Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
The purpose of this essay is to illustrate the concept of analogy in the late works of St. Thomas Aquinas, i.e., in his two Summas, and to go on to compare this with Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of “family resemblance” (“Familienähnlichkeit”), in order to reveal some interesting similarities between the named linguistic‐philosophical concepts of these two very different thinkers.
1 Cf. A. Anzenbacher: Einführung in die Philosophie. Vienna 1981, p. 311.
2 Cf. J. Schmidt: Article “Analogie“. Lexikon der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik (LEM). Munich 1984, p. 7 f.
3 Cf. J. Lotz: Article “Analogie“, Philosophisches Wörterbuch, 8th ed., Freiburg 1961, p. 9 f.
4 LEM, p. 8.
5 Cf. H. Holz: Article “Analogie“, in: Hermann Krings et al. (ed.): Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe. Vol. 1: Das Absolute – Denken. Munich 1973, p. 53.
6 Cf. W. Kluxen: Article “Analogie“. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie I (HWPh).WBG Darmstadt, 1971(f.), col. 214 – 227. Cf. also K. Müller: Article “Analogie“, in: A. Franz et al. (ed.): Lexikon philosophischer Grundbegriffe der Theologie. Freiburg i. Br. 2003, p. 23–25.
7 “Ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ κατ᾿ ἀρχὰς ἐλέχθη, ταῦτα ἀτάκτως ἔχοντα ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἑκάστῳ τε αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετρίας ἐνεποίησεν, ὅσας τε καὶ ὅπῃ δυνατὸν ἦν ἀνάλογα καὶ σύμμετρα εἶναι.” Timaeus 69b (writer's emphasis)
8 Cf. HWPh, col. 216.
9 ibid., cf. col. 216 f.
10 Cf. LEM, p . 8.
11 Cf. R. Teuwsen, Familienähnlichkeit und Analogie. Zur Semantik genereller Termini bei Wittgenstein und Thomas von Aquin. Freiburg i.Br.; Munich 1988, pp. 108 ‐ 118, here: p. 109 f.
12 Cf. HWPh, col. 217.
13 Cf. LEM, p. 8.
14 Cf. STh I, 13, 5: “Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis, nec totaliter diversa, sicut est in aequivocis; …”; see also ScG I, 34.
15 Cf. A. Anzenbacher, Einführung in die Philosophie, Vienna 1981, p. 178.
16 ibid. The English translation of this illustration has to be different, since the German equivocation involves the unrelated words Strauss (a bouquet) and Strauss (an ostrich) (Tr.).
17 Cf. STh I, 13, 5: “Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari, sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. ”
18 Cf. STh I, 13, 5: “Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eamdem rationem, deficienter; …”
19 Cf. STh I, 13, 5: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum est imperfecta; quia etiam nec idem secundum genus repraesentat, ut supra dictum est (quaest. IV, art.3).“; see also auch K. Müller, Thomas von Aquins Theorie und Praxis der Analogie, Frankfurt‐Bern‐New York 1983, p. 106.
20 Revised Standard Version.
21 ScG I, 34, The Summa contra Gentiles, literally translated by the English Dominican Fathers, Aeterna Press 2014, p.49.
22 ibid.
23 ibid. p.50.
24 ibid.
25 ibid.
26 STh I, 13, 5; translation by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Benziger NY 1948.
27 HWPh, col.219. See also K. Müller: Article “Analogie”, in: Lexikon philosophischer Grundbegriffe der Theologie, p. 23–25.
28 Cf. K. Müller: Thomas von Aquins Theorie und Praxis der Analogie, Frankfurt‐Bern‐New York 1983, p. 91 f.
29 K.Müller: Lecture I Winter Semester 97/98: Kritik und Kommunikation. Grundfragen der Erkenntnistheorie, der Sprach‐ und Medienphilosophie. 2.2 Analogie.
30 K.Müller: Thomas von Aquins Theorie und Praxis der Analogie, Frankfurt‐Bern‐New York 1983, p. 91.
31 K.Müller: Lecture I Winter Semester 97/98: Kritik und Kommunikation. Grundfragen der Erkenntnistheorie, der Sprach‐ und Medienphilosophie. 2.2 Analogie (unpublished manuscript).
32 ibid.
33 Cf. A. Anzenbacher: Einführung in die Philosophie, p. 312.
34 Cf. K. Müller, Thomas von Aquins Theorie und Praxis der Analogie, Frankfurt‐Bern‐New York 1983, p. 102.
35 Cf. STh I, 13, 5: “… cum hoc nomen, sapiens, de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia, et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus hujusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia, vel potentia, vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen,sapiens, de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam; non autem cum dicitur de Deo; sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eamdem rationem hoc nomen, sapiens, de Deo et de homine dicitur.”
36 The two principles familiar to St. Thomas in the analysis and constitution of meaning, which he uses in his reflections on the use of language, are the principle of similarity and the principle of difference. Here he explains the former by taking our use of the word “wise”. By the principle of similarity, we expand the meaning of a word while preserving its original meaning. The boundaries of meaning are opened up, which results in the blurring of outlines in language, of which we have already spoken. The second principle, the principle of difference, is the opposite of the principle of similarity, since it requires the limiting of the meaning of a concept by the introduction of distinctions (differences). Thus one begins with “proper” (proprie) and “improper” (improprie) meanings, and proceeds to ever more complicated nuances. (This was a speciality of scholasticism that ultimately led to the exaggerated hairsplitting of Neoscholasticism.) On this see K.Müller, Lecture I, Winter Semester 97/98: Kritik und Kommunikation. Grundfragen der Erkenntnistheorie, der Sprach‐ und Medienphilosophie. 2.2 Analogie (unpublished manuscript). See also K.Müller, article “Analogie” in: Lexikon philosophischer Grundbegriffe der Theologie, p. 25.
37 Philosophische Untersuchungen (PU) [Philosophical Investigations] I, 66.
38 PU, I, 66.
39 PU, I, 67.
40 PU, I, 68.
41 Cf. PU, I, 67 and 68.
42 Wittgenstein has the same difficulty when he tries to describe the linguistic phenomenon he calls “family resemblance”; he has to engage in lengthy explanations and adduce a range of examples (game, number) and metaphors (network, relationship, and hence “family resemblance“). On Wittgenstein's method cf. PU, I, 69.
43 Cf. PU, I, 69.
44 Cf. PU, I, 67: “Why do we call something a ‘number’? Well, perhaps because it has a – direct – relationship with several things that have hitherto been called ‘number’.”
45 LEM, p. 7.
46 Cf. our remarks (§3.4) on the analogical use of the concept “wise” (sapiens). Thomas is aware of the imprecise nature of this predicate, but actually intensifies it and uses it for meaningful discourse about God.
47 The German original version of this article has been published by the author under the following title: Ludwig Wittgenstein und Thomas von Aquin über Analogie, Eine vergleichende Gegenüberstellung, GRIN Verlag, München 2016. The article has been translated into English by Graham J. Harrison.
