The Strait of Hormuz as Network:Rethinking Japan’s Security in the Indian Ocean
Abstract
This essay critically examines the ongoing conflict in the Middle East from the perspective of international humanitarian law, questioning the moral and political justifications behind escalating military actions. It argues that the increasing civilian casualties constitute a grave violation of globally shared humanitarian principles, despite their acknowledged structural limitations.
Focusing on the U.S.–Japan Alliance, the essay challenges the prevailing assumption that Japan’s security framework extends to the Indian Ocean region, particularly the Middle East. It contends that this region lies beyond the alliance’s practical and legal scope, and that Japan’s involvement in such conflicts represents a deviation from its foundational diplomatic principles.
Against this backdrop, the essay introduces the concept of non-state, network-based diplomacy, highlighting the role of private-sector actors, researchers, and grassroots exchanges in shaping long-standing relationships between Japan and the Indian Ocean region. These multilayered networks are further interpreted through the Islamic legal concept of maṣlaḥa (public good / welfare), understood here as a form of relational capital grounded in trust, reliability, and mutual benefit.
The analysis concludes that security should not be reduced to military expansion, but rather reconceived as the maintenance and expansion of relational networks. The current erosion of such networks — driven by state-centered, interest-based geopolitics — risks not only Japan’s national interest but also the broader stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The essay ultimately calls for the restoration of these networks as an ethical and practical imperative, particularly in addressing the humanitarian crisis faced by non-combatant actors such as stranded maritime workers.
International Humanitarian Law
One month has passed since the outbreak of war. In Iran, it is said that 1,900 people have already lost their lives.[1]
This is an outrage beyond words. Considering that innocent lives are also being taken in the West Bank and Lebanon in connection with this conflict, even this number may be no more than the tip of the iceberg.
There have also been casualties on the Israeli side, as well as among American soldiers. Yet, as civilian casualties continue to increase without restraint, the inhumanity of those who carry out the attacks — or of the acts of war themselves — must be called into question.
This constitutes a grave violation of international humanitarian law. Grounded in part in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and continuing to uphold the high ethical principle of respecting and protecting human rights across national borders — even while possessing structural weaknesses in its binding force — this body of law nevertheless exists. And yet, how is it possible that such a globally shared consensus can be so easily disregarded, and such acts of violence carried out?
Revenge and Prestige
The one who issued the orders, Donald Trump, claims that this is simply the result of following his own moral convictions. Needless to say, past American interventions in the Middle East have consistently failed. The “moral conviction” that calls for the democratization of Iran and regime change shows no sign of learning from history, nor of respecting international humanitarian law.
Moreover, for Israel — long treated as an enemy by Iran’s revolutionary regime — this policy amounts to overwhelming support for dismantling that regime through the use of American military superiority. The acceleration of Israeli attacks, in parallel with the repeated extensions of U.S. strikes on Iran’s energy facilities, is clear evidence of this.
Within his moral framework, the enemy is replaced by an absolute demon, while he himself is positioned as the absolute embodiment of justice. If, in addition, he is guided by apocalyptic beliefs and convinced that God is on his side, then neither the lessons of the past nor international agreements concerning humanitarian principles can exert any restraining force.
Rather, one cannot help but glimpse behind this rhetoric his personal interests — the desire to eradicate the long-standing adversary of the United States, the Iranian Islamic revolutionary regime, and to leave his name in American constitutional history as a savior of the nation. Should this not be called a runaway form of morality?
“The U.S.–Japan Alliance”
According to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S.–Japan Alliance is described as “the cornerstone of peace and stability in Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, and the Japan–U.S. relationship, grounded in a strong alliance, forms the basis of Japan’s diplomacy.”[2]
Let us read this carefully. It explicitly states that it is the “cornerstone of peace in Japan and the Asia-Pacific region.” The term itself is “Asia-Pacific.” In other words, it refers to the regions of Asia (primarily East, South, and Southeast Asia) and Oceania surrounding the western Pacific Ocean.
In the original security treaty, the more limited concept of the “Far East” was used. However, in contemporary discourse, the scope has been politically expanded to “Asia-Pacific,” and further to the “Indo-Pacific.”
Yet, if we follow the Ministry’s own explanation, it is difficult to argue that the “Indian Ocean region” is included within its practical scope. The Middle Eastern regions that have become the theater of the present war may, in fact, lie outside the realistic scope of the U.S.–Japan Alliance. Therefore, this region should be understood, both legally and practically, as lying beyond the alliance’s direct range.
If that is the case, the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces or naval vessels to this region should, in principle, be out of the question. Nevertheless, Japan provided financial support during the Gulf War and dispatched Self-Defense Forces during the Iraq War. These actions represent operations beyond the alliance’s original scope; they do not demonstrate that the Indo-Pacific has become the “sea” of the U.S.–Japan Alliance. For that sea is not a “sea of power,” but a “sea of relationships.”
The Indian Ocean Region
From the latter part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ description — namely, the Japan–U.S. relationship as the cornerstone of diplomacy — how, then, has Japan engaged with what may be called the “Indian Ocean region,” that is, South Asia and West Asia?
Without going as far back as the time when numerous monks traveled from China in search of the wisdom of Sanskrit, names such as Kōtarō Yamaoka, Ippei Tanaka, Keishō Amasaki, Tetsu Nakamura, and Girow Orikata come to mind. Nor can we forget the rescue of the Ertuğrul Frigate, or the issuance of emergency visas to Jewish refugees by the diplomat Chiune Sugihara.
Looking further at the past fifty years, we may point to Middle East researchers, archaeologists, practitioners involved in ODA, and both senior and junior volunteers of Japan International Cooperation Agency. The author himself served, from January 1994 to 1999, as one of the founding members and later director of the Japan Center for Academic Exchange at the University of Aleppo in Syria, receiving generations of Japanese-language instructors dispatched by JICA. Thereafter, he continued to organize exchange programs inviting learners of Japanese from the Arab world to Japan, as well as programs centered on Arabic-language study that involved visits to the Arab–Islamic world. Over seventeen years of service, these were carried out almost every year.
In other words, even in the Indian Ocean region, persistent grassroots-level exchanges have formed the foundation.
Suzuki, Toyota, Mazda, Mitsubishi
Yet, perhaps even more than these efforts, it was Japanese products themselves that built strong relationships with Middle Eastern societies: Suzuki light trucks that carried goods through the souqs in place of donkeys; motorcycles of Honda used by shepherds and Bedouins as substitutes for horses; and the Toyota Land Cruiser, which traversed not only ordinary rough roads but even sandy deserts with ease, sometimes even carrying weapons.
During the author’s stay in Syria, luxury cars were often brands such as Mazda or Mitsubishi. The taxis he frequently used were originally Mazda models, manufactured in Iran via Hyundai. The official vehicle of the director of the institute where he was affiliated was a Mitsubishi Lancer, carefully maintained by its driver. He also recalls that, at the time, people preferred second-hand Japanese-made radios by Panasonic or Toshiba over brand-new Chinese products.
The fact that Japan was a nation that had achieved victory in the Russo-Japanese War and had risen again from the devastation caused by the atomic bombings was also mentioned repeatedly by local people.
Non-State and Network-Based Diplomacy
What we find here is a rich web of relationships cultivated through things and practices — above all, the high quality of Japanese products, and, in the author’s personal experience, the character of the Japanese people as perceived by those in Syria.
This may be described as Japan’s non-state, network-based diplomacy — that is, forms of diplomacy conducted not by the state alone, but through companies, researchers, practitioners, and grassroots actors.
As demonstrated by the expansion of Suzuki in India, such multilayered relationships enabled Japan and the Indian Ocean region to connect not only with allies but with the region as a whole, in a networked manner.
In contemporary terms, Japan maintains particular, and often face-to-face, connections with the peoples of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, and even Israel. Moreover, depending on how it is employed, this network possesses the potential to expand across the entire region without fragmentation.
Maṣlaḥa as Relational Capital
The reliability that sustains these relationships lies in a quality that does not discriminate among buyers and never betrays those who purchase. In this context, what is shared is not merely the acquisition of “profit,” but a deeper sense of satisfaction and conviction. In Arabic terms, such reliability gives rise to a form of well-being known as maṣlaḥa(public good / welfare).
maṣlaḥa stands in opposition to corruption and injustice; it is a form of “good,” “justice,” and “welfare” that aims at reconciliation. Whether in components, manufacturing, transactions, or sales, if even a small part is tainted by defect or dishonesty, maṣlaḥa cannot be realized.
In the current situation of the Indian Ocean region — where conflicts between enemies and allies are repeatedly reproduced, and the very value of relationality embodied in maṣlaḥa appears to have been appropriated by a logic of self-interest — security should not be understood as the expansion of military power. Rather, it ought to consist in the maintenance and expansion of networks.
The Course of “Clever” Diplomacy
Yet, in response to the reckless actions driven by President Trump’s moral convictions, the Takaiichi administration appears to be advancing discussions premised on the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces and naval vessels, even though this is not the “Asia-Pacific region.” Let it be repeated: the Indian Ocean region lies outside the U.S.–Japan Alliance. And yet, it is precisely in this region that Japan’s non-state, network-based diplomacy has, in both name and reality, accumulated relations of good-neighborly engagement.
Despite the fact that Japan depends on crude oil transported through the Strait of Hormuz[3] — a route secured precisely because of these accumulated relationships — its current posture appears to be little more than an appeal and performance aimed at demonstrating alignment with the “American side.” A reckless war initiated by shallow moral reasoning is met with ad hoc and deferring responses.
In the face of an international order reduced to the logic of “interest” alone, maṣlaḥa becomes fragile. The network itself is folded into the binary logic of friend and foe, losing its very place of existence. In other words, the network of relationships that had barely remained in this region has been damaged and lost by the “tsunami” of governmental decisions.
As a result, might this not trigger an unprecedented loss of national interest — not only for Japan, but for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole? Is this truly the outcome of so-called “clever diplomacy”? Has Japan not, in fact, become a form of “defenseless, good-natured diplomacy” that depends entirely on the U.S.–Japan Alliance, even to the point of accepting increases in military expenditure as unavoidable?
Restore the Network
At present, due to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, it is reported that between twenty thousand and forty thousand crew members are stranded aboard vessels forced to remain in the Gulf.[4] Many of them come from Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa. They are not citizens of the warring states. They are, quite simply, collateral victims.
Working under low wages in order to support their families, they now face dwindling supplies of food and water. With no replacement crews available, they remain under constant vigilance, exposed to the threat of missile attacks that may come at any moment, unable to find rest.
Here, too, we find people abandoned even from the minimum level of maṣlaḥa required in times of emergency. Just as with those living under direct bombardment, this critical situation must not be overlooked. Each individual is equally human. There are no enemies or allies here, no believers or unbelievers. What is required is rapid and appropriate assistance that transcends all boundaries.
This is also an urgent and practical demand derived from the maqāṣid of Islamic law — specifically, maṣlaḥa ʿāmma — which aims to realize, as it were, a “categorical imperative” for all humanity: the preservation of life, reason, property, and progeny, beyond the confines of any particular community or creed.
The days of suffering and endurance for these crew members continue.
Allāhu aʿlam (God knows best).
Footnotes
[1] “Editorial: One Month Since the Attack on Iran — End This Lawless War Immediately,” Tokyo Shimbun, March 28, 2026, 07:53.
“(Timeline) One Month Since the Outbreak — The U.S. Administration Unable to ‘Win’: Military Superiority Fails to Resolve the Crisis, Risk of Prolonged Conflict,” Asahi Shimbun Digital, March 28, 2026, 05:00.
[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Frequently Asked Questions (North America), Question 2: ‘What does it mean to reconcile the U.S.–Japan Alliance with international cooperation?’”
Answer: “The U.S.–Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of peace and stability in Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, and the Japan–U.S. relationship, underpinned by a strong alliance, forms the basis of Japan’s diplomacy.”
It should be noted that in the “Overview of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty (Key Provisions),” terms such as “the Far East” or “the security of the Far East” appear, but the phrase “Asia-Pacific region” cannot be found. Furthermore, in the commemorative materials marking the 60th anniversary of the signing and entry into force of the treaty (2020), the term “Asia-Pacific region” is absent and instead replaced by “Indo-Pacific region,” which may be more appropriately understood as a political articulation of strategic vision.
[3] According to the Middle East Research Institute of Japan, “An Overview of the Situation in Iran — From the Perspective of the Middle East and Eurasia (6): The Impact of Attacks on Iran on Middle Eastern Energy Conditions and Implications for Japan,” March 9, 2026:
“The disruption of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz poses a significant concern for Japan’s energy procurement. Following its alignment with Western countries in reducing imports of Russian crude oil in 2022, Japan now relies almost entirely on oil from Gulf-producing states. The Middle East accounts for approximately 94% of Japan’s crude oil imports as of 2025, with around 90% of this passing through the Strait of Hormuz. While Japan may be able to respond in the short term through the release of oil reserves, in the medium to long term, rising oil prices — combined with a weaker yen — are likely to significantly increase domestic fuel costs.”
[5] For the concepts of maṣlaḥa and maṣlaḥa ʿāmma, see the author’s previous essay, “Is Prioritizing “National Interest” Our Only Option?”
Special Thanks to: ChatGPT
タイトル画像：
Suzuki Fronx WDB3S 1.5 SGX Hybrid Ice Grayish Blue Pearl Metallic with Black roof.jpg via WikiMediaCommons
Acknowledgements
This English version was prepared with the support of ChatGPT.
The author gratefully acknowledges its assistance in translation and linguistic clarification.
Original version in Japanese:
ホルムズ海峡のネットワークーーインド洋地域における日本の安全保障
