Gettin' the Hang of It
Alright, I think I'm starting to figure out what Arendt is doing here. She seems to be lamenting the loss of the political, which I take to be a public space for our actions. Now, I'm not entirely sure how Arendt uses this term yet, action, but I'm keeping my eyes out for a clearer definition and more revealing uses of the word.
Arendt looks to be locating the loss of the political in two historical events: 1) the rejection of the political life for the contemplative life by philosophy, and 2) the rise of society out of the private life which comes to overtake and eventually replace the political realm of human affairs. The first is pretty straightforward, and Arendt uses ancient and Christian philosophy as examples. The second is a little more complicated, but could be put so: private concern for the necessities of life comes to be a public concern, economics leaves the household, and organizes itself as "society" which manages and directs both the public/political and the private aspects of life. Society displaces the political and as the new public realm also pervades private life.
Why is this a problem? Well, Arendt seems to be suggesting that the political, a space in which human beings can act and create, is a condition of homo sapien. Human beings are human beings in part because they can act and create. In order to do these things, they require a shared location, the public/political space, which has been disintegrating since late antiquity. Is Arendt saying that humanity is losing itself? Being animal is no problem, but being human?
There is one thing that bothers me about all this though. Arendt seems to be using original Greek thinking and acting (Greek "self-understanding" is the phrase she uses) to justify her analysis of the political. Although Arendt hasn't directly said it yet, it appears obvious that the loss the political is a negative thing. She at least implies that humans cannot be human without it. But why does Arendt think she needs to erect an original Greek world that preserved the distinction between the political and the private? Heidegger does the same damn thing: Oh! We need to return to originary Greek thinking, to the Greek understanding of Being, to the inception of Being! The both of them feel the need to appeal to the Greeks to legitimate their own enterprises, as if they were unable to do it themselves. What's the deal?
Arendt looks to be locating the loss of the political in two historical events: 1) the rejection of the political life for the contemplative life by philosophy, and 2) the rise of society out of the private life which comes to overtake and eventually replace the political realm of human affairs. The first is pretty straightforward, and Arendt uses ancient and Christian philosophy as examples. The second is a little more complicated, but could be put so: private concern for the necessities of life comes to be a public concern, economics leaves the household, and organizes itself as "society" which manages and directs both the public/political and the private aspects of life. Society displaces the political and as the new public realm also pervades private life.
Why is this a problem? Well, Arendt seems to be suggesting that the political, a space in which human beings can act and create, is a condition of homo sapien. Human beings are human beings in part because they can act and create. In order to do these things, they require a shared location, the public/political space, which has been disintegrating since late antiquity. Is Arendt saying that humanity is losing itself? Being animal is no problem, but being human?
There is one thing that bothers me about all this though. Arendt seems to be using original Greek thinking and acting (Greek "self-understanding" is the phrase she uses) to justify her analysis of the political. Although Arendt hasn't directly said it yet, it appears obvious that the loss the political is a negative thing. She at least implies that humans cannot be human without it. But why does Arendt think she needs to erect an original Greek world that preserved the distinction between the political and the private? Heidegger does the same damn thing: Oh! We need to return to originary Greek thinking, to the Greek understanding of Being, to the inception of Being! The both of them feel the need to appeal to the Greeks to legitimate their own enterprises, as if they were unable to do it themselves. What's the deal?
