in Epist. ad Corinthios II, *cap.* V. Quoniam oblatus est pro peccatis, non immeritò peccatum factus dicitur, quia & hostia in Lege, quæ pro peccatis offerebatur, peccatum nuncupabatur, ut nos essemus justitia Dei in ipso, qui peccatum nesciebat: dicente Iesaïa, Qui peccatum non fecit, nec dolus inventus est in ore ejus, quasi peccator occisus est, ut peccatores justificarentur apud Deum in Christo.

Epiphanius Hæresi LV. Πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτὸν προσηνέγκας, ἵνα λύσῃ θυσίαν παλαίας διαθήκης, τὴν ἐπιλέσταν ζῶσαν ὑπὲρ παντὸς κόσμου ἱερουργήσας, αὐτὸς ἱερεῖον, αὐτὸς θύμα, αὐτὸς ἱερεύς, αὐτὸς θυσιαστήριον, αὐτὸς θεός, αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, αὐτὸς βασιλεύς, αὐτὸς ἀρχιερεύς, αὐτὸς πρόβατον, αὐτὸς ἀρνίον, τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν γενόμενος, ἵνα ἡμῖν ζωὴ καὶ πάντα τρόπον γένηται, καὶ τῆς ἱεροσύνης αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀμετάστατον ἐδραίωμα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας ἀπεργάσηται. [*Primùm quidem seipsum obtulit, ut sacrificium Testamenti Veteris aboleret, perfectius aliud vivumque pro toto orbe offerens. Ipse hostia, ipse victima, ipse Sacerdos, ipse altare, ipse Deus, ipse homo, ipse Rex, ipse Pontifex maximus, ipse ovis, ipse agnus, omnia in omnibus pro nobis factus, ut omni modo vita ad nos perveniret, & sacerdotii sui immutabile fundamentum jaceret*].

Andreas Cæsariensis ad cap. I *Apocal.* Illum, inquit, decet honor, gloria, & imperium, qui ardenti charitate incensus sua morte genus nostrum à mortis vinculis liberavit, sanguinisque vivifici & aquæ effusione à peccatorum sordibus nos abluit, ac in regium sacerdotium cooptavit.

Prudentius in Rom. Mart.

Hæc illa crux est omnium nostrûm salus.

Romanus inquit, hominis hæc redemptio est.

Chrysostomus proœmio Comment. in Esaïam. Quàm multæ est Deus erga nos clementiæ? Filio non pepercit, ut parceret servo: unigenitum tradidit, ut redimeret servos planè ingratos, sanguinem Filii sui luit in pretium.

Idem Eccl. post II, 27. VIII *ad Romanos.* Καὶ ἑτέρως δεδεήσεις παρακαλεῖν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἵνα ἡμῖν χαρίσηται, ὅπερ δὴ τῷ Μωϋσεῖ γέγονε, καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ φησὶν, ἄφες με καὶ ἐξαλείψω αὐτοὺς, ἵνα αὐτὸν ἐμβάλῃ εἰς τὴν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ἱκετηρίαν [*Alii etiam, ut pro nobis orent, efficit, ut nobis gratiam largiatur: quod in Moyse accidit; Huic enim, Mitte me, inquit, & delebo eos: quò eum impelleret, ut pro iis oraret*].

Mox: Διά τοι τοῦτο πολλάκις λέγει τὸν Δαβὶδ, καὶ τὸν δεῖνα καὶ τὸν δεῖνά φησιν αὐτοῖς καταλλάττεσθαι, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ κατασκευάζων πάλιν, ἵνα καὶ σχῆμα ἐπιτεθῇ τῇ καταλλαγῇ [*Idcirco sæpe ob Davidem & illum & illum dicit se cum iis in gratiam redire, idipsum rursus efficiens, ut & reconciliationi accedat forma*].

Eleazar in sermone Maccabaïco Deum rogat pro populo, Καθάρσιον αὐτῶν ποιῆσον τὸ ἡμῶν αἷμα, καὶ ἀντὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῶν λάβε τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν [*Piaculum illorum fac sanguinem nostrum, & pro animabus eorum sume animam meam*].

Hieronymus lib. I *adversùs Pelagianos.* Cùmque, ait, voluerit intrare, offerat vitulum pro peccato, & arietem in holocaustum, duosque hircos accipiat ab universo populo: unum ex eis offerat pro peccato suo, & unum pro peccato populi, & arietem in holocaustum. Alter hircorum cuncta peccata suscipit populi, in typum Domini Salvatoris, & effert in solitudinem: & sic placatur Deus omni multitudini.

Idem in Esaïæ cap. LIII. Despectus erat & ignobilis, quando pendebat in cruce, & factus pro nobis maledictum, peccata nostra portabat, & loquebatur Patri, Deus meus, quare me dereliquisti?

Augustinus de Trinitate, lib. XIII, *cap.* XIV. Quæ est justitia quâ victus est diabolus? Quæ, nisi justitia Iesu Christi? Et quomodo victus est? Quia cùm

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cùm in eo nihil morte dignum inveniret, occidit eum tamen. Et utique justum est, ut debitores quos tenebat, liberi dimittantur in eum credentes, quem sine ullo debito occidit. Hoc est, quod justificari dicimur in Christi sanguine. Sic quippe in remissionem peccatorum nostrorum, innocens sanguis ille effusus est.

Et mox: Pergit inde ad passionem, ut pro debitoribus nobis, quod ipse non debebat, exsolveret. *Et cap. proximo*: Tunc sanguis ille, quoniam ejus erat qui nullum habuit omnino peccatum, ad remissionem nostrorum fusus est peccatorum, ut quia eos diabolus meritò tenebat, quos peccati reos conditione mortis obstrinxit, hos per eum meritò dimitteret, quem nullius peccati reum immeritò pœnâ mortis affecit. Hac justitia victus & hoc vinculo vinctus est fortis, ut vasa ejus eriperentur, quæ apud eum, cum ipso & Angelis ejus fuerant vasa iræ, & in vasa misericordiæ verterentur.

Idem in Ioannem tract. XLI. Non reconciliamur, nisi ablato peccato, quod est medium separans: sed mediator est reconcilians. Vt ergo tollatur maceria separans, venit ille Mediator, & factus est sacrificium Sacerdos ipse.

Lib. VII *de Civitate Dei cap.* XXXI. Deus misit nobis Verbum suum, qui est ejus unicus Filius, quo pro nobis in assumpta carne nato atque passo, quanti Deus hominem penderet nosceremus, atque illo sacrificio singulari à peccatis omnibus mundaremur, ejusque spiritu in cordibus nostris dilectione diffusa, omnibus difficultatibus superatis in æternam requiem veniremus.

Enarratione in Psalmo XCV. Tenebantur homines captivi sub diabolo, & dæmonibus serviebant; sed redempti sunt à captivitate. Vendere enim se potuerunt, sed redimere non potuerunt. Venit Redemptor, & dedit pretium, fudit sanguinem suum, & emit orbem terrarum. Quæritis quid emerit? Videte quid dederit, & invenite quid emerit. Sanguis Christi pretium est. Tanti quid valet? Quid, nisi totus orbis? Quid, nisi omnes gentes? Valde ingrati sunt pretio suo, aut multum superbi sunt qui dicunt, aut illud tam parvum esse, ut solos Afros emerit: aut se tam magnos esse, pro quibus solis illud sit datum. Non ergo exultent, non superbiant, pro toto dedit, quantum dedit. Novit quid emerit, quia novit quanti emerit, & quanti dederit.

In Psalmo CXXIX. Sacerdos noster à nobis accepit, quod pro nobis offerret. Accepit enim à nobis carnem: in ipsa carne victima factus est, holocaustum factus est, sacrificium factus est.

Lib. IV *contra duas Pelagianorum epistolas cap.* IV. Sed Pelagiani quomodo dicunt solam mortem ad nos transisse per Adam? Si enim propterea morimur, quia ille mortuus est, ille autem mortuus est quia peccavit, pœnam dicunt transire sine culpa & innocentes parvulos injusto judicio puniri trahendo mortem sine meritis mortis. Quod de uno solo Mediatore Dei & hominum homine Christo Iesu Catholica fides novit, qui pro nobis mortem, hoc est, peccati pœnam sine peccato subire dignatus est. Sicut enim solus ideo factus est hominis filius, ut nos per illum Dei filii fieremus: ita solus pro nobis suscepit sine malis meritis pœnam, ut nos per illum sine bonis meritis consequeremur gratiam. Quia sicut nobis non debebatur aliquid boni, ita nec illi aliquid mali.

Lib. XIV. *contra Faustum Manich. cap.* IV. Suscepit Christus sine reatu supplicium nostrum, ut inde solveret reatum nostrum, & finiret etiam supplicium nostrum.

Idem Sermone octavo de Tempore: Duplex principaliter causa est, ob quam Dei filius factus est filius hominis. Vna est, ut secundùm hominem, omnia patiendo pro nobis, à peccatorum nos vinculis liberaret. Sic enim Esaïas Propheta prædixerat: Hic peccata nostra portavit, &c. Altera verò causa est Dominicæ passionis, ut nos, quos sanguine suo redemit à vitiis atque criminibus, non solùm doctrinæ auxilio & gratiæ, sed etiam exemplo suo ad studium sanctitatis accenderet.

De Temp. serm. CI. Mors nisi à morte superari non poterat: ideo mortem Christus sustinuit, ut injusta mors justam vinceret mortem, & liberaret reos justè, dum pro eis occidebatur injustè.

Et serm. CXLI. Dominus noster Iesus Christus communicando nobiscum sine culpa pœnam, & culpam solvit & pœnam.

De serm. Domini in Luca serm. XXXVII. Culpa est quod injustus es: pœna est, quia mortalis es. Ille ut esset proximus, suscepit pœnam tuam: non suscepit culpam tuam: & si suscepit, delendam suscepit, non faciendam.

Et mox: Suscipiendo pœnam & non suscipiendo culpam, & culpam delevit & pœnam.

Cyrillus in Leviticum lib. X. Tunc clamavit omnis populus, ut Barrabam dimitteret, Iesum verò morti traderet. Ecce habes hircum qui dimissus est in eremum vivus, peccata populi secum ferens clamantis & dicentis, Crucifige, crucifige. Iste est ergo hircus vivus dimissus in eremum, & ille est hircus qui Domino oblatus est hostia ad repropitianda peccata, & veram propitiationem in se credentibus populis fecit.

Idem contra Iulianum lib. IX. Vide igitur Sacramentum & quomodo in duobus hircis bene delineetur. Caper enim, hoc est, hircus pro peccatis Sacerdotis & populorum occidebatur, secundùm quod in lege jubebatur. Quoniam autem pro peccatis nostris immolatus est Christus, hirco assimilatur. Nam sic dicit Propheta Iesaias, Omnes sicut oves erravimus, homo viâ suâ erravit, & Dominus tradidit ipsum pro peccatis nostris. Nam duo hirci assumuntur: non quòd duo Christi, hoc est, duo filii secundùm aliquos, sed magis quòd oportebat videri etiam occidendum pro nobis & morientem quidem secundùm carnem, viventem autem secundùm Spiritum.

Idem in Iohann. lib. II, *cap.* I. Vnus pro omnibus Agnus occiditur, ut omne genus hominum Deo Patri offerat. Vnus pro omnibus, ut omnes lucrifaciat, ut omnes non ulterius sibi ipsis, sed Christo, qui pro omnibus mortuus est, & pro omnibus resurrexit, vivant. Nam quoniam in peccato eramus, atque idcirco morti atque interitui debebamur,

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Filium suum Pater in redemptionem pro nobis dedit. Vnum pro omnibus, quoniam & omnes sunt in ipso, & omnibus ipse melior est.

Idem Homil. Ephesi in Nestorium dicta. Revera (impii hi hæretici) perditionis sunt filii & semen iniquum, qui Dominum, à quo sunt empti, negent: Empti enim sumus pretio, non quidem corruptibili, putà auro & argento, sed pretioso sanguine, tanquam agni immaculati & incontaminati, Christi. Quomodo fuisset autem sanguis vulgaris hominis similis nobis, orbis redemptio?

*Exegesi ad Valerianum de Verbi incarnatione: quæ extat concil. Eph.T.*VI. *cap.*XVII. Qui corporis expers erat ut Deus, corpus sibi aptatum fatetur, quò eo pro nobis oblato, suo nos omnes livore, juxta Prophetæ vocem, sanaret. Quo pacto autem unus pro omnibus mortuus justum pro omnibus pretium exsolvere potuit, si perpessionem illam puri cujuspiam hominis fuisse dicamus? Quod si verò Verbum secundùm humanam naturam passum, propriæ carnis perpessiones, quasi proprias in se transtulit, sibique vindicavit, tunc demum unius mortem secundùm carnem omnium hominum vitæ præponderasse rectissimè asserimus.

Theodoretus Quæst. IX. *in Num.* Μόνος γὰρ ὁ δεσπότης Χριστὸς, καὶ ὡς ἄνθρωπος, τὸ ἄμωμον ἔχει, ὃ τοῦτο προορῶν ὁ προφήτης Ἠσαΐας βοᾷ· Ὃς ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ εὑρέθη δόλος ἐν τῷ στόματι αὐτοῦ. τοῦτο χάριν καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἁμαρτίας ἀνέλαβεν, οἰκείας οὐκ ἔχων. ὅτος γάρ, φησι, τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν φέρει, καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν ὀδυνᾶται. καὶ ὁ μέγας Ἰωάννης· Ἴδε ὁ ἀμνὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ αἴρων τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ κόσμου. διὰ τοῦτο ὃ ἐν νεκροῖς ἐλεύθερος, ὡς ἀδίκως ὑπομείνας τὸν θάνατον. [*Solus enim Dominus Christus, etiam ut homo, maculâ caret: & hoc prævidens Propheta Esaias proclamat, Qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore ejus. Vnde factum est, ut aliena peccata assumeret, cùm propria non haberet. Ille siquidem peccata nostra tulit, & pro nobis afflictus est. Et Ioannes ille magnus, Ecce Agnus Dei, qui tollit peccata mundi. Propterea dicitur inter mortuos liber, tanquam qui mortem injustè passus sit*].

Idem Serm. X. *de Providentia sic Dominum inducit loquentem,* Ἀποδέδωκα γὰρ ὑπὲρ τοῦ γένους τὸ χρέος· οὐκ ὀφείλων γὰρ θάνατον, θάνατον ὑπέμεινα, καὶ μὴ ὑποκείμενος θανάτῳ, ὑπεδεξάμην τὸν θάνατον· καὶ ἀνόθυνος ὤν, ἐνεγράφην τοῖς ὑπόδικοις· καὶ ὀφλημάτων ὑπάρχων ἐλεύθερος, μετὰ τῶν ὀφειλόντων ἐτάχθην. ἀπέδωκα τοίνυν τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄφλημα· ὃ θάνατον ἄδικον ὑπομείνας, καταλύω τὸν δίκαιον· καὶ τοὺς ἐνδίκως κατεχομένους, ἀδίκως κατασχεθεὶς, τῆς εἱρκτῆς ἀπολύω. βλέπε τὸ γραμματεῖον τῆς φύσεως ἀπειλημμένον, ὦ πικρὲ θάνατε! βλέπε αὐτὸ τῷ σωρῷ προσηλωμένον, καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἀπηλλαγμένον· βλέπε αὐτὸ πονηρίας ὑπογραφὴν δεδεγμένον. ἀπέδοσαν τοίνυν οἱ τοῦδε τοῦ σώματος ὀφθαλμοὶ, ὑπὲρ τῶν κακῶς θεασαμένων ὀμμάτων. αἱ τοῦδε ἀκοαὶ, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀκοῶν τὸ μολυσμὸν δεξαμένων. ἡ γλῶττα ὡσαύτως, αἱ χεῖρες, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη, ὑπὲρ τῶν λοιπῶν ἁμαρτίαν διαπραξαμένων μελῶν. τοῦ ὃ χρέους ἐκπεσόντος, προσήκει τοὺς τούτου χάριν καθειργμένους, τῆς εἱρκτῆς ἀπαλλαγῆναι, καὶ τὴν προτέραν ἀπολαβεῖν ἐλευθερίαν, καὶ εἰς τὸ πατρῷον χωρίον ἐπανελθεῖν. [*Debitam enim pro humano genere persolvi; qui mortem non debui, mortem sustinui: quique morti subjectus non eram, mortem suscepi. Insons cùm essem, sontibus adscriptus sum: quique à debitis omnibus liber eram, in debitorum ordinem constitutus sum. Naturæ ergo debitum persolvi; Et dum mortem immeritam sustinui, meritam dissolvo: quique justè detenti fuerant, ipse injustè correptus è carcere dimitto. Vide chirographum, quod naturam apprehendit, ut intra ejus aliquando fines consisteret, ô amara mors! Vide illud ipsum cruci affixum, & sublatas ex eo peccatorum notas adspice. Vide ut malitiæ subscriptionem jam non habet. Hujus ergo corporis oculi oculorum qui malè spectaverant, solverunt debitum: hujus aures pro inquinatis satisfecere auribus: similiter & lingua, manus ac membra reliqua pro membris, quæ peccata qualiacunque commiserunt. Debito igitur persoluto, convenit, ut qui propter illud carceribus inclusi fuerunt, carceribus liberentur, & pristina libertate fruantur, ac ad patrios locos redeant*].

Proclus Constantinopolitanus homil. de Christi nativitate. Πολλὰ ὤφειλεν ἐξ ἁμαρτιῶν ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσις, καὶ ἠπόρει πρὸς τὸ χρέος. Διὰ γὰρ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ πάντες τῷ ἁμαρτίαν ἐχειρογράφησαν· δοῦλος ἡμᾶς καθεῖχεν ὁ διάβολος· τὰς ὠνὰς ἡμῶν προσέφερε γραφῇ κεχρημένῳ τῷ πολυπαθεῖ ἡμῶν σώματι. εἰσήκει ὁ κακὸς τῶν παθῶν πλασιογράφος, ἀπαιτῶν ἡμῶν τὸ χρέος, καὶ ἀπαιτῶν ἡμᾶς τῷ δίκῳ. ἔδει τοίνυν δυοῖν θατέρου, ἢ πᾶσιν ἐπαχθῆναι τὸν ἐκ τῆς καταδίκης θάνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντες ἥμαρτον, ἢ τοιοῦτον δοθῆναι πρὸς ἀντίδοσιν τίμημα, ᾧ πᾶν ὑπῆρχε δικαίωμα πρὸς ἀθῳότητιν· ἄνθρωπος μὲν οὖν σῶσαι οὐκ ἠδύνατο. ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τῷ χρέει τῆς ἁμαρτίας. Ἄγγελος ἐξαγοράσαι τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα οὐκ ἴσχυεν· ἠπόρει γὰρ τινὰ τοῦτο λύτρον. λοιπὸν οὖν ὁ ἀναμάρτητος Θεὸς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμαρτηκότων ἀποθανεῖν ὤφειλεν. Αὕτη γὰρ ἐλείπετο μόνη τοῦ κακοῦ ἡ λύσις. Τί οὖν; αὐτὸς ὁ πάσαν φύσιν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων εἰς τὸ εἶναι προαγαγὼν, ᾧ μηδὲν πρὸς παροχὴν ἄπορον, ἐξεῦρε τοῖς καταχρέοις ζωὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην, καὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λύσιν ἀστρεπεστάτην, καὶ γένεται ἄνθρωπος ἐκ παρθένου, ὡς οἶδεν αὐτός· λόγος γὰρ ἑρμηνεῦσαι τὸ θαῦμα οὐ δυνάται· καὶ ἀποθνήσκει ᾧ ἐγένετο· καὶ λυτροῦται ᾧ ὑπῆρχε, κατὰ τὸν λέγοντα Παῦλον, Ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ, τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν παραπτωμάτων! ὦ τῶν μεγάλων πραγμάτων! ἄλλοις ἐπραγματεύετο τὸ ἀθάνατον· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὑπῆρχεν ἀθάνατος. [*Multum homines ob peccata cùm deberent, solvendo ei debito non erant. Erant enim omnes per Adamum conscripto chirographo fassi se peccasse: detinebat nos diabolus in servitute: is se emisse nos jactabat, scripturaque ad eam rem utebatur, videlicet corpore nostro multis passionibus obnoxio. Imminebat dirus ille falsarius, vibransque in nos chirographum exposcebat ad supplicium. Alterum ergo necesse erat, aut damnatos omnes ad mortem trahi, cùm omnes peccassent, aut ejusmodi pretium in pensationem dari, quo soluto, jure omnia possent recusari. Homo igitur servare non poterat; erat enim eidem debito, quod è peccato oriebatur, obstrictus. Nec verò angelo ulli facultas fuit redimendi humanum genus, neque enim erat ulli angelo quô redimeret. Reliquum erat, ut Deus peccare nescius pro his qui peccaverant, moreretur. Id enim unum supererat mali remedium. Quid ergo? qui naturam universam ex iis, quæ non sunt, ut esset, efficit, cuique nihil difficile est præstare, idem & damnatis vitam certissimam, & morti remedium aptissimum invenit; factusque est homo è virgine, quod quâ ratione factum sit, ipse novit: oratio quidem nulla est, quæ id miraculum explicare possit. Deinde, quæ ejus pars nata erat,*

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erat, eâdem obiit: & quâ antea exstitit, eâ nos & redemit, juxta illud Pauli, In quo habemus redemptionem per sanguinem ejus, remissionem transgressionum. O rem magnam! aliis immortalitatem peperit, erat enim ipse immortalis.]

Leo de pass. serm. XII, Quam sibi in hujus Sacramenti præsidio spem relinquunt, qui in Salvatoris nostri corpore negant humanæ substantiæ veritatem? Dicant quo sacrificio reconciliati, quo sanguine sint redempti? Quis est qui tradidit semetipsum pro nobis oblationem & hostiam in odorem suavitatis? Aut quod unquam sacrificium sacratius fuit quàm quod Pontifex verus altari crucis per immolationem suæ carnis imposuit? Quamvis enim in conspectu Domini multorum sanctorum preciosa fuerit mors, nullius tamen insontis occisio, propitiatio fuit mundi. Acceperunt justi, non dederunt coronas, & de fidelium fortitudine exempla nata sunt patientiæ, non dona justitiæ. Singulares quippe in singulis mortes fuerunt, nec alterius quisquam debitum suo funere solvit, cùm inter filios hominum solus Dominus noster Iesus Christus exstiterit, in quo omnes crucifixi, omnes mortui, omnes sepulti, omnes etiam sunt suscitati.

Claudianus Mamertus de statu animæ lib. II, Pictavus Hilarius inter complura præcelsarum disputationum suarum, quiddam secius sentiens, duo hæc veris adversa disseruit, Vnum quod nihil incorporeum creatum dixit: Aliud, nihil doloris Christum in passione sensisse. Cujus si vera passio non fuit, redemptio quoque nostra vera esse non potuit.

Anastasius Sinaita, Episcopus Antiochenus de rectis fidei Catholicæ dogmatibus lib. IV, *de passione & impassibili Deitate Christi*, Effusus est sanguis ejus, qui multis redimendis sufficeret: forsan melius fuerit dicere omnibus; sunt siquidem & omnes multi.

Procopius Gazæus in Exodi cap. XXIV, Cùm Christus naturâ sit conjunctus Patri, si ejus participes facti fuerimus per Spiritum, connectemur per ipsum quoque Patri, in Divinæ naturæ societatem venientes. Nec aliter illi contenderunt in montem, quàm priùs exercitati sanguine Christi, qui dedit semetipsum pretium redemptionis pro nobis, offerens carnem suam, ut irreprehensibile sacrificium Deo & Patri.

Gregorius Magnus lib. III, *Moral. cap.* XIII, Alius ad Paradisum conditus Divinæ potentiæ similitudinem superbè rapere voluit: sed tamen culpas hujus superbiæ sine culpa Mediator exsolvit. Hinc est quod Patri quidam sapiens dicit, Cùm sis justus, justè omnia disponis, eum quoque qui non debet puniri, condemnas. Sed pensandum est, quomodo justus sit & omnia justè disponat, si eum qui non debet puniri, condemnat. Mediator enim noster puniri pro seipso non debuit, quia nullum culpæ contagium perpetravit. Sed si ipse indebitam mortem non susciperet, nunquam nos à debita morte liberaret. Pater ergo cùm justus sit, justum puniens omnia justè disponit, quia per hoc cuncta justificat, quòd eum qui sine peccato est pro peccatoribus damnat.

Isychius in Levitici cap. XVI, Lex filios Israel reos maledicto & morti constituit, ut propterea necessariam haberent expiationem, & pro eis quidem principaliter unigeniti immolatur sacrificium. Immolatur autem & pro omnibus hominibus, ita ut Caiphas diceret, Oportet ut unus homo moriatur pro populo, & non tota gens pereat. Quodque dictum erat confirmans, simulque & corrigens Euangelista Iohannes addidit, Hoc autem a semetipso non dixit, sed cùm esset Pontifex anni illius, prophetavit, quia moriturus esset Iesus pro gente, & non solùm pro gente, sed ut filios Dei qui dispersi erant in unum colligeret, Gentes videlicet. *Et paulo post*, Pro sensibili Israel Iesus immolatus, & pro omni humano genere ad expiationem immunditiarum nostrarum obtulit.

Antiochus in Exomologesi, Verbum tuum nulla prorsus aspergine peccati decoloratum, quem per tuæ viscera misericordiæ misisti, suum ut plasma revocaret in viam, caro factus, nostri causâ passus est crucifigi, & abolevit quod adversùm nos erat chirographum, peccatorum nostrorum factus propitiatio.

Sophronius Hierosolymitanus Epist. ad Sergium Constantinopolitanum Patriarcham, Pro hominibus Christus mori dignatus est, & pro eorum redemptione suum Divinum sanguinem fudit & munus præ omni dignitate divinius suam animam posuit.

Elias Cretensis ad orat. I. *Nazianzeni*, Christus dictus est redemptio, ut nos, peccato venditos, in libertatem asserens, & quia pro totius orbis expiatione tanquam redemptionis pretium seipsum dedit.

Nicephorus Constantinopolitanus Ep. ad Leonem III, *quæ extat apud Baronium tom.* IX *Annal. pag.* 587. *edit. Mor.* II, Credo eum crucifixum esse, non in qua splendet cum Patre substantia, etsi Dominum gloriæ crucifixum fuisse dicitur, in sermone retributionis, sed in terrena nostra natura, in qua terrestrem nostram massam suscepit, & maledictum pro nobis factus est, ut benedictionis, quæ ab eo est, socios nos efficeret, & malefactorum secundùm carnem sustinuit mortem pati, ut mortis aculeum mortem sustinendo condemnaret in carne sua, & destrueret hunc, qui habebat mortis imperium, hoc est, diabolum.

Marcus Eremita lib. de his qui putant se operibus justificari, cap. XX, Χριστὸς δεσπότης κατ' οὐσίαν, καὶ δεσπότης κατ' οἰκονομίαν, ὅτι καὶ μὴ ὄντας ἐποίησε, καὶ τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ θανόντας διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος ἐξηγόρασε, καὶ τοῖς ἄτῳ πιστεύουσι τὴν χάριν ἐδωρήσατο. [*Christus & secundùm essentiam Dominus, & Dominus secundùm œconomiam: quòd & fecit nos cùm non essemus, & peccato mortuos sanguine suo redemit, hisque qui ita crediderint gratiam largitus est.*]

Theodorus Abucara Episcopus Carum disp. XV, *cap.* V, Deus justo judicio suo à nobis omnia exigebat, quæ in Lege scripta sunt: quæ, cùm solvendo non essemus, idcirco pro nobis Dominus noster illa persolvit: & maledictionem condemnationemque cui obnoxii eramus assumpsit, ultroque in se recepit: quæ pati debueramus, illa ipse pertulit.

Idem ibidem, Iam mihi, quinam sint hostes illi quinque, edissere, a quibus nos Christus liberavit. A. Mors, Diabolus, legis maledictio, atque condemnatio,

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demnatio, peccatum, & infernus. *B.* Quod ad mortem quidem attinet, eam Christi obedientiâ destructam esse dixisti, sic etiam quonam modo nos à Diaboli servitute liberarit: eloquere jam quî nos à Legis maledictione redemerit, factus pro nobis maledictio? *Et post pauca A.* Iusto suo judicio Deus à nobis omnia illa exigebat, quæ in Lege scripta sunt, quæ cum solvendo non essemus, idcirco pro nobis Christus Dominus noster illa persolvit, & maledictionem, condemnationemque, cui obnoxii eramus, assumpsit, ultroque in se recepit, & quæ pati debueramus, illa ipse pertulit, flagellatus, sputis conspersus, percussus, colaphis cæsus, crucifixus, & pro nobis mortuus est.

Theophylactus in cap. I *ad Hebr. verba illa: Per seipsum faciens purgationem peccatorum nostrorum,* Cum locutus esset de majestate Divinitatis Verbi, deinceps de cura ipsius, quam in homines per carnem gerit, disserit, quod multò majus est, quàm quod omnia ferat. Duo autem hîc ponit, tum quod mundarit nos à peccatis, tum quod per seipsum hoc fecerit. Nam per crucem & mortem, quam ipse sustinuit, purgavit nos, non solùm, quòd mortuus sit pro peccato nostro, cum ipse omni peccato vacaret, quodque pœnas luerit, quas ipse tamen nobis non debebat, ac solverit naturam quæ simpliciter ob Adami peccatum ac transgressionem condemnata erat, &c.

Ad cap. IX. Eam ob rem mortuus est Christus, ut nos mundaret, ac in testamento reliquit nobis condonationem noxæ, ac usum paternorum bonorum, Mediator factus Patris nostri. Pater enim noluit nobis dimittere hæreditatem, sed irascebatur ut filiis rejicientibus ipsum & abalienatis. Christus itaque Mediator factus reconciliavit nobis ipsum. Quomodo? Quod nos oportebat pati, (mori enim debuissemus) hoc ipse pro nobis sustinuit, nosque dignos testamento reddidit.

Anselmus de concept. Virginis & pecc. orig. cap. XXI. Dicit aliquis, Si non habent singuli peccatum Adæ, quomodo asseris nullum salvari sine satisfactione peccati Adæ? Nam qualiter justus Deus exigit ab illis satisfactionem quod non habent? Ad quod dico, Deus non exigit ab ullo peccatore plus quàm debet: sed quoniam nullus potest reddere quantum debet, solus Christus reddidit pro omnibus qui salvantur, plusquam debetur.

Bernardus Epist. CXC. *ad Innocentium,* Homo qui debuit, homo qui solvit. Nam si unus, inquit, pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt: ut videlicet satisfactio unius omnibus imputetur, sicut omnium peccata unus ille portavit, nec alter jam inveniatur, qui forefecit, alter qui satisfecit: quia caput & corpus unus est Christus. Satisfecit ergo caput pro membris, Christus pro visceribus suis.

Arnoldus Carnotensis opusc. de septem verbis novissimis à Christo in cruce prolatis, Tract. I. Deseritur cum derelictis, & pro natura quam assumpserat, tributum solvit, & evecturus secum genus suum ultra hujus seculi pelagus, piratis rapacibus naulum carnis suæ protulit inviscatisque dentibus eorum illusit voracibus, & tam se quàm prædam suam abstraxit & evexit. Pro debitoribus debitorem se objecit, & quod ex se non debebat, ultro debere non abnuit, ideoque totius debiti summam ab eo qui pro omnibus se tradebat, exactor exegit.

Nicetas Choniates in Annalibus, in Iohanne Commeno, Τὸ τῆς ἡμετέρης φύσεως πῶμα πεσὼν ἀνήγειρεν ὁ Χριστὸς ὀπὶ σταυρῷ τὰς χεῖρας διείς, καὶ μικραῖς ῥανίσι κόσμον ὅλον εἰς ἕνωσιν ἀγαγών. [*Christus extensis in cruce manibus, naturæ nostræ ruinam suo casu erexit, & parvis guttis totum mundum univit*].

Nicolaus de Cusa Cardinalis Excitationum lib. X. Propter nostram justificationem sic actum est per Christum. Nam nos peccatores in ipso infernales pœnas, quas justè meremur, exsolvimus.

Rabbi Albo cap. XXV, *Orationis* III. *libri de* עקרים, Præterea solent sapientes in semetipsis tolerare pœnas & supplicia multitudini peccatorum debita. Sic enim invenimus Deum jussisse Ezechielem Prophetam recumbere in latus suum, & sustinere supplicium in se ferendo iniquitatem domûs Israël, itaque mirandum non est, si ob peccatum populi puniatur Sacerdos.

Varro, LVSTRVM nominatum à *luendo*, id est solvendo, quòd quinto quoque anno vectigalia & tributa per Censores solvebantur.

Lucanus,

Hic redimet sanguis populos, hac cæde luetur
Quicquid Romani meruerunt pendere mores.

Iulius Firmicus, Vt mitigatâ offensâ hominem cum Deo prosperâ conciliatione componeret.

Non defuisse Deo alios redimendi modos. *Ioh. Arn. libro* II, *pag.* 480.

Sapient. contr. Causas, cur ita redimendum fuerit genus humanum, nondum in hâc infirmitate cernimus, sed postea discendæ erunt in omni æternitate.

Piaculi vox usurpata Livio de Deciis.

Lustrari est offensâ deorum liberari. *Servius ad Æn.* III. *Vide notat. Theolog.* IV, 18, *& sequentibus.*

Plinius lib. III, *Epist.* IX. Postremo, ne potentissimi vilissimo quoque quasi piaculari dato, alienis pœnis elaberentur.

Salv. Regimen esse non potest, nisi fuerit justum in rectore judicium. 21.

Ovidius,

---Hanc animam pro meliore damus.

Sequuntur miscellaneæ quædam annotationes circa margines exemplaris Hillensbergiani inventæ, quas, quoniam dubio nobis videbantur ordine positæ, hic subjungere maluimus, indicatâ paginâ & lineâ circa quas inventæ fuere, quam alieno loco inserere.

IVstitia providentialis, *pag.* 303. *a lin.* 53
Iustitia desumpta, Suares 341. Iustitia *ibidem a* 54
Virtutes quomodo in Deo sint, 314. Suares de Iustitia Dei & 326. *ibid.*
Iustitia generalis in Deo est respectu debiti specialis, *ibid. b* 12
Non opus esse ponere specialem justitiam vindicativam, Suares 436. *ibid.*
Suares de Iustitia 436. 306. *b* 20
An hoc modo justitia vindicativa in Deo sit attributum particulare, Suares, 436. *ib. b* 49
Alph. de Castro de Potestate Legis pœna. lib. II, cap. XI. circa finem, 307 *b* 7
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Suar. de Lib. Div. 257. 309. *a* 28
-- -- 258. *ibid. a* 54
-- -- 252. vide egregium Basilii locum, quem citat Vossius hist. Pel. 502. 311. *a* 15
Alph. de Castro de Pot. legis pœnalis lib. II, cap. XII. fol. 524. *ibid. a* 42
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Quæ ab H. GROTIO *in hoc tomo illustrantur & explicantur.*

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Unde & Errata quædam ſupra præterviſa corrigi poterunt.

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449,	b 12.	*in Narthece seu Ferula.*
257,	a 63.	aliquem.
263,	b 11.	proposuit.
274,	b 5.	Pastores.
282,	b 15.	autem.



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