

# Counterinsurgency

A Symposium, April 16–20, 1962

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Stephen T. Hosmer, Sibylle O. Crane

This report is based on the Symposium on Counterinsurgency that was held at the RAND Corporation's Washington Office during the week of April 6, 1962. The Symposium was sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Any views or conclusions contained in this report should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of ARPA. *Counterinsurgency: A Symposium* was originally published by RAND in 1963. This new RAND edition reflects the original layout with the addition of a new foreword.

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## FOREWORD TO THE NEW EDITION

THIS APRIL, 1962 SYMPOSIUM was held at a time when Kennedy Administration officials were focusing increasingly on the growing communist insurgency in Vietnam and on the verge of radically expanding the numbers, roles, and types of U.S. military forces in that country. The purpose of the symposium was to distill lessons and insights from past insurgent conflicts that might help to inform and shape the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and to foster the effective prosecution of other future counterinsurgency campaigns.

To gather these lessons and insights, RAND brought to the same conference table twelve U.S. and allied officers and civilian officials who had expertise and a proven record of success in some aspects of guerrilla or counterinsurgency warfare. As their biographies will testify, the accomplishments and backgrounds of the symposium's formal participants gave their views significant credibility. Each participant could claim firsthand experience with guerrilla or counterinsurgent operations in one or more of the following post-World War II conflicts: Algeria, China, Greece, Kenya, Laos, Malaya, Oman, South Vietnam, and the Philippines. Three of the participants had led or operated with anti-Japanese guerrilla or guerrilla-type units in Burma and the Philippines during World War II.

During five days of meetings, the participants exchanged views on a wide spectrum of topics relating to the political, military, economic, intelligence, and psychological measures required to defeat insurgencies. Convinced that the fundamental verities of effective counterinsurgency policy and practice that were elucidated by the participants remain as valid today as they were 44 years ago, RAND decided to republish the symposium proceedings.

Among the insights that emerged from the discussions, the reader will find a number of counterinsurgency best practices that seem especially germane to the insurgency challenges confronted today by the United States and its allies. These include discussions of the counterinsurgent's need to:

- Identify and redress the political, economic, military, and other issues fueling the insurgency
- Gain control over and protect the population, which the counterinsurgent must see as the prime center of gravity in any counterinsurgency conflict
- Establish an immediate permanent security presence in all built-up areas cleared of enemy forces
- Accumulate extensive, fine-grained human and other intelligence on insurgent plans, modes of operation, personnel, and support networks
- Avoid actions that might antagonize the population
- Convince the population that they represent the “winning side” and intend to prevail until complete victory is secured

The participants also discussed measures to control borders (particularly effective in Algeria), techniques for countering and conducting ambushes, and the utility of mounting “false insurgent” operations. They also addressed the issue of when and how the counterinsurgent knows he is winning, and came to a consensus that the most important indicators of success were when the people voluntarily cooperated in providing intelligence and were willing to disregard insurgent orders.

While there were points of difference among the participants, there was far more accord than disagreement. Indeed, the participants clearly shared a common view about the fundamentals of effective counterinsurgency. One of the UK participants, Lt Col Frank Kitson, later described how he was struck by the unity of outlook:

“Although we came from such widely divergent backgrounds, it was if we had all been brought up together from youth. We all spoke the same language. Probably all of us had worked out theories of counterinsurgency procedures at one time or another, which we thought were unique and original. But when we came to air them, all our ideas were essentially the same. We had another thing in common. Although we had no difficulty in making our views understood to each other, we had mostly been unable to get our respective armies to hoist in the message.”<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately, Frank Kitson’s observation about the difficulty in persuading “armies to hoist in the message” has proven all too true in the case of U.S. and allied indigenous military forces fighting insurgencies. Counterinsurgency best practices were frequently

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<sup>1</sup>Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, London: Faber & Faber, 1977, pp. 200-201. General Sir Frank Kitson, GBE, KCB, MC, DL completed his forty-year military career as Commander in Chief, UK Land Forces (1982-1985).

ignored during much of the Vietnam War and have been less than fully followed in recent conflicts. Hopefully, the republication of this symposium will stimulate greater interest in their observance in the future.

Stephen T. Hosmer  
April, 2006



## PREFACE

THIS IS A REPORT on the Symposium on Counterinsurgency that was held at The RAND Corporation's Washington Office during the week of April 16, 1962. The Symposium was sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and was organized and chaired by Stephen T. Hosmer of RAND's Social Science Department.

The basic rationale in undertaking the Symposium was that, rather than approach the problems of guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare theoretically and academically, it might be useful to draw on the knowledge of men of recent and direct experience in counterinsurgency, with a view to assembling a large body of detailed information and judgment on the multifarious aspects of this inadequately explored form of conflict. It was hoped that such a pragmatic approach would not only provide fruitful insights into earlier struggles but would, above all, yield valuable lessons for the future. The main criterion in the selection of the participants, therefore, was that each have firsthand and successful experience in some phase of insurgent or counterinsurgent operations.

RAND was most fortunate in being able to bring together the particular group of military and civilian experts who constituted the Symposium.\* The biographic information about the participants' background and achievements reflects not only their unusually high caliber but also the diversity of their experience, knowledge, and special skills. Some of these men had been combat leaders; some occupied headquarters positions; still others were engaged in highly specialized activities such as civic action or operations research into weapons and communications technology. Together, they combined the experience of some nine different theaters of insurgency during the last twenty years, including such key areas as Malaya, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Kenya, and Algeria.

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\*Since not all the participants were able to attend every meeting, the schedule was so planned as to permit those whose time was limited to be present at the discussions that bore on their own experience and special interests.

To derive maximum benefit from this wealth and variety of expertise, the Symposium was conducted in a manner that would encourage the freest possible exchange of ideas and experiences. Hence there were no formal papers, but only informal roundtable discussions in which the members of the group were asked to present their opinions and to draw freely on their recollections of problems encountered and techniques employed in their areas of operations.

To give the Symposium a degree of structure and continuity, "Proposed Terms of Reference" (see Appendix) were drafted and distributed to the participants in advance of the meetings to serve, not as a rigid agenda, but as a general outline and guide to the discussions. As was inevitable in view of the scope and complexity of the subject, not all aspects of counterinsurgency could be covered exhaustively. Some that might have been treated in greater detail, had time permitted it, were only touched on in passing, and some aspects were not discussed at all. Then again, several points were more prominently debated than had been envisaged.

The summary of the discussions, which constitutes the present report, follows the order and progression of the meetings as closely as possible in the hope of conveying something of the spontaneous character of the talks and the manner in which certain findings and generalizations evolved. It is hoped that the detailed subheadings at the beginning of each section will prove useful in orienting the reader whose interest may be confined to particular questions. (The ten sections of the report correspond to the ten half-day sessions of the Symposium, and a listing of the participants present appears at the beginning of each section.)

The report was prepared by our rapporteur, Sibylle Crane, who attended all sessions and was able also to consult the taped recordings of the proceedings. Each participant in the Symposium had an opportunity to read and amend in draft form all statements in the report that were attributed to him.

It is well to realize that, with a few exceptions, the officers and civilians who took part in the Symposium were intimately associated only with particular phases of the larger campaigns in which they served, and their experience was often confined to one geographic sector of the total theater. Their generalizations, as the participants themselves were careful to point out, necessarily reflect each individual's personal vantage point in time and place and may not in every case be equally valid for all periods and regions of the conflict to which they refer.

As the following report shows, the Symposium succeeded in yielding a variety of informed viewpoints and significant individual experiences, which in turn led to many valuable cross references, comparisons, and at times disagreements. However, the talks also revealed surprisingly large areas of agreement and community of experience.

Although no conscious attempt was made to establish a consensus on a given idea or technique, or to formulate universally valid principles, the participants recorded a high degree of concurrence—often unanimity—on major premises and principles of operations, as well as some unexpected similarities of experience. To the extent compatible with the format of this report, such areas of understanding, agreed principles, and parallel experience have been stressed editorially.

The RAND Corporation owes a debt of profound gratitude to the participants who, in spite of pressing commitments elsewhere, found the time to contribute so generously to this Symposium. It is hoped that those who must deal with current and future problems of counterinsurgency will find some profit in the summary of an exchange of views by highly articulate practitioners of an art of warfare that is assuming an ever-growing importance in our military thinking and planning.



## MEMBERS OF THE SYMPOSIUM

Chairman: STEPHEN T. HOSMER  
*The RAND Corporation*

### Formal Participants\*

CHARLES T.R. BOHANNAN, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS-Ret.  
WENDELL W. FERTIG, Colonel, USA-Ret.  
DAVID GALULA, Lieutenant Colonel (French Marine Corps)  
ANTHONY S. JEAPES, Captain (British Army)  
FRANK E. KITSON, MBE, MC, Lieutenant Colonel (British Army)  
EDWARD GEARY LANSDALE, Brigadier General, USAF  
RUFUS C. PHILLIPS, III  
DAVID LEONARD POWELL-JONES, DSO, OBEY Brigadier General  
(British Army)  
JOHN R. SHIRLEY, OBE, Colonel (British Army-Ret.)  
NAPOLEON D. VALERIANO, Colonel (formerly with the Armed Forces  
of the Philippines)  
JOHN F. WHITE, Colonel (Royal Australian Army)  
SAMUEL V. WILSON, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

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EUGENE V. RUTKOWSKI

### The RAND Corporation

J.W. ELLIS, JR.  
TERRELL E. GREENE  
GEORGE K. TANHAM

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\*For biographies, see pp. xix-xxiii.



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## BIOGRAPHIES OF THE FORMAL PARTICIPANTS

**LT. COL. CHARLES T. R. BOHANNAN, AUS-RET.**, has been intimately associated with the major events in the Philippines in the last two decades, playing an important role, in particular, in the struggle against the communist (Hukbalahap) insurgent movement of the postwar period. A geologist, archaeologist, and cartographer prior to his enlistment in the U.S. Army in 1941, he saw combat in various Pacific theaters during World War II and took part in the liberation of the Philippine Islands from the Japanese. He returned to the newly independent Philippine Republic in 1946 and, for the next three years, participated in the anti-Huk campaign as a counterintelligence officer, thus gaining firsthand, authoritative knowledge of the nature of guerrilla warfare and the principles and techniques of counterinsurgency. In the later phases of the campaign, he served in Manila as JUSMAG advisor on unconventional operations to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Col. Bohannon, who now makes his home in the Philippine Islands, is the coauthor, with Col. Napoleon D. Valeriano, of *Counter guerrilla Operations: Lessons from the Philippines*, published by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1962.

**COL. WENDELL W. FERTIG, USA-RET.**, won great distinction during World War II as a guerrilla leader in the Philippines. A mining engineer and army reserve officer, he was superintendent of the largest iron mine in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war, when he volunteered for active duty with the Corps of Engineers of the Philippines Department of the U.S. Army. After the fall of the Philippines, Col. Fertig organized and commanded the Philippine-American guerrilla forces on Mindanao and, during the next three years of the Japanese occupation, developed them into a highly trained and effective force. His efforts did much to pave the way for the return of the American forces to Mindanao in 1945. Between the end of the war and his retirement from the service in 1956, Col. Fertig's assignments included a tour as professor of military science and tactics at the Colorado School of Mines (1947-1951); the post of Deputy Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army (1951-1953); and that of Deputy Director of the Joint Staff of PROVMAAG-Korea (1954-1955). Today, Col. Fertig is a practicing mining-engineer consultant in Denver, Colorado. He is a frequent lecturer on guerrilla and psychological warfare and has issued a number of publications on the subject in the last ten years.

**LT. COL. DAVID GALULA** has had an unusually wide variety of experience in a number of theaters of revolutionary warfare. Having graduated from the French military academy at Saint-Cyr in 1940, he served in North Africa, France, and Germany during World War II. From 1945 to 1948 he was posted to China (part of that period as Assistant Military Attaché), and thus was able to acquaint himself at firsthand with communist guerrilla strategy and tactics in the civil war. In 1949/1950 Col. Galula was a military observer with the U.N. Special Commission on

the Balkans (UNSCOB) during the civil war in Greece, which ended with the defeat of the communist rebellion. He subsequently served for nearly five years as his country's Military Attaché in Hong Kong. In 1956, at the height of the Algerian rebellion, Col. Galula was given command of a company assigned to the district of Kabylie, east of Algiers, an area of intensive FLN operations, which he succeeded in clearing militarily and returning to governmental control in the two years of his command. From 1958 until he came to the United States in April 1962, except for six months spent at the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia, Col. Galula worked at general military headquarters in Paris on various aspects of unconventional warfare and, in particular, the war in Algeria. In the spring of 1962 he joined the Center of International Affairs at Harvard University as a research associate.

**CAPT. ANTHONY S. JEAPES** has taken an active part in counterinsurgent campaigns in Malaya and in the Middle East. A graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, he was commissioned into the Dorset Regiment in 1955, and shortly thereafter went with his battalion to Germany as part of the 4th Infantry Division. His next post two years later was that of instructor to a "Junior Leaders" unit at Plymouth, England. In 1958 he was selected to attend the Special Air Service course in Wales and joined the elite 22nd SAS Regiment in the campaign against the Chinese terrorists in Malaya. The special function of that regiment, for which its members were carefully selected and trained, consisted in having small units penetrate the guerrilla-infested deep jungle to spot and ambush terrorist concentrations and collect intelligence from the aborigines inhabiting the areas. In 1959 Capt. Jeapes participated in the defeat of the rebellion in Oman, before returning to the United Kingdom with the 22nd SAS. Since October 1961 he has been at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as SAS exchange officer with the 7th Special Forces.

**LT. COL. FRANK E. KITSON, MBE, MC,** has taken part in the British counterinsurgency campaigns in both Kenya and Malaya. Having spent his first seven years as an officer of the British infantry chiefly in occupied Germany, he was posted to Kenya in mid-1953, at the height of the Mau Mau rebellion. His primary task was to help the intelligence branch of the police obtain the information needed by the security forces in their fight against the terrorist gangs. In the course of the next two years Col. Kitson developed and perfected a novel approach and technique for the collection and utilization of the special kind of intelligence that is indispensable in guerrilla warfare. He was able subsequently to apply this experience in the antiterrorist campaign in Malaya, where he had command of an infantry company in 1957. In recent years Col. Kitson's assignments have included a year at the British Army Staff College at Camberley; a post in the Military Operations Branch of the War Office, responsible for the Middle East; a tour as army instructor at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, England; and several months at the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia. Col. Kitson has recorded his experience in Kenya in a book entitled *Gangs and Counter-gangs*, published by Barrie and Rockliff, London, 1960.

**BRIG. GEN. EDWARD G. LANSDALE, USAF,** who became an officer in the U.S. Army in 1943 after having served with the Office of Strategic Services, has been involved in many of the insurgent and counterinsurgent efforts that have concerned the United States in the last twenty years. From 1945 until 1948 he was Chief of the Intelligence Division at Headquarters AFWESPAC in the Philippines (later the Philippine Ryukyus Command). He returned to the Philippines in 1950 to become the JUSMAG liaison officer and, in the course of time, a close personal friend and advisor to the newly appointed Secretary of Defense Magsaysay. In that

capacity he helped the Philippine Armed Forces develop psychological operations, civic action, and prisoner-rehabilitation programs in the struggle against the communist Huks. Later, in Southeast Asia, Gen. Lansdale was an advisor on special counter guerrilla operations on General O'Daniel's mission to the French forces in Indochina (1953). He subsequently served with MAAG-Vietnam in Saigon (1954-1956), advising the Vietnamese government on internal security problems, psychological operations, intelligence, civic action, and the refugee program, and in the process became a personal friend of President Diem. Since 1957 Gen. Lansdale has served in a number of posts in Washington. He became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1957; joined the staff of the President's Committee on Military Assistance in 1959; and in 1961 was appointed to his present position as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

**RUFUS C. PHILLIPS, III** has an impressive background in the fields of psychological warfare and civic action in Southeast Asia. In the middle 1950's, as a member of the Military Aid Advisory Group and psychological warfare advisor to the army of South Vietnam, he was responsible for organizing the Vietnamese army's psychological warfare branch and also had a major role in the pacification operations in the previously communist-held areas of South Vietnam. In 1957 Mr. Phillips went to Laos on behalf of the ICA and spent the next two years working with the Lao government in launching and directing a "civic action" program that was designed, much like the earlier effort in Vietnam, to win the loyalty of the population in rural areas for the legitimate government and away from the Communists through political, economic, and psychological means. After an interim of three years with a private firm of consulting engineers in Washington, D.C., Mr. Phillips has recently returned to Southeast Asia once again. In September 1962, following a brief assignment for AID to survey counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam and draft an AID program in support of counterinsurgency, he was appointed Assistant Director for Rural Affairs/ Counterinsurgency, USOM/Saigon.

**BRIG. DAVID LEONARD POWELL-JONES, DSO, OBE**, has had a distinguished and varied military career and has served in a number of theaters of war in the Middle and Far East. An officer in the Indian army, he was transferred in 1947, at the time of independence, to the Brigade of Gurkhas that was retained in the British service. During World War II he served in the Middle East from 1939 until 1941, participating in campaigns in the Western Desert, Eritrea, and Syria. He then returned to India, and from there was posted to Southeast Asia and Hong Kong. He acquired extensive experience of the problems and tactics of modern counterinsurgency during the emergency in Malaya, where he had a prominent part in the British operations against the communist terrorists. He served as a battalion commander in Malaya from 1953 until 1956 and as commander of a brigade from 1957 to the end of 1958. The following year Brig. Powell-Jones attended the Imperial Defence College in London. His numerous appointments in intelligence and in planning have included a tour as member of the International Planning Team in the NATO Standing Group in Washington (1951-1953), and the post of Director of Plans both in the War Office (1960/1961) and in the Ministry of Defence (1961). Brig. Powell-Jones is now Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff on the British Army Staff and his country's Assistant Military Attaché in Washington, D.C.

**COL. JOHN R. SHIRLEY, OBE**, has had wide experience in the area of counter guerrilla warfare, primarily from the point of view of the operations-research specialist and expert in communications. His training at the Army Signal School in New Zealand, the Digla Signal School in Egypt, and the Catterick Signal School in England laid the foundations for his active career in the fields of electronics and military tactics. After World War II Col. Shirley's assignments

included that of director of British army operations research in Western Europe, with responsibility for the scientific support of the Northern Army Group, a task oriented to the requirements of a large-scale war. Thereafter, his efforts in the service of the British government were directed predominantly toward the demands of limited warfare, including problems of counterinsurgency. Thus Col. Shirley was asked to direct an operations-research team in Malaya in the mid-1950's during a critical phase of the British campaign against the communist terrorists, with particular attention to the improvement of weapons and communications. Subsequently, he served as leader of a technical group that was sent to Kenya to investigate similar problems in the campaign against the Mau Mau rebellion. Since then Col. Shirley has joined Booz-Allen Applied Research, Inc. in this country and has become a citizen of the United States. As Director of Research, and more recently as Vice President of that company, he has been responsible, among other things, for studies in the field of military operations research, development engineering, electronic warfare, and radio communications.

**COL. NAPOLEON D. VALERIANO**, a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy and the U.S. Cavalry School, has had a distinguished career as an officer in the service of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, in the course of which he became intimately involved in both guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare. At the time of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, he was serving on the headquarters staff of the 31st Infantry Reserve Division during the Bataan campaign. After the surrender Col. Valeriano served with the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces on Luzon until General MacArthur's return in 1945, when he joined the 1st Cavalry Division of the Sixth Army and participated in the Philippine liberation campaign. Among his numerous staff and command positions after the war was that of commander of the 7th Battalion Combat Team, which achieved spectacular results under his leadership in 1949/1950 against the communist Huk guerrillas on Luzon. Col. Valeriano subsequently served as military assistant to President Magsaysay; commander of the Presidential Guards Battalion; Secretary to the Philippine National Security Council; and national Security Co-ordinator for the Philippines. From 1954 to 1955 he was in South Vietnam on loan to the U.S. Military Mission. Thereafter, he became the Philippine Military Attaché in Thailand and his country's military representative to the SEATO Secretariat. Col. Valeriano resigned his commission in 1957. He is coauthor, with Lt. Col. Charles T. R. Bohannon, of *Counter guerrilla Operations: Lessons from the Philippines*, published by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1962.

**COL. JOHN F. WHITE, OBE, AAR**, gained his most valuable experience in counterinsurgent strategy and tactics during the emergency in Malaya. A graduate of the Royal Military College of Australia, he had previously served with the Australian Parachute Battalion (1941-1946) and had spent five years as instructor at the Royal Military College and the Australian Parachute School. He had been a company commander and brigade major during the Korean war (1951-1952). In the latter part of 1957, following three years in Australia on various instructional and staff duties and a brief tour of duty in Singapore, he assumed command of the Third Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment in Malaya, where for two years he successfully employed a large variety of counterinsurgent techniques against the communist terrorists. In 1960 Col. White attended the U.S. Armed Forces Staff College. For the past two years he has been his country's Military Attaché in the United States.

**LT. COL. SAMUEL V. WILSON** has been concerned with aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency throughout his distinguished military career. An officer in the U.S. Infantry (Special Forces qualified), he taught guerrilla and counter guerrilla tactics at the Infantry School at

Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1942 and early 1943. He then joined the 5307th Composite Unit known as "Merrill's Marauders," with whom he participated in the North Burma campaign in 1943/1944. He was highly decorated for his part in this campaign, which essentially was one of guerrilla tactics and operations. After the war Col. Wilson was chosen to undergo training in the army's four-year program for foreign area specialists. His general field of specialization was Russia, and his particular area of intensive research was the Soviet partisan movement of World War II. Between 1959 and 1961 he served at Fort Bragg as director of instruction in the U.S. Army Special Warfare School and as a member of the Seventh Special Group (Airborne). In June 1961 Col. Wilson was appointed to his present post as executive officer to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.



APRIL 16, 1962, A.M.\*

## CHARACTERISTICS AND PATTERNS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

*Insurgency and Counterinsurgency as They Differ from Ordinary Warfare: Their Main Objective, Control of the Population ~ The Political and Psychological Side of Guerrilla Warfare, and the Importance of the Ideological Base ~ The Crucial Function of the Trained Political Cadre ~ The "Secure Base" of the Guerrilla as a Political Rather Than a Physical Asset ~ A Review and Analysis of Areas of Potential Insurgency Today*

MR. HOSMER of The RAND Corporation, as host and chairman of the Symposium on Counterinsurgency, opened its first session by greeting those present on behalf of RAND. He pointed out in the introductions that each member of the group had had extensive and successful experience in guerrilla or counter guerrilla warfare, as had several other participants and guests who would join the Symposium for briefer periods in the course of the week. The aim of the meetings, as MR. HOSMER saw it, was to assemble some of the wealth of the participants' experience and knowledge of the subject, and to permit a free exchange of ideas and opinions, in the hope of identifying principles and techniques of guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare that would be useful to all those who today are concerned with that problem. The approach, therefore, was to be practical rather than academic. Instead of formal papers there would be intensive round-table discussion, for which the Proposed Terms of Reference that had been distributed to the participants in advance of the meetings were to serve as a general guide rather than a rigid agenda.

MR. HOSMER then invited debate and comment, with the suggestion that the following opening questions from the Terms of Reference might serve as a useful point of departure: What conditions cause guerrilla movements? What motivates

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\*Present: Col. Bohannon, Mr. Ellis, Col. Fertig, Col. Galula, Mr. Greene, Mr. Hosmer, Gen. Lansdale, Mr. Rutkowski, Mr. Tanham, Col. Valeriano, Col. White, Col. Wilson.

the individual guerrilla? What are the major points of difference between communist guerrilla organizations and noncommunist insurgent movements?

COL. GALULA began the discussion with some general comments on the unique purpose of the modern insurgent, which, in his opinion, determined the scope and focus of any attempt to explore and to meet the problem. Guerrilla warfare, the most primitive form of armed conflict, has, in the last twenty years, been refined to the point where it is today an entirely new kind of warfare, for which the traditional textbooks offer no guidance, and about which we are having to learn from often painful experience. Revolutionary warfare requires a revolutionary approach on both sides in the struggle. Whereas in ordinary war the objective is to destroy the enemy and occupy his territory, the guerrilla's aim is to control the population. This, therefore, must be the aim of the counter-guerrilla as well. Although the Symposium's main interest would appear to be centered on the military aspects of guerrilla warfare, it is well to realize (*a*) that we must concern ourselves at least equally with what precedes military activities (that is, what creates the guerrilla movement) and what will follow them; and (*b*) that the political aspects of guerrilla movements are highly important if not decisive.

Asked to enlarge on these statements, COL. GALULA continued: Those accustomed to planning in terms of conventional war often do not realize, for example, that it is difficult and sometimes futile to try to "identify priority targets for counter-guerrilla operations" (a discussion topic suggested in the Terms of Reference), because one of the principles of the insurgent is his willingness to abandon a base rather than fight for it in what might be an unsuccessful attempt. Thus in 1947 Chinese Nationalist forces, in a large-scale operation, reached the capital of the Communists only to find it empty of all installations and military and administrative officials, an unthinkable situation in ordinary war. In 1953 in Indochina the French came across a Vietminh study which concluded that no base or installation was worth defending. Yet that very year the French mistakenly decided to attack Vietminh targets; they found nothing.

There are, in COL. GALULA's view, two patterns of revolutionary warfare. In the first, which might be called the "orthodox" (communist) pattern, an existing issue in the country is exploited by the revolutionary camp. It may be political, economic, or even religious; it may be acute or dormant. (If it is dormant, the insurgents must make it acute.) Countries such as Peru, where wealth and political power are vested in a few while the masses are poor and powerless, offer potential issues of this kind. So does every colonial territory, where the foreign ruler

holds most or all of the power. Conversely, the Greek Communists in the late 1940's failed precisely because they lacked such an issue, indeed any issue. In addition to an exploitable problem, successful guerrilla action requires a weak government and an ineffective police force. (Therefore insurgency in the Iron Curtain countries, with their strongly established police forces, is unthinkable today.)

In preparing the ground for a military offensive, the first and most difficult step for the revolutionaries is to create a strong party. (In Burma, for example, the Communists have not succeeded in establishing such a single elite party.) The second step is to spread the main issue to the masses in an effort to create a broad popular front.

After these two early steps, which involve no fighting and usually stay within legal bounds, the revolutionaries can move into actual military operations. Selecting a region far removed from the center of government and difficult to control by legitimate forces, and one in which their party is already strong, they will initiate guerrilla warfare, though at first only on a small scale and predominantly with small weapons. To avoid the guerrillas' becoming what Mao Tse-tung calls "roving bandits," they must obtain bases, either within or (as in South Vietnam today) outside the country's borders, and these bases also become the centers for the political organization through which the insurgents must gain control of the population and win its support.

Militarily, the next step is to organize from the irregular guerrillas regular units of growing size (platoon, company, battalion, even division), the advanced guerrillas, until eventually the insurgent forces include regular troops, local units (which generally form the core of the local defenders of communist territories), the guerrilla companies (which operate in enemy territory), and the militia. With this setup, the Communists can strike as and where they see opportunities for success, until they have reached a point of equilibrium with the legitimate forces at which it is safe to mount a major, decisive attack. If the government's side is weak, victory may come even without a last-ditch large-scale battle, possibly as a result of a communist offer to negotiate.

In the "unorthodox" pattern of guerrilla warfare, a group of impatient revolutionaries will omit the time-consuming phase of building a strong party. By using "blind terrorism," that is to say, through random bombings and assassinations, they will attract attention to themselves and win latent supporters to their cause. Then, by selective terrorism—a policeman here, a doctor there, or a man who refuses to contribute money to the cause—they are able to isolate the counter-

insurgents from the rest of the population and terrorize the people into silence. (Algeria is an example of these tactics.) Once the "battle of silence" is won, the guerrilla can operate freely, and from here on the unorthodox pattern follows much the same lines as the orthodox. As in the latter, the creation of the insurgents' party is the crucial task, and the support of the population is recognized as essential.

One basic difference between insurgency and counterinsurgency, in COL. GALULA's definition, is that the insurgent starts out with nothing but a cause and grows to strength, while the counterinsurgent often starts with everything but a cause and gradually declines in strength to the point of weakness. Planners of counterinsurgent strategy must not lose sight of that crucial difference. They must understand, moreover, that regular army operations have rarely been successful (except perhaps in the somewhat special case of Malaya, and then only after the British had resettled the population in guarded camps). And they should be aware, too, that aid programs and various other attempts to raise the people's standard of living have never yet yielded the desired results. The counterinsurgents, on the other hand, must realize and exploit the inherent weakness of guerrilla warfare: the fact that neither the people nor the insurgents' political organization within the population can move.

The characteristic pattern of counterinsurgent warfare, as COL. GALULA sees it, begins with an operation designed only to destroy, or expel from a chosen area, the insurgents' main armed forces. Once this has been achieved—by purely military means—the counterinsurgent can, and must, work on the population with a view to gaining control over it. He does so by destroying the insurgents' political organization, and by finding among the people capable and trustworthy new leaders who then are given full powers and support. Thereafter, the active help of the population is enlisted in the effort to wipe out the remnants of the guerrillas—now too few to be caught in large-scale operations. And, finally, the counterinsurgent side must organize a party of its own to prevent the guerrillas' return. Once the process is completed in one area, and sometimes even before, it is repeated in another, usually an adjoining area.

COL. FERTIG qualified COL. GALULA's opening statement by pointing out that the guerrilla warfare of the past twenty years was not in itself new; only its methods had been perfected. If the defenders have sometimes not met it effectively, the reason has been not so much weakness or inefficiency of government as simple failure to recognize the problem they faced. Thus, in the Philippines the Huk guerrilla movement was allowed to develop without the legitimate

government's taking any real action, out of a "do-gooder's" mistaken policy of leaving decisions and initiative to the local population wherever possible.

MR. GREENE mentioned cases such as Malaya, the Philippines, and Vietnam, where revolutionary wars had started in times of military and political upheaval, and the insurgents gained a head start by taking advantage of a vacuum in leadership or of recent military experience and the availability of arms. (COL. BOHANNAN cited Colombia, Cuba, China, and the Boer War, on the other hand, as instances where this had not been true.) COL. FERTIG added that the Communists have frequently usurped the leadership of a nationalist movement, taking advantage of existing disorganization and people's readiness to fight, and initially hiding behind the nationalist cause.

As to what motivates the individual guerrilla, COL. FERTIG pointed to his experience of the Philippines, where joining a cadre of the guerrillas\* was often the only alternative to dying by torture. The initial bands of guerrillas—many of them desperados and virtual bandits with nothing to lose—produced a few men of leadership caliber, out of whom the movement grew, while the rest were absorbed or eliminated. COL. GALULA cited, as an example of the effectiveness of appealing to men of lower class origin, the efforts of the Communist Party in France to recruit cadres among the roughly 14,000 African students each year. Inevitably, the most susceptible of these students were the least significant among them, men with little to lose and much to gain by the communist promise to raise them from obscurity.

COL. BOHANNAN objected that the generalization failed to take account of the significant minority of genuine believers—be it in communist doctrine or in another ideal—from whom came the outstanding leaders of insurgent movements. Many of the best Filipinos, for example, who might have lived peacefully under the Japanese, voluntarily incurred the dangers of joining the guerrillas because they fervently believed in the cause of freedom. Although, as COL. FERTIG pointed out, these dedicated men were more often found on the civilian side, there were educated, motivated activists also in the guerrilla companies; rowdies alone did not make for a successful guerrilla campaign. GEN. LANSDALE fully supported this view; there has to be a motive, he said, around which to create the political basis that is essential for a viable guerrilla movement.

COL. GALULA granted that there were four major possible motivations for the guerrilla: belief in the ideals of the movement, personal ambition, fear (for oneself or one's family), and the desire to join the bandwagon after initial suc-

\*COL. FERTIG and his troops represented the insurgent side against the Japanese occupation of the Islands.

cesses. COL. FERTIG confirmed the importance especially of the first of these on the basis of his observations in the Philippines, where he attributed much of the guerrilla movement's eventual success to people's willingness to fight for the liberty and democratic government of which they had had earlier experience. MR. HOSMER cited a study based on interviews of captured Malayan terrorists (most of them in the communist movement for some time), which had pointed up the importance of the individual's stake in the movement. And, as an illustration of the varieties of motivation, COL. WHITE summarized the situation in Malaya, where during the war the population had gone all out to fight the Japanese. After the war some leaders of the erstwhile anti-Japanese forces headed the communist forces, now out to get rid of the British; they were dedicated men, but were quickly joined by many who found it more attractive to terrorize for gain than to work for a living.

MR. RUTKOWSKI raised the problem of how to identify the point of transition at which control of the movement passes from the low-level, self-interested bandit to the eventual communist leader. How does the latter manage to replace the original strong-arm man?

In answer to the second question, COL. FERTIG stressed the advantage of the leader who is able to offer the potential recruit to the guerrilla side more than protection of one bully against another. In the Philippines control was achieved more easily as men like himself could identify themselves with an outside power that promised to help the country, and could point to American successes in Australia and to General MacArthur's pledge to return. COL. GALULA cited the historical example of China in 1947, where, despite the tradition of banditry, the Communists succeeded because of superior organization combined with dedication.

COL. WHITE and COL. BOHANNAN both felt that the banditry aspect was being stressed unduly, with China almost the only case in which it had been a major factor in a guerrilla movement. In the Philippines, Malaya, and other insurgent theaters, the appeal has been primarily to the interests of the people. In the special case of Colombia, banditry, without ideological base, has survived the guerrilla movement itself, of which the Communists, who did much to provoke it, never gained control.

GEN. LANSDALE stated that, inasmuch as the hard-core Communists will work for years (even, as in Vietnam, for decades) preparing the ground for a take-over, and will resort to military means only if they can't succeed by political means (Indochina and the Philippines being cases in point), it is essential that we identify

the areas in which such cadres are at work or in the making to be able to stop them in time. To do so is all the more important, COL. GALULA added, as the counter-insurgent suffers a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis the insurgent if the latter is allowed to develop unnoticed or unchecked. Once the insurgent side has established some degree of control, there is no longer room for a rival clandestine organization.

As a prerequisite for any attempt at identification such as GEN. LANSDALE suggested, COL. WILSON emphasized the distinction—thus far inadequately stressed in our service schools—between two entirely different situations in which the Communists initiate guerrilla war. In the first they will seize on existing resentment (people's hatred of an oppressor, or their desire to recover lost privileges or property) and capture an independent movement already under way. The second is the culmination of years of communist planning and organization, as in the case of Central Vietnam, which was just described by GEN. LANSDALE, and of many other countries.

COL. GALULA then reviewed, country by country, the areas of potential unrest today, in an effort to identify nations with latent issues that threatened most seriously to become acute, making these countries plausible sites and vulnerable targets of communist insurgency.

Among Asian countries, COL. GALULA thought, the Philippines would seem to present no great problem. Indonesia, with an active Communist Party, has one major issue, economic chaos, and thus may be considered ripe for guerrilla initiative. (The absence of such action thus far might be explained by Moscow and Peking's pressure against it.\*) Cambodia, lacking any major ethnic or religious conflict, offers no grave threat. Burma, on the other hand, with its strong racial and religious issues, furnishes certain possibilities for communist exploitation and future trouble. In India the central problem, poverty, is an obvious basis for communist propaganda work. Pakistan, with its perennial conflict between East and West Pakistan and the inequitable distribution of population and revenue between the two, offers a similar opportunity. Ceylon, with the conflicts inherent in its having several races and languages, bears watching.

The main problem in many countries of the Near East, as COL. GALULA sees it, is the concentration of wealth and political power in a few hands and the extreme poverty of the masses. This is certainly true of Iran. In Saudi Arabia the problem is

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\*GEN. LANSDALE sought the explanation rather in the Indonesian Communists' hope of winning by political means alone. Having a simple majority of the voters living in Central Java, which is dominated by the Communists, and given the country's form of representative government (majority rule rather than representation by states, provinces, or islands), the Communists may see no need to turn to armed conflict.

tempered by the sparseness of the population; in Libya it is likely to increase once the country's oil resources are exploited.

Finally, in North Africa, Tunisia and Morocco are coping with a serious problem of unemployment (Tunisia alone has somewhere between 400,000 and 500,000 unemployed males), and this may eventually lend itself to communist exploitation. The problems of countries south of the Sahara—South Africa, Angola, and the various Spanish and Portuguese possessions—are largely colonial in nature.

MR. HOSMER, using as an example the case of Indonesia (where a militant, well-organized Communist Party has concentrated its main strength on Java, though the Outer Islands would seem to be better suited to guerrilla warfare), raised the more general question of the importance of local terrain, communications, sea access, and similar concerns in the choice of areas for guerrilla operations.

COL. FERTIG, in reply, described as an ideal site for guerrilla operations an island with poor communications, easy access to the sea, and a mountainous interior (with year-round rains) that could grow enough food for both the insurgents and the people. He cited the advantages that his own guerrilla troops on Mindanao had enjoyed, for these very reasons, over those on Luzon. The wide plains of Luzon, easily covered by Japanese tanks, offered no hiding places to the guerrillas, who were pushed back into almost uninhabited and inhospitable mountains, where they quickly starved.

COL. BOHANNAN pointed out that the Communists in the postwar period were able to give the Philippine government a good deal of trouble on Luzon, even though they were in wide-open plains, with excellent communications and roads for the army, and did not have COL. FERTIG's terrain advantage and strong base organization. This, he thought, was due to their strong political base and heavily armed force. COL. GALULA confirmed that, once the insurgents had established a strong foothold and organization, terrain ceased to be the overriding factor; population density, he thought, then became decisive.

In a lengthy discussion of what constituted a "secure" base, the participants agreed that a secure base was a political, rather than a physical, one. In MR. TANHAM's definition, the secure (political) base is one where you have either won over or neutralized the people of the area to the point where they refuse to co-operate with the enemy even after you leave; thus you may have a secure base even in an area that the enemy occupies sporadically. COL. FERTIG commented that he himself, in the Philippines, had never had a secure base by the above definition; every one of his headquarters was sooner or later occupied by the Japanese. And he quoted from a captured document in which the Japanese

General Moramoto admitted having had control only of the places physically occupied by the Japanese.

In answer to a question from COL. GALULA about the intelligence of both sides in the Philippines, COL. FERTIG explained that, whereas his own guerrilla forces had complete information on the Japanese, the Japanese were only partially and sometimes inaccurately informed about his movements and positions. They were often unable to sift the truth from among planted stories and from those concocted by would-be agents overly eager to supply information for which the Japanese were paying. As a general rule, COL. FERTIG believed that the guerrilla, if he is to survive, must have better intelligence than his enemy—an advantage, COL. GALULA added, that he can achieve only if he has the support of the people. At the beginning of hostilities, the population typically is divided into three distinct groups: a small body of people already willing to support the guerrilla, a large neutral group, and a small segment that is actively hostile to the insurgents. It is the task of the guerrilla leader to identify the small group already friendly to his cause and to use it to control the majority and neutralize the hostile minority.

Here, COL. BOHANNAN pointed out the importance of distinguishing between indigenous communist insurgency (to which COL. GALULA's rule undoubtedly applied) and the type of guerrilla movement that is based on an enemy invasion and occupation. In the latter case, the guerrilla will begin by having the sincere good wishes of the vast majority of the population, and the hostile and apathetic will represent only a very small group. In COL. WILSON's opinion, this was the main difference, not yet well enough understood, between the guerrillas of World War II and the present communist-organized instances of guerrilla warfare. Today in Vietnam, for example, both sides are vying for the 75 to 80 per cent of the population who are politically apathetic.

The discussion returned briefly to the continent-by-continent review of countries that were more or less ripe for communist insurgency. According to COL. FERTIG, much of South America and most of Central America has all the elements that generate such movements: a large and extremely poor lower class, a small and very wealthy upper class, and virtually no middle class. Chile is an example of these conditions, but its length militates against effective simultaneous organization of both north and south, and the northern desert terrain is unsuitable for guerrilla operations, for the government could forestall or defeat any insurgent attempt merely by controlling the water holes there. GEN. LANSDALE quoted MR. PHILLIPS' view that Ecuador and Bolivia were the chief danger areas in South

America. COL. VALERIANO thought that any Latin American country on the Pacific side was a ripe candidate for an outbreak of guerrilla warfare today. Colombia has had much guidance from Chinese experts, suggesting the possibility that, as soon as the situation in the Caribbean is sufficiently stabilized, the Chinese Communists may be planning to foster communist insurgency in the countries immediately west and southwest of that area. Recent developments in Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador lend weight to this theory, and, in general, the Chinese Communists appear to be expanding their influence on the Pacific side of Latin America. Aside from the economic and social imbalances favoring them, there is another possible motive: the psychological effect to be gained by any successful challenge of the principle of Pan-Americanism.

Apropos of the often-expressed fear that Castro may export his revolution to other Latin American countries, MR. HOSMER raised the question of the function and importance of foreign experts and advisors both in preparing the ground politically and in training the future guerrillas militarily. Can this be accomplished with a relatively small corps of specialists? The Communists, COL. GALULA maintained, object to this in principle and would have the natives do the work, even if it takes time, rather than inject Russian or Chinese advisors directly. COL. VALERIANO pointed out, however, that rebellions can be, and often are, prepared by an outside power, which will train and indoctrinate indigenous groups of individuals abroad and then send such skilled cadres back in to lead the insurgent movement. A classic example is the case of Fidel Castro, who, after an abortive attempt to seize power, fled to Mexico, underwent intensive training under the well-known communist guerrilla trainer Colonel Bayo, and returned to Cuba with a cadre that included Raul Castro and Che Guevara.

As one of several instances where outside leadership had been evident at the site of the rebellion, especially in the formative and early phases of a guerrilla war, MR. GREENE mentioned American and Indonesian communist agents in the Philippines who helped with the political organization. COL. BOHANNAN added that this help extended also to training of the field army, but he stressed the inconspicuous advisory, rather than leading, function of these foreign nationals. In Malaya, on the other hand, said COL. WHITE, where 92 per cent of the guerrillas were Chinese, there was no supply or help, and little influence, from without; and MR. TANHAM pointed out that the Vietminh, too, had only minimal outside assistance until the Chinese reached the border.

Yet, apart from any question of direct leadership and physical aid, COL. GALULA said, the doctrinal influence of Communist China was very apparent in

Indochina. It manifested itself, for instance, in 1949 in the Vietminh's radical change of attitude toward their prisoners from the previous rough treatment to the Chinese principle of decent treatment and suasion with a view to political conversion. (As a prisoner of the Communists in China in 1947, COL. GALULA had been treated, quite typically, almost like a guest of honor.) The Chinese Communists generally gave their prisoners a choice among several alternatives: (a) joining the communist army, (b) settling as civilians in communist territory, (c) being demobilized, and even (d) going back to the national army (which meant that their captors would not have to feed them). Once, interviewing a group of 250 junior officers in a prison camp, COL. GALULA met three who had been prisoners before, and had returned to the Nationalists and been recaptured. The conciliatory approach was so effective that during the war the Communists had Nationalists guard their prisoners. (COL. FERTIG recalled a similar phenomenon in the Philippines, where a Japanese general in 1944 launched a conciliation program that proved so effective as to constitute a real threat to the guerrillas.) COL. GALULA contrasted the Chinese principle with the less sophisticated methods of the FLN in Algeria, who treated their prisoners brutally and often killed them.

APRIL 16, 1962, P.M.\*

## PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SOME EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL APPROACHES

*The Indispensable Need for Popular Support ~ How Important a Target Is the Individual Enemy Leader? ~ French Operations in Algeria: Principles and Typical Procedures; How To "Clean" a Contaminated Village, Procure Intelligence, and Establish Lasting Control; "Compartmentalizing" a Newly Recaptured Area in the Postmilitary Phase ~ Choosing Priority Targets for Concentrated Effort: Various Nonmilitary Criteria; the Merits of Widely Distributed Small-scale Operations ~ Mobilizing Local Society To Aid the Counterinsurgent Effort ~ The Judicious Use of Terror and the Importance of Lawful Procedures ~ Civilian or Military Control of the Over-all Effort? Several Views ~ Preferred Organizational Structures for Effective Counterinsurgency (the Examples of Algeria, the Philippines, and Malaya) ~ Disrupting the Guerrilla's Program for Conquest ~ The Power To Protect the Local Populace as a Prerequisite for Winning Its Support*

AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE for a more detailed treatment of the objectives of counter guerrilla operations and the kind of organization needed for such operations — subjects already touched on — MR. HOSMER quoted the statement, made earlier by COL. WILSON, that "the primary objective of counter guerrilla warfare is not merely the guerrilla's elimination, neutralization, and conversion, but the winning-over of the apathetic majority of the people." COL. BOHANNAN disagreed. In his opinion, the ultimate objective is indeed the elimination of the enemy (by liquidation, neutralization, or conversion), but the path to that end runs largely through the civilian population. Because the guerrilla can't live without the civilians' support, the latter offer a way of getting at him; therefore, winning them politically, though not a *principal* objective (since they present no direct threat to you), is

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\*Present: Col. Bohannon, Mr. Ellis, Col. Fertig, Col. Galula, Mr. Greene, Mr. Hosmer, Brig. Powell-Jones, Mr. Rutkowski, Col. Valeriano, Col. White.

certainly a most important *immediate* objective. COL. GALULA added that, wherever you have gained control and won the support of the population, and have thereby defeated the guerrilla locally, you can afford to release your forces, for the guerrilla cannot easily come back.

In COL. BOHANNAN's view, people will revert to their normal political indifference once the leaders of the guerrilla have been eliminated. COL. FERTIG agreed: Nowhere, he said, is leadership more important than in guerrilla warfare, where there is often strong attachment to the individual who symbolizes the cause; by eliminating him you have accomplished much of your task. COL. GALULA had found this not to be entirely true in Algeria, where, as soon as leaders were caught, new ones emerged to take their place. As a rule, the second run was distinctly inferior to the first, and the third was somewhat better again (because the guerrilla had realized the importance of good leadership through this recent experience). In the end the high rate of attrition among insurgent leaders inevitably led to a significant decline in their quality. Yet the rebellion continued, because the rebels in the field were too strongly committed to it; and, though COL. FERTIG was right in saying that the elimination of one guerrilla leader was more effective than that of ten to twenty ordinary fighters, it was rarely decisive.

The exceptionally capable leader, according to COL. BOHANNAN, is perhaps even more important to the counterguerrilla than to the guerrilla movement. The troops' personal attachment may be less of a factor there, and any one leader is therefore not indispensable, but the qualities of aggressive leadership, imagination, and flexibility are crucial. The ability to shift and improvise in accordance with changing requirements is needed most, and at the same time most difficult to exert, where you are operating within an established administrative structure that has established procedures. In the Philippines it took a Magsaysay (or any one of at least a half-dozen other men with the same drive, imagination, and rapport with the people who might have done the job) to cut through the multiplicity of vested functions and privileges and launch an effective movement. One of the most difficult problems is placing a man with such qualifications in an official position where he can use them.

COL. WHITE pointed out that in Malaya the British leaders who succeeded one another had all been men of stature and unusual ability, and that, in fact, the counterinsurgents in most instances were more fortunate than the insurgents in having a larger reservoir from which to recruit able leaders. COL. GALULA granted this last point, but added that this advantage was offset by the disadvantage of a relatively slow rate of natural selection, as compared to the guerrillas whose use of

nonbureaucratic criteria and methods (the most effective of which is physical elimination) makes for a very fast process.

COL. WHITE's statement that, in principle, it was wise to kill the enemy leader, wherever possible, met with general agreement. Yet COL. FERTIG cautioned against the unforeseeable possibility that, in so doing, you might propel into prominence a better leader; he cited the case of Col. Volckmann (who has since retired with the rank of brigadier general) in Northern Luzon: though a third-generation leader, he was more effective than his two predecessors, who had trained him and from whose errors (both men were betrayed) he had learned. The first to fight on the basis of guerrilla tactics, he streamlined his organization and eliminated every potential traitor.

COL. GALULA pointed out that the Communists themselves have strong doctrinal objections to overemphasizing the importance of the individual leader; hence, they rotate leaders, groom successors, and try to prevent the cult of personality. MR. GREENE substantiated this point with a quotation from Che Guevara to the effect that Fidel Castro had not been essential to the success of the movement in Cuba—a statement that COL. GALULA thought quite consistent with the classic tenet that communism is a mass movement helped, but not made, by leaders.

COL. VALERIANO thought that, once you killed an enemy leader, much depended on how fast and well you exploited the confusion caused in his camp by his sudden loss. Also, low-level leaders are more lucrative targets than upper-level leaders. In the Philippines, for example, if you killed a squadron leader, it would take a year to a year-and-a-half for the squadron to be reconstructed, and it would never again be as effective as before. (Once the squadron that took part in the ambush and killing of Mrs. Quezon had been identified, there was a seven-month successful campaign to rout out all its commanders, and the 700-man squadron was never re-formed.) COL. WHITE's experience in Malaya, on the contrary, had been that even low-level leaders were quickly replaced (as in the case of an ambushed leader whose wife took his place within a week).

COL. VALERIANO said that his side in the Philippines had actually operated on the principle, stated earlier by COL. WHITE himself, that leaders at all levels must be eliminated. The higher ones, though their death does not necessarily cause the collapse of the rebellion, mean a greater loss of prestige for the movement. Hence, generally speaking, the counter guerrilla leader will do best to aim for the elimination of his counterpart in the field, and clever exploitation of the shock effects of loss can bring large rewards. In Central Luzon the shock periods varied from one-and-a-half months (for example, in the Huk Regional Command 3)

to two weeks (as under the more aggressive commander of Regional Command 2), before a squadron would show up in battle again under new leadership.

In answer to MR. GREENE's question about the immediate effect of the surrender of Taruc on the Huk movement, COL. BOHANNAN thought Taruc's was not a good case in point. The movement was virtually doomed by that time, and the effect of the surrender of its spiritual leader was merely to symbolize this fact to his followers. A dedicated man, activist as well as spiritual leader, Taruc saw surrender as the only way to avoid useless fighting, and he did not have open to him the exits that permitted Greek communist leaders to flee to adjoining countries in a similar situation in 1950.

Upon MR. HOSMER's question as to other primary objectives in counter-guerrilla warfare, COL. GALULA, drawing on his Algerian experience, gave this exposé of an approach that he believed applicable to many insurgency situations.

By the time the armed forces of the government are called in, part of the country will have been contaminated by the guerrillas, and incoming troops will find the population in some areas already organized, terrorized, afraid of spies, unwilling to talk, and yielding little or no information on guerrilla organization and troops.

The first step for the counterinsurgents, therefore, is to choose, within the contaminated territory, a smaller area in which to concentrate their efforts. As commander of the counterinsurgent side, you must take into account not only the obvious (military and topographic) factors that would be considered in a conventional war in choosing the most suitable area for an attack, but also certain aspects of the situation that relate to the populace. Among these are the density of the population and the degree to which the guerrilla has already organized the people. (The more sparsely populated and the less well organized the area, the easier the problem.) Once you have decided on the area to be purged, you can proceed to destroy the enemy, or at least expel him from that sector, by the relatively simple method of mounting a series of one-day attacks that might be called "cylinder-and-piston" operations. (The cylinder in this case is a cordon of fixed troops around three sides of the infested area; the piston is a concentrated force moved in from the fourth side to compel the enemy to retreat or scatter toward the fixed troops.)

The main purpose in this first step is not necessarily to destroy the rebels but to set up in the area small posts that are safe from rebel counteraction. If, after a week or a month of such an effort, you can establish forces of battalion, company, and finally platoon level, you have accomplished your aim.

With a number of posts and sizable troop units on your side and the rebels in

the area reduced to small, scattered elements and men in hiding, you can go on to the next step: establishing the degree of control that will prevent the rebels from coming back. The ideal would be to seal the area, as was done for the whole of Algeria, where it became impossible after 1957 to smuggle in more than four people at a time across the eastern and western borders. But this extremely costly mechanical procedure may not be feasible in most situations.

Having completed the first step, and having chosen an area of control that is not so small as to permit outside rebel forces to penetrate it within a night's march nor so large as to cause your forces to be too thinly distributed, you can afford to retire some of your forces, keeping only a reserve strong enough to handle enemy incursions. To this end, you "compartmentalize" the area, with a post in each compartment (say, at company level), and a local commander in control. (See Fig. 1.) Most important, the over-all direction of the process has to be with a territorial commander, familiar with the area and in touch with its people, who must remain the undisputed chief even if high-ranking troop commanders are brought in. In choosing the location for the posts you do well to pick the politically and administratively most important villages rather than positions that are strategic only from a military point of view.




FIG. 1—Compartmentalizing Area of Control in Postmilitary Phase

Here, COL. VALERIANO interrupted COL. GALULA to ask (a) how, in these clearing operations, one distinguished the genuinely peaceful farmer from the seemingly peaceful one who was a part-time armed guerrilla at night; and (b) what could be done about the regular guerrillas who remained imbedded in the population.

COL. GALULA answered that the typical population in insurgent territory consists of (a) the regular guerrillas; (b) the part-time guerrillas (described by COL. VALERIANO); (c) political supporters of the revolutionaries; and (d) the rest

of the people, with many shades of feelings. In the first phase of counterinsurgency just outlined, you need to concern yourself only with the first of these, because once the "regular" forces of the enemy are expelled or immobilized, the part-time guerrilla cannot easily operate. Regular guerrillas who hide in the population will come out sooner or later, or else they will just split up and stop all their armed activity. In the first instance, you will catch them; in the second, they cease to be a problem for the time being, and their final elimination can be entrusted to a concerted effort of the entire population at some later time.

In reply to COL. BOHANNAN's question as to how many troops are required for an operation such as the one described, COL. GALULA thought that this would depend largely on the terrain, and you could not therefore give universally applicable facts and figures. To take a specific case, in the Kabylie area east of Algiers, which is about 100 miles long and 60 miles wide, with precipitous mountains that require the soldiers and vehicles to make long detours to cover relatively short distances, and with a population density equal to that of Belgium, surprise was impossible, for troops had to come from afar and by the highways, and it took twelve battalions to comb an area of 18 square miles.

Having secured an area militarily, COL. GALULA continued, you must work on the population and, first of all, destroy the rebels' political organization. For this you need intelligence, which you can get only if the people are convinced that you are not only strong but are going to stay, so that they need not fear reprisal from the guerrillas for having helped you. Wait until you discover three or four people in each village whom you suspect of working with the insurgents. Arrest them all at the same time, not one by one, for they will find a certain safety in numbers (if a secret is betrayed, it might have been any one of them). Then interrogate them, and they probably will lead you to the insurgents' political cell. COL. GALULA singled out three important points in embarking on the destruction of a village insurgent organization: (1) This is essentially police work and, ideally, therefore should not be done by the army. If for lack of police the army has to undertake it, special intelligence groups should be organized for the task, so as to dissociate the army as such from the unpleasant side of police activities. (2) It is useless to purge a village unless you are ready to establish a post in it. Otherwise, the rebels will rebuild a cell from the outside, and you will have to repeat the entire process later, against much greater popular reluctance. (3) To control a village, which includes surveillance of all traffic in and out, you must institute a system of passes and permits, based on a complete census that establishes who the legitimate inhabitants are and who does not belong. The house-by-house census,

your first individual contact with the people, is also your opening for psychological operations.

Having purged the village and ascertained from local informers not only who was *for* the guerrillas but also who was *against* them and may therefore be material for antirebel cadres, you must ask the people to elect new leaders. Once elected, these men must be tested for their reliability through a variety of civic tasks, and the one who proves himself must be given all possible power and aid.

Finally, you must help the population set up its own defense units (either paid, full-time professional forces or a militia of local farmers), and make the people select military leaders from their own ranks. After that, the remaining small rebel elements usually surrender and disappear, and you can then bring down your strength to two or three men whom you leave behind, while the bulk of your forces is freed to repeat the process in another, usually an adjoining, area. This method, at first used only experimentally by individual commanders, later became standard procedure in Algeria.

Asked specifically how much time it might require to clean up a typical area, COL. GALULA gave this account of the first problem he encountered on arriving in Algeria and of his success and rate of progress in the operation. In July of 1956 the company he then commanded was assigned an area in Kabylie. The company sector (or *sous-quartier*) was part of a battalion area (or *quartier*) 10 miles long and 6 miles wide, with mountains ranging up to 3000 feet, which contained seven main villages and five or six hamlets and had a total of twelve to fifteen thousand inhabitants. By October COL. GALULA had cleaned the first village in his *sous-quartier*, having been lucky enough to be given a list of all FLN political agents, which led to a great deal of intelligence information. By December (the *sous-quartier* having by then been enlarged) he had purged and occupied three more villages.\* By February 1957 this entire *sous-quartier* had been cleaned up. Periodically, as the battalion *quartier* was expanded, so was the *sous-quartier*, and in the end COL. GALULA had complete and effective control over an area comprising half the original battalion *quartier* plus considerable territory in the lowland to the south of it, with a total population of about fifteen thousand.

In another and much larger area, COL. GALULA added, where, after their initial successful operations of 1956, the French units busied themselves mainly with military tasks and left the population to itself, the insurgents not only survived

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\*In answer to a question from COL. VALERIANO: A typical distance between villages in Algeria would be about three-quarters of a mile, but road passage might require a 3-mile march, and men on foot were hard to spot because of the terrain cover.

but thrived. Having learned a valuable lesson in the early months of the war, they organized their forces into small groups of never more than twenty men (the standard number being between five and ten), and it took months of intensive, large-scale operations in 1959 to achieve anything significant against them.

COL. VALERIANO mentioned similar operations conducted by the Japanese in the Philippines. In one of these, after learning where a few Americans were hiding, they saturated the area with an entire division and stayed forty-five days in the very village where the Americans were, employing the most brutal terror methods. But when they left, the Americans were still there, having found it safer to stay hidden than to move out. COL. VALERIANO himself had marched in with weapons and radio receivers on the eleventh day of the Japanese operation. Despite their massive effort, the Japanese obtained very little information from the local people. Terror and torture succeeded in producing the opposite of their intended effect. Even informers were often executed, and rather than tell on the Americans, the Filipinos hid them in their cellars, and the women fed them. As soon as the Japanese moved out, leaving only a normal garrison behind, the other side quickly regained control, and the Americans came out.

COL. GALULA saw in this incident an illustration of a fundamental error of the Japanese: that of antagonizing the population by an abuse of terror. The ultimately more successful method, which required greater patience, was to keep the guerrilla moving, trap him sooner or later, and gradually persuade a population that has not been so antagonized to give you the needed information and to refuse to hide the guerrillas. Without this kind of co-operation, the insurgent or counterinsurgent cannot long sustain a military advantage. During the civil war in Greece, for example, the Communists staged commando-type operations rather than typical guerrilla action. The terrain made it easy enough for them to infiltrate and operate behind the Greek lines, but they failed to establish a hold because they lacked the support of the population and therefore were denounced and caught when spotted by citizens.

COL. VALERIANO's account also illustrated to COL. GALULA, however, the serious danger of the guerrilla's staying imbedded in the population. If you cannot prevent this from happening, you have to force the guerrilla to hide so deeply that he cannot again attack in numbers and will eventually be forced out when you have control of the population.

Asked by COL. FERTIG what success the French had in excluding the guerrillas from the inner ring of the perimeter in Indochina, COL. GALULA said that they succeeded until 1952. After that the Vietminh were too highly organized, with regular

troops as well as guerrillas operating within and outside the perimeter, and the French could no longer cope with them.

To COL. BOHANNAN this French experience in Indochina demonstrated the fundamental danger of concentrating too many of your troops on keeping a small area clean, thereby leaving too large an area in which the guerrilla can operate undisturbed. COL. GALULA pointed out that the counterinsurgent's paramount strategic objective must be to use his initial superiority of numbers and matériel in such a way as to prevent the guerrilla from moving from one phase of revolutionary warfare to the next; in selecting the area or areas of main effort, therefore, he must consider many factors. In Algeria the strategy until 1958, if any, was mainly to keep the border waterproof and to maintain order in the cities. After 1958, with the same forces, a more coherent effort was directed at certain areas, starting with the western (Moroccan) border, going on to the eastern border, from there to Algiers, etc.

In answer to a question from MR. HOSMER, BRIG. POWELL-JONES spoke on objectives in Malaya. Here, too, the British had to establish priorities, as they were not strong enough to be effective everywhere at once. The Briggs Plan, later developed further by General Templer, was to set targets for various parts of the country, clearing them one at a time and thus making them into what were called "white" areas. Keeping the whole territory "waterproof" (an easier task in Malaya than in Algeria) was most important. Within the area so sealed off, priorities for concentrated effort were determined in various ways—some because of their political importance (big towns, seats of government, or those nearest to Singapore), others because they were relatively easy to clean up. The main settled areas were along the west coast, and within the various districts the progression in general was from the coast inland and from the administrative centers outward, with the last terrorist strongholds inland from the east coast (a pattern, COL. GALULA commented, that resembled the one ultimately used against the Communists in Greece).

BRIG. POWELL-JONES stressed also the psychological advantage of manageable small-scale operations. The as yet uncommitted civilian population sees that you can accomplish what you set out to do, and in a reasonably short time; your own soldiers derive satisfaction from such a tangible success; and the terrorists, on being told that you will clean up a given area in a given number of months, are faced with the alternatives of letting you do it (fine!) or trying to stop you (thereby helping you achieve your aim of bringing the enemy to battle). COL. GALULA mentioned the added advantage of gaining the needed experience in small areas rather than spreading inevitable mistakes over large ones. Moreover, the local operation permits you to spot local leaders for later positions of responsibility.

MR. HOSMER then raised the question of how and at what point one mobilizes the other elements in the society to aid in the general counterguerrilla effort. COL. GALULA thought that, where the guerrilla already has the support of the people, you cannot hope for support until you have purged the area of rebels and created a new political organization. COL. BOHANNAN looked on this as a "self-defeating point of view," because even an area under guerrilla control has in it a few people who will not co-operate. The cylinder-and-piston method described by COL. GALULA is a good one if, as in Algeria, you have the necessary troops. With fewer men you may have to entrench a counterguerrilla troop near a village, let the men gradually make contact with the villagers during the day (even if the guerrilla comes back at night), and keep the guerrilla on the move by constant patrolling.

Although COL. GALULA's Algerian experience did not bear out COL. BOHANNAN's theory, both men agreed on the importance of patrolling and, above all, on the fact that the population is the key to the problem. COL. BOHANNAN emphasized again, however, that the operations outlined by COL. GALULA called for an enormous troop-to-guerrilla ratio (not likely to obtain in a country with an indigenous guerrilla force), and also, he pointed out, for the suspension of civil liberties to an undesirable degree.

COL. GALULA thought that the troop-to-guerrilla ratio might not be quite so great a problem as COL. BOHANNAN assumed, but admitted that the question of civil liberties was a serious one for the defenders of democracy. The French in Algeria had been very much aware of this, and had gone to extraordinary lengths to maintain the appearance of lawful processes. Until 1958, for example, every unit had a team of gendarmes attached to it, whose function was to follow the men into action and, after the shooting, count the dead and make a report of "manslaughter" against the commanding officers. In a legal farce the case would go to court, there to be dismissed. Also, there was at least a theoretical rule that, when you met an armed enemy, you had to warn him three times (!) before firing at him. These experiences demonstrated the need to adapt peacetime legislation for the protection of civil liberties to the special conditions of insurgency.

BRIG. POWELL-JONES agreed that the problem was difficult, but he insisted on the importance of maintaining a modicum of legality and order, of conducting searches as decently as possible, etc., so that the people can think of you as essentially "good." In Malaya every effort was made, as in Algeria, to preserve at least a semblance of due legal and humane procedure, despite the unfortunate incidents that inevitably occurred now and then.

COL. GALULA concluded that firm and unequivocal rules, a scale of punish-

ments to fit the crimes, and the will to enforce these penalties were essential if one hoped to achieve perfect control. The fact that not every commander in Algeria understood and acted on this principle accounted, he thought, for the variations in the success of pacification from one command to another.

In order to overcome the duality of military and civilian authority that at times made it difficult for the military commander to apply the above principle, COL. GALULA explained (in answer to a question from COL. VALERIANO) that certain sectors in Algeria had to be declared "military" areas; in the nonmilitary areas, the local general succeeded only where he was on good terms with the local prefect.

This was very different, BRIG. POWELL-JONES pointed out, from the situation in Malaya, where the military could never take over from the civilians. Even in the very worst areas control was vested in a committee (under the chairmanship of the civil authority), which at the Civil District level included the District Officer, the police, local civilians (European planters and representative Chinese and Malaysians), and, last of all, the soldiers. In declared "black" areas, where the troops had the right to shoot at sight, that right had to be expressly granted, and could be withdrawn, by the appropriate committee. Any breakdown of civil authority, or instances when the military took the law in its own hands, BRIG. POWELL-JONES considered a victory for the other side. The stated function of the military, he emphasized, was to back up the civil authority, and the number and distribution of troops was entirely a matter of priority of targets. The severity with which the civilian population had to be controlled and restricted depended on how desperate or favorable was the military situation, a fact that served as a strong incentive to the people to help the legitimate forces, whose success meant less local terrorism and greater freedom for the civilians.

Food was still another means of pressure; the principle was to allow the individual just enough so that he could say to the guerrilla, "I can't give you any, for if I do, I'll starve myself." But as far as the local population was concerned, the source of authority to impose or remove restrictions and other pressures remained the District Officer, working through the police, and backed up by the military only if necessary.

In the Philippines, COL. VALERIANO said, the situation was again different from either the Algerian or the Malayan scene. With the breakdown of civil government in the heavily contested areas, including the disappearance of local police authority, the military leader perforce became the principal figure in the fight against the Japanese.

At the start of the Huk campaign, in early 1946, many public positions at the

village, municipal, and provincial levels were unfilled as a result of war casualties and the inability of the postwar government to refill these vacancies. Moreover, most of the remaining civil servants either deserted their posts or refused to exercise their functions for fear of Huk reprisals. Enterprising military officers, therefore, aware of the danger of an administrative vacuum, took on the burden of civil responsibility with the acquiescence (and in some cases the direct encouragement) of political leaders. The public itself preferred to direct its problems to the lowly garrison officer rather than to the provincial executive who was known to lack the powers and instruments of government. Thus, when Magsaysay took over in 1950, the only functioning authority in Huk-controlled areas was the military establishment, with local military commanders virtually free of interference or restrictions from the civil government. Magsaysay exploited this situation to the best advantage.

COL. FERTIG pointed to the difficulty and danger of generalizing from such diverse experience and political settings. Even within the Philippines the situation varied; in Mindanao he himself was fortunate enough to have a civilian government of legally elected representatives of the people that took over, while in other parts of the islands it was necessary to create the political government.

MR. HOSMER then solicited opinions on optimum structures and approaches in the organization for counter guerrilla warfare, with realistic allowance for the fact that you have to use and make do with what is available.

COL. GALULA named several desiderata: (a) a territorial military command, in which the commander must be the sole and complete military boss; (b) two kinds of troops—mobile reserves, not concerned with the population, who can be stationed and moved as necessary and who require certain types of men and leaders, and “grid” (or “framework”) troops who stay put and understand how to deal with the people; and (c) two types of leaders—those who work well with the population, and those whose main ability and inclination lie in fighting. In the framework, BRIG. POWELL-JONES added, comes the opportunity for maintaining the façade of civil power: the police should be in control, responsible to the civil authorities; below them, the home guard; behind and supporting them, the military.

COL. BOHANNAN (in answer to a question by COL. FERTIG) commented on the effectiveness in the Philippines of special-purpose counter guerrilla units: a few small teams who moved into the jungle looking for guerrilla bases and leading other units to them. These special teams avoided fighting except in very advantageous situations, and, though they would not in themselves have solved the problem even if there had been more of them, they were an effective means of added harassment.

BRIG. POWELL-JONES mentioned that in Malaya (unlike the Philippines, where the troops were constantly patrolling and coping with crises), harassment of the enemy in this manner, though not often directly productive, had the additional advantage of giving the troops a sense of being militarily engaged and not merely auxiliary policemen. But, he pointed out, too much in the way of generalities should not be deduced from the Malayan campaign, which was an unusually difficult one for the communist enemy because of the way in which his forces were strung out in isolated pockets, the vast area of deep jungle, his lack of effective communications, and the diverse (Chinese, Malay, and Indian) population.

COL. VALERIANO explained that a typical task force in the anti-Huk campaign had, in addition to the military intelligence and civil affairs team, so-called battalion combat teams. On the staff of a battalion commander was a civil affairs officer who surveyed local defense assets in the area (the civilian police force, armed civilian volunteers, etc.). These were supervised, trained, and mobilized so that they might later take over local defense and fight any remaining guerrillas, leaving the army free to pursue and harass the fleeing enemy.

BRIG. POWELL-JONES then gave a detailed account of the administrative setup, and the role of the military in this setup, in southern Malaya, a jungle area with few roads and poor communications except those on the coast.

Malaya as a whole was divided into nine states, and each state was governed by a "war executive committee," with the legal governor of the state at the head, and a committee to advise him that consisted of the head policeman, the head of the State Home Guard and senior soldier in the state, and responsible representative civilians. The state, in turn, was divided into districts, each headed by the District Officer, with a local committee (head policeman, etc.) analogous to that at the state level. Allotted to the state would usually be a brigade; to the district, a battalion. Towns and other centers of population were wired in, and their perimeters lit at night. In the towns and larger villages, there were enough resident police to maintain security, but everywhere the locals themselves were enlisted as volunteer police (special constables) and home guards, and the latter were given arms and distinguishing armbands. (Inevitably, some of the more isolated settlements were occasionally overrun by the enemy.)

The battalion commander would be in general support of the civil authority in a given area. In some cases, an armed police unit—a so-called police operations squad—was also in general support, but it was then usually attached to the battalion commander as an additional reinforcement. The battalion never operated in a

settled area without the permission of the head civilian administrator, and it maintained close liaison with the police "framework." In obviously suitable areas (for example, jungle parts known to have guerrillas in them), the local military commander might request, and be granted, a free hand, including permission to call for bomber support; but he would not go into guarded and inhabited areas except by prearrangement and on agreed schedules.

COL. FERTIG, at MR. HOSMER's request, then described and commented on the antiguerrilla organization of the Japanese in Mindanao. The original Japanese program called for using local police and elected officials, but it was soon abandoned. Instead, the Japanese reorganized their puppet troops into the "Bureau of Constabulary," who proved more dangerous than the Japanese soldiers, for they were "contaminators." (To avoid a "brother" problem, the Japanese brought Bureau of Constabulary soldiers to Mindanao from other islands.) The guerrillas were able to harass them so effectively, however, that they ceased to go out on patrols, and were eventually withdrawn entirely from all but two areas.

The Japanese, who had an average of 150,000 men on the island of Mindanao, never committed many of their own firstline troops to the antiguerrilla campaign. The only exception was the foray of June 1943, when about 1800 men were involved for two weeks; but there, as in other instances, the guerrillas were back in possession within ten days, for the Japanese consistently lacked co-ordination and wisdom. For example, a harassed Japanese unit at times would move out, having first burned its supplies rather than leave them behind, and shortly afterward new troops would be moved into that very area and would be quickly starved out.

The Japanese never launched an effective counter guerrilla operation, partly because they failed to realize that they were dealing with organized resistance, rather than, as they thought, with isolated groups of bandits. The result was a virtual stalemate until the guerrillas received enough supplies and heavy weapons by submarine to stage attacks.

As for the organization of the anti-Japanese guerrillas, each province supported one division (which might vary in size from 5500 to 18,000 men). As soon as an area was freed from Japanese control, the civilian authorities were re-established, and the military answered to them. As commander in Mindanao, COL. FERTIG was in the unusual situation of being both President Quezon's representative to the civilian government and, as General MacArthur's commander, the military head. But the civilian institutions were dominant, with the army acting only as protector and in combat. The civilians printed the money (no military scrip was

used), and their courts operated in all but the Moslem areas. Mindanao was more fortunate than Luzon in never being so thoroughly occupied. For one thing, the Japanese invasion of Mindanao came relatively late (after the fall of Bataan and just before Corregidor); for another, the guerrillas were more easily supplied, because deep waters and open seaways permitted submarines to approach closely.

In COL. FERTIG's view, the importance of access to outside support is one of the main principles of guerrilla warfare; even if it is not used, there is great psychological value in the soldiers' feeling that they are not cut off. (Conversely, BRIG. POWELL-JONES added, the counterguerrilla must aim at giving the guerrilla just that sense of being cut off.) For the benefit of troop morale, the facade of outside contact and support was maintained in the Philippines even if doing so at times required a slight distortion of the facts.

COL. BOHANNAN (in reply to a question from MR. GREENE) said that, in the period before the American landings, the Huk movement received very little American support during the Japanese occupation, except where a local commander of legitimate guerrillas might make small reciprocal arrangements with a co-operative local Huk leader.

The participants returned briefly to the problem of using terror wisely and selectively (as compared to the self-defeating indiscriminate manner in which the Japanese employed it). BRIG. POWELL-JONES illustrated the advantage to be gained once again from emphasis on legality. In Malaya, after some early cases of communist brutality, the British found it effective to subject a terrorist to the due process of civil law and sentence him to death. Knowing the process, others might think twice before adding to their records any unnecessary brutality that could be brought up against them at the trial (just as they might hope for mitigating acts to weigh in their favor). In the Philippines, too, according to COL. FERTIG, the stress was on necessities of warfare (not assassination), on concentration camps for the duration only, on hewing close to the legal line.

Commenting on MR. GREENE's observation that the FLN's terrorism of civilians had apparently not lost them the support of the Moslem population, BRIG. POWELL-JONES emphasized that the counterinsurgents cannot win the support of the population unless they have the power to protect it. (In Malaya the British had to bring people into perimeters before they were able to do that.) If this was invariably true, MR. GREENE wondered what had kept the population in the Philippines nevertheless loyal to the Americans, even though they were not able to protect it against the indiscriminate terrorism of the Japanese. Was it fear of reprisals from

the guerrillas, or just stubborn hatred of the Japanese invaders? COL. VALERIANO thought it was essentially the latter.

In COL. GALULA's view, the Communists themselves are aware of the possible boomerang effect of terrorism on a mass scale, and their principle is to use it only long enough to intimidate the civilians. Similarly, the FLN, with one killing, would set an example strong enough to scare a large crowd into acquiescence and, once successful, would stop. (Later, having lost their hold on the people, they resorted to large-scale terrorism and were unsuccessful.)

Yet there are cases, COL. GALULA recalled, in which strong measures gain not only acquiescence but active support. In China, for example, two refugee priests from Hainan Island, on reaching Hong Kong, reported that the people of their island were hostile to the Communists. Yet five months later, when the Chinese Nationalists twice tried to parachute an agent onto the island, each was met and cornered by the local militia. The planes had been heard, and any militiaman knew that, if he failed to report it, he might be denounced by one of his colleagues on watch duty or by the militiaman in the next village and, if so, would then undoubtedly be shot.

Again in China in 1952 the Nationalists staged a raid—planned as a hit-and-run operation—on a coastal peninsula that became an island at low tide, by dropping parachutists followed by landings. The 'chutists were met by a thousand militia, and the invaders lost the ensuing battle. The Nationalists had miscalculated in expecting the militia to give up without fighting, but the militia could not afford to, knowing that the invaders would not stay. (This confirmed BRIG. POWELL-JONES' earlier point about the importance of being able to protect the populace whose support you are seeking.)

MR. HOSMER suggested that disrupting the guerrilla's program and timetable for conquest and take-over might constitute a key target for counterinsurgency. How serious, he asked, had the effect of such a disruption on the guerrilla proved to be in past experience? BRIG. POWELL-JONES thought the answer to this question depended partly on how flexible the enemy was in reorienting strategy according to changed circumstances.

In Malaya, after the failure of their initial plans, and their subsequent dispersal, the communist high command convened only about twice a year to map out policy for the entire six-month period to come, and their communications were poor. As a result, the British gained a crucial advantage over a considerable period if they could change the situation in such a way as to make the agreed policy inapplicable. BRIG. POWELL-JONES recalled at least one instance where the guerrillas

recognized a certain method as bad, but were unable to change it until the next semiannual meeting of their high command. COL. BOHANNAN added that a competent guerrilla often did not publicize his targets and policy for fear of the negative psychological effect on the civilians that any failures or setbacks would produce.

The decision to advance from one phase of revolutionary warfare to the next, COL. GALULA said in conclusion, is the most critical that the insurgent leadership has to make, and one that, if taken prematurely, has in the past led to crucial setbacks and even to total failure. The Greeks in 1947 thought themselves strong enough to offer the national forces substantial targets, and failed; the FLN miscalculated similarly in 1956; and the Vietminh came close to disaster in the first attempt to engage the French in set battles, and succeeded only on the second attempt, several years later, after they had Chinese support.

APRIL 17, 1962, A.M.\*

## TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES OF COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE (I)

*Principles of the Defense of Fixed (Military and Nonmilitary) Installations in Guerrilla Warfare ~ Patrolling ~ Ambush and Counterambush, and Their Modern Refinements ~ Optimum Size of Patrol and Ambush Party ~ Firearms for Ambush and Patrol: Comparative Merits of Different Weapons; the Noisy as against the Silent Weapon; Some Preferences and Recommendations ~ Clearing Potential Ambush Sites: Two Views ~ The Importance of Ambush Drill ~ The Uses of Dogs ~ The Main Objective of Pursuing the Guerrilla*

MR. HOSMER suggested as the topic for the morning the "tactics and techniques of counter guerrilla war," with emphasis on detail. He invited the participants to relate some of their particular problems and operations, their successes in terms of what they had hoped to achieve, and the devices and methods that were especially effective, as well as those that were not.

Beginning with the "defense of fixed installations" (which, at COL. BOHANNAN's suggestion, was understood to include such nonmilitary installations and common guerrilla objectives as powerplants and water reservoirs), COL. GALULA thought that the great problem, particularly in the early and middle stages of a war, was the large number of installations to be defended, ignorance of which of these the enemy was likely to attack, and inability to free enough troops to defend them all. The principle on which to operate, therefore, is that of defending only installations that are absolutely essential, and of relying for the rest on simple devices (radio sets, flares, etc.) to permit sending quick alarm calls for reinforcement and to give the population a sense of being protected.

CAPT. JEAPES thought it difficult to generalize about what it took to defend an installation, since the need changed with the circumstances. COL. WHITE,

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\*Present: Col. Bohannon, Mr. Ellis, Col. Fertig, Col. Galula, Mr. Greene, Mr. Hosmer, Capt. Jeapes, Mr. Rutkowski, Col. Shirley, Col. Valeriano, Col. White.

pointing out incidentally that in the later stages of control the home guard could protect many installations and thus release regular troops for military pursuit of the enemy, suggested that the participants distinguish between routine precautionary defense measures, and those one takes in case of an actual attack. (Among the former he mentioned the use of wire fencing and lights, and also of cutters with which to mow down all grass for 20 to 25 yards from the wire fence to prevent people from crawling under it unobserved—a simple and yet formidable job.) On this last point, COL. FERTIG commented that in grass country the traditional methods of organizing ambush, counterambush, and patrols had proved ineffective because the high grass was the friend of the guerrilla, and the only workable way of patrolling an area had been to send a solid group of troops armed with shotguns. COL. WHITE had found the use of light aircraft, early in the morning, a useful way to spot ambushes in advance. He emphasized the all-important need for mobile reserves that can be rushed quickly to any trouble spots.

Against a well-organized guerrilla, said COL. FERTIG, the defense of fixed installations is difficult, since he has the initiative and often chooses targets not in accordance with the defender's ideas of priority (for example, the case of the defenders who protected an oil depot but failed to guard the valve on the loading side of the tank, with the result that the guerrillas were able to empty the oil into the sea).

COL. GALULA spoke of various ways in which the Vietminh refined the ambush. Aside from the continuing problem for the French of avoiding especially the ambushing of their reinforcements, there was also a constant danger of infiltration of fixed installations. Viet troops would be hidden among peasants in the so-called *camions chinois*; a battalion of militia in disguise once followed a Catholic procession into a town in Tonkin. Ambushing a village at night and then attacking the relief column was a frequent trick, repeated quite recently in South Vietnam. Even the use of helicopters against such attacks has never been very successful because a well-organized assault will be too quickly over. (A good ambush, COL. WHITE thought, should be successful in the first thirty seconds.) COL. SHIRLEY added that the value of helicopters was further limited by the availability of excellent cover for the withdrawing guerrillas; in Malaya the trucks bringing relief forces often were successfully ambushed. The British attempted to armor-plate some of them and used various other devices to protect the men in them.

In Algeria (COL. GALULA), vehicles were armored and, to enable the soldiers to get out quickly when attacked, the seating arrangement in the trucks was modified. Instead of having two rows against the sides of the truck with the soldiers

facing in, the rows were placed lengthwise toward the middle, with the men facing out. To avoid concentrated attack on your convoys, it is essential to allow enough space between vehicles (CAPT. JEAPES). And armored cars should accompany the convoy (COL. WHITE).

As regards the counter guerrilla's equipment, COL. GALULA had found shot-guns very effective as short-range antipersonnel weapons, and he emphasized the advantage of using weapons too heavy for the guerrilla to carry from the scene with him. Flame throwers, CAPT. JEAPES thought, were to be ruled out, for it would be dangerous to start a fire in areas that you yourself have to get through. COL. FERTIG recalled his practice in the Philippines of giving his own guerrillas just five rounds or so of ammunition per rifle, so that they could not stay long on target but had to run back to their assembly points for reloading, thereby forcing the Japanese to chase many individual men at once and so disperse their forces.

For the protection of fixed installations COL. GALULA stressed the usefulness of night patrolling, starting before sundown and continuing till 4 or 5 A.M. (During the day there is not much danger of attack, given the counter guerrillas' superiority in manpower, planes, etc.)

COL. SHIRLEY, incidentally, was emphatic on the need for frequent ambush-drill practice—at least once a week, he thought—at specified and publicized times and places. To illustrate the dangers of sporadic, spontaneous drilling, he recalled coming across an incident in Malaya in which some zealous elements of a Malay regiment, imbued with the importance of preparing and being prepared for the ambush, had decided to stage a drill, with live ammunition, on what they believed to be a deserted stretch of land, only to find their fire returned instantly by the home guard of a neighboring tin miner, a New Zealander, who believed himself under real attack. The mock ambushers, in turn, assumed that they had accidentally stumbled on a nest of Communists, and the battle raged on for quite a while before the mistake was discovered, which almost miraculously had caused no casualties.

Returning to some of the requirements for the successful ambush, CAPT. JEAPES gave a detailed description of the 24-hour deep-in ambushes that his SAS (Special Air Service) Regiment had conducted against the Chinese terrorists (the CT's) in the tropical jungle. About twelve men would lie in wait for up to ten or eleven days, with four men in the firing line at any one time (they would be on for two hours, then off for four, with shifts overlapping), and often they would get nothing in the entire time—a tiring and frustrating operation that required much patience, discipline, and self-control. This applied only to the

operational hours, that is, the daylight hours. There was no need to extend the routine far into the night, when the thickness of the jungle kept the terrorists from moving, though on major trails, for example, night ambushes were nevertheless maintained at times. It was impossible for an ambush team to move during the day without danger of being discovered; hence, if the men expected to meet the enemy on a certain night, they went out the night before and lay low throughout the following day.

COL. WHITE agreed on the importance and also the difficulty of the ambush and counterambush. In his Malayan experience it took twenty men to maintain a ten-man ambush; if enemy troops were expected to pass by a certain place at a certain time, the soldiers would go out as much as three days in advance and lie low. They virtually never used existing tracks. Indeed, in going back and forth between firing position and rest camp, the men would never use the same route twice to avoid leaving recognizable traces in the grass.

CAPT. JEAPES, on the contrary, had preferred using only a single narrow track, however deep and unmistakable it might become as a result of repeated traffic, gambling that the enemy would not stumble on it. Even if he did, there was a chance that he would follow it out of curiosity and thus stumble into an ambush or a base camp. More likely, terrorists coming across such a trail, unless their number was quite large, would try to withdraw unseen, not knowing how many troops they might find at the end of the trail.

There followed some discussion among COL. WHITE, COL. SHIRLEY, and CAPT. JEAPES as to the wisdom of ambushing the tracks in the expectation that the enemy would use them. COL. SHIRLEY's experience had been that the troops spent many fruitless hours waiting for the enemy along the tracks, and only a surprisingly small number of Chinese casualties were inflicted during the brief fire fights characteristic of the ambush. Indeed, in most instances in Malaya, neither guerrilla nor counter guerrilla achieved a very high percentage of casualties through ambush.

COL. GALULA described an unorthodox but extremely successful experiment with the "one-man ambush," which had been tried by a friend of his who commanded a sector in Indochina. A single man, it turned out, was almost invulnerable, and the system permitted the setting of a large number of ambushes.

As to the demoralizing effect of frequent ambushes on the guerrilla, CAPT. JEAPES believed it to be an important aspect of psychological warfare. A CT troop of, say, fourteen men that had run into ambushes on three consecutive

nights and lost a couple of men in each was apt to come out and surrender on the fourth day.

COL. SHIRLEY agreed and suggested that, if ultimately the morale effect on the enemy is indeed related to the lethal effect on him, the operational researcher might devote himself to finding the threshold beyond which the guerrilla will not accept the hazards of his occupation and will be inclined to return to civilian life.

COL. VALERIANO saw this as another argument (valid at least in the Philippine situation) for not tying up the bulk of the defending forces in the perimeter of a fixed installation but deploying it on the outside, then inviting the enemy to attack the perimeter, and firing at him from the rear. To anticipate likely points of attack and to secure the routes needed for mobile reserves, COL. VALERIANO's forces developed an elaborate procedure that involved mining (or marking as "mined") the likely ambush points and, on the basis of a survey by the intelligence officer, classifying places and routes by various categories calling for diverse types of action.

From the guerrilla point of view, COL. FERTIG had found "counterpatrolling" a single coastal road between two strong points, where the enemy patrol moved regularly back and forth, an effective tactic requiring only a few men. Constant harassment up and down the track, with only an occasional ambush, was enough to make the Japanese decide to patrol less frequently and only on moonlit nights. This effort had the added advantage that, by scattering your ambush forces over a wide area, you forced the enemy to dissipate his counter guerrilla forces.

COL. SHIRLEY wondered whether the question of the optimum size of a guerrilla or counter guerrilla unit had been fully explored. In Malaya it had been handled pragmatically. A typical patrol would be about a dozen men strong; yet some were as small as four men, while others went up to company strength. Ideally, he thought, "the smaller the better." COL. WHITE stated his own preference for the three-man patrol (so that two could carry the one who might be wounded), and recalled that in Malaya an entire battalion would sometimes swamp an area in such teams of three.

MR. GREENE mentioned a number of devices that the Viet Cong ambushers are using today along with actual weapons, and that, together, make the ambush a formidable factor: (1) traps of various kinds (covered and camouflaged holes, with sharp stakes at the bottom that have poison or urine on them to cause infection; bent-over saplings with sharpened pieces of bamboo attached to them; buried pieces of wood with 4- or 5-inch iron spikes sticking up into the soft

cover, very effective in muddy terrain, where patrolling soldiers are barefoot or only in tennis shoes; crude traps that close over a man's calf); (2) the practice of setting up at ambush points a dense series of sharpened bamboo stakes pointed toward the trail or road, so that ambushed defense troops will impale themselves as they leap toward the source of the fire; (3) mines made of artillery shells with electronic detonators controlled by wire, so that civilian traffic or lightly loaded convoy vehicles can pass undisturbed, and the mine can be set off under, say, a truckload of soldiers. All but the last device can be produced cheaply and with local labor and materials.

COL. GALULA commented that most of these devices were used already by the Chinese Communists, as were underground caches with interconnecting tunnels (even, in Indochina, under paddy fields filled with water). COL. FERTIG recalled the use of tetanus-infected bamboo spikes against the Japanese, all the more effective because an incapacitated soldier represents a greater burden to his side than a dead one. CAPT. JEAPES cited a practice, developed in Arabia, of pushing forward a 3-ton truck with a well-protected driver and allowing it to be blown up (usually with no harm to the driver)—a tactic that lent itself to use against the ambush, though it was not so employed in Arabia.

Upon a question from MR. RUTKOWSKI, the group then went into a detailed discussion of various firearms, and specifically of the virtue and desirability of noisy as compared to silent weapons, for use in ambush and counterambush. There was agreement with COL. VALERIANO's view that, in general, silent weapons are more desirable from the guerrilla's, that is, from the ambushing party's, point of view, because they delay the reaction time, and that, for the same reason, the defender would prefer a noisy gun. But other factors obviously entered into the choice of weapons: the morale effect of a particular gun on a particular enemy; the preference of the soldier carrying and using it; its weight; its hitting power; the degree of training required for handling it; its chief intended use and effect (close combat, surprise, etc.); the terrain in which the soldier is operating; the general scenario. The experiences and opinions of the participants are briefly summarized as follows:

COL. SHIRLEY: Though it is easier to make a noisy gun, a silent one that also turns out to be a killer would have a highly demoralizing effect. In Malaya the most aggressive men in the patrol chose the Bren gun, the heaviest and not nearly the most practical. Research established no explanation for their preference. Yet it turned out that the Communists feared the Bren gun far more than the lighter

weapons that the British carried, possibly because they lost more of their men through it, but possibly also because of its vicious noise.... Silent weapons, by and large, have less hitting power than noisy ones, and in an ambush you might decide to sacrifice hitting power for the advantage of silence and the enemy's delayed reaction.... As to a weapon's stopping power, the scenario (that is, what is likely to happen to the man who doesn't go on running and fighting) as well as the soldier's make-up and conditioning will largely determine whether, when injured, he falls down incapacitated or goes on fighting. There are great differences in reaction from one nation, or one race, to another.... A larger number of hits will offset a relative lack of stopping power.... The shotgun, though not desirable for large military units, is a good weapon for small groups.... The optimum velocity and size of the round remain to be explored. The British thought the smaller, high-velocity weapons the most effective, but the soldiers' own opinions did not fully confirm this view.

COL. WHITE: The Belgian FN rifle, which is a noisy lethal weapon, was probably the one most feared by the guerrillas in Malaya in recent years.... An example of poor stopping power was the old 9-mm Owen (as distinct from the recently issued new Owen). The shotgun, on the other hand, was very desirable for a quick surprise operation at close range. Against the danger of a surprise attack in close country, it is enough to give a shotgun to the forward scout to protect himself and give the rest of the squad a chance to deploy themselves or get away.... As to the most desirable size of round, much research into the problem was done in Malaya in the last two years of the emergency, based on systematic examination of the dead for the effect of various types of rounds on them.

COL. FERTIG: The soldier's reaction to an enemy weapon is not necessarily a reflection of its practical usefulness. The Japanese, according to a report in the Philippines, placed the Tommy gun first on the list of feared weapons, the Browning automatic rifle second, and the carbine last. They were much frightened also by the 2.36 bazooka (used by the Americans in place of artillery and very easily detonated). They themselves used hand grenades very effectively; the American troops did not like to use them.... The American soldiers' preferred weapon (and COL. FERTIG's choice for the one-man patrol) was the shotgun, with the 30-inch barrel cut down to 22 inches (rather than the typical 18 inches of the sawed-off gun) for slightly better range. The perennial problem also was how to keep the ammunition dry in moist, tropical country (a problem mentioned by several speakers, along with various methods that had been tried to solve it, such as covering each round

with candle or sealing wax).... In answer to a question from MR. HOSMER as to the best way to equip a small patrol in the jungle or heavy brush: The lead man would probably want a Browning automatic rifle (and would prefer an Enfield to a carbine), and there should be at least one very noisy weapon (a Tommy gun) for the illusion of greater manpower that it produces.

COL. BOHANNAN: When seeking combat, you want a silent weapon, which puts the enemy at an initial disadvantage because of the slower reaction time; when on the defensive, you want the noisiest possible to scare the enemy away.... The World War II T-17 (impact-detonating) rifle grenade, with a better-than-average range of about 150 yards, proved very effective in the Philippines and might well be so in counter guerrilla warfare today. And the Philippine army developed a double-barreled, fully automatic carbine that fired about 1700 rounds per minute, with little accuracy but enormous noise effect.... As for the optimum small-arms round, there has been no appreciable advance made in the last sixty years. A desirable round would be something with characteristics at least equal to those of the carbine cartridge and no larger than the .32 short pistol cartridge, so that its small size and weight would permit its being easily carried; even the .223 round, suggested by CAPT. JEAPES, would still be too large.

CAPT. JEAPES, commenting on the relative punch of different weapons discussed by other speakers, mentioned several weapons (the 30-caliber carbine, the 9-mm Sten gun, and the Sterling) that had been found undesirable in the fight against the CT's, and also against the Mau Mau in Kenya, just because they lacked penetrating power. He challenged another speaker's statement, however, that a shotgun hit is a minor wound. In his experience, most men will at least go down from it, and, if the gun is fired at close range, they will be hurt badly.... The optimum weapon will vary, aside from more obvious factors, in accordance with the terrain (twigs in jungle can be a danger with easily triggered guns), with the length of the march on which it is to be carried, etc., and it is difficult to generalize.

COL. GALULA: For a one- or two-man patrol, the preferred weapon would be the submachine gun. But the excellent new German Setme, a gun manufactured in Spain—something like a submachine gun with the power of a rifle—could make the submachine gun obsolete.... The .22 rifle with a dum-dum bullet would perhaps be the best caliber in its category.... Power is relatively unimportant, as any live ammunition will usually do the job of putting out the man who is hit.

MR. RUTKOWSKI thought that shotgun technology, in particular, had advanced little since World War I and was an important area for improvement.

MR. GREENE, referring to the demoralizing effect of noise on those under attack, noted that bombs in World War II had been equipped with whistling devices to enhance the morale effect of aerial attacks, and he therefore speculated on the possibility of making guns and rifles even noisier than they need be.

MR. HOSMER next directed the discussion to the difficult and timely problem of the counterambush, and solicited comments on possible techniques for both heavy country and open areas.

COL. GALULA stated that, where you are in danger of being ambushed, it is well to avoid having cover too close, and that a 20- to 30-yard clearing on either side of the road is therefore desirable—a statement that was seconded by COL. VALERIANO and COL. WHITE but challenged by CAPT. JEAPES and COL. BOHANNAN. COL. VALERIANO, stressing the amount of work such clearing operations involved, and hence the need to be selective, reported having pinpointed in the Philippines mainly those areas where close cover greatly improved the ambushing opportunity (for example, a promontory with overhanging trees), and having set the civil officials to clearing them under the supervision of security officers. (In dangerous spots where clearing would have been too arduous, a few soldiers would dig ostentatiously when they were sure to be observed, so as to make the guerrillas believe they were mining the area.)

In Malaya, said COL. WHITE, civilian support was enlisted even more widely in that every plantation owner was made responsible for keeping his plantation cleared of the underbrush. CAPT. JEAPES argued that an enemy could hit you as well at 20 yards as at 2, and that the fact of your having an unobstructed area around you actually gave him an added advantage. COL. SHIRLEY pointed out that it would depend on tactics in a given situation whether it was more desirable, when ambushed, to jump into high grass and brush, even on the chance that guerrillas might be hiding in it, or whether you would want to be sure of having the enemy at least 20 yards off. Initial large-scale clearing attempts in his experience had demanded much organization of the civilian population; efforts to accomplish it with chemical vegetation killers had not come off.

COL. FERTIG described how Japanese plane crews, caught late in the war in a heavy hemp area (the best hiding imaginable), had set up effective guards and ambushes around the individual Japanese planes, until the guerrillas learned to counterambush them with one-man patrols (told to shoot at anything that moved) and eventually forced them out of the hemp area to positions where they could be attacked by bombing.

As regards immediate action in response to an ambush, COL. WHITE described

a fairly simple procedure, based on the patrol's or convoy crew's careful drill practice, by which each man knows in advance whether to go right or left, to high or low ground, and the main principle is to shoot back and then quickly get out in the direction away from the fire.

MR. HOSMER inquired into possible techniques that might yield warning of an ambush.

COL. SHIRLEY mentioned the hopes that the British in Malaya had placed in dogs (pointers) accompanying patrols, and the excellent pointers the troops were furnished. Yet in his experience, possibly because of inept handling, these dogs had not been effective. Much more useful had been human trackers from Borneo, the Dyaks, who developed a high degree of "woodcraft" and were alert to human smells, depressed grass blades, the smallest disturbance.

COL. FERTIG agreed. The Japanese, who introduced war dogs early in 1943, abandoned them after about five months, which suggests that they, too, did not find them useful in tracking down the guerrillas. But the hill people whom the Colonel's own forces relied on were uncanny in predicting ambushes; they claimed they could "smell" a Japanese, and the guerrillas never doubted their word. After the American landings in Mindanao, when the Japanese became the hunted, the ideal fighting force, and eventually standard unit, with which to spot and wipe out the isolated Japanese patrols was a 200-man company of American troops, to which was added a 60-man company of Filipinos who acted as guards and flanks and spotted the Japanese.

CAPT. JEAPES had a much higher opinion than the previous speakers of the potential value of dogs, provided they were properly used and their limitations recognized. In his experience, patrol dogs (mainly Alsations) had been very keen in spotting ambushes or CT camps (they would sit down and point in the exact direction of the enemy); and tracker dogs (mostly Labrador retrievers) had been used quite effectively in follow-up operations. He maintained further that keenness of smell was not the monopoly of the native. Englishmen, after living in the jungle for some time, learned to smell soap, cigar smoke, cooking rice, etc., at 50 to 60 yards.

COL. WHITE agreed. Soldiers in the Malayan jungle (not allowed to smoke or use brilliantine on their hair) seemed to develop the ability to smell the difference between an Australian, a Gurkha, and a New Zealander; yet the Australian bushmen were better still; and the Dyaks were best of all. As for dogs, the British in Malaya used three types (tracker dogs, ambush dogs, and guard dogs), but they had their limitations. Each dog was only as good as his handler; it was difficult to ration

them; they soon wore themselves out; and the dog's handler was good for nothing but the dog. Of the three, the guard dog was the least vulnerable. Tracker dogs were useful as members of the highly specialized "tracker team," which typically consisted of one lieutenant and ten bushmen, heavily armed, plus eight dogs (only one or two of which accompanied the team at any one time). When these expert trail followers were unable to find the enemy's track, the dogs often did.

COL. GALULA found that dogs served another valuable service in being often the first to be shot at, thus warning and sparing the men.

Several of the participants thought that dogs were also a psychological weapon in view of the unnerving effect they had on the men being chased or trailed by them. COL. BOHANNAN recalled that the Japanese in the Philippines picked up any untrained dogs and ran them into the jungle just to demoralize the guerrillas; COL. WHITE reported having paraded the British dogs before the villagers in Malaya on every occasion to impress people with their fierceness (and, incidentally, to keep the dogs in training—a most important part of keeping them useful).

Asked by MR. HOSMER whether, once the counter guerrilla had found a trail, he could overtake the enemy, COL. WHITE admitted that, in Malaya, the Chinese were faster than their pursuers, day or night, and were hardly, if ever, caught. COL. VALERIANO and CAPT. JEAPES felt that the crucial objective of pursuit was to keep the guerrilla moving, establish his general route and direction, and then anticipate him by cutting him off with blocking forces, interception units, or helicopters. Moreover, if you can keep the chase up for, say, twenty days, feeling so constantly pursued may create psychosis in his group. Thereafter, evidence of the guerrilla's demoralization, the sight of frightened, bedraggled men begging for food and information from the villagers along their route of withdrawal, will have a powerful impact on the population. As hard-pressed guerrillas lose their poise, they lose their personal prestige, especially in the Asian countries, where losing face is tantamount to defeat. For this very reason, there have been cases of proud guerrilla commanders who elected, against their better military judgment, to be annihilated by the counterinsurgents in a final battle. A guerrilla leader who shows fear of being captured or cornered is bound to infect not only his followers but also the supporting populace, and in the resulting chaos the insurgents' supply, escape, and intelligence-gathering systems will then be easy to infiltrate or otherwise disrupt to a point that precludes their restoration by the guerrilla side.

Generally speaking, COL. VALERIANO pointed out, communist guerrillas, no matter how dispersed, will eventually have to reassemble, and it is important,

therefore, to establish the likeliest assembly point and then try to infiltrate it—possibly in civilian (guerrilla) disguise—and sow confusion. (He told of finding an entire guerrilla unit, which seemingly had vanished into thin air, in the nearest village, pretending to be simple farmers.) COL. WHITE added his own experience that guerrillas tended eventually to return to the areas with which they were most familiar, usually their home districts.

COL. BOHANNAN concluded the discussion by pointing to one limiting factor in the doctrine of pursuit just described, that is, the need to make optimum use of the forces available. For it is easy to tie up too many troops chasing too few guerrillas, thereby neglecting areas that should be secured.

APRIL 17, 1962, P.M.\*

## TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES OF COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE (II)

*Border Control: Terrain, Manpower, and Cost as Limiting Factors; a Detailed Description of How Borders Were Sealed in Algeria ~ Containing the Enemy within a Known Area ~ Massive "Saturation" Tactics ~ Encirclement and Sweeping Operations: Planned or Improvised; Infiltrating the Guerrillas by Exploiting Their Lack of Intercommunication ~ Pseudogang Operations and Other Uses of Disguise ~ Emergency Alert Systems: The Effective Use of Radio in Algeria ~ Drying Up the Enemy's Supply of Arms and Equipment: Various Methods ~ Food Denial ~ Surface Logistics: A Typical Backpack for Deep-jungle Penetration; the Suitability of Present-day Vehicular Equipment for Guerrilla Terrain; Amphibious Carriers; the Inadequacy of River Vehicles; the Case for Planes and Helicopters in Support of Ground Troops; Aircraft for Reconnaissance ~ Air Logistics: The Pro and Con of Air Supply; Free-drop versus Parachute; Compensating for Loss of Surprise; the Morale Effects of an Airlift Capability on the Troops of Both Sides*

MR. HOSMER suggested placing the emphasis in the afternoon's discussion on other tactics and techniques of counter guerrilla operations such as baiting the enemy, encirclement and sweeping operations, area and route denial, and border control — starting with this last problem.

In COL. FERTIG's view, you must define the area of concern when talking about border control. Sealing a border to the extent that COL. GALULA had reported its being done in Algeria (where eventually only an inconsequentially small number could penetrate it) may be possible in open terrain, but would not necessarily be feasible in certain mountain and jungle areas. In regions where there is only one trail into the country (for example, the Red River route from South China into Northern Indochina), it may or may not be practicable. Thinking always of men on

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\*Present: Col. Bohannon, Col. Brundage, Mr. Ellis, Col. Fertig, Col. Galula, Mr. Greene, Mr. Hosmer, Capt. Jeapes, Mr. Rutkowski, Col. Shirley, Mr. Tanham, Col. Valeriano, Col. White.

foot—not of highway or rail traffic—it is virtually impossible, in a great many cases, to seal a border completely.

In Malaya, according to COL. SHIRLEY, no serious attempt was ever made to seal the border between Malaya and Thailand, although the British did try, by certain political pressures on the Thai, to prevent Malayan Communists from training in safety in Thailand and moving south across the border with comparative ease. As one looks almost hopelessly at the tremendous border of Vietnam, only the sharpening of orthodox methods—concentrating on the most likely roads and tracks, etc.—suggests itself. Modern devices, such as radar, for detecting movement, though probably usable in some areas, do not promise to solve that particular border problem.

COL. BOHANNAN pointed out (and COL. SHIRLEY agreed readily) that one must carefully select from the entire bag of orthodox tricks those that lend themselves to a given situation. Thus, the ideal method—clearing an area 200 to 1000 yards wide along the border, then stringing wire along its full length and controlling it from the air—would be prohibitively expensive in view of likely results, whereas deep patrolling for, say, five miles inside the border might be more promising. However, COL. WHITE's experience of spending six weeks on the Thai border, knowing that a large camp of Chinese terrorists, with constant courier-crossing activity, was within four hours' march, had proved to him the relative futility of that kind of patrolling in mountainous areas where, furthermore, people on either side of the border could easily intermingle without being identified. Under the circumstances, using reconnaissance aircraft combined with active patrolling to keep the enemy from building roads and bringing in convoys and large bands had a certain nuisance value, and at least slowed down his progress toward large operations, though these methods could never stop the experienced guerrilla.

In answer to a question from MR. HOSMER as to the possibility of picking up the guerrillas once small bands have crossed the border and re-formed themselves into larger units, and harassing them on their way to targets and settled areas, COL. WHITE thought this would require luck, vast numbers of troops, and a less difficult terrain than either the Malayan-Thai or the Vietnamese border. As to whether it is worth the effort even to try to maintain border control under such difficult conditions, COL. WHITE indicated that it would depend on the individual commander's view of the need for harassment and on the size of his reserve—and most commanders are unlikely to have enough troops to spare.

COL. BRUNDAGE opened the question of water boundaries, which several speakers agreed were far easier to control. COL. SHIRLEY emphasized the greater

usefulness there of modern technical detection aids, even on so long a coastline as that of Vietnam, provided you have the means to follow up on detection. He compared today's advanced technology to the lack of technical gadgetry in Malaya, where the British, flying low over the jungle known to be hiding Communists, could not see them (he was frankly skeptical of COL. WHITE's contention that some of the pilots could).

COL. SHIRLEY, as an electronics specialist, had conceived the idea that an airplane with its radar tuned to the metal barreling of the rifles that soldiers moving in file through the jungle were bound to be carrying would be able to spot such hidden forces in a terrain that normally contained not a particle of metal. He sent the suggestion to the War Office for thorough scientific exploration, and also tried it himself experimentally. Both attempts failed. The War Office reply called the idea unworkable; and COL. SHIRLEY, in a day's flight over the jungle, was unable to penetrate the canopy at any time, and even failed to pick up on his radar screen a Sunderland four-engine flying boat at anchor directly below the reconnaissance plane. He thought, however, that this negative showing was almost entirely a reflection of the poor maintenance of equipment typical of operations in Southeast Asia. With today's American equipment, a much better job could be done in this difficult environment, though it still would appear impossible to seal off an entire border in such a way.

MR. HOSMER asked COL. VALERIANO about the methods he had used to prevent Huk bands, once they were identified in a given area, from extending their activities beyond it. The answer: aggressive patrolling around the area by local police or any troops that can be spared, and gaining the co-operation of the people in spotting the Huks (a kind of help that is obtained only through the systematic screening of villages and routine interrogation of all individuals to identify those who have no business in a given place). COL. BOHANNAN added, however, that it had proved virtually impossible in the Philippines to contain any band of trained guerrillas who wanted to leave an area. It was better, therefore, to keep patrols moving all the time, leaving the guerrillas uncertain where they might meet such a patrol, and to hope for a chance encounter between them.

The fact that the guerrillas are usually fragmented into small groups was recognized as a major problem for counterinsurgency. COL. SHIRLEY once proposed a massive operation in Malaya, in which an entire brigade was to saturate a terrorist-infested area. However, this idea was turned down because it had been tried earlier with almost no success. While there might be psychological advantage in not dismissing this tactic and thus keeping the guerrilla fearful that his area might be

"saturated" by the other side at any time, such an operation can never be expected to yield a great many kills, given the guerrillas' faculty for just fading away.

In the Philippines, according to COL. BOHANNAN, saturation operations in themselves picked up people only by accident, but an ancillary device was to leave stay-behind groups (preferably near trails and springs) when the forces were ostensibly pulled out, so that the Huks, after they felt safe enough to come out of hiding, could be picked up by them. COL. VALERIANO described one such successful operation. In a Huk area believed to be safe for the guerrillas (in swamp terrain that made pursuit difficult), and hence a regular rallying and supply center for them, seven rifle companies, including commandos with civilian clothes and radio sets in their packs, marched in; a few days later, having left the commandos behind, the troops marched out in full view of the inhabitants, and as soon as the Huks emerged, the commandos gave them lively action. Wherever this principle was applied (it was done in mountain areas, too), good signal communications to synchronize movements were of the essence. Thus, part of the stay-behind party could fraternize with the Huks, pretending to belong to another Huk unit, and notify other parts of the group where to block or intercept the enemy.

At MR. HOSMER's suggestion, COL. GALULA then gave a detailed exposé on the very successful methods for border control in Algeria that he had briefly alluded to earlier. Figure 2 is an illustration of the typical complex of fence barriers—COL. GALULA called it a "barrage"—on the Algerian-Tunisian and Algerian-Moroccan borders.

At the very beginning the French made the mistake of building the barrage directly against the border, where it could too easily be attacked from Moroccan or Tunisian soil. Thereafter, they allowed a considerable margin between the actual border and the first of the several parallel barricades—a simple wire barrier, about 1 to 1½ meters high, to keep the livestock and wild animals out of the mined and electrified area inside the barrage. About five meters behind this first fence came an entanglement of barbed wire, which occupied a width of about ten meters and was mined. Next was a three-meter-high electrified (5000 volt) fence capable of killing as well as sending the alarm when touched. Immediately parallel to it ran a road to permit access to the fence for maintenance and repair. Behind the road was another mined wire entanglement, and next to that an unmined wire fence to keep unauthorized people from the danger area. Finally, a well-paved road on the inner perimeter was patrolled at night by vehicles that were spaced at frequent, regular intervals and used large searchlights. During the day, the barrage was patrolled from the air. A series of gates in the barbed wire and fences permitted




FIG. 2—Typical Complex of Fence Barriers on Moroccan-Algerian Border

access to the outer perimeter for occasional patrols and defensive action. For the alarm system, the entire barrage area had been so compartmentalized that the precise spot of any disturbance was immediately known wherever the alarm registered, and mobile reserves could therefore reach it in minimum time. The power for the electric fence came from stations spaced from ten to twenty miles apart, and alarms at the power stations indicated if and where the fence had been cut or grounded. False alarms, set off by animals, were an occasional problem.

Although the initial impact of the barrage was tremendous, the FLN gradually found ways of crossing it. A couple of scouts would cut through the minefield, then straddle the electric fence with a tall wooden stepladder, and signal to other troops to follow them across it. In this manner, however, it would take them four hours to traverse an area that might normally take a mere fraction of that time. In trying to delay still further, if not entirely to stop them, the French found radar

very helpful, although they had a problem in interpreting signals. To illustrate the over-all effectiveness of the barrier, in one instance, an entire company attempted to cross, but only one man succeeded, while 51 withdrew, and the rest were caught; in another case, out of 1000 who tried, 6 of the 110 who crossed the first barrier survived and escaped, and the others died or were captured.

The system was costly in money and labor. Erecting the fence (a total of about 2500 kilometers, from the coast down along the two borders well into the desert) consumed about one-sixth of total military expenses for an entire year; also, rain and other factors required constant repairs on the electric fence, and waterproofing the mine detonators continued to be a problem. But the expenditures were well worth while in view of the troops saved. Moreover, the system, though easiest to construct in flat, open country, is workable in any terrain. In Algeria, for example, it extended the full length of the enormous Moroccan border, including some very difficult terrain in the north, where there were typically two or even three barrage lines. From early 1958 on the FLN was unable to bring supplies across that border. All of their crossing attempts were unsuccessful, or in such small numbers as to make no significant difference. Among other difficulties, they ran out of men trained to perform the unpleasant job of clearing the minefields. Also, the dropping of flares at night to illuminate the barrage added to the discomfort of the guerrillas. And once the French soldiers manning the patrols along the Moroccan border received large searchlights with a range of 2 kilometers, these completely discouraged attacks. Fortunately for the French, the FLN never resorted to the much-feared diversionary tactic of mounting several attacks, with a number of crossings, at one time.

MR. GREENE speculated on the possibility of getting electricity out of such an electric fence system for use in the hinterland—for civilian homes, radio, perimeter lighting, etc.—an incidental benefit by which to charge off some of the heavy investment.

MR. HOSMER turned to the topic of encirclement and sweeping operations, and COL. GALULA began the discussion by distinguishing between (a) encirclement operations that you prepare in advance, and (b) those that are improvised. The former require a great deal of personnel (they lose the benefit of surprise and hence must be made large enough to be sure of catching some of the enemy); the latter benefit by helicopter transport. For the prepared encirclement, which must be accomplished within a single day, he advocated the kind of cylinder-and-piston operation he had described earlier, during which the perimeter troops must dig themselves in, assuming an essentially defensive position.

COL. SHIRLEY amplified the last statement by a reference to Malaya, where air bombings were sometimes used, in the absence of the cylinder around the piston, in order to stop the gaps through which the enemy might escape—a method he regarded as not very satisfactory. Upon COL. GALULA's statement that aircraft (even planes used only for troop transport) will inevitably slow down the guerrilla, COL. SHIRLEY thought this was true only in the daytime and, furthermore, depended much on the terrain. Useful wherever enemy forces were in the open and in large groups, aircraft had been quite ineffectual, for example, in Malaya, because of the dense ground cover.

CAPT. JEAPES, in his encirclement operations against the Chinese terrorists, had found ways of turning the guerrilla's faculty for quick dispersal to the advantage of his own side. He would place small-party ambushes in a large circle around the target and then send three or four larger units into the area. In an effort to get away from these units and out of the area, the CT's would scatter and run into the ambushes. Very similar tactics, it appeared, had been used in Algeria and also in Malaya. Furthermore, as COL. GALULA pointed out, any operation that results in the random scattering of the guerrillas affords an opportunity for infiltrating them, for they have no system of intercommunication and are at a loss to tell the difference between an unknown guerrilla unit that is genuine and one that is a plant.

In the Philippines COL. VALERIANO had had considerable success with infiltration based on this particular ruse. He trained and conditioned a volunteer force of 4 officers and 76 men (Force "X") in a special camp, to the point where they resembled a typical Huk squad in the minutest detail. To add realism, two wounded enlisted men volunteered to join Force X. Then, equipped with weapons originally captured from the Huks, Force X staged a sham battle against COL. VALERIANO's forces, in order to appear as having been driven from its own area into that of the Huks whom they were trying to infiltrate. Their cover story was bought, and for four days they fraternized with the local Huks (even came close to obtaining an interview with the Huk supreme commander), and learned their entire *modus operandi*, the identity of their leaders, their supply sources, and the civilian government officials who were secretly collaborating with them.

On the fifth day, the fact that the men had more ammunition than did the ordinary Huk guerrilla—the one flaw in the preparations—seemed to have aroused the local commander's suspicions. Force X thereupon decided to strike, and, within half an hour, had deactivated two Huk squadrons, its guerrilla members either killed or seriously wounded. Immediately afterward, two uniformed companies

moved in and screened the local inhabitants for two weeks. The impact of this operation was such that, whenever thereafter two Huk squads met, they did not trust each other. However, similar experiments by other commanders were less successful because planning and preparation had not been detailed and thorough enough.

Nothing on so elaborate a scale was ever tried in Malaya, said COL. WHITE; but CAPT. JEAPES had successfully dressed up his only Chinese corporal in CT clothes and sent him out among the terrorists, who were taken in by him; and in Kenya the British commander COL. KITSON\* had been most successful in disguising some of his men as Africans to sow confusion among the Mau Mau who did not know each other.

COL. VALERIANO recalled another use of disguise, in which he staged sham battles in front of local villagers between uniformed forces and some of his men dressed in Huk clothes. After tying them up and manhandling them a little, the soldiers would turn the pseudo-Huks over to the police for safekeeping (that is, ostensibly, to prevent them from rejoining the enemy). When they finally came out of prison, the men had a great deal of information and sometimes told stories of entire villages collaborating with the Huks.

A related device, not involving disguise, was to kidnap peaceful farmers and hold them for a while, waiting to see whether their absence would be reported. When, after five days or so, the chief of police or the mayor still had not reported these disappearances to the army authorities, it was a safe guess that these local officials were on the side of the guerrillas.

On the subject of an effective alert system, COL. GALULA described the one in use in Algeria, where the French maintained a single VHF channel for emergencies, with a monitoring receiver, and every large post, regiment, battalion, and even military planes would be on that emergency channel. With a ready reserve unit at division level, reinforcements could be brought to any trouble spot by helicopter within half an hour, and support planes could take off at one minute's notice. In answer to a question from MR. RUTKOWSKI, COL. GALULA said that security for the channel was never a problem; the FLN did not succeed in swamping the French with emergency calls, for they failed to capture the necessary number of transmitters and lacked the batteries and spare tubes with which to maintain those they did get.

Turning to the subject of the control of arms and other equipment, MR. HOMER asked what techniques the participants had employed or encountered for

\*COL. KITSON attended the sessions of the Symposium on Friday, April 20, 1962.

limiting the supply of arms to the guerrilla side (aside from border control and other methods already discussed).

COL. VALERIANO described the system used successfully in the Philippines: an attractive price scale for arms voluntarily surrendered, which brought in a flood of weapons of all sorts; strict control over firearms issued to licensed holders; and severe penalties (up to ten years' imprisonment) for people using arms without license. Many weapons, nevertheless, remained in the hands of subversives, who in the beginning were able to buy needed ammunition from the citizens. In the last three years of the Huk campaign, however, they lacked ammunition in sufficient quantity.

As an example of the price scale, COL. BOHANNAN mentioned 70 to 100 pesos (or U.S. \$30 to \$50) for a rifle (up to 200 pesos if it was in very good condition). Personally, he was against the program, for he would have preferred arming the citizenry. Also, a great many unserviceable arms had to be paid for with money that could more profitably have gone into replacements and spare parts, of which there was a shortage. He thought more highly of the usefulness of ammunition control. This was achieved in part by improving the discipline of one's own troops so as to cut down on sales of ammunition by the men. One very successful trick was to let the soldiers sell ammunition that, when fired, killed the man shooting. When that happened, the entire enemy company, not knowing whether the mishap was due to gun or ammunition, would get "gun-shy" and spend valuable time taking apart the gun as well as the ammunition. If they suspected the latter, they might angrily go in search of the man who had sold it to them, and get caught that way.

COL. WHITE described the system in Malaya, similar to that in the Philippines, whereby the British paid the equivalent of U.S. \$330 for a Bren gun and about 35 cents for individual rounds of ammunition, and exercised tight control over weapon-holders. At first, the Chinese terrorists were able to take the weapons issued to the civilians whom the British were training to defend the villages; later, the people held on to them. Soldiers, on the other hand, never gave up their weapons, knowing they would be court-martialed if they did. Even single rounds, CAPT. JEAPES pointed out, had to be accounted for; if they were accidentally dropped, the fine might be up to a month's pay. In the case of a lost magazine, it would be much higher, and a report would go to general headquarters. The village home guard also had relatively few losses, knowing that, if they lost a gun, they would be told to go on patrol without a weapon. Also, they were deliberately equipped with shotguns in the (mistaken) assumption that, if lost, it was the least valuable weapon. COL. BOHANNAN commented that so rigid a system of controls

would be difficult to impose on an independent army such as the Philippine forces.

In answer to a question from MR. RUTKOWSKI as to how easy it would be to introduce certain devices into the bandit forces by way of arms and ammunition, COL. WHITE thought this would not be difficult; and COL. FERTIG related his own experience in the Philippines, where the native counter guerrillas in the service of the Japanese received virtually no ammunition from the Japanese and would eagerly pick up anything they found lying around, providing the guerrilla with a good opportunity for introducing devices that would incapacitate the user.

CAPT. JEAPES and COL. BOHANNAN thought it more important to deprive the enemy of food than of weapons, as the guerrilla can survive without a gun but not without food. (COL. FERTIG qualified this last statement: The guerrilla must have arms at least at the outset, or else, as in the Philippines, receive them soon thereafter through outside assistance, if there is to be a movement at all.) It was generally granted that in certain countries, including Vietnam, it would be impossible to cut off the enemy's food supply (COL. BRUNDAGE thought that it would be feasible in certain sections of Vietnam), and that, in general, a guerrilla who is completely cut off from the outside can survive for a considerable time, though with obvious hardships. The FLN, COL. GALULA reported, received no weapon shipments from outside Algeria after 1958 and at the end of the war was down to about 6500 weapons. But even if you succeed in drying up the guerrilla's stock of firearms, said CAPT. JEAPES, you have not necessarily incapacitated him; he may resort to knives and still more primitive weapons before he surrenders.

On the subject of surface logistics, MR. HOSMER asked CAPT. JEAPES whether weight had been a major factor in long-range, deep-penetration operations.

CAPT. JEAPES: The men in the SAS trained for it very hard and still do. The most they ever carried in was a 90-pound knapsack, containing two weeks' rations. They did not expect to fight with that. Rather, they would dump it in the area of operations and from it pack only a very light load (containing little more than three days' rations and a hammock) with which to do the actual fighting. Much time and thought went into working out the lightest rations. Rice was the main staple, as it was with the CT's, but the British also needed tea. Even heavy Western eaters learned to subsist on very little if they had to carry it. A typical diet would be a breakfast of nothing but tea; a mid-day snack of tea, cheese, and biscuits; and an evening meal of curried meat, rice, tea, biscuits, and perhaps a piece of chocolate.

American hammocks, and even the British net hammocks, were found too heavy, and the men preferred to make their own from parachute silk, just as they improvised a substitute for the heavy British poncho. They carried only one spare

set of dry clothes, into which they changed each night. Not expecting big engagements, they brought with them three magazines (sixty rounds) of ammunition. There would also be two wireless sets that worked on continuous wave. Battery-operated, similar to the 109 set, with a range of 250 miles that was good for most purposes, these could be carried by one man. Where greater range was needed, a larger and heavier continuous wave set with a hand generator was taken in—unpopular with the men, however, because of the strain of carrying and cranking.

Apropos of the hammocks mentioned, COL. WHITE added his own view that, except in the deep jungle to which CAPT. JEAPES was referring, where there was no danger of enemy attack during hours of darkness, hammocks were treacherously difficult to get out of in a sudden attack (especially the American jungle hammock that needed only to be tipped over to make the occupant defenseless), and he had therefore never permitted them to be used in Malaya.

Regarding land vehicles and their characteristics, MR. HOSMER asked whether present-day operational requirements could be met from available equipment, properly modified.

Generally speaking, COL. WHITE (supported by CAPT. JEAPES) thought it best to make do with existing, conventional vehicles and to avoid becoming overspecialized and overorganized. COL. FERTIG singled out the recently developed "tote goat" as particularly useful in difficult mountain terrain. This vehicle, which is commonly and most successfully being used nowadays by hunters in the high country of Colorado, resembles a small scooter with two wide wheels and 4-inch tires, and is able to do 7 to 8 miles per hour in low gear at about 23 miles to the gallon. It is cheap in maintenance costs and capable of climbing slopes, carrying both a man and his equipment, where even a pack horse would not do.

COL. GALULA spoke of the need for amphibious carriers in some countries (especially Indochina), causing CAPT. JEAPES to wonder why the Americans could not take care of that need with helicopters, which thus far were being used mainly for transport. Helicopters, COL. WHITE added, would have none of the gas and maintenance problems of land vehicles.

COL. FERTIG mentioned the "Hover" craft (SRI) as able to move across a man's path very rapidly to trap him. And COL. VALERIANO had found the "weasels," which moved crisscross fashion, particularly good in swampy and generally watery areas (they later were used to push roadbeds forward); native-made sleds, too, could pull heavy loads cross-country and had the advantage of requiring no personnel training or maintenance. In COL. BRUNDAGE's view, there were enough vehicles available today for use in those countries with open terrain or road networks,

but he felt the need remained for good land vehicles with cross-country capability.

As for river vehicles, the consensus was that no craft was universally usable, and that shallow water and weeds around propellers continued to pose the major problems.

MR. HOSMER then went into the subject of air and air-ground tactics and techniques, with a question about the efficacy of aircraft in counterinsurgency for other than transport use.

COL. GALULA regarded planes as invaluable for the fast support of ground troops, provided you have a good alert system and have trained people on the ground to co-operate with the plane crews. The French in Algeria attached planes (T-6's and T-28's, Sky Raiders, and the Mistral—an obsolete but good jet fighter similar to the Vampire) to companies, sometimes even to platoons; drill and training, with well-organized channels between the people needing and those controlling the planes, yielded excellent results. The French also used Piper Cubs over roads to protect convoys, and helicopters with the SS-11 guided missile against targets that were difficult to reach otherwise.

CAPT. JEAPES agreed as to the principle of air support for ground troops. A small patrol, for example, can dig around and find targets, such as caves, that can be discovered only by the foot soldiers, and then call in a jet armed with rockets. But he preferred a system by which support planes were pooled and assigned as needed rather than permanently attached to a battalion or company.

COL. BOHANNAN outlined an arrangement that he had found most efficient and adequate; it involved permanent assignment to a battalion of five aircraft (L-5's and L-19's), five pilots, five maintenance men, etc. These planes, COL. VALERIANO explained, were not fighters but work horses, which checked on patrols, picked up messages from the ground, and dropped supplies—enough, in one instance, to maintain two battalions in the mountains for seven weeks.

COL. GALULA granted the advantages of the system just described so long as aircraft was plentiful, but he wondered how it would operate where a limited number of available planes called for decisions on priorities. During World War II in the Philippines, COL. FERTIG reported, the Marine Aviation Corps had been called in for fighter support and had been guided to the targets by L-5's; though quite outside the rules, this arrangement had worked out well.

The participants were agreed on the effectiveness of aircraft in counterinsurgency. Planes will slow down the guerrilla even after he gets used to them, said COL. GALULA, and the Sky Raider will do it most effectively; COL. FERTIG believed the psychological impact of airplanes on the guerrilla to be tremendous,

as was shown, for example, in a case where troops that were safely dug in by the sea irrationally came out of their dugouts when enemy planes flew over them; and in COL. BOHANNAN's experience, the Japanese were particularly frightened of the L-5, which, though not a fighter, often heralded artillery shelling.

COL. WHITE described the tactical use of aircraft in Malaya, where light planes of the L-19 type had been very effective in a number of functions: for emergency supply drops to small patrols; for the firing of artillery; for reconnaissance; and for set operations against a known enemy camp. In COL. WHITE's experience (which was confirmed by CAPT. JEAPES), a trained pilot acquired the faculty of seeing what was in the jungle, especially on early morning reconnaissance flights, and could thus become a valuable source of information. As to the ideal level of control, it should be no lower than the brigade to ensure maximum use of the plane.\* With respect to aircraft used as fighter support, COL. WHITE saw little difference between conventional and guerrilla warfare, with the problem of troop and target identification still a very difficult one. He described an experiment by which British troops in tropical areas had been successful in devising a code of differently colored balloons to identify their own positions and strength.

In answer to a question from MR. HOSMER about the desirability of having one pilot patrol and become thoroughly familiar with a single area, COL. WHITE preferred a more flexible system by which a group of pilots would be assigned to taking turns in a number of patrol areas, so that within three to six months each man would be fully acquainted with all of them and able to handle any part of the larger territory.

COL. GALULA commented briefly on the possibilities—largely unexplored so far—for using airplanes in gas warfare. The French originally developed a gadget that could spread tear gas over a sizable area but forced the planes themselves to fly too high. They discarded it in favor of helicopters, but these have not as yet been used in the field. For obvious psychological reasons, gas spread by air was never used for riot control in the cities. Moreover, its effects are so short-lived that it can be successfully used only where very quick follow-up action is possible.

Returning to the role of aircraft in reconnaissance, MR. RUTKOWSKI wondered whether planes had any effective function during the night, admittedly the best time for patrol and reconnaissance in counterinsurgency. COL. FERTIG reported some surprising results in spotting the upturned faces of people on the ground

\*A seeming difference of opinion as to whether the planes ought to be controlled at brigade or at battalion level was partly explained by the slight difference between the American and the British conception of the brigade. In the typical American setup, the brigade is largely a co-ordinating unit; for the British, who are usually more hard-pressed for forces, planes, and equipment, it has to perform a more active part.

when you flew over them at night, especially as it is instinctive for men to look up at a passing plane. COL. VALERIANO had found the L-5's very useful at night, at the height of the Huk campaign, when the Communists were strong enough to attack towns in Central Luzon and the counter guerrillas lacked reliable communications between their bases and the towns. He had kept an L-5 in the air at all times, and as soon as it spotted a fire (the Huks were using arson), planes would go to work on the area, dropping flares and discouraging the movement of Huk forces. COL. GALULA described the successful protection of the border barrages by planes flying constantly back and forth and dropping flares to keep the guerrilla from moving. (He did not think, in answer to a question from CAPT. JEAPES, that the use of flares had affected the night vision of his own troops.)

MR. HOSMER now raised the subject of air logistics, inquiring especially into the merits of helicopters, and the needed characteristics (silence, etc.) of transport aircraft.

It was agreed that surprise was very difficult to preserve in air operations. COL. GALULA suggested that, having inevitably given away the fact that troops or supplies are on their way, you could try, by mock landings or erratic flight patterns, to confuse the enemy as to their actual destination. Better still, if you can afford the planes, thought COL. BOHANNAN, is to keep aircraft in the air so much of the time that the guerrilla side becomes saturated with more reports than it can possibly sift out. CAPT. JEAPES, on the other hand, stressed the desirability of maintaining secrecy whenever possible; supplies to cut-off troops, in particular, should be carried in by men on foot rather than dropped. In the jungle operations of the SAS, the troops always started out with two weeks' rations, heavy though these were to carry, just to avoid having to be air-supplied and thus run the danger of revealing their position.

COL. WHITE admitted that the man-pack was desirable for small operations, but regarded helicopters or planes as the only alternative for supplies or man drops in large-scale operations. COL. BOHANNAN was inclined to make an even stronger case for the logistic uses of aircraft. He felt that the potential of air drops, which are economical in manpower and money, had not been fully enough exploited; by the relatively simple device of keeping a few planes, perhaps no more than two, continually buzzing back and forth over an area, you could camouflage your movements well enough to use air drops extensively without endangering your security. COL. WHITE concurred; he quarreled with the theory, taught by the special warfare schools, that air support is a bonus, and advocated air supply as a routine means of support wherever other vehicles are unusable.

As for the free-drop versus the parachute technique, CAPT. JEAPES favored the latter, having found the free-drop not sufficiently accurate as well as a hazard to the ground troops. COL. VALERIANO disagreed, recalling that he had once laid out an entire air strip in the middle of a mountain range using free-drop supplies in connection with helicopters; once the troops had been moved out of the way, he had found the free-drop method safe and accurate ("we could free-drop fresh eggs").

There was general agreement on the psychological value of air support in its effect on both the enemy and the counter guerrillas. COL. VALERIANO cited the case of an important Huk personage who allowed himself to be captured in the mountains. He had been demoralized, and led to believe that his cause was lost, by the sight of supplies being dropped to the government forces while he and his men were starving. He was released on condition that he go back and persuade his followers to surrender, as indeed they did. COL. WHITE stressed the importance for the morale of your own troops of letting the men know that, when they are sick or wounded, a helicopter will fetch them.

COL. WHITE ended the afternoon's discussion with the more general observation that all the methods and techniques mentioned by the participants in the preceding two days hinged on finding the right leaders and placing them in positions where they could do the most good. This applies, he said, not only to the leadership of your own military forces, but also to the police, the intelligentsia, and the administration of the country in which you are operating. It took the first three months of his assignment to Malaya, and a series of initial failures, for him to recognize this principle and to begin to operate on it with success.

APRIL 18, 1962, A.M.\*

## PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES OF POLITICAL ACTION

*Gearing the Aim of the Counterinsurgent to the Objective of the Insurgent ~ Co-ordinating Political and Psychological Ends ~ A Step-by-step Prescription for Wresting Political Control from the Insurgent: Screening the Population; Identifying Potential Supporters; Selecting Cadres; Organizing an Indigenous Political Leadership; Supporting Each Step by "Strategic" and "Tactical" Propaganda ~ Three Requisites for Success: A Firm Ideological Base, Resolute Counterinsurgent Leadership, and Expert Knowledge of Revolutionary Warfare ~ Subordinating Military to Civilian Authority Wherever Possible: How This Policy Succeeded in Malaya and the Philippines, and Why ~ Children as a Source of Intelligence: Ethical Barriers to Their Exploitation; the Incidental Rewards of Kindness ~ Recognizing the Turn of the Tide: The Psychological Moment To Convince the Enemy That He Is Losing ~ Progressing from the Easy to the More Difficult Victory: The Case for Small Test Areas of Demonstrably Successful Operations ~ The Weight of Economic, Political, and Ethnic Factors in Counterinsurgent Planning ~ Retaining or Seizing the Initiative in Selecting Areas for Military and Political Effort: "A Bad Plan Is Better Than No Plan"*

MR. HOSMER announced the topic for the day's discussion ("principles and techniques of political operation, psychological warfare, and civic action") and invited the participants' comments on the first point on the agenda, "fundamental principles to be followed in political action."

GEN. LANSDALE felt that this question had to be approached from the viewpoint of counterinsurgency as it related to insurgency. The basic situation being one in which the guerrilla side is essentially out to capture the population, and territory is captured in the process, the chief operating principle of the counterinsurgents must be to formulate aims and devise methods that will win the people to their side. Our side is conspicuously weak in the definition of this objective and

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\*Present: Col. Bohannon, Mr. Ellis, Col. Fertig, Col. Galula, Mr. Greene, Mr. Hosmer, Gen. Lansdale, Mr. Rutkowski, Mr. Tanham, Col. Valeriano, Col. White.

in the productive co-ordination of political and psychological ends. Western political leaders are inclined to deal in concepts that seem imprecise to those on the local foreign scene, and the stress at other echelons is often too much on mechanics and technical application. Thus, diplomats tend to think in terms of negotiating a *modus vivendi* (that is to say, in terms of compromise); the people below them, in terms of political structure; the psychologists, only in terms of the communications media. In Vientiane, for example, GEN. LANSDALE had once met with several representatives of various nationalities who were actively at work on the psychological aspects of the Laotian situation and had started a newspaper and a radio station. Yet when asked by him *why* they were doing this work, not one had a realistic answer. Whenever we have faced a communist enemy, his side—thanks to the concerted effort of a handful of experienced people—has had a precisely stated objective, a timetable, and patience. The answer to our problem, GEN. LANSDALE suggested, may be for each one who has a function in the total picture to inject the necessary wisdom and purpose within his own small area of jurisdiction and activity.

COL. GALULA's experience completely confirmed GEN. LANSDALE's remarks. On being sent to Algeria in 1956, he and his fellow commanders were told simply to "pacify," on the assumption that one could win the population to one's side just by being kind. The mistakes that were made in those early days, in spite of dedication and ample manpower, were due partly to ignorance of the principles and methods demanded by modern guerrilla warfare.

COL. GALULA then outlined at some length his own theories, principles, and procedures—proved by his experience in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria—which he regarded as generally relevant and applicable to all guerrilla warfare situations.

Communist techniques, he believes, derive from the realization that in any situation, whatever the cause, a small minority is actively *for* the cause, another small minority is actively *against* it, and the large majority is *undecided* and uncommitted. By that same "golden rule" the counterinsurgent side, in turn, must make it its first task to identify those who are already for it and then persuade them to work on the passive majority with a view to winning it over. Obviously, the better your cause, and the larger the share of the population that is actively on your side, the easier it will be to neutralize or eliminate the opposition. The initial situation determines the methods by which to identify the sympathetic minority. If the insurgents have established control, people are not likely to come forward immediately and reveal themselves, and it will require pressure and force before they do.

The next step is to choose among those who are *for* you those who are *good*. This screening can be accomplished by setting potential leaders tasks of increasing difficulty. In the selection of cadres it is well, once again, to look at the very efficient methods of the Communists and their imitators. In Algeria, for example, the rebels found an issue, managed to attract a small corps, and used this to influence and win a larger corps. They then divided Algeria into six areas, each organized and controlled by its own boss, in whom was vested the all-important function of collecting money, and who, in turn, subdivided his area down to the village level, choosing his cadres upon careful observation of who contributed and who did not. Once such cadres have been formed, they furnish the initial guerrilla forces, and the rest follows.

An example of the communist principle that organized cadres must pave the way for military action was furnished in China in 1949, when the Chinese Communists, on reaching the Yangtze River, stopped for five or six months, ostensibly to "negotiate" with the National government, but actually to organize and train the political cadres that they still lacked in the south before moving in their troops to take control there. Then, having deluded the Nationalist side to the point where it actually sent teams of negotiators, they suddenly crossed the river and did not stop again until they reached the border.

The case of China also illustrates the Communists' method, once they are militarily in control of an area, of creating an "issue" that will permit them to rally followers who can then aid in the political conquest of the population. "Land reform," by which every Chinese farmer was to receive a piece of land of his own, was just such an issue. An obviously attractive goal, it was attainable only by confiscating the property of "rich landowners," who initially were arbitrarily defined as people with more than one acre of land. For certain villages, however, which turned out to be already so divided up that no farmer qualified by that definition, the Communists simply changed the criterion of wealth to half an acre (in some cases even less), in order to preserve the issue that would separate the supporters from the hostile and indifferent.

On the counterinsurgent side, too, all military and psychological action must be geared to finding cadres. Whereas orthodox warfare requires only two men on the army staff—a chief of operational planning and a chief of logistics—in revolutionary warfare you need a third, namely, the man who can say, at the time an operational idea is first conceived and before the operation is planned, "this operation is useless in terms of your objective of winning the population; but that one, which seems militarily stupid, is excellent from the political point of view."

Ideally, this third function, being essentially political, should not be the job of the military; but of necessity it must be, because only the army has the needed reservoir of manpower. It should be integrated with the army's established responsibilities throughout the counterinsurgent effort of conquest and control in a well-defined "SOP." Thus, the six successive steps in the full application of a counter guerrilla doctrine are

1. Expelling the enemy's armed forces from a chosen area.
2. Assigning small selected units to work with the population.
3. Eliminating those elements that actively support the enemy.
4. Finding a group of potential leaders.
5. Selecting the ultimate leaders from among them.
6. Organizing these leaders into a political party.

None of these steps may be omitted, though at times it will be possible to go rapidly from one to the next. Passage from one phase to another, as difficult for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent side, requires much imagination and astute leadership. Moreover, the units needed to accomplish the first step, being militarily oriented, do not necessarily lend themselves to the primarily political tasks involved in the subsequent phases (just as people who think largely in terms of psychological action are apt to ignore military factors). One possible way of solving the problem is to screen units of soldiers to find among them those with a political orientation and aptitude and then assign these to the task that is paramount once an area has been physically conquered.

As regards the counterinsurgents' accompanying propaganda effort, one may distinguish, first of all, between "strategic propaganda" (designed to show that the defender's cause is good and that his position is strong) and "tactical propaganda" (geared to each of the above six steps and an essential weapon in its achievement). To name just one example of a tactical propaganda aim, in the first step (expulsion of the guerrillas' armed forces from a chosen area), the enemy, on being told that the counterinsurgents are about to clear that sector, has a choice between leaving it and accepting a fight. Since the defender's interest lies in the latter alternative, his propaganda must be aimed at forcing the rebels to fight rather than to disappear. Apart from propaganda directed at the enemy himself, the first step must be accompanied also by an appeal to the native population, which should be, essentially, only this: "There will be military engagements; try to stay neutral!" For neutrality is all that is needed in the military phase of the war. And, finally, there is the propaganda line to be taken with the counterinsurgent troops, namely, to "avoid

any action (such as the shelling of villages) that will antagonize the populace."

GEN. LANSDALE pointed out that psychological warfare is meaningless without a forceful, positive ideological base from which to combat and surpass the dynamic ideas of the communist side, supported as they are by every known trick of propaganda. Against those communist beliefs, rooted in nineteenth-century philosophy, we should at least pit our own ideals, rooted in eighteenth-century philosophical concepts, to show that we are *for* something and not just fighting a negative, defensive battle. Those whose support we are seeking must have reason to feel that they are being asked to risk their lives for something worth while. The example of Malaya demonstrates the crucial importance of a wise political goal, and a practice consistent with it, in the achievement of military victory. By the same token, "liberté, égalité, fraternité," if practiced as professed in Indochina, might well have changed the outcome of the French-Vietminh war.

Moreover, everyone who has had a command position in a counter guerrilla campaign knows that there are always some men among his troops who attract support from the population simply because they believe in a great ideal that they can communicate to others and that the people can share. The ideals and beliefs of such natural leaders are worth heeding; they might well become part of the ideological base of the counterinsurgent side. And, COL. GALULA added, whenever such a natural leader emerges, he ought to be given the widest possible powers, in violation, if necessary, of established military tradition and without reference to his formal education. To do so, however, requires the kind of flexibility that distinguishes the communist side but which, unfortunately, conflicts with conventional concepts of Western armies and governments.

COL. BOHANNAN reiterated with approval GEN. LANSDALE's point about the importance of a national objective and about the need for people at the working level to carry it out on a small scale; he stressed the additional requirement that, from the top to the bottom level, all actions be at all times clearly in pursuit of the national objective, lest the enemy find abuses of the principle and thus an opportunity for saying, "They are just talking, but you can see that they don't mean it."

Even more indispensable a psychological factor, COL. GALULA thought, was the absolute, unwavering determination of the top leaders. He cited Hungary as an example of a war that had been won by counterinsurgents through firm resolution even though their cause was bad, and Indochina as an illustration of a good cause that failed for lack of determined leadership.

COL. BOHANNAN would not go quite so far. Batista's defeat in Cuba and Chiang's in China, he suggested, tended to prove that resolute leadership was not

enough; and the nationalistic aspirations of the Vietminh, unobjectionable as they appeared at first glance, probably had influenced the developments in Indochina almost as much as had the irresolution of the French. Without agreeing, therefore, that "resolution at the top" was any more important than either an understanding of revolutionary warfare or a wise political goal, he was prepared to grant that all three elements were necessary to successful counterinsurgency.

COL. WHITE, on being asked whether and to what extent the foregoing remarks applied to the case of Malaya, stressed the relative simplicity of the problem there (as compared to the areas with which the earlier speakers had been concerned), thanks largely to the background of British rule and organization, a loyal police force, and the established policy that self-government would be granted as soon as possible. As military commander, COL. WHITE was merely in aid of the civil powers. This meant, in practice, that he took no action without the approval of the District Officer (a Malayan), the Police Chief (an Indian), and the Special Intelligence Officer (a Chinese). On the other hand, certain moves, even though none of these men might object to them, were ruled out by COL. WHITE himself as too likely to antagonize the population. In the end, it was the consistent show of reasonableness that won over the people of Malaya, and the problem was still easier once the country became self-governing.

COL. VALERIANO described very similar principles and results in his own experience in the Philippines. In Huk territory the civilian authority occasionally broke down to the point where the field commander had to take over many of the functions of civilian government officials. But, in general, the military authorities did their utmost to defer to the civilian power. They built up the prestige of the provincial governor (whether they liked him or not) by parading their support of him in public. They ultimately convinced the people that because of the guerrillas the military was necessary and that the troops were acting as a police force.

With the emergence of Magsaysay, who consistently stressed the close working relationship between military officers and local civilian representatives, the task became easier. Field staffs had a civil affairs officer, a most useful man, who not only provided liaison with the civilian authorities but was able to contribute the civilian viewpoint to the planning of operations, often speaking up spontaneously and effectively against a proposal at the time it was made, without first having to consult the provincial government about it. For example, he was the only one likely to remember that a projected operation coincided with the harvest season, and to point out the slight tactical returns it would yield as compared with the greater value of allowing the locals to bring in their rice.

The Philippine campaign, GEN. LANSDALE added, was an example of a complex situation in which the political objective was essentially very simple. Because popular faith in constitutional government had broken down as a result of fraudulent elections, it could not be restored by the electoral process until the ballot box itself was restored and protected. To do this became the aim of Magsaysay's policy and actions. At the time Magsaysay took office, COL. VALERIANO recalled, one year before the next elections, he realized how successfully the Communists were exploiting the popular anger over earlier, questionable elections, and he promptly announced the government's determination to ensure the fairness of the coming (1951) elections. He then made the army responsible for guarding the ballot boxes and protecting voters against intimidation. Also, he put ROTC units into active service, highly motivated boys still in their 'teens, who were given arms, uniforms, and some training, and proved very effective in discouraging political groups in rural areas from repeating the fraudulent practices of earlier elections. When the votes were counted, the people, knowing that the elections had been "clean," knew also that the government was of their own choice, and the rug had thus been pulled out from under the communist propaganda.

Militarily, this political victory of the government was reflected in the number of people who overnight volunteered their services to Headquarters, presenting the government forces with more agents than they could possibly use (an experience that COL. GALULA and COL. WHITE recognized as one that signaled the turn of the tide in their own theaters). Especially striking and of great practical value was the appearance at COL. VALERIANO's battalion headquarters, one week after the elections, of a mob of three thousand women, children, and able-bodied men—simple, unarmed villagers who had been supplying the Huks with food and intelligence for nine years but had now come to surrender. After the effectively organized interrogation of the first hundred, the rest voluntarily submitted all information on the basic Huk supply system, as well as on the whole pattern of tax assessment and payment, for the entire area of settlements within the Huk Regional Command No. 3. This long-wanted intelligence enabled COL. VALERIANO to put the strongest of the commands permanently out of commission.

Prompted by COL. GALULA's statement that the Communists invariably aim for the support of the intellectuals and of the youth (and that, in order to win, they must have at least the former firmly on their side), MR. HOSMER asked COL. WHITE to speak about his own "campaign for the children."

COL. WHITE acknowledged the important role that "children"—a term under which he was including students up to about the age of twenty-four—have played

in virtually every mob action. Children actually started the last riots in Singapore and thus brought the whole island under martial law. In Malaya the troops spent much time and attention on the children and indeed made perhaps their most intimate impact on the adult population not by the punishment-and-reward system but through their friendship with the children—the pocketfuls of candy, the playgrounds and youth centers, the officers' attendance at school games at the invitation of the headmasters. Although fully aware that the children were also spying on them, the troops had little difficulty establishing rapport, and COL. WHITE's outfit to this day maintains three scholarships under which one Indian, one Malayan, and one Chinese child are being educated.

GEN. LANSDALE recalled several incidents of the use of children in military conflicts: the Asturian miners who used children as messengers, and villagers in the 1955 pacification campaign in Vietnam who passed information on through youngsters of kindergarten age on the assumption that their youth protected them against reprisals. On a different plane was the profound impression that American soldiers at the turn of the century (when the U.S. Army was sent to the Philippines to pacify what were essentially guerrilla forces) made on the Filipino people simply by being kind to their children, feeding them sweets, and teaching them school. Where precisely, GEN. LANSDALE implied, was one to draw the line between the benevolent, permissible use of children and their immoral exploitation?

COL. GALULA had found himself temperamentally unsuited to organizing and exploiting children for the purpose of gathering intelligence through them. Fortunately, the enemy had not organized the children against him (if he had, it might have been necessary to react with the same tactic), and COL. GALULA felt free, therefore, to follow his own inclination, which was to leave the children out of the war, to provide educational and athletic facilities for them, and to accept gratefully any useful information they might spontaneously offer. His area had seven schools, with a total of seven hundred children, who received there not only academic instruction but milk, food, and the opportunity for sports and games. COL. GALULA granted, however, that even he would not hesitate to organize the children in any situation where the enemy was a foreign invader.

This, of course, had been precisely the position of COL. FERTIG in the Philippines, where children were effectively enlisted for a variety of tasks in the struggle against the Japanese. However, they were not, strictly speaking, "organized," and their contribution was a gratuitous adjunct to intelligence work rather than part of the plan. Moreover, they were supposedly all volunteers, and they reported to the civil authorities rather than to the army. COL. FERTIG recalled that some boys

as young as ten had exhibited all the resourcefulness and leadership qualities that one might hope to find in an adult. Children, lightly armed, were commonly used as reporters to their fathers in the volunteer guard, and, in areas where it was impossible to maintain posts, they also acted as runners. In addition, they participated in the "bamboo telegraph" that operated without interruption through Japanese-occupied terrain for fifteen months before it was finally broken.

The Japanese (in answer to a question from MR. HOSMER) were unsuccessful in their attempts to cultivate the children, because of the same inconsistent, irrational behavior by which they alienated the adults. By offering candy one day and slaps the next, they gradually frightened off possible recruits among the young. This, despite the fact that in December 1941 the Americans and their allies had lost face so completely that for a long period thereafter the Japanese enjoyed the support of the population while the guerrillas had to start from scratch.

In the Huk campaign COL. VALERIANO had observed a similar development, and a comparable lack of wisdom on the part of the enemy. Once the government forces under Magsaysay began to show successes, the Huks abandoned their previous policy of friendliness toward the population in favor of the most blood-thirsty and ruthless tactics (they attacked hospitals and massacred civilians regardless of age and sex), methods that permanently alienated the people and marked the beginning of a growing rapport between civilian youth and the army.

One of the ways in which COL. VALERIANO attracted the young was to invite provincial schools to stage tournaments on the basketball court at his headquarters, with refreshments served at the army's expense. The enterprising intelligence officer made himself acquainted with the youngsters, discovered that several of them were the children of Huk commanders, and methodically obtained from them a file of information not obtainable through ordinary intelligence channels. These data included, for example, the fathers' birthdays or the expected arrival dates of new babies—times, that is, when a Huk family man might be tempted to leave his mountain base for a short stay at home, thereby offering the government troops an opportunity for picking him up.

Turning to another aspect of the problem, MR. HOSMER asked the group: "How, in the area of strategic psychological warfare, do you convince a people that you, rather than the guerrillas, are going to win?"

COL. GALULA once again stressed as the crucial requirement a determined government and unwavering policy at the top. If the government hesitates or the policy changes, the local people are bound to be discouraged and the loyalist cause will suffer a setback of months and sometimes years, no matter how hard and well

the people in the field may be working. The rebels' propaganda is sure to exploit any such weakness at the top.

In Algeria, the FLN's line was simple: "The French proclaimed that they were staying in Indochina, Tunisia, and Morocco forever, yet they left; now they say they'll remain in Algeria, but they will pull out in the same way." No words—not even such evidence as the heavy French investment in the country—could prevail against such a simple argument. And a cabinet change in Paris, with its attendant uncertainty about the future, would instantly wipe out any political benefits of recent military advances. The FLN for its part, aware of this interaction, was quick to deny any rumor about negotiations, for fear that their followers would equate talks with compromise and see in them a sign that their organization was crumbling. This, to COL. GALULA, was just one manifestation of the fact that a revolutionary war calls for unyielding, extremist attitudes on both sides and leaves no room for the moderate middle. Thus, every attempt to form a "third force" in Algeria failed, for only in postwar times can the liberal element emerge in numbers.

COL. VALERIANO had found no more dramatic and persuasive way of demonstrating that the guerrillas' was a losing cause than to let former Huks talk to the crowd about their experiences before and since their surrender. If an ex-Huk could say, for example, that some of his compatriots in Mindanao were being helped by the army, that they had houses, animals, and tools and were doing scientific farming, this kind of testimony made a powerful impression, for it gave the lie to the contention—central to the Huks' ideological appeal—that Filipino farmers were landless tenants.

COL. FERTIG agreed with the previous speakers that the decisive changes in a guerrilla war were made, or caused to happen, by the top leaders, but he pointed out that, from the moment the atmosphere changed in your favor, even events at the grass roots could turn people from lukewarm into enthusiastic supporters. (Thus, a sudden strong sense that the anti-Japanese guerrillas were winning once caused surrenders of Japanese soldiers in Mindanao to rise from none to seventy in a single month, even though in surrendering those men were violating all their principles.) The crucial and most difficult thing, however, is to capture, and immediately exploit, the psychological moment at which people are ready to shift their faith and sympathy to your side.

GEN LANSDALE agreed that no simple gimmick or psychological measuring device could help one detect that moment; to recognize and seize it required "the wisdom of Solomon." Moreover, the Western counterinsurgent is up against the

communist principle of mesmerizing the masses by the incessantly repeated assurance that ultimately and inevitably communism will win (even at times when it seems to be losing), a demagogical device foreign and unacceptable to members of a democratic society. To prevail against it, we must at all times be ready to back our words with actions, to give tangible proof of our determination to win.

COL. GALULA stressed, in addition, the importance of having a plan behind every show of strength. He recalled instances when such a show, lacking effective follow-up action, had boomeranged as the terrorist side could say: "Look at what they had to bring in, and still they haven't managed to catch us."

In this connection, MR. RUTKOWSKI reiterated the advice of an earlier speaker that it is well to choose and publicly identify a small, manageable area and then to clean it up, thereby convincing the natives that they are dealing with a purposeful and efficient government. This principle of the small test area within the larger one, COL. WHITE pointed out, was followed in Malaya; and in 1955-1956, as a glance at a military map for that period would show, "black" and "white" areas were intermixed as on a checkerboard.

COL. GALULA then described the extent to which the idea of the "test area" had permeated the experimental theory of the Chinese Communists in all its applications, permitting them to operate with speed and efficiency despite the vastness of the country. Thus, by a variety of criteria, they would choose "key areas" at every level (for example, Manchuria as a whole, then a key province outside Manchuria, and ultimately key villages throughout the country). The reason for the selection of one key area might be that it was ideologically advanced; another would be chosen because it was backward; a third, because it was close to a big city; and a fourth, because it had an ethnic minority. Being thus representative of the variety and complexity of the country's problems, these were to serve as testing grounds for new ideas and institutions, but not until the proposed innovation had been subjected to a very thorough theoretical critique.

Typically, therefore, when the Politburo had decided that the time was ripe for a novel measure (such as the organization of semisocialist co-operatives, for example), it would submit the idea to the Central Committee for discussion and possible improvement. If the majority favored it, the idea would officially become "Project No. 1" and would thereupon be submitted, for compulsory discussion, to a vertical slice of the Party in the key areas (that is, to a total of perhaps seven hundred people, from the head of the Communist Party in Manchuria down to the Party's representative in the small random settlements). Frank, critical discussion would reveal new problems, sometimes to the point where the leadership

decided to drop the idea entirely. More often, the proposal would be modified in the light of suggestions and criticism, labeled "Project No. 2," and launched experimentally in all key areas. Communist leaders and observers from other areas would be invited to watch and afterward discuss the experiment. Their reactions might cause the plan to be further modified—in which case it became "Project No. 3"—or they could lead to its abandonment even at this late stage. Once approved, however, and in final form, the project would be released for implementation throughout the country, with the same cadres who had observed its experimental phase serving as advisors to local officials.

By the above method, COL. GALULA had seen such formidable tasks as a country-wide census and the institution of a rationing system throughout China accomplished in a matter of one or two weeks. The French, by contrast, were apt to launch an attractive idea blindly, without experimentation or consideration for the local situation (for example, their 1956 project for local self-government in Algeria, by which they hoped to improve the political system), and to find themselves compelled later to revise it from the bottom up and at great cost.

MR. HOSMER suggested that the Chinese Communists' approach to innovations, as described by COL. GALULA, might well be adaptable to the present anti-communist struggle in South Vietnam. The idea, he thought, of selecting "key areas" in which you can be certain of military victory, bringing them under control, building them up from the government's point of view, and using them for purposes of demonstration promised to yield large returns.

In GEN. LANSDALE's view, MR. HOSMER had here touched on the true problem at the bottom of the discussion, namely, the fact that the Communists have been far more astute than their opponents in weighing all possible factors in an area, and making sure that conditions are favorable both to a military victory and to its political follow-up, before moving their troops into that sector. They will look at a situation locally in all its economic, political, and ethnic ramifications before deciding that a given military venture is worth risking. COL. GALULA cited the case of Burma as one where the Communists so far have chosen to forgo an easy military victory—which would require only one or two battalions—because other, nonmilitary factors combine to make them regard Burma as a burden rather than an asset so long as it does not have a strong and tested Communist Party.

MR. TANHAM thought that the Americans in the past had made the mistake of not taking the initiative in the choice of areas, concentrating instead on hitting back where the Communists chose to attack. To the extent that they did select the areas of concentration, MR. GREENE added, they were inclined to overempha-

size the importance of consolidating control in remote parts, to the possible neglect of areas nearer the main cities. Another criticism (from COL. FERTIG) was that our military planners tend to treat counterinsurgency in the manner of fire fighters—the bigger the conflagration, the faster they rush to its center—and never think of starting at the brushfire end.

There appeared to be general agreement as to the soundness of the approach recommended by MR. RUTKOWSKI, which was to divide the entire theater into many areas; to classify these according to how difficult it would be to establish control in each; then to begin with the easiest and work up from there; but always to reserve a few easy ones in case you suffer reverses and need an ace in the hole. The relative strategic or administrative value of a given territorial objective is only of secondary importance; as GEN. LANSDALE put it, “even a resort area is fine if it is an easy victory.”

In answer to MR. HOSMER's question as to what criteria the British used in selecting a particular “black” (communist-controlled) area in Malaya for a clearing operation, COL. WHITE listed such factors as enemy strength, tactical and logistic opportunities, and the response of the population. Also, since the guiding principle was, wherever possible, to isolate forces and followers of the enemy (who had a very good organization) and to interrupt his courier system, certain areas were inevitably more desirable than others.

COL. GALULA re-emphasized the importance of planning, quoting Mao Tse-tung's maxim that “a bad plan is better than no plan.” GEN. LANSDALE, in conclusion, suggested that those planning for the control of hostile areas would do well to heed a lesson that the Vietnamese forces learned in the course of reoccupying communist-held areas after the country's partition at the Seventeenth Parallel; they discovered that even seasoned Communists are vulnerable in their loyalty to the movement and susceptible, therefore, to a skillful psychological warfare approach.

APRIL 18, 1962, P.M.\*

## PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND CIVIC ACTION

*"Strategic" as Distinct from "Tactical" Psychological Warfare: The Aims, Media, and Executants of Each ~ Some Requisites for a Successful Psychological Campaign in Insurgent Territory: A Positive National Purpose Illustrated by Constructive Action; Ideals Comprehensible to the Local People; Deference to Native Mores; Fairness and Legality in Reward as in Punishment ~ Magsaysay's Example of Personalized Government and Responsiveness to the People's Wishes and Needs ~ The British Conception and Practice in Malaya ~ The American Problem in Vietnam and Laos: The Handicap of the Advisor; Instances of Blunder and of Success ~ Steps in Winning Popular Support in Algeria: Health Stations; Schools; Collective and Individual Propaganda ~ The Role of Propaganda Media and Devices ("Gadgets and Gimmicks") in Demoralizing the Armed Insurgent and Influencing His Active Supporters ~ "Black" Propaganda ~ Civil Action Programs in Vietnam and Laos ~ The Potential Role of the Local Official ~ Advantages of Military over Civilian Direction for Civic Action Programs ~ The Perennial Need for Ready Funds in All Phases of Counterinsurgency ~ Prisoner Rehabilitation Programs as a Psychological Weapon*

MR. HOSMER opened the meeting with the proposal that the treatment of psychological warfare and its supporting political operations be geared as much as possible to detail and specific instances, with emphasis on techniques that members of the Symposium had tried and found particularly effective.

By way of introduction, COL. GALULA distinguished between "strategic" and "tactical" psychological warfare and between the levels at which each is executed. *Strategic* psychological warfare, in his definition, is planned at the theater level, in line with the policies and strategic goals that are formulated at the top; its chief media are radio, the press, films, and any other means of communication directed at the population as a whole. The executants of *tactical* psychological

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\*Present: Col. Bohannon, Col. Brundage, Mr. Ellis, Col. Fertig, Col. Galula, Mr. Greene, Mr. Hosmer, Mr. Phillips, Mr. Rutkowski, Col. White.

warfare begin at the highest level that has direct contact with the population (in Algeria, this tended to be the company rather than the battalion commander) and continue down to the lowest. Their task—more difficult than the demands of strategic psychological warfare—lies in varying media and techniques to suit the particular conditions at each of these lower echelons. A tactical propaganda action, moreover, must be sustained if it is to be useful and effective; this became apparent in Algeria, for example, when the French experimented unsuccessfully with movie teams that moved from place to place.

As to how one demoralizes the guerrilla and convinces him that his cause is not worth fighting for, several of the participants saw possible answers in the lessons of the campaigns with which they had been most closely associated.

COL. BOHANNAN recapitulated and amplified some of COL. VALERIANO's earlier analysis of the impact of Magsaysay's personality, policies, and methods on the Philippine situation (especially through the dramatic demonstration of the government's ability and willingness to guarantee free elections in 1951), with the result that, within a year, the mood of the country changed from total distrust of the government to total contempt for the Huks. The experience seemed to prove not only, as COL. VALERIANO had already pointed out, the effectiveness of showing communist propaganda to have been wrong, but also the overwhelming appeal of a national policy that aims at stability in government and is concerned with the citizen's own aspirations, the rights of minorities, and other democratic freedoms. Needless to say, for the policy to be fully convincing, the government must fit into it from top to bottom. In the Philippines, unfortunately, the national objective was never clearly set forth in words, though the cause of Magsaysay and the government would doubtless have benefited by a formal statement or document.

COL. FERTIG, however, had an explanation for Magsaysay's failure to proclaim his aims officially. Magsaysay was not the head of the government but only its Secretary of Defense, and the kind of statement that would best have expressed his objectives and served his purposes could never have been condoned by the government because of the criticism of past policies that it would have implied.

MR. PHILLIPS drew his illustration of a constructive approach from the situation in South Vietnam in 1954–1955. It was summed up, he thought, in this answer of an American officer to a member of the Military Advisory Mission who had asked what he was supposed to do: "Find out what the people want, and then we'll try to help them get it." As was said at the beginning of the Symposium, any country that is under communist attack—whether involved in actual guerrilla warfare or

in a political situation leading up to it—contains causes of dissatisfaction upon which the Communists are feeding. The anticommunist side, therefore, must discover these causes and identify the issues with a view to satisfying the desires and aspirations of the people.

In South Vietnam in the mid-fifties, for example, it became evident that the Communists had patented a simple issue—"independence"—and their propaganda was aimed at showing the Vietnamese government's domination by the French, its weakness and corruption, its lack of control over an untrustworthy army. (Some of these allegations had indeed not been entirely unjustified in the early 1950's.) Within less than two years after 1954, the Diem government succeeded in taking this issue away from the Communists by demonstrating its own independence and energetic leadership through a variety of actions, including an effective pacification campaign and civic action (with tangible material benefits to the people), and, in general, by its efforts to restore order from chaos. Simultaneously with proving its own autonomy, the government provided increasing evidence of the Vietminh's domination from abroad. At the same time, it was becoming ever more apparent that the Communists were unable to fulfill their wartime promises of what they would do for the country once there was peace. On local issues, too, communist propaganda was punctured little by little, and popular support dwindled accordingly. During the pacification campaign, for instance, when the troops moved in and neither stole nor raped but, on the contrary, were helpful to the civilians, this clearly proved communist propaganda to have been false, and helped to shake people's faith in the Vietminh still further.

The guerrilla fighter or supporter himself, in COL. GALULA's experience, is most quickly demoralized if he is cut off from the population—through the process of systematic purging—and becomes convinced that there is no hope for him. To illustrate, COL. GALULA recalled the case of two civilian FLN members who, on learning that their village was about to be purged, fled to seek the support of the armed guerrillas just outside the area, but were told there that the villagers would have to fend for themselves. After remaining in hiding for a week, they joined another *maquis*, in a distant area, but became so demoralized as a result of the doubly discouraging experience of being abandoned by the local guerrillas and separated from their own people that they surrendered.

As for trying to find out what the people want—MR. PHILLIPS' prescription for a constructive pragmatic approach—it is possible, COL. GALULA thought, to guess wrongly or to place too much emphasis on the lesser concerns out of unawareness of, or inability to correct, the major ones. In the case of Algeria, the

leaders in Paris had a number of theories about the needs and wishes of the people, all of which turned out to be of secondary importance. As those in the field found out, the Algerians wanted peace above all else and at any cost; they were indifferent to any other promises.

COL. FERTIG put the point even more strongly. The common man, particularly in Asia, is apolitical, interested only in his little world and his own needs, and impervious to such abstract ideals as democracy and representative government. If the anticommunist forces in Vietnam have not been as successful as was the anti-Huk campaign in the Philippines, this has been due, in COL. FERTIG's view, to Western failure to understand these Asian traits, and to the absence of a national figure of anything like Magsaysay's dimensions. Magsaysay, a unique leader, personalized government in a way not familiar to the Asian nations, made himself available to any citizen who wanted to see and talk to him, covered the islands to their remotest points (within four months of his taking office, all but perhaps 150,000 out of 2,000,000 islanders in the area of operations had seen him in action), listened to grievances, and took immediate action to remove their cause. In short, he demonstrated that the government was concerned with the people's needs and desires—peace, food, land—rather than with abstract concepts beyond their comprehension or with goals remote in time. The average Asian, COL. FERTIG believes, cannot cope with a period of waiting, for he lives only from day to day, and anything not in the immediate future is to him tantamount to infinity and therefore meaningless.

MR. PHILLIPS disagreed with COL. FERTIG, believing his view to be an underestimate of the typical Asian, who, while unable to understand the big issues, has some definite feelings about his basic rights and dislikes being ordered around, especially by outsiders. He desires and understands a situation where, when he goes to sleep at night, he can expect to find his family well and safe in the morning; where the only dangers to be feared are from the elements, not from man. Moreover, he is quite susceptible to the idea, which Magsaysay brought home so effectively to the Filipino people, that the government is really his servant. We ought to make our strongest appeal to him on this plane—the promise of civil liberties, of equal justice impartially administered, and of the citizen's part in the government—for this is where the Communists cannot compete with us and are most vulnerable.

COL. BOHANNAN thought that COL. FERTIG, in generalizing about the Filipino, might indeed have underestimated somewhat the degree of political consciousness that had come with the country's rapid growth in the last fifteen years. But he

agreed with COL. FERTIG that the main difference between the Philippines then and Vietnam today lay in the nature of the leadership. A unique man with unique methods, Magsaysay devoted his energy, the power of his office, and his personal magnetism to offering the people a way of life that was patently better than the communist example and promise. Vietnam has lacked a leader with his intensely personal and dramatic appeal, though its president has an equally strong purpose and probably greater intellectual capability.

MR. PHILLIPS thought that this need not be the critical factor; if you did not have a national leader of Magsaysay's stature, you could help develop local leaders. To judge by the experience in Laos, the Asian will readily respond to a forceful local official whose efforts bring tangible results. Several years ago, for example, a police lieutenant in a village in Xieng Khouang Province near the Vietnamese border, with very little material support from Vientiane, persuaded the villagers to take the initiative and provide the labor for a civic and road-building program of their own. Under his guidance they pooled their ideas, established priorities, and organized themselves for the effort, and the result was an impressive civic achievement, a cause of great pride to the villagers, and an example to neighboring communities. No idea emanating from and supported by the central government could have worked better. And in 1961 these villagers demonstrated great solidarity and patriotism by putting up a desperate fight when they came under communist attack in the course of the Vietminh invasion. Father Hoa, the militant Catholic priest in Binh Hung Village (South Vietnam), is another example of how much a local leader can accomplish in Southeast Asia.

MR. HOSMER asked COL. WHITE to comment on the approach in Malaya, where, it appeared, the information program had largely been directed at the noncommunist population, and the psychological warfare program, at the terrorists.

The typical noncommunist inhabitant—the average tapper—presented what COL. WHITE called a fairly simple problem, for he cared little who ruled him so long as he had peace and his rice. Local officials—the *penghulus*—saw to it that the natives' rights were protected, and that, if the troops trampled down plantings, the military authority was informed and a complaint registered. Communication was easy and direct. COL. WHITE would send his band to a village to play, and when everyone was assembled, there would be talks, with the *penghulus* airing their problems and grievances, and a military representative explaining what the army was trying to do to help the Malaysians and alleviate their hardships.

While every kind of tactical and strategic psychological warfare was being used against the terrorists in the jungle, the very simple carrot-and-stick principle

was effective with the civilians. The nature of punishments and rewards had to be worked out with the aforementioned committee, which included the District Officer and the Chief of Police, that is to say, men who were in touch with the people. Punishments often had to be severe, and supervision close. Curfews were particularly painful and hence very effective. Conversely, an extra hour or two added to the hours before the curfew by way of a reward went a long way toward making people happy and served as a valuable incentive to staying within the rules. Fairness was essential when using the stick. Moreover, it was preferable to have it used by the civil administrator rather than the military, thereby enhancing the prestige of the former while dissociating the latter from an unpleasant function. Once the necessary control was established and the time had come to use largely the carrot, one of the most effective ways in which to show trust in the local citizens was to let them form their own defense force.

COL. BOHANNAN observed that the relative simplicity of controlling and influencing the local population in Malaya was atypical and to be explained by the fortunate circumstance that the British were able to count on the loyalty of the civilian as well as the military government. By contrast, in most countries faced with an indigenous revolt that an indigenous government is trying to suppress, a major problem is to make sure of the loyalty of government, police, and military, and then to convince each of them that the other two are loyal. To the extent that the problem existed in Malaya at all, it was manageable, and the disloyal elements could be weeded out without political reservations. In the Philippines, by comparison, a *pengbulu* who was known to be playing ball with the Communists might also be a loyal supporter of the governor or of still higher elected officials, and it would then be impossible to touch him because his votes were needed.

In answer to MR. HOSMER's question on what it took to gain the confidence of the military, civilian, and police authorities and to create trust and co-operation among them, COL. WHITE summed up his own views and principles, which seemed to him valid not only for Malaya but for most Asian societies that we were likely to be dealing with.

In COL. WHITE's experience, the man best equipped to accomplish the difficult and slow task of making people trust him and work with one another, and especially of persuading those of position and influence to do the things he would have them do, is the one who in the foreign country aims for much the same moral standards as he would at home, who lives a clean life, is efficient, demonstrates trust in others, and has the peculiar faculty that makes people do things for him or at his suggestion. If he has those qualities, if he makes sure that he is right in what he does and

proposes, and if he lives and talks with the natives and learns to understand them, he will gain their confidence. Moreover, not only the commanding officer himself but every soldier around him must be imbued with these ideas and aims, must acquire a knowledge of local customs, and, if possible, should be able to speak the language. As an illustration of the importance that this last point can assume, COL. WHITE recalled that the Sultan in his area refused to receive him and his staff until they were able to speak to him in Malayan. A final requirement, closely related to the respect for local customs, is the military commander's willingness to consult with local officials wherever possible rather than proceed immediately with actions, even sound ones, that are based only on his judgment.

COL. WHITE's own experience in Malaya demonstrated to him both the fruitful results of these methods and the negative returns you may expect from any policy ignoring them. In his first three months, which were spent in a "black" area where many villagers were relatives and supporters of terrorists, the harsh methods he initially used—and quick, angry action when these methods failed to work—proved quite useless; by contrast, the change to the more humane and considerate approach he adopted and consistently followed thereafter yielded immediate benefits in goodwill, co-operation, and information freely offered.

MR. PHILLIPS, though in general agreement with COL. WHITE, pointed out that the Malayan situation was perhaps unique. The Americans, he thought, faced a somewhat more difficult problem in Vietnam and Laos because, being not in command but only in the position of advisors, they had to do things by proxy.

MR. PHILLIPS' observations in those two countries also had convinced him that one ill-advised deed by a single soldier can undo the good of much thoughtful action; it requires careful indoctrination of the military—the men and often even the officers—to instill in them the needed respect for the local civilians as well as a willingness to help these people in other than military ways. He described the kind of psychological blunder that comes of failure to understand the essential mission. The colonel in charge of a pacification operation had ordered a bridge that had been destroyed during the war to be rebuilt by the army engineer troops at great effort, in order to enable the civilians to carry their goods to market. After the bridge had been opened, the colonel made an inspection and discovered the engineer officer-in-charge directing army vehicles across the bridge while ordering the civilians to make their way down the river bank, through the water, and up the other side, just as they had done before there was a bridge.

As for those whose function it is to initiate political and social change in a foreign country, they are well advised to do so by indirection, by using their

influence with the local citizens to persuade them to rid themselves of the wrong leaders and bring in the right ones, and to do so by elections, if possible, or by psychological means, rather than by direct, peremptory action. As a humorous illustration of this principle, MR. PHILLIPS told of the stratagem by which COL. VALERIANO dislodged the mayor in a village under his jurisdiction, a very adroit man, whom he knew to be a Huk sympathizer but who had strong political influence in Manila to protect him. COL. VALERIANO's troops had stumbled on a communist patrol well outside the town and killed three of them. The next day two of the dead were brought to a spot within earshot of the townspeople, and, after a mock ambush, whose fire was heard by everyone, their bodies were dragged to the center of town. When a large crowd had assembled and the mayor was about to inspect the bodies, COL. VALERIANO stepped up and loudly thanked him "for the information that led to the killing of these two men." Hopelessly discredited in the eyes of the Communists, the mayor fled to Manila the next day.

COL. FERTIG, returning once more to the importance of respecting local customs and taboos, had seen it demonstrated by the Filipinos' reaction to Japanese indifference to their mores. Looked up to by the people at first as representatives of a successful nation, the Japanese were too imbued with their own superiority to make allowances for local idiosyncrasies. A few serious violations of the natives' moral code were enough to change the climate of opinion within two weeks from the initial acceptance of the Japanese presence to such angry resentment that the week of September 15, 1942, saw a total of forty-five uprisings. (Their particular affronts were to take the women by force and to slap the men.)

The Communists, COL. GALULA remarked, are fully aware of the advantages to be gained through conformance to native standards of conduct, and one of the eight "basic rules" that their soldiers are taught is "never take or buy anything from the people without their consent; and when you get up in the morning, put back the door you have slept on." The crucial importance that the Communists attach to this kind of preparation can be seen in the experience of a hard-pressed guerrilla unit that appealed for reinforcements and was turned down with the explanation that the troops were "not yet indoctrinated." In COL. GALULA's experience, most communist soldiers lived scrupulously by those rules. For example, when, during his captivity in China, the Communists decided to move him from a prison to private quarters in town, he was escorted by a soldier who knocked on the door of the house that was to be taken over for the purpose, politely asked permission before entering, and declined the owner's friendly offer of tea, even of hot water, though he must have been thirsty after his march.

At the suggestion of MR. HOSMER, COL. GALULA then described in some detail the pattern he typically followed in Algeria once he had set up a unit in a village, the problems he encountered most frequently, and the successes that proved his methods valid.

One of the first steps initiated immediately after a military post had been established was to open a first-aid station, which was always badly needed because of the shortage of medics and the generally poor health conditions. When the population failed to respond to an invitation to use the station, for fear of being seen making contact with the enemy, it was necessary to resort to forced treatment. Twice a week the battalion doctor would make a tour and give free consultations, with special attention to the children, who were often the avenue by which to win over the adults.

Another early step in establishing contact with the population was to open, or re-open, schools. In the area under COL. GALULA's jurisdiction, the only school—with sixty places for a population of close to twenty thousand—had been closed and then burned at the start of the rebellion. Again, parents and children did not respond to the first request for attendance; but on being told that, as of a given date, they would be fined for their children's truancy, the parents decided to co-operate.

A third major task was to launch a propaganda campaign consisting of two different approaches. One of these was to address people collectively and then try to draw as many of them as possible into a discussion. (Typically, they listened willingly but would not talk.) The other was to reach them individually through a method of propaganda that required the co-operation of well-indoctrinated soldiers. To this end, COL. GALULA would divide a village into sections, assign a squad to each, and instruct its members to accost individually any man they met, discuss with him various topics, both general and local, and record his reaction. The soldiers' notes proved surprisingly revealing, and, in usually no more than a week, it was possible to tell from them who was hostile, who was merely afraid, and who showed signs of co-operation.

The main concern during a purge period was fear of hurting the innocent and missing some of the guilty. COL. GALULA followed the principle he had learned from the Chinese Communists of showing leniency to those who repented, and punishing all others. The leniency policy, he found, paid large dividends, especially as it paved the way for early self-government (the official policy of Paris) and predisposed people to vote of their own accord for the leaders whom COL. GALULA silently favored. After elections, with the co-operation of the new local

authorities, it was possible to use the carrot more and more. Collective punishment was avoided if possible, or it was disguised (as, for example, in the announcement that a given meeting would not begin until the last man had arrived, which, in effect, meant punishing all others by making them wait).

Money was of great importance in consolidating control and winning the loyalty of the populace through civic action. COL. GALULA was aided in the success of his first pacification effort by the fact that the operation coincided with the new budget, and money was made available to him for a local project. He thereupon had the newly elected mayor call in the municipal council to deliberate on possible uses for the appropriation. When the council remained split between proponents of a well and those who preferred to spend the money on a highway that would permit trucks to reach the village (a third proposal, for a new mosque, having had to be vetoed for reasons of policy), COL. GALULA suggested putting the problem before all the villagers, who then voted in favor of the well.

As the troops established control in an area in Algeria, they taught the value of sanitation; they urged people to clean their villages, and showed them how to build latrines in their houses. In one village, where no money was available for a much-needed school building and a request for funds had been met with a vague promise for the future, the enterprising mayor persuaded the municipal council that the village could build its own school by having every family donate one man-day per week or its equivalent in money. And with the aid of a little "black-market" money obtained by COL. GALULA, they did indeed build a school in just that way—another illustration of MR. PHILLIPS' point about the potential contribution of the exceptional local official. In other cases, where the mayor was weak or incompetent, COL. GALULA was forced to work around and in spite of him, unless he could persuade the prefect to kick him upstairs.

The discussion turned once more to the propaganda media, emphases, and devices that had been used successfully against the armed insurgents themselves. COL. WHITE described his methods in Malaya as of the standard, straightforward kind. The dropping of leaflets containing picture stories (for example, of terrorists coming in and being spotted and chased out) was a favorite device. Once the food-denial plan began to yield good results, a newly captured prisoner was photographed in his emaciated condition, fed well for a few weeks, and photographed again surrounded by his family and looking prosperous, and both pictures, properly annotated, were then printed side by side on the same leaflet and floated in terrorist terrain. Family feeling was a vulnerable point on which it was useful to play—as in pictures of terrorist women with their new babies. Also, ground broad-

casts were used wherever possible. A co-operative prisoner might be flown over the area that hid his gang, and he would tell the terrorists on the ground how well he was being treated. Or, the radio would play on the terrorists' nerves by repeating incessantly the time and place of a planned attack. In addition, every picture and message contained brief instructions on how to surrender and what areas were safe for anyone wanting to come in. Another way of reaching the men in the jungle was through village meetings, in the certain knowledge that among those present were people in touch with the guerrillas. Routine methods also included telling the wounded terrorists where they might come to receive aid, and sending medics to the villages of the aborigines (a tactic that brought gratifying responses, particularly when it was possible to cure children).

At someone's mention of "the role of sewing needles and matches," MR. HOSMER inquired into the participants' experience with gadgets of that kind, as well as with certain "gimmicks" designed to confuse or deceive the enemy, and asked for opinions as to their effectiveness.

With respect to gadgets, COL. FERTIG pointed out that the importance of a given item to the enemy, and hence its value as a bargaining weapon, bore no necessary relation to its cost. He had once operated in an area of the Philippines to which he and his men gained entrance through a "side door" that it was essential and yet difficult to protect. The people who lived within the area itself had little use for money or even additional weapons, but their women badly needed sewing needles. In a mutually beneficial arrangement, therefore, the head man was given five rounds of ammunition and ten needles, in return for which he undertook to protect the side door and keep sentries posted. COL. FERTIG's side also made effective use of another scarce item—matches—adding propaganda value to them by having each book carry General MacArthur's picture with the legend "I shall return."

From the anticommunist campaign in the Philippines, some years later, COL. VALERIANO recalled a typical and very simple gimmick that proved most effective in bewildering and frightening individual enemy soldiers. He had taken half-sheets of paper, drawn on each of them a big staring eye and a triangle with sunrays going out from it, and then had covert patrols plant them in places where the Huks were likely to come across them. The finder's first reaction was likely to be, "What is this piece of paper that has no meaning?"; his second, "it must have a meaning, or the enemy wouldn't have bothered to draw it." As a result, a number of Huk hideouts and sleeping places were abandoned.

COL. BOHANNAN advised the use of "gadgets and gimmicks" only so long as their cost in terms of manpower reserves and effort did not diminish your strength

for the military pursuit of the war. For, as he pointed out, they will at best be auxiliary, never conclusive, weapons. The single most effective device, in his opinion, remains the pocketful of sweets for the children. Most others are useful only by adding a little to the normal harassment and unpleasantness of the guerrilla's life, just enough perhaps to tip the scales for a few of the enemy in favor of giving it up.

Several participants mentioned instances of what COL. GALULA called "black" propaganda, that is, propaganda seemingly emanating from the other side, but actually faked and planted by you in order to compromise the enemy or make him look cowardly. A friend of COL. GALULA, while operating in Vietminh territory, once posted a faked official order for all male villagers between eighteen and twenty-five years of age to assemble at a certain place and time. Accustomed as they were to obeying orders, they came, and the French troops just picked them up.

MR. PHILLIPS told of a somewhat more intricate scheme executed in Central Vietnam, at the time that the Vietnamese, under the Geneva Agreement, were reoccupying areas long held by the Vietminh. As the Communists withdrew from a locality, they consistently refused to exchange their own wartime scrip for regular Vietnamese currency, and the people of the area were stuck with the worthless money. The Vietnamese, therefore, printed and distributed large numbers of leaflets throughout the areas that the Vietminh were about to leave, stating that anyone wanting to exchange communist scrip for national currency was invited to come on a certain day to the last town that the Vietminh were evacuating. In response to these leaflets, a tremendous crowd of people—some from as far as 100 miles away—arrived at once clamoring for Vietnamese government currency, and the Vietminh, unable to make the exchange, suffered a blow to their prestige because they had to deny what had been assumed to be their own propaganda.

At MR. HOSMER's request, MR. PHILLIPS then spoke at length about the civic action programs in Vietnam and Laos with which he had been closely associated, making a strong case for such programs, and naming some of the requisites for successful civic action anywhere.

In Indochina the long rebellion against the French had totally disrupted all traditional administrative and other public services. Given these chaotic conditions, civil administrators were afraid to leave their provincial capitals, thus adding to the neglect and isolation of the villages. Civic action in Vietnam or Laos, therefore, came to mean primarily a special effort, outside normal administrative channels, to bring the services of government to the villages.

The first problem in restoring contact between the villages and the central government and re-establishing administrative functions was to regain the people's loyalty and their support. This was no easy matter, for the departing Vietminh had left behind their agents, who constantly assured the population that the Communists would return and that the wisest course, therefore, was to continue supporting them. The task of effective counteraction was carried out through two different types of organization: through army units and through civilian teams, both trained to approach the people directly and to work side by side.

The former technique was an integral part of the army's larger pacification effort in Vietnam. G-5 officers who had taken a special course in propaganda and civic action were attached to a battalion and would accompany military units into the area to be pacified, their special task being to ascertain the most urgent needs of the village or villages—roads, wells, schools, roofs, etc.—and then to meet them. To that end, they would help set up a village council or similar body to be officially in charge of the undertaking. Then, using army supplies and funds, they would help the villagers through this organization to carry out the project. Once completed, it not only spoke for itself in its tangible benefits to the people but could also be used by propagandists as an example of what communism and the Vietminh had failed to do.

The second technique, copied from earlier experiments in the Philippines, was to take native Vietnamese or Laotian civilians from the ministries, give them special training in how to approach people and teach them certain elementary skills, and send them into the villages in small teams. Dressed in black pajamas (the mark of the villager in Vietnam, as compared to the white sharkskin of the ordinary civil administrator), they would help the inhabitants with simple projects, instruct them in giving basic medical aid, and initiate various forms of self-help. Then, having trained them to the point of self-sufficiency, they would move on to another village to repeat the mission. Before leaving the larger area in which they had been operating, they normally arranged for a "civic action co-ordinator" to be appointed at the district or province level, who would keep the action alive and call in members of the team to advise villagers whenever necessary. One of the problems the teams encountered was that of jealousy from the regular civilian administrators; they overcame it by trying, wherever possible, to give the district official most of the credit for the projects in question. Another, more serious, problem in the beginning (1955 to 1957) was the American government's reluctant and inadequate material support for this kind of program, which did not fit neatly into the military and economic aid pattern.

The over-all operation was somewhat more difficult and limited in Laos than in Vietnam, owing mainly to national differences in education and skills. Whereas the average Vietnamese team member could be expected to have roughly the equivalent of a secondary education, his Laotian counterpart was likely to have had no more than three years of schooling. As a result, the work in Laos required longer and more thorough indoctrination, and members of the army were called on to help the teams. However, even though the total number of villages covered was much smaller than in Vietnam, the action served a particularly useful function in creating, in the civil service and the government ministries, a recognition of the need for this kind of aid, a sense of moral obligation to continue it within their jurisdictions, and also, for the first time, an awareness of the manner and style in which to organize and conduct such an effort. Previously, the central administrators' show of concern for the needs of the provinces had been limited to "grand tours" of the remote areas, where they would be received with much ceremony but dared have no meaningful contact with the villagers. Some of the men who had helped organize the initial civic action teams were subsequently used to train village, district, and province chiefs, and thus helped in laying the groundwork for an expanding program of government-initiated rural aid.

Under a different program, conducted in Laos concurrently with the one just described, and aimed at the same objective, goods were stockpiled at the provincial level for self-help projects, and the provincial chief was empowered to release these supplies to any village upon request, provided the villagers agreed to contribute to the project by transporting the material and furnishing the labor. This program met with enthusiastic response. In fact, contrary to some Western preconceptions about the lethargy of the typical Lao, MR. PHILLIPS had found him receptive to ideas and willing to learn as well as work. Education, in particular, had a tremendous appeal. Once, when the government had announced that it would supply the teachers wherever villages built their own schools, two thousand more schools went up within a few months than there were teachers to fill them.

A civilian-sponsored program for civic action (in answer to a question from MR. HOSMER) is by no means preferable to a military one, in MR. PHILLIPS' experience. Indeed, the effort in Laos would have been more far-reaching and effective, had it been military from the very start. But the government at first would not approve that idea, for fear of giving the military too much power. And although the civilian effort did receive some help from the military, it was not until 1959, after a change in political leadership, that the Lao army was able to launch a civic action program of its own, with all the advantages of its large manpower reserves.

Whereas the total number of civilian civic action workers in Laos never exceeded 200, more than 10,000 territorial troops (out of a 25,000-man army) were eventually divided up into six-man teams, who co-operated with local authorities by providing security for the local communities and by assisting the population in a variety of small projects. The men were trained for two months (wherever possible, in some special skill). The best-educated in the team would be used as a teacher and provided with schoolbooks and propaganda materials; another was taught elementary medical operations; and the rest were usually "pick-and-shovel" men. A few of them learned how to operate motion-picture projectors. Also, an attempt was made to equip each team with a transistor radio so that the men could listen to broadcasts from the capital and pass the information on to the local people.

In short, the methods were direct and unsophisticated, and wherever the program was thoughtfully planned and adequately supported, it worked very well and, by its demonstration at the village level, provided the spark for undertakings on a district or provincial scale. However, this program, too, suffered from inadequacies and delays in the material support it received from the U.S. government (owing at least in part to disputes over which agency, DOD or ICA, was primarily responsible for it), and never had the consistent support needed to gain the fullest co-operation of the villagers.

COL. FERTIG commented, in general, on the peculiar difficulty of obtaining the relatively small subsidies and appropriations that these specialized local programs and operations required. He regarded as typical the response of one of his wartime chiefs to a request for 250,000 pesos to be used for the benefit of American prisoners in Japanese hands. It was too much money to hand out, but too small and cheap a project to get the Pentagon interested in it.

MR. HOSMER, recalling the tremendous payoff of the "EDCOR" program in the Philippines, asked COL. BOHANNAN to elaborate on its success.

The chief value of this particular civic action program, said COL. BOHANNAN, had been that it furnished an excellent political weapon by disproving one of the main arguments of the enemy's propaganda. Because the Huk campaign slogan had been "land for the landless," and every Filipino wanted land, it was decided to activate and dramatize a dormant resettlement program (voted in some time earlier by the Philippine Congress for the benefit of war veterans, but never yet implemented), making sure that only good land was offered, and sparing no effort to establish the government's credibility in the eyes of the people.

Under the EDCOR program, a surrendered Huk was taken to a resettlement

area and given a little house and six hectares of partly cleared land, which he could hope to own in a year or two. Although fewer than a thousand were actually settled in this manner, the morale and propaganda effect of the operation was out of all proportion to the relatively modest investment it had required. Civilians tired of supporting the Huks would point to the program and tell the rebels to surrender; men who had been guerrillas for ten years or so found the prospect attractive. Huk leaders were brought out of the hills under safe-conduct passes, and then sent back to tell the story to the guerrillas.

MR. PHILLIPS doubted, however, that a program of this kind could have any lasting profound effect on the political character of a country if it were planned and conducted merely as a mechanical operation. You have to convince people that you are doing something *with* them as well as *for* them, he emphasized, and such a program has to yield more than material benefits. It must be democratic in substance rather than form, and must establish a bond between the citizen and his government. People have to feel that they are not merely beneficiaries but participants. Laos affords numerous examples of the dividends that this approach can yield. With the help, especially, of some Filipinos (who, in spite of a language barrier, communicated better with the average Lao than did many Americans), some Laotian leaders learned to appreciate this basically democratic approach and were able to transmit their enthusiasm to others.

COL. GALULA, reviewing the contrasting attitudes and methods of his own unit in Algeria in terms of their results, thought that they confirmed all that COL. WHITE and MR. PHILLIPS had been saying. The battalion he was later to join arrived in February 1956 (a marine battalion made up of draftees, except for the officers, and hastily thrown into Algeria from France), and its immediate task was to clear up a heavily populated area about 15 miles from Algiers. It was at the height of FLN terrorism, when the population was much against the French, and the troops, afraid and furious, reacted angrily and violently. For the first three months this earned them considerable applause, until the Paris press criticized them for their alleged harsh reprisals, and the battalion was moved to Kabylie "for disciplinary reasons."

It was at this point that COL. GALULA joined the battalion and undertook the slow but ultimately successful task of indoctrination by which to convince the men that they had to avoid whatever would antagonize the civilian population. In the end, some of those who had once resented the label of "*pacificateurs*" came to feel quite superior toward the "warriors" with their useless methods. Despite the physical hardships they suffered, the men in COL. GALULA's unit became a dis-

ciplined, dedicated group (they seemed to include few or no Communists), one of whom, for example, bought medical supplies for native babies out of his own pocket because the army had no provisions for them.

Asked by MR. HOSMER whether he had found it difficult to protect the informers who helped him in the earliest phase of a clearing operation, COL. GALULA said that this had never been a problem, because he did not, except on one occasion, act on the information given him by a single informer. Instead, he waited until he could arrest and interrogate a group of at least three or four men, so that the insurgents would never know which of these had informed against them. Once some degree of control had been established, the informers were no longer in any danger of reprisal; COL. GALULA at first had a platoon to protect the village, and eventually he would organize a self-defense corps, from which was recruited the "*commando de chasse*."

MR. HOSMER inquired whether the French had ever had a program for the rehabilitation of FLN prisoners comparable to the EDCOR program in the Philippines.

Until 1958, said COL. GALULA, there was no over-all policy; FLN members usually would fight to the end rather than surrender, and the treatment of prisoners, left to the discretion of individual commanders, varied greatly. From 1958 on, however, the official aim was to "win over" the FLN, though it took years to convince the rebels that they could surrender with impunity. COL. GALULA's division gave out medals for capturing, but not for killing, FLN members. Once captured, the ordinary soldiers were frequently released and persuaded to join the French forces, where they made the best recruits for the "*commandos de chasse*."

Members of the FLN's political organization, on the other hand, were sent to rehabilitation camps. But the work there was bungled for lack of a doctrine, or a systematic approach, on which to base the enforcement of discipline. In many camps, instead of working with prisoners individually, the officers in charge (former Vietminh prisoners, who were impressed with the communist brainwashing methods in Indochina even though these obviously had not had the intended effect on the officers themselves) foolishly attempted to win the FLN political prisoners by indoctrinating them with propaganda, with so little success that some camps turned into virtual seminars for the enemy. In the exceptional camp, by contrast, the personality of the commanding officer at times produced unusual results, and it was not uncommon in those instances for the prisoners to be given passes to visit their families.

Coming back once more to the broader masses, and the means by which to

influence them and help them build a stable society, COL. GALULA had found that in Algeria—as undoubtedly elsewhere—the long-range key to pacification was education. His greatest triumph had been his success in teaching the adults, having overcome the resistance even of the fathers, who commanded tremendous respect and veneration and were naturally unwilling to expose themselves as more ignorant than their children.

Another generally valid principle that COL. GALULA had derived from his experience in Algeria was that activities on behalf of the people among whom one is operating must be pursued, not only for the sake of “doing good,” but also for the political benefits likely to accrue from them. And perhaps the most important function of the counterinsurgents, and an indispensable step toward consolidating their gains, is to select the new leaders from among the population.

APRIL 19, 1962, A.M.\*

## INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (I) PROBLEMS AND TECHNIQUES OF INTELLIGENCE- GATHERING, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS

*Observations from the Anticommunist Campaign in the Philippines: Methods of Intelligence-gathering; Blending a Signaling System into the Scenario; Air-Ground Intelligence Liaison; Screening a Village for Informants ~ Problems and Methods of Intelligence Operations in the Deep Jungle: The Difficulties of Protecting the Informant (Patrolled Malayan "Jungle Forts" as an Alternative to Perimeter Resettlement) ~ The Modus Operandi on the Jungle Outskirts of Malaya: The Distribution of Intelligence Functions; Resettlement; Food Control; Search and Sweep Operations; Camouflaging the Movement of Troops and Agents; the Intelligence Uses of Dates and Data from the Guerrillas' Personal Dossiers ~ A British View on a Desirable Relationship between Military and Civilian Authorities: The Administrative Organization in Malaya; the Channeling and Utilization of Intelligence ~ Algeria: Operating Principles and Procedures for Obtaining Information; the Problem of Capturing Small Guerrilla Bands on the Defensive ~ The Argument for a Large Network of Low-level Agents ~ Communications Monitoring ~ Avoiding the Danger of Establishing Patterns, the "Curse" of Guerrilla Warfare ~ Opinions on the Limited Usefulness of Bombing in Counterinsurgency ~ Other Uses of the Airplane: Fighter Support; Target-marking*

MR. HOSMER began by announcing the main topics for the day's discussions — "techniques of intelligence operations" and "techniques of communications and control" — pointing out that both were of very vital concern to those currently engaged in counterinsurgency. In Vietnam, for example, the undeniably superior intelligence of the Viet Cong is today perhaps one of the most serious problems for the loyal troops, whose own movements and plans are frequently known to the Communists,

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\*Present: Col. Bohannon, Mr. Collbohm, Mr. Ellis, Col. Fertig, Col. Galula, Mr. Greene, Mr. Hosmer, Capt. Jeapes, Mr. Rutkowski, Col. Shirley, Mr. Tanham, Col. Valeriano, Col. White.

while they themselves have no warning even of operations involving as many as one thousand Viet Cong.

COL. VALERIANO was the first to speak at some length about the approaches to intelligence that he had used or observed in the Philippines, and to mention certain lessons they had taught him about the nature of intelligence-gathering.

The characteristic scenario in which COL. VALERIANO had to operate was a village known to be heavily supporting a Huk squadron in the field, with most able-bodied male inhabitants out among the armed units that were roving the countryside, hiding by day and operating by night. After trying to determine who was still in the village and who was missing, the most important task of the counterinsurgent side was to learn about the village support organization.

The typical village turned out to be organized into several units, each with specific support functions. In general, these support activities were divided between political affairs (which included education and indoctrination) and—more important to the counterinsurgents—intelligence. In trying to establish the connection and methods of communication between the intelligence support units in the village and the units in the field, it was essential to penetrate the village and also, if possible, the armed bands in the hills and swamps. Army agents would move among the villagers disguised as peddlers or delivery boys.

In one very successful operation, COL. VALERIANO and a small group of agents went into a swamp area controlled by the guerrillas, passing themselves off as public-works surveyors. (They were taking advantage of a publicized government plan for road construction in the area.) Equipped with all the paraphernalia of such a surveying unit, they passed the initial scrutiny of the Huks, who thereafter did not interfere with them, though they did keep them under surveillance and occasionally used them to obtain supplies.

Living with the guerrillas as they did, COL. VALERIANO and his men came to know the pattern of the village support organization, and indeed the entire *modus operandi* by which the armed Huk units were being supplied and taxes raised for their support. Also, they began to recognize individuals who might be recruited as counteragents. At first, most of those who were approached with the suggestion that they work for the government refused to co-operate. The reason for their reluctance was either lack of understanding or fear; only rarely was it to be sought in dedication to the guerrilla cause. Those who were successfully recruited in this way, however, formed the basis of an intelligence network that began with few agents and simple methods but grew slowly in numbers and complexity.

In the beginning liaison with local agents was maintained by such primitive

devices as leaving messages under certain stones or behind a given church pillar. Gradually, however, it became possible to obtain a wealth of valuable information by infiltrating small numbers of men, with radio sets, into the outlying area, where, hidden in the bushes, they could keep an eye on the village at all times, observing the routine of all its inhabitants, noting any unfamiliar faces that turned up, and tracing recurrent patterns that pointed to an intelligence network and code. Still later, COL. VALERIANO resorted to kidnapping certain apparently innocuous civilians and taking them to distant headquarters, where they were well treated and usually persuaded to divulge some information—including such seemingly innocent intelligence as who was particularly friendly with a certain person (who happened to be the brother of a guerrilla leader). All leads so obtained were then promptly developed on the chance that they might yield something important.

The Huks' system of communications within their area of operations was simple in its conception and impressive in its effectiveness and reliability; transmission at times was faster than by the government's radio sets. COL. VALERIANO's men stumbled on the entire system almost by accident, after becoming suspicious of certain repetitive patterns of behavior.

The basic principle of the guerrillas was to blend all signals into the scenario, using landscape and native customs as camouflage for the code. Thus, in a landscape dotted with houses and small farmyards, one woman, on seeing a squad of the government forces walking around, would open a certain window within sight of the next house; a young girl there, having seen her, would go and nonchalantly open her garden gate; in the next house, a little boy of nine would watch for that signal, and then run and tie a clothesline from one side of his yard to another; and so the transmission process would continue, until the signal reached the armed Huk forces well outside the village. The security circle around the armed camps themselves was so good as to be virtually impenetrable, and even the barking of dogs was exploited by the guerrillas as a signal of movement and an indication of its direction.

In time, COL. VALERIANO's intelligence, too, learned to use elements in the environment as the props for its own communications system, down to the barking of the dogs, which during the night served to alert the counterinsurgents to the secret departure of villagers, who could then be intercepted by blocking forces.

To track down large concentrations of Huks, COL. VALERIANO's unit developed very effective air-ground intelligence liaison with the aid of the light aircraft attached to their battalion. To this end, they first recruited in the guerrilla area persons who were able to signal to planes, and who could be expected to learn very

quickly of the presence of any Huk concentrations (for news traveled fast, and the farmers had to be informed of the arrival of any guerrillas they were expected to help feed). Secret patrols then went to instruct those agents in a simple code, which consisted of three basic signals. The information sought concerned the size of any enemy force, the direction in which it was moving, and whether or not it was likely to stay in the area. Each agent would have his own set of signals, different from all others, so as to avoid establishing patterns and giving the show away. And all of these were mapped and co-ordinated at battalion headquarters.

In the typical setting in which the ordinary villager lived and moved, the arrangement with the agent—the owner of a house and yard—might be as follows. If he learned that a concentration of guerrillas was due northeast of where he lived, he would lean his plough against the northeast corner of his house; if his information was that the force numbered between 150 and 200 men, he would place two haystacks together; if he learned of a planned ambush, he would open the gate. Whatever the particular signals, they always blended naturally with the environment and a farmer's typical routine.

With the several observation posts pinpointed on a large map at battalion headquarters, pilots would be sent out for three flights daily, always by irregular patterns but in such a way as to reach all signals from all posts. Each agent had his code number, under which the pilot would report back to headquarters the information picked up from the ground. And even though the intelligence of the individual observer was at best approximate, the signals of all observers combined, when plotted on a single map, would yield a surprisingly reliable estimate, on the basis of which many successful ambushes were laid. The size of the network depended, of course, on the number of agents that could be recruited, but the general attempt was to have at least one ground spotter for every 10 square miles, and often the coverage was much denser.

At COL. BOHANNAN's suggestion, COL. VALERIANO went on to describe his techniques for screening a village in order to obtain informants. After initial blunders—the combination of a blind, uninformed approach, poor troop conduct, lack of discipline, and consequent hostility on the part of the population—he standardized methods, instituted discipline through rigid supervision of the soldiers, and made the officers responsible for any infractions by the men. In a well-defined operating procedure, the screening force was divided into several specially trained units. One of these, the "enclosing unit," would seal off all village exits and entrances; the "security unit" served as a reserve in support of the enclosing unit; the "collection unit" assembled the inhabitants in the center of the village; still another

was the "search unit." Members of this last unit would visit and search individual houses in the company of a leading village official, who then signed a statement that nothing but subversive materials had been seized (to forestall any Huk allegations that the searchers were robbing the citizens). The collecting unit would separate the men from the women and children, keep them from communicating with one another, and send them, in turn, to be individually interrogated. Afterward, the testimony of alleged relatives and friends would be compared, and false cover stories spotted by cross-examination on such minor details as family birthdays and recent breakfast fare.

Psychological warfare methods included simple dramatics (a witness who appeared to have been shot dead for not giving the asked-for information, at the sight of whose "body," covered with chicken blood, the next man invariably volunteered to speak), and also such subtler techniques as disguising a soldier as a village informer, covering him with a canvas sack, with holes only for his eyes, and asking him to identify the person being interrogated—a spectacle so demoralizing that it alone was often enough to persuade a man to tell the truth. Once everyone was known to have been separately interrogated, and all men were thus under equal suspicion of having passed on whatever intelligence was divulged, it was quite safe for any loyal person to come forward with information.

Prolonged screening processes, during which large numbers of people would be sitting around idle, also offered an opportunity for the civic action teams to make their first impression. They would talk to the waiting crowds, entertain the children, administer medical treatment and advice, and generally show the populace that their aim was to be helpful, not vindictive. After repeated visits of this kind, if it was possible to keep the nuisance factor to a minimum, most villages responded; it was not uncommon for the brother of a Huk commander to come forward and promise to talk his brother into surrendering, on condition that the brother not be harmed.

In order to win their co-operation, the government forces had to convince the civilians of two things: that they were determined to get the information they needed, and that, far from wanting to shoot down every guerrilla that came out of the bush (as Huk propaganda alleged), they were prepared to deal humanely with those who surrendered.

CAPT. JEAPES, whose chief experience had been with the SAS (Special Air Service) in the Malayan jungle, had faced a rather different and more difficult problem in obtaining information from the natives. The Chinese terrorists (CT's) had withdrawn from the perimeter, where they were controlled, into the deep jungle

inhabited by the peaceful nomadic aborigines, and had won the confidence of those simple people by teaching them how to produce more and better food in exchange for a portion of the crop. When the SAS moved in, the aborigines at first denied having seen any terrorists, but as the men stayed and lived with the natives for weeks on end, the information began to come in. After a few months, however, the unit would have to leave, the CT's would return, reprisals were severe and often bloody, and the next security force that came in would have a hopelessly difficult time eliciting any information at all.

In an unsuccessful experiment some of the aborigines nearer the outskirts of the jungle were moved into resettlement areas, safe from the Chinese; but although better provided for than ever before in their lives, these jungle nomads could not live outside their natural surroundings.

A better solution turned out to be the construction of so-called jungle forts. In areas where the SAS found enough local tribes to warrant it, the patrols would begin by cutting a landing zone for helicopters, which would then fly in materials and Malay police. With the help of the Malaysians and even some of the aborigines the jungle fort would then be built, not as a stronghold, but as a base to which the patrols could come for food, ammunition, and, most important, medical equipment (the most persuasive factor in winning the aborigines' support for the security forces). These jungle forts consisted of sandbag positions at the center, some atap huts around them in which people could sleep, storage facilities, and a few outposts on the periphery that would enable those inside to withstand a limited attack. Not to be confused with some thirteen-odd large base forts, which included landing strips and fortifications, these jungle forts were actually no more than central police posts from which the tribal area would be continually patrolled (by police, rather than by the SAS, whose job had really ended with the setting up of the arrangement).

As they saw frequent patrols and police, as the security forces helped them to improve their crops without asking a share of them in return, as they received medical care, presents of cloth, and, when they needed it, food, and as now and then they saw one of their erstwhile communist demigods in a sad state of defeat, the aborigines came to feel better protected and cared-for by the legitimate forces than they ever had been by the terrorists. They were even willing to suppress their nomadic preferences and stay within the patrolled area, especially since they were compensated for any crop losses they suffered as a result; and as they felt safer and friendlier, they began to volunteer information without urging.

Personal contact, however, was all-important in winning and maintaining their confidence, and it was the unorthodox soldier (the man who was regarded in his

own unit as slightly mad) who often proved to possess the greatest faculty for making himself liked and accepted by the natives to a degree that the CT's had never achieved. Every police post would select several such men and assign them as "key men" to the tribes under its control, one to each tribe. By living, feasting, and playing cards with the *penghulu*, they would quickly win the popularity that enabled them to obtain what information they wanted.

COL. WHITE, operating in the settled areas outside the jungle, had encountered entirely different intelligence problems requiring different techniques. Figure 3 served as basis for his description of the *modus operandi* within two or three years after his arrival in a typical "black" area.

The town in the northwest corner, including the adjoining village (a particularly bad one originally located to the southwest, which had been moved, crops and all, to the outskirts of the large town), as well as all other villages and the living areas of the plantations, were completely surrounded by wire so as to help keep the bandits out and the food in. Originally, it was easy enough for innocent-looking tappers to go out and meet with the bandits at the jungle's edge (sometimes wearing three shirts and a pair of shoes, which they would shed before returning), and almost as easy for the terrorists to mix with the people in the plantations, carrying back with them rice and other supplies. These possibilities were greatly curtailed by the wire enclosures, together with a strictly enforced curfew—no tapping after 4 in the afternoon, and all lights out at 8. The very effective food-denial plan required all food, both in towns and on the plantations, to be centrally cooked, with carefully calculated rations, and handed out twice a day. These activities were well guarded by the police (never the military) or, in the later stages of control, the home guard.

COL. WHITE's forces faced three kinds of enemies: (a) The "armed work forces" (AWF's), jungle-based and under the leadership of a former schoolteacher, who were natives of the area, knew every inch of the terrain, and had friends and relatives among the population with whom they maintained regular contact, visiting at certain times and places, and communicating by much the same signals as those COL. VALERIANO had described earlier; (b) the "independent platoons," killer-boys who operated in the deep jungle but would come out long enough to collect medical supplies and food and lay ambushes, and who were connected with one another throughout Malaya by courier routes and occasionally, though not often, by radio; and (c) the communist headquarters in the south and in the north, and the main headquarters in the central section of Malaya, which directed the over-all operation.

Against this background, the information to be gathered was of two kinds,




FIG. 3—The *Modus Operandi* on the Jungle Outskirts of Malaya

military intelligence and "special branch" intelligence. The former, a direct responsibility of COL. WHITE in his capacity of military commander, was obtained largely by two standard methods: by tracing the past history of the AWF's and independent platoons in an effort to discern a pattern for the direction of their movements, the frequency and intervals of their visits, and the particular estates at which they made contact, so as to be able to anticipate them; and by patrolling, thereby hoping to find tracks, to stumble on a courier post, and to set ambushes from which to observe the enemy's movements.

The more complex task was that of the head of the actual intelligence organization (the "Special Branch"), whose office, like COL. WHITE's command post, was inside the police station and next to that of the head of police. He obtained his information through agents, from captured terrorists and surrenderers, and by search-and-sweep operations. COL. WHITE and his military intelligence officer cooperated and consulted with this chief of the local Special Branch at every opportunity, deferring to his authority and judgment, and passing on to him and his very efficient staff for development and action all captured prisoners and anyone who came to the military offering information.

The Special Branch officer, familiar to all the natives, was known to have his pockets stuffed with Malayan money that he was ready to hand out in exchange for information. Moreover, "safe" houses were maintained outside the village, to which newly captured persons could be taken by armored car without anyone's knowing their whereabouts or the fact of their capture.

COL. WHITE cited the spectacular case of the terrorist area leader, who was captured with his wife, spirited to such a safe house, and persuaded to join the government's side, at handsome pay. After a trial contact with the villagers, to make sure that no one knew of his capture or was likely to suspect him, he rejoined the CT's as a government agent and, within six months, was responsible for forty captures.

Search-and-sweep operations in Malaya were much as described by COL. VALERIANO, except for the fact that the search area was cordoned off; the troops did the searching, but the Special Branch officer and his men did the interrogating, and villagers were obliged to be present to witness the correctness of the proceedings.

Despite the fact that intelligence was centered (wisely, COL. WHITE thought) in one organization, despite the efficiency of Special Branch and its growing network of agents, and even though most of the enemy's signals gradually became known, there were occasions even late in the war when all the information was at hand and the CT's nevertheless succeeded in outwitting their opponents.

COL. WHITE then outlined in some detail the structure by which at every level

—from the center of government, through the nine Malayan states, down to the local level at which he himself was operating—policies and decisions were vested jointly in the chief administrative officer, the top military men, and the civilian head of the Special Branch. Below the capital these functions were combined in the State War Executive Committees (SWEC's), and below these in area War Executive Committees (several such WEC's to a state, their exact number depending on the area's geographical characteristics and the size of enemy and troop concentrations in it).

In COL. WHITE's command, collaboration took the form of scrupulous consultation in advance of every move. Indeed, it was symbolized in the so-called morning prayers, daily meetings attended by the commander or his deputy, the district officer, the head policeman, the local head of Special Branch, as well as persons of more limited responsibility (such as the men in charge of food denial, forestry, and the like). The commander took no major step without the blessing of both the police chief and the head of Special Branch, and each was at all times fully informed of all activities of the other two. The military intelligence officer, though he did not know everything that Special Branch was doing, enjoyed its confidence and had enough information for a fruitful collaboration.

The peculiar circumstances in which operations were conducted, the need to move amidst watchful women and children who were known to be enlisted in the enemy's elaborate signaling system, and the fact that the several companies of a battalion were distributed over a large area (with some as much as 20 miles from headquarters) required the strictest measures for the protection of all plans, large and small. No plan was ever made without the presence, and the express approval, of the signal officer (a point whose importance COL. WHITE stressed the more emphatically as he felt that it was not sufficiently appreciated in the American forces). Once a decision had been made and orders had been given to the company, no one was allowed to leave the company area until the operation was well launched.

As a standard precaution in nearly all operations, the troops would leave by night. Moreover, to camouflage the movement of troops and agents, military vehicles were kept in motion at all times on roads specially built along the jungle fringe. On those occasions when they were transporting troops, the men were trained to leave them, fully equipped, at speeds of up to 20 miles an hour, to disappear into the jungle singly, and to reassemble at a prearranged place. (They usually were picked up by helicopters, and returned after a circuitous flight.)

Special Branch maintained accurate dossiers on the guerrillas, as well as on the wives who were with them and on their families in the villages. Knowing which wives were pregnant, the troops would listen for the cry of a baby in the jungle at

the appropriate time, or lie in wait for the visiting father if the child was born in the village. Wherever possible, the dossiers included photographs of the men (and even the women) which, aside from their obvious usefulness in identification, contributed to troop morale by giving the men a sense of knowing what the enemy looked like whom they were asked to chase. CAPT. JEAPES recalled a time, before helicopter traffic in and out of the deep jungle became relatively easy, when SAS patrols were equipped with small, cheap cameras and asked to photograph every CT they killed and take his fingerprints, for use in identification and also in statistics on the size of the enemy forces.

Finally, terrorists as well as counterinsurgents watched the calendar closely for any holidays—Chinese, Indian, Malay, Australian—when those feasting and drinking might be expected to relax their guard. COL. WHITE at times planned entire operations, with the aid of the calendar, in terms of such calculations.

The techniques used in Algeria were similar in some respects, yet they differed in others in response to the unique demands of the situation. The French, COL. GALULA explained, were up against three types of rebel units and organizations: the armed forces of the FLN, separately organized terror groups, and the rebels' political organization within the population. Moreover, the intelligence problem varied greatly, and required different techniques, with each of the three main stages of the war, which were determined by changing ratios of military strength and popular support.

In the first stage, from the beginning of the war in November 1954 until early 1956, the rebellion spread like brushfire, and the French had neither enough troops nor any support from the people, with the result that they rarely obtained good intelligence and, if they did, were unable to act on it. In the second stage, from early 1956 to 1957, they were still lacking popular support, and their operations, therefore, were blind rather than planned on the basis of intelligence. But manpower by then was adequate, and the forces succeeded in breaking the FLN military organization to the point of reducing it to very small units. Only in the third and final stage, however, did the French have sufficient support from the populace as well as the means to stage major operations (the main problems, by that time, being posed by the rugged terrain and the fact that the armed rebel bands were too small to offer targets).

Support from the people was clearly the crucial determinant for successful intelligence, and, hence, ultimately for victory. At the highest level of theater and government, where it was possible to intercept the rebels' radio broadcasts to their organizations in Algeria and abroad, the French did have information, but only of

the kind that is transmitted through such channels. Below these, intelligence had to be obtained from the people, and at the beginning it was at best sporadic; information volunteered by captured rebels, if not actually false, was either already known or impossible to exploit.

The first systematic breakthrough came from the realization that the rebels were forcing their organization, including the obligation to contribute to its support, on the people, all of whom knew the identity of the FLN agent who collected their money and who, in turn, was in touch with the higher echelons. With this approach in mind, and aided by the fact that, nominally and physically, they were in control throughout Algeria while the rebels were hiding, the French compartmentalized the country, and the officer and his unit in charge of a compartment were thus able to interrogate and get to know every person within that sector. The method was simple and effective. However, there were mistakes and abuses that led in early 1957 to the formation of a special unit, called *détachement opérationnel de protection*. These were security troops, which were sent as needed to any local commander on his request.

On the same principle, an army paratroop division was called in to take over police functions in Algiers in 1957 after a small terrorist unit of about fifty rebels had effectively terrorized the entire city of 600,000, including the once loyal police. It took the army just one month to wipe out the FLN's civil organization in Algiers.

COL. GALULA, too, had coped effectively with the problem of breaking the civil organization in the villages and towns within his command and of persuading the people to pass on the information he needed. He proceeded from the knowledge that the rebels had a three-man committee in every village (the leader, the political commissar, and the money collector), and that the villagers knew every one of the three.

COL. GALULA's favorite and most successful technique, shortly after he had begun to garrison a village, was to arrest simultaneously several citizens for minor infractions of the curfew or other rules, and to keep them locked up without further punishment or trial. He would interrogate them every day, until, worn out with waiting and feeling somewhat protected by their very number, they would talk one by one. After that, COL. GALULA could arrest the village FLN cell and its collaborators—anywhere from ten to fifteen people—knowing that these were the right people. Once a village had been purged, the information always flowed readily. And every reconstituted political organization proved inferior to the previous generation and easier to break.

The difficulty in Algeria came as the rebels' armed forces declined in size. From up to battalion size in early 1957 they went to less than company strength a year later, until in 1959 the armed enemy consisted only of many small groups of three to ten men. In their attempt to survive, these isolated insurgent bands were favored, on the one hand, by the rugged terrain and, on the other hand, by the surprising density of the population. For one thing, they could easily obtain what food they needed; the weekly market day, to which crowds of people came from far away, was too well established a custom for the government to stop, and it made any food-denial plan useless. Observation from the air or through binoculars was equally unsuccessful, as the rebels moved only by night.

Eventually, the problem was attacked somewhat more efficiently with the organization of the aforementioned *commandos de chasse*. These units of 30 to 120 men (most of them rebel defectors) were lightly equipped and supplied (the problem of supply and reinforcement was simple because of the large number of posts throughout the country) and sent out into the woods for as much as five days on end to watch and stalk any guerrillas they found, overpower them if they could, and otherwise send the alarm. In the end, however, the surviving rebel bands, though their identities were well known, were caught largely by accident, like small flies in a large net, for they had lost contact with the population, and any information leading to a capture was thus no more than a happy chance.

COL. GALULA gave two examples of the virtual hopelessness of this problem. His troops tried for three years to capture the leader of one of the five major regional areas, whose radio communication with Tunisia they were intercepting. But, although the man's position had been spotted within a perimeter of less than 5 miles, and a total of 2000 troops in those three years went out in an attempt to capture him, he was caught and killed only when he accidentally fell into an ambush while on his way to a meeting in Tunisia in early 1959.

The previous May, Joseph Alsop had visited the command post and accompanied COL. GALULA on what Alsop later called "a blank day": ten battalions trying in vain to catch a group of from ten to thirty rebels known to be hiding in a certain forest area, 6 kilometers long and 4 kilometers wide. After a deception operation the battalions, carefully spaced out, had moved in from all sides during the first hours of darkness, completed the "encirclement" two hours before sunrise, and found no one!

In answer to a final question about the density of French government troops: COL. GALULA's sector (about 20 miles long and 20 miles wide) had seven battalions

in June 1956; four battalions in the spring of 1957; two in 1959; and only one in 1960, whose strength was not concentrated, but was distributed (with the help of the militia) over all the posts once occupied by seven battalions and several newer posts as well.

COL. FERTIG, though technically he had been on the guerrilla side, likened some of his problems to those of the counterinsurgents. His organization represented a legitimate government, which had to bring into line certain dissident guerrilla operators, with the Japanese obviously as a third and major factor. He subscribed wholeheartedly to the idea that only a very large number of agents and informants can supply the kind of intelligence most needed in counterinsurgency—quite contrary to the orthodox military belief that one good agent is better than a lot of poor ones. Might a machine be devised, he wondered, which, on being fed a great deal of semireliable information from many minor agents, could come up with a picture as full and accurate as would be supplied by a small number of top agents? COL. FERTIG then recalled various specific aspects of his Philippine experience.

The aim of his troops had been to force the Japanese to patrol in large elements, rather than in many small units, so as to furnish targets. Also, the larger the operation the more planning it required, and the guerrillas were usually forewarned of an impending major attack by an increase in radio traffic. Thus, in country where all movement was by animal or on foot, they had time to move out of the way of the attackers. Then, when the patrols were returning to the garrison, tired and more careless as they neared the end of the trek, the guerrillas would try to trap them.

The most dangerous element against the guerrillas was the Bureau of Constabulary established by the Japanese—Filipinos indistinguishable from the guerrillas themselves. But, as mentioned earlier, the steady harassment of these active troops forced the Japanese to withdraw them, leaving only the Japanese enemy himself.

The war in the Philippines proved to COL. FERTIG, among other things, that the guerrilla, in order to survive and win, must have better intelligence about the enemy than the enemy has about him. The Philippine guerrillas were fortunate in being provided, from the start, with Australian radio equipment and in having the operators to handle it. They were forced, however, to remove the voice tubes from the sets, as even the strictest discipline could not prevent the men from making the occasional idle remark that, if monitored, would give their position away.

With the Japanese in control of the air, and night movements limited by the presence of snakes and crocodiles, guerrilla operations were normally confined to small parties (mostly three or four men, and never more than a squadron except on the waterways), who went out just before dawn carrying their own supplies. In controlled areas they would move as much and as often as possible to convince the population that it was being protected.

Everything was done to avoid establishing patterns ("the curse of the guerrilla movement," as COL. FERTIG called it). A platoon was allowed to operate in a given area for no more than ten days; refresher courses in jungle warfare taught the importance of avoiding such habits as cooking every day at the same time or sleeping in the same place; and training camps as well as headquarters were moved frequently, except in protected areas. Before moving headquarters (sixty-one days being the longest that COL. FERTIG ever stayed in any one), the guerrillas would build three or four new ones in different spots, and until the morning of the move no one knew which would actually be occupied.

These precautions were indicated because the Japanese were using much the same kinds of sources as the guerrillas (bar-room conversations and low-level agents) and were building up a good intelligence network. To some extent, they succeeded in penetrating the guerrilla organization, though never very deeply. One of their mistakes was to give their intelligence net a twofold job—collection as well as penetration; another blunder, widely publicized by the guerrilla side, was to execute their own informers as well as enemy agents.

Going back to counterinsurgent operations in Malaya, MR. HOSMER asked COL. SHIRLEY whether he and his operations-research group had concerned themselves with problems of intelligence. They had not, COL. SHIRLEY explained, but had confined themselves to the examination of weapons equipment and techniques, with a view to applying operations-research methods to their improvement. The chief reasons for not entering directly into the area of intelligence were (a) that his group was skilled only in the field of communications intelligence, and this form of intelligence, though vitally important, was not obtainable and usable in that theater and that kind of war as one would like to imagine; and (b) that communications monitoring in Malaya did not play the part that one had come to assume on the basis of the European experience in World War II.

COL. SHIRLEY elaborated on both these points. The methods that COL. WHITE had described earlier were typical and most satisfactory for all military operations against small enemy concentrations. With close liaison between the military and the Special Branch—most important at battalion level, but repeated wherever

possible at company level—Special Branch obtained the information and fed it to the commander, who used it as a basis for planning ambushes and attacks. General headquarters, where COL. SHIRLEY was working with both army and air force, would receive the occasional request for air force action against an enemy camp inside the jungle fringe to which the battalion commander had decided not to commit his troops, and would be supplied with whatever intelligence, locally obtained, might help pinpoint the location of the camp on the photographs of the jungle fringe that were maintained at headquarters. As it turned out, however, the information was rarely accurate enough for the precise map references that were needed by the pilots. In addition, the aircraft were fitted with navigational aids that were inadequate for the particular terrain, distances, and low-level attacks involved.

The conclusion among the operations-research staff, therefore, was that sudden surprise of the enemy—the most desirable and most difficult objective—was in most instances achieved, not in direct response to intelligence, but through essentially orthodox techniques that had been modified and sharpened (above all, through the patient and persistent combing of any area where enemy movement was suspected).

As for the monitoring of communications, it came as something of a shock to those conditioned by the European theater, who had been taught the importance of radio security and the need for deception techniques, to realize that the prime requirement for the military in Malaya was simply to get through. Any concern about interception by the Communists was overshadowed by the effort to overcome the difficulty, inadequacy, and slowness of communications. The British battalion groups operated on a number of fixed high frequencies, which in many cases they did not change from one end of the month, or even the year, to the next, unless it were to avoid interference. Furthermore, all the units of a battalion were on the same frequency, so as to heighten the chances that every report would be picked up by at least one of them. Detection and identification should thus have been quite easy for the Chinese terrorists, but if they did intercept, there was no evidence that it ever paid off for them. Had there been, the British would quickly have changed the system.

As a final point in the morning's discussion, MR. HOSMER raised the question of the usefulness of bombing in guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare. How many kills, he asked COL. SHIRLEY, could the average bombing run in Malaya be expected to yield?

In the period of the emergency with which he had been associated (that is,

1949-1951), COL. SHIRLEY did not recall evidence of anyone's being killed by the daily sorties against targets. There were several reasons why planes were nevertheless used: (a) they had an undeniable psychological effect on the guerrillas; (b) they provided stops across lines of escape that could not be covered by infantry (a far preferable system); and (c) they were a means of justifying the presence of as much air force strength as London would permit, against the possibility that these planes might suddenly have to play a vital part in a larger limited war with Communist China. In Malaya the planes actually had a very limited function in the attack role. They clearly could not be used against villages, nor even in the areas between settlements. Their use remained confined to the jungle fringe and (in response, for example, to a radio message from CAPT. JEAPES reporting the presence and location of a camp) the deep jungle.

The problem of target-marking, the participants agreed, was never solved satisfactorily, though balloons were the preferred method. COL. SHIRLEY recalled general headquarters' preoccupation with the difficulty of sighting a communist camp without being sighted first by the concealed communist sentries on the perimeter tracks. The opportunity to use a balloon as target marker was thus rare indeed, because the CT's would disperse on the alarm from their sentries. COL. SHIRLEY did not, however, rule out the possible usefulness of such a target-marking device in theaters where the guerrilla has become very strong and his larger units thus offer more substantial targets. Vietnam, he thought, might prove to be such an area, as the situation there appeared to be moving from sublimited to limited warfare.

COL. WHITE had found bombing a waste of money and of time because of the small size of enemy groups and the difficulty of accurate positioning. He had, however, used fighter support with some success. Indeed, if the enemy's camps had been larger, this might have been the answer, though, to be fully effective, it would have required the shortening and simplification of communications to the planes. Once again, however, COL. WHITE warned against overemphasizing the British operational experiences in Malaya; with its basic framework of established British administration and a loyal native police, it had been an atypical theater, where commanders like himself never faced some of the formidable problems and obstacles that confronted other members of the Symposium.

APRIL 19, 1962, P.M.\*

## INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (II) ORGANIZATION, METHODS, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT

*Psychological Foundations for an Effective Intelligence Network ~ The Value of a Single Intelligence Service versus Separate Civilian and Military Organizations ~ Several Counterinsurgent Campaigns: How Their Intelligence Organizations Reflect the Unique Circumstances of Each ~ The Potential Role of the Civilian Police: A Question of Reliability, Power, and Training ~ Enabling the Informer To Pass Intelligence with Impunity ~ Mechanical Problems of Effective Communications in Difficult Terrain: A Specialist's Account of Research and Experimentation in Malaya (the Use of Skywave; Choosing Optimum Frequencies; Some Causes of Failures and Their Corrections; the Problems of Accurate Tuning and Workable Antennas; Making Do with Available Equipment) ~ Batteries and Various Types of Generators: The Problem of Powering Radio Sets under Adverse Conditions of Climate and Resupply ~ Recent Improvements in Communications Equipment ~ Divergent Opinions on Requisites for an Adequate Village or Outpost Alarm System (from Push-button Signal to Two-way Voice Transmission) ~ Facilities and Procedures for Instant Responsive Action as the Crucial Requirement for an Effective Signaling System ~ An Example from the Philippines: A Successful Signaling System Based on Simple Devices, Careful Organization, and Adaptation to the Local Scene ~ The Case for the Simple, Inexpensive Gadget over the More Complex ~ The "Paraffin Test" and Possible Analogous Devices To Identify Guerrillas*

BEFORE THE GROUP addressed itself to the details of intelligence and counter-intelligence techniques, COL. SHIRLEY made this general and basic point, on which he was seconded by other participants: People, he said, are alike in that they want to be on the winning side; therefore, if the democracies can convince the local nation in a guerrilla warfare theater that they, rather than the Com-

\*Present: Col. Bohannon, Mr. Ellis, Col. Fertig, Col. Galula, Mr. Greene, Mr. Hosmer, Capt. Jeapes, Mr. Phillips, Mr. Rutkowski, Col. Shirley, Col. Valeriano.

munists, will be the ultimate winners, they will not only gain the psychological advantage but will also break through the intelligence barrier. If they fail to do that, even their sympathizers among the local people will naturally shun the danger of informing on the Communists whom they expect to be their masters in the end.

MR. PHILLIPS, in support of COL. SHIRLEY's statement, pointed out that the Communists themselves fully recognized its truth and, therefore, in their propaganda never let up on the theme of inevitable final victory even in the face of setbacks.

CAPT. JEAPES had seen the success of this tactic well illustrated among the people of Southeast Asia. Although the large majority of these were not Communists but industrious, peaceful people interested mainly in their families and the business of making a living, many of them worked for the CT's in Malaya, for example, because they felt they had no alternative. Indeed, they begged the British to protect them, in wire enclosures if necessary, against having to help the Communists.

Turning to the specific techniques of both sides in various past theaters of operations, MR. PHILLIPS described some of the difficulties the Laotian government had had to overcome before it could establish the kind of relations with the people that would yield information. In the days of French rule, when the Communists first came to a village of peaceful Laotians unwilling to do violence to anybody, they methodically set about involving and implicating individuals in terrorist acts, convincing them that they were thereafter on the French blacklist and had best prepare for retaliation, and thus gradually committing more and more of them to anti-French attitudes and violent action. Once committed to the other side, these people were difficult to win back.

COL. BOHANNAN returned the discussion to the idea of a single intelligence organization—which COL. WHITE had defended at the morning session, and which undoubtedly had proved workable in Malaya—as one that he thought inconceivable as well as inadvisable in any country not accustomed to British rule and its unique practices. The safer system, whose adoption COL. BOHANNAN favored for all countries faced with insurgency problems, was one in which military intelligence played the primary role, with a second (civilian) intelligence service fulfilling its own useful functions, and each service checking on the other to prevent the danger of its usurping too much power or becoming corrupt. In this way, to be sure, the information might have to go all the way up to the president's office before it could be fully co-ordinated, but the greater danger, COL.

BOHANNAN thought, lay in allowing the fear of exposing operational plans to control the intelligence system. He cited as symptomatic of this mistaken attitude COL. WHITE's remark that he "knew everything, but [his] intelligence officer did not."

Moreover, he was not easily persuaded that the British system was necessarily the more efficient. In the Philippines between 1947 and 1950 the following were working on the communist problem in Manila alone: Military Intelligence Service (MIS) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (with separate branches of intelligence and counterintelligence), the Philippine Constabulary, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Ministry of the Interior, secret agents of the president, Customs, Immigration, Internal Revenue, secret agents of the Special Branch of the Manila Police, and intelligence agents of other countries. With all the inevitable confusion, overlapping, and rivalry that went with this diversity of effort, these many organizations, with large numbers of people and very little money, did a good job of maintaining intelligence on the Communists.

Later, when action against the Huks really got under way, intelligence activity in the field was the responsibility of MIS, whose support of the combat forces took two forms. Certain teams were more or less permanently assigned to the combat forces (each battalion combat team had one MIS team); other teams operated directly out of headquarters, either to augment a particular combat team or to work independently of the military commander in the area. The permanent assignment of MIS officers throughout an area with a view to establishing informants' nets against possible subversion, all the while co-operating closely with any combat units in the area, seemed to COL. BOHANNAN a *sine qua non* in all countries with actual or potential guerrilla problems.

CAPT. JEAPES (speaking also on behalf of the absent COL. WHITE) was shocked at the assumption of other-than-total trust between the services. But to COL. BOHANNAN a certain degree of distrust, rivalry, and even occasional enmity between the civilian and the military intelligence services was a fact of life that did not seriously affect the capacity for fighting the common enemy; obviously, one had to seek within such a system what co-ordination and collaboration one could achieve.

To COL. SHIRLEY, who described the single-service arrangement as administratively and psychologically the only possible extension of the situation the military encountered on arriving in Malaya, COL. BOHANNAN granted that this was indeed the natural and best method for Malaya (as for other parts of the British Empire). But compare this, he suggested, with the average South American,

Middle Eastern, or Southeast Asian country, where the principal business of the armed forces is to maintain internal security in case of a rebellion, while the ministry of the interior most likely controls a national police force (which, if necessary, can be played off against the armed forces), and, finally, the president may have his own "national intelligence service" to keep watch over the first two. In case of rebellion, if the army had no intelligence service of its own, it would have to rely on that of the police, and this would result not only in interservice dependence and rivalry, but also in an unsatisfactory flow of information wherever (as is likely to be the case) at least part of the police is connected with or in favor of the rebellion. The only safeguard against such a situation, COL. BOHANNAN repeated, is a separate military intelligence service, with resident officers and agents throughout the country who co-operate with the police and other services but owe allegiance to the armed forces.

The police in a given country, COL. SHIRLEY pointed out, may be fully trustworthy if properly supported. (No doubt the British had an alternative system in readiness, had the police in Malaya not been loyal.) He stressed also the basic difference between, say, the present picture in Vietnam, and the kind of counterinsurgency operation that begins and is well launched as a mere police action before the military forces are called in—the case of Malaya and also of Kenya. The operations rooms that the British troops found set up in the police stations on their arrival in Malaya were already impressive centers of intelligence operations; the police quickly proved itself both efficient and loyal; they had all the information that the battalion commander lacked; and the working arrangement followed naturally from this situation, with the police looking after the undercover methods and the troops concentrating on the typically military (in a sense more orthodox) intelligence.

Algeria (COL. GALULA) experienced both the unified and the dual system, as these had just been described. At the higher levels, that is to say, in the cities, the intelligence task was divided among (a) the *Police de Renseignements Généraux*, (b) the *Sûreté*, and (c) the *Bureau de Sécurité de Territoire* (counterintelligence). In the rural areas, by contrast, the *Sûreté* did not operate; the civilian police was powerless; the constabulary was militarily oriented; and the army, therefore, did all intelligence work in the field with a single (military intelligence) service.

The situation in the Philippines (COL. FERTIG) was different from any of those mentioned. The Huk insurgents were Filipinos, and the troops in the field fighting them were Filipinos. With only few American advisors, and much fumbling and pressure at the political level because of vested interests, the counterinsurgency

effort was slow in being organized. COL. BOHANNAN likened that situation to the one in Vietnam today. Much though the United States would like him to, President Diem is not prepared to create the kind of intelligence organization that would be most efficient, for fear that unscrupulous politicians might try to gain control of so powerful an instrument and use it to cut his throat. In other words, Diem must tolerate inefficiency to remain strong and keep his opponents from uniting ("a tradition of France," was COL. GALULA's comment, "where a single, unified police and intelligence service is considered dangerous").

For South Vietnam, and indeed for most underdeveloped countries, MR. PHILLIPS was inclined to make a case for the military man as the best intelligence person. The police in most new countries lack, among other things, the experience and the training that would make them a useful intelligence organization against the guerrillas. In MR. PHILLIPS' experience, a combat commander in the army in a country such as Vietnam is often not only the best intelligence officer but also the best administrator and the best economic developer of an area; it is a fact, though it may not be very desirable or even efficient, that a few reliable and competent men usually end up running everything anyway, civil as well as military.

CAPT. JEAPES, strengthening his earlier argument against the supremacy of military intelligence, contended that the average villager was likelier to entrust his information to the policeman he had known all his life than to the unknown soldier from outside the village. This was not necessarily so, said COL. BOHANNAN; the villager could have good political reasons for distrusting his policeman-neighbor, yet might have been well impressed with the army's efficiency and its ability to protect him. COL. VALERIANO looked at the question from still another angle. The villager (who is eager, above all, not to stick his neck out) prefers to report to the man who is in a position to act on the information immediately—a possible reason that he may choose to go to the village law-enforcement officer rather than to the MIS man who must first report to headquarters.

The potential informer who has trouble finding a safe way of parting with his information, everyone agreed, is a common problem. CAPT. JEAPES recalled a simple and effective method used in Malaya, by which the police would surround a village during curfew and leave a piece of blank paper at every house; in the morning, they would let each villager drop his paper (unmarked except for the information itself) into a large box, which was later opened at police headquarters, with the anonymity of the informants thus fully protected. As another tried channel of information COL. FERTIG mentioned the Catholic priest, at least so long as the enemy is an agent of communism or another ungodly cause.

To MR. HOSMER the preceding discussion showed a very general agreement on the importance of intelligence in fighting the guerrilla, but at the same time it revealed the absence of any consensus on the mechanics by which to achieve it. Methods will have to vary from area to area and according to local conditions, and it is clearly futile to try to formulate any generally applicable rule.

MR. HOSMER then invited COL. SHIRLEY to speak about the problems and techniques of communications, a field in which the Colonel had particularly wide and valuable experience.

The War Office in London, COL. SHIRLEY explained, recognized early in the emergency that failure of communications was a crucial bottleneck in military operations in Malaya. The military power was there, but even when intelligence was adequate, this power could not be brought to bear at the right time and place for lack of communications of the necessary range and quality. COL. SHIRLEY, as a communications engineer and operations-research specialist, was placed in charge of the team sent out to direct operations research in the Far East and, in particular, to apply its techniques to the study and improvement of communications in Malaya. He was told in advance that, to the extent that proposed solutions required equipment, the only acceptable suggestions would be those involving existing and available material. Plans for more advanced radio and other communications equipment were then under way, but off-the-shelf solutions were needed until the time, about three years thence, when such new equipment would actually be available to the forces in the field.

On arrival in Malaya COL. SHIRLEY found that the forces were trying, unsuccessfully in many instances, to operate well outside the range of their equipment. The battalions were using high-frequency (HF) equipment, although, by the end of World War II, the British had followed the Americans in switching to the very high frequencies (VHF), where interference from other stations and from atmospheric disturbances did not occur, but which depended, on the other hand, on the unbroken, undivided direct ray. This last factor had proved to be severely limiting to the use of VHF in Malaya, because the trees and rough terrain immediately screened it. The military, therefore, had fallen back on the heavy and unwieldy HF equipment—difficult to tune and with very low power output—that had been discarded toward the end of the war.

Surprisingly enough, the infantry signalers, who were not specialists and might have been expected to have difficulty operating these sets at other than very short range, had so masterminded their operation (with the use of long wire aerials) that they were able to communicate by morse code (cw) over a distance of 50 to 60

miles. Because the groundwave range in the Malayan terrain was only on the order of a mile or so, they had resorted to the skywave (indirect ray), and had managed the seemingly impossible feat of getting their signals through (as shown in Fig. 4), though they had yet to devise the most efficient system of doing it. The biggest handicap was having to halt in order to communicate, for you could not move in the jungle with a long antenna nor get enough radiation from a set without one. A patrol, therefore, had to stop and prepare the set before he could signal, which might delay a report from minutes to hours; if caught in a firing engagement, he would have no means of reporting until the fight was over.




FIG. 4—The Use of Skywave in Communications in Malaya

COL. SHIRLEY and his team devoted themselves to finding the optimum working frequency for this skywave method of communication. Although the British manuals at the time were basing their guidance for skywave on use of the F layer of the ionosphere, several hundred miles up, the group was able to show, on the basis of ionosphere soundings made at the University of Singapore, that the losses suffered through having to send a ray the much greater distance to the F region considerably outweighed those resulting from the use of a lower frequency, which existed in Malaya during the daytime in the E layer, at a height of only about 80 miles. (Since all traffic and operations in this theater occurred during the day, the limitation of the E region to the daytime hours was not a very serious one.) The

suggestion that the E layer be substituted for the F layer of the ionosphere was adopted for Malaya and eventually incorporated in the signals manuals as well.

A by-product of the work on optimum frequencies was the realization that, regardless of how the direction from battalion to company headquarters to scattered patrols might appear from the ground, with the use of skywave their signals to each other were going within an arc so close to the vertical that it was actually possible to use directional radio techniques by which to beam the signals vertically.

Having decided against the use of the basically much better groundwave (a dangerous decision, but made inevitable by the nature of the terrain), and given the fact that battalion and company headquarters tended to remain fixed for weeks and months, the research team recommended that these headquarters use a very broadly directional antennna, simple and cheap to construct with available material. COL. SHIRLEY chose as adequate for the purpose two half-waves, which gave an immediate gain of 4 or 5 decibels. This solution, in response to a situation that had never before confronted a communications engineer, met with considerable skepticism; but it worked so well that it was adopted throughout Malaya, where eventually it was improved by an antenna substituting two full waves for the two half-waves.

Another weakness the operations-research group examined was the frequent failure of the communicators to get their signals through even with adequate equipment and skill. The most prevalent cause of failure turned out to be the fact that the unsuccessful patrol was on a frequency just slightly different from that of headquarters—a situation easy to correct once it had been identified. The military in Malaya had elected not to change frequencies daily, as has to be done in many theaters for the sake of security. They preferred to operate for the duration on a single frequency (not necessarily the one assigned by Singapore or Kuala Lumpur but usually at least near it), which operators and monitors knew intimately (including the interference to be expected on it), and which lessened the chance of the operators' shifting onto wrong frequencies.

COL. SHIRLEY's group did not discourage this practice, for the enemy, as already mentioned, either was not intercepting these communications or, if he was, failed to take advantage of any intelligence so received. Had there been evidence to the contrary, the advantages of the system would obviously have had to be weighed carefully against its benefits to the other side. But, COL. SHIRLEY warned, it is easy to misinterpret evidence and to credit enemy intelligence with elaborate achievements for which there may be simpler explanations. You have to look very closely at the enemy's capabilities, therefore, making sure that they are in fact due to interception; to avoid the costly mistake of spoiling a good

communications system out of what may be an unwarranted concern over security.

The proper tuning of radio sets always remained a problem in Malaya; time and again, a pilot on a supply-dropping mission, in spite of good signals both ways, would fail to receive the message from the ground for which he was listening, simply because the ground set was a few kilocycles away on another frequency. COL. SHIRLEY and his group unsuccessfully suggested that the entire system be switched to crystal control, which would have obviated the tuning difficulty. The proposal was turned down, partly because of the tremendous number of crystals that would have been needed to support such an operation, but mainly for fear that, being locked inflexibly on one frequency, and unable to slip to either side of it at will, the communicators might find themselves without a usable channel if, for example, they were drowned out unexpectedly by a high-powered Malayan or Chinese station.

Aside from making the most of the disadvantageous situation that precluded the use of VHF (by choosing the best possible frequencies and introducing the simple and cheap antennas already mentioned), the operations-research group looked into the problem of antennas in general. The jungle patrols were resourceful in devising the most varied techniques by which to sling the wires out above the trees. Some used quarter-wave antennas; some, half-wave; some, three-quarter-wave. There were different theories also about the most desirable angle at which to point the aerial, though, as COL. SHIRLEY's group was able to show, the use of the skywave made the orientation of the antenna quite unimportant. Given a free choice, and especially if they were using some groundwave as well, the patrols were advised, for maximum radiation, to point their antenna at right angles to the direction in which they were trying to communicate.

On the whole, however, no major solutions to the antenna problem were found, and no significant changes introduced, as a result of these research efforts. The troops did not take to the idea of using target-marking balloons to raise their antennas, for fear that these might give their positions away. Although the low-strung aerials that they continued to use worked well enough, there is much room for research, COL. SHIRLEY believes, into the question of just how much would be gained in strength of transmission by elevating the antenna to the maximum height to which the troops are physically able to raise it.

The rest of the team's effort was directed toward the design of equipment with a form factor better suited to the operation in Malaya than the heavy and awkward World War II radio sets that were then being used. COL. SHIRLEY was able to look at some excellent light and compact American sets that were being

designed at the time. But being VHF equipment, they were not usable over the large distances in Malaya, where the rugged terrain made it impossible to build—and, if necessary, to defend—the relay stations that would have been required.

In Kenya, by contrast, though the distances were comparable, it was possible to use VHF. Much of the activity there took place outside the jungle, the high points on the rolling terrain were often accessible by road and hence suitable spots for relay stations, and police stations, which were nearly always on high ground and had radio communications, could be used as temporary radio headquarters from which, with antennas sufficiently raised, VHF was made to work. Even here, however, the British had difficulty finding suitable, horizontally directional, antennas among their own combat VHF equipment at that time, and eventually were able to obtain these only from America.

Finally, in Malaya, a severely limiting factor, and a problem never fully solved, was the supply of batteries and power for the radio sets. The infantry were persuaded to carry dry batteries in their packs. In addition, there were larger, heavier batteries for higher powered, more reliable sets. Unless it was possible to resupply batteries by air, however, transmission and reception time had to be kept to the minimum necessary to make the batteries last. (Air supply became easier as the war went on.)

The few pedal generators available were most unpopular with the troops because of the strain of carrying and pedaling them. In a few, special cases small gasoline generators were dropped into the jungle by helicopter. (CAPT. JEAPES, to COL. SHIRLEY's surprise, had never received or even seen one of these, though he had had occasion to admire the American model.) A British generator that was fired by wood and could produce enough watts for a lower powered set was devised during World War II but never reached Malaya; and an idea for using thermoelectric power was not developed.

The solution of the power-supply problem, COL. SHIRLEY thought, might lie in the much-publicized development by the United States of a generator fired by propane (presumably also by wood, if necessary), which could produce a few hundred watts—enough, that is, for the communications requirements of any counterinsurgency operation—and would have the virtue, above all, of being absolutely silent. Although these generators would not be light, they would obviously be far superior to anything the British were compelled to use in Malaya and Kenya.

Unlike the British in the Malayan and Kenya campaigns, the Americans believe in crystal control. According to CAPT. JEAPES, their Special Forces are equipped with crystal sets today; and COL. FERTIG told of using crystals in the

Philippines throughout World War II, chiefly for lack of personnel that could tune other sets accurately.

As for power supply, COL. FERTIG recalled, the troops in the Philippines had some success with a steam generator that worked best when it could be fired on straight coconut shell (its firebox being too small for anything else). Mainly, however, the forces benefited by the fact that International Harvester, some time before the war, had brought in large numbers of 5 to 7 horsepower single-cylinder engines that drove a generator (with even a built-in radio-noise suppressor). This self-contained unit, which ran on any kind of fuel available, could be turned into a small powerplant, and it became the main source of power despite the fact that it required two strong men to carry one set. The available gas generators were useless for lack of gas. (They would not run on alcohol.) The best generators for continual rugged use in the tropical climate turned out to be a few World War I models that had been sold to the Japanese as surplus and recaptured from them in World War II.

Batteries were a great problem in the Philippines, as was all equipment that came off the shelves and had not been designed for the tropics. Most communications problems were solved by the fortuitous arrival of a medical officer who turned out to be an ingenious ham operator and was placed in charge of the signal section. Thereafter, portable sending sets were built on the spot, on small boards, from tubes, coils, and crystals that had been shipped in. Another lucky break was the fact that every municipality in COL. FERTIG's area had been equipped before the war with a fine Phillips tropic-proof all-band receiver, which, though heavy to carry, was very rugged, packed easily, and worked beautifully.

As for high-wattage units for central stations, the best 100-watt set available — the so-called suitcase set that could be charged on almost any voltage — had been designed specifically for Europe (and was therefore not to be issued through channels to any other theater); but it had been possible to "steal" some of these sets in Washington and have them brought into Manila with the first penetration party. Like other American army equipment not built for the tropics, their cases had to be waterproofed at once with varnish or wax and then kept as cool as possible.

COL. SHIRLEY, in a final comment on his own and COL. FERTIG's account of the technical inadequacies of equipment, pointed out that many of these shortcomings had meanwhile been corrected. The HF tuning problem, for example, does not exist with the newest sets, which have all the advantages of easy, accurate tuning of the crystal-control set, without the disadvantage of rigid confinement to a limited number of fixed frequencies. There are also available today sets no larger

or heavier than the old half-watt sets but capable of putting out over 100 watts.

Having a large number of fairly high-powered sets operating in a single country (for example, in Vietnam) does, of course, increase the likelihood of interference among the various groups. But this problem can be solved partly through wise frequency selection and the use of proper directional antennas; in addition, it will require discipline and training to keep air messages to minimum verbiage and thereby permit the largest possible number of operators to share a single frequency without undue interference.

The SAS in Malaya, CAPT. JEAPES reported, had found the British army sets unsatisfactory and had chosen instead the Foreign Office set used by FO agents, the Marconi 182, a heavy, crystal-controlled set with a pedal generator. Today, there is an entire range of very good sets available, especially the ANGRY 109 used by the American special forces and, still better because lighter to carry, the 128 British Foreign Office set that the SAS is using. The PRC-10 has proved excellent for communications between detachments,\* and has only recently been used in Alaska. (CAPT. JEAPES had no experience of how it might work in the jungle.) Another good British set is the A-40, with a built-in whisper device that allows a whispered message to come out loud and clear at the other end. Voice-level requirements, COL. SHIRLEY commented, have always been a matter of some dispute. The operators' complaint that their voices threatened to give their positions away was met to some extent by the introduction of rubber mouthpieces.

In contrast to earlier speakers, COL. GALULA in Algeria had faced few communications problems. The French forces took advantage of the existence of a strong civil network, which they had little trouble keeping open and in repair. There was very little sabotage and none of the battle for telephone lines that COL. GALULA had witnessed, for example, in North China. Given the terrain, and the dense network of fixed stations, the transmitters had no difficulty using VHF, their only problems being a perennial shortage of sets and the time it took to send a defective one to division headquarters for repairs. Eventually, the shortage of radio sets, and also of batteries, was relieved through increased production at home.

MR. HOSMER's final question on communications regarded the village or outpost alarm system; such a system called, he thought, for a fairly simple device that warmed up and worked instantly and was able to give sufficient information about the nature and extent of the threat.

COL. GALULA described as very successful the transmitter used in Algeria, which, at the pressing of a button, sent an impulse that activated a light or rang a

\*COL. BOHANNAN, having had extensive experience with the PRC-10 at Ft. Riley, cited the opinion of the troops that it was not nearly so good as the far-from-perfect SCR-300 that it replaced.

bell at headquarters. Rather heavy and costing (at a guess) between \$200 and \$300 to install, these transmitters were distributed to farms and villages outside the protected areas, and the returns justified the investment.

The military in other theaters, said COL. BOHANNAN, were not fortunate enough to have a device of that kind available to them. In the Philippines, where they made do with war-surplus "Gibson Girls," and also in Vietnam, such a simple alarm system would have been warmly welcomed.

An adequate alarm device, in MR. RUTKOWSKI's opinion, must meet three requirements. It must be simple and fast for the sender to operate; there has to be a clear indication at the receiving center as to which signal post is transmitting; and it must be possible to test the set at regular intervals. Even with a satisfactory alarm system of this kind, however, there will always be the serious problem of false alarms, which might be met if one were able to spot in advance the villages and posts likely to be in trouble and thus could feel safe in ignoring signals from others. (In Algeria, it appeared, the enemy never caught on to the existence of the signaling system, and there were no false alarms.)

MR. RUTKOWSKI strongly believed that the least complex device was the most desirable, and warned against becoming tied up in a development program for gadgetry that was not really essential for the purpose (such as scramblers for voice communicators used by patrols). MR. ELLIS' suggestion that you might complicate a signal device in order to get more specific information across—for example, push the same button twice in order to signal danger—was precisely the kind of complexity that MR. RUTKOWSKI thought inadvisable.

There followed a discussion of the merits of the large and bulkily mounted transmitter, which the enemy cannot easily carry off, over the small, easily hidden clandestine device. CAPT. JEAPES (in principle an advocate of the use of radio or telephone wherever possible) stressed the virtues of at least a one-way transmitter that will permit the sender to furnish details about the reported danger. But, he conceded, in a black area where many people are friendly to the enemy, the man who is to give the alarm or information must have the most inconspicuous set for the sake of his own safety, though preferably still one that allows him to pass on a limited amount of information; and, in a black village where he may be the only informer, even the simplest warning device, indicating only that "something is going to happen," may have to suffice (the more so, COL. GALULA pointed out, as the "privacy" in which one has to operate a clandestine machine is a rare commodity in Asia).

The situation is different in a cleared area, relatively free of the enemy,

where there is no need for a clandestine gadget, and a case can be made, in the opinion of MR. GREENE and MR. RUTKOWSKI, for the larger device as part of the general fortification of the area. In that situation, CAPT. JEAPES wondered, would not radio, with the possibility of voice exchange, be far preferable to a button-pushing, light-flashing device that did not enable you to give any particulars of the danger signaled? Even in a black area, COL. VALERIANO added, it has been possible to report an untoward happening through the surveillance party with a radio set operating unsuspected by any of the villagers.

COL. BOHANNAN praised the twenty-year-old "Gibson Girl" as being adequate, with slight modifications, for the basic requirements of a security alarm system; since it was also cheap and apparently still available, he felt that it should be procured and used pending the development of a more suitable gadget. He cited simplicity of operation, ruggedness, and absence of a resupply problem (that is, operation by generator rather than battery) as essential features of a suitable radio. MR. ELLIS pointed out, however, that a modern improved counterpart of the "Gibson Girl"—smaller, lighter, and procurable in large quantities—was now part of the air-sea rescue kit of the U.S. Air Force.

The technology of a village alarm device, MR. RUTKOWSKI concluded, is at the most a secondary problem; the crucial question is what happens at the end where the message is received. For without the facilities and procedures for instant action, a signal system quickly becomes worthless.

COL. VALERIANO, fully alert to that problem, had evolved an elaborate, and apparently very successful, standard procedure in his area of command in the Philippines, which he now described in some detail.

All the large towns in the area maintained regular telephone contact with battalion headquarters. Against the possibility that the Huks might cut telephone wires, and because they invariably attacked at night, the local defense forces were equipped with flares and kites, whose working condition was periodically tested by special detachments. Also, COL. VALERIANO had sporadic test runs to show just how fast a mobile reserve could rush from the camp to the point of contact, and how promptly the local defenders could attack from the other side. The cutting of telephone lines might herald either an attack on the town or an ambush of reinforcements, and the troops had to prepare to meet the Huks from both directions.

Throughout the night, beginning with the 4:00 P.M. change-over to the new officer of the day, and working by a strict timetable, officers or other members of the guard would call up the various telephone contacts at specified times.

Whenever one failed to answer, a scout or armored car would be dispatched; it was preceded, however, by the so-called honeymoon team: an enlisted man and a woman agent, disguised as peasants and traveling in a dilapidated civilian vehicle as though late returning from market, who thus blended naturally into local landscape and customs. As the pattern of the Huk ambush included a signaler at each end of the ambush zone, the woman of the team was trained to look backward. If she noted a signal behind her, she would flash the alarm as soon as she and her companion reached the next town; if there was no sign of trouble, the scout car could safely proceed and be followed by the telephone repair truck.

As another part of the standard operating procedure, and an effective counter-check on the routine just described, any town that failed to get its telephone signal at the appointed time would send out shooting flares, which were relayed by intelligence teams hidden throughout the area and equipped with radio sets.

Needless to say, an automatic alarm system of the kind described earlier would greatly have facilitated the task, especially for the remoter spots, and COL. VALERIANO admitted having "dreamed about one."

COL. SHIRLEY pointed out that each scenario called for a different support program. Given the inevitable limitations in funds, and therefore the need for priorities, one area commander might request simple voice transmitters above all else, another would want to put available money into tighter military controls, a third would wish to have more in the way of orthodox communications for the central villages and perhaps some simple gadgets for the smaller ones, and so on.

In Malaya, for example, police and wire communications were relatively good (if the rebels cut the wires, as they did almost nightly, this had the advantage of helping the defending forces to spot them), and no request for an automatic alarm system was ever put forward. On the other hand, the very simple voice alarm system that COL. SHIRLEY tended to favor—comparable to the "Gibson Girl" in cheapness and operating on one frequency—would not be difficult to design, and would afford the opportunity to pass on limited information if time permitted. CAPT. JEAPES argued strongly for the merits of such a system as compared to the automatic push-button set advocated by COL. GALULA; wherever a voice system was available in Malaya, he had found planters reporting information between rounds in the midst of a firing engagement.

There was general agreement with MR. HOSMER as to the importance of reaching the trouble spot in time to save the man under attack. COL. BOHANNAN

pointed out, however, that there is psychological value to be derived from the very fact that the troops begin acting instantly, even though they may not always arrive in time. COL. SHIRLEY added that the enemy, knowing that the defending forces have communications and are on their way, will often be prompted to clear out in advance of the troops' arrival, which amounts to an indirect military gain for the counterinsurgent side and can be an important factor in the general objective of keeping a war at the guerrilla level.

COL. VALERIANO then gave a detailed account of an incident that took place in a typical area near his battalion headquarters, an excellent illustration of the functioning of the communications system he had described earlier. (See Fig. 5.) At the time of the incident, although the army had regained control of




FIG. 5—An Alarm-signaling System in the Philippines

the town and villages shown in the figure, the Huks were continuing to harass these settlements, chiefly because they had once been a center of supply activities. At the recommendation of his civil affairs officer, COL. VALERIANO had assigned one of his best sergeants and a PFC to organizing and training a civilian guard of about fifty men, including both police and armed civilians, as the area's local defense force.

One night at 11:45 battalion headquarters found the telephone connection to the municipal center to have been cut, presaging either a Huk attack on the town and villages or an ambush on the reinforcements that the enemy expected to be dispatched along the road to town. Simultaneously with the discovery at headquarters, the people in town who failed to receive the scheduled call sent up a blue flare (blue being the code that indicated "line cut, but danger not imminent"), and this signal was picked up and relayed to headquarters by individuals in each settlement whose job it was to keep watch in the direction of the town.

The honeymoon team, followed by the scout car, was promptly sent out in the standard manner. Before reaching the second bend in the road, the man and woman, noticing lights by the side of the road that betrayed the presence of Huks at that natural ambush site, stopped their own vehicle and the scout team behind them. Meanwhile, the sergeant with his local defense force near the town, on the far side of the trouble spot, having seen no movement on the perimeter of the town, suspected (correctly) that the enemy's plan was to attack the reinforcements rather than the town. Leaving behind only a small contingent of defenders, he marched most of the fifty-odd civilians and police down the road and caught the ambushers from the rear, killing nine of the thirty-six Huks in the party.

This and similar incidents convinced COL. VALERIANO that, so long as you have a fast-working communications system, primitive though it may be, and an efficient SOP that enables the troops to take instant action in response to a threat, the civilians in turn will willingly and spontaneously act in their own defense. Moreover, the very existence of such a system acts as a deterrent to the enemy. Once the Huks in COL. VALERIANO's sector caught on to the mere fact that there was a system, they ceased their activities, and the area became so dull that it could safely be left with only one motorized company. The company commander had his men throw occasional flares, for no reason other than to confuse the enemy and make him assume the presence of larger forces. Whether or not they were deceived by this, the Huks never exploited the absence of the battalion.

In the setting just described, visible flares had obviously been adequate,

as might be, in a different theater, the even simpler Indian smoke signal. COL. FERTIG mentioned as still another alternative the use of a gong, properly coded, in certain non-Christian countries where gongs were part of the local color. But COL. BOHANNAN, for one, could conceive of situations where these primitive methods would not be usable, or where it would require too elaborate an organization to make them reliable.

In answer to a question from MR. HOSMER about the reaction procedures of the Japanese against the guerrillas in the Philippines, COL. FERTIG reported that, at least in the early part of the occupation, the Japanese small units (part of a special group trained on Formosa for jungle warfare) were exceptionally well provided with communication equipment (much better than the rest of the Japanese army), and the reaction time of these voice-equipped units was extremely fast. The home-guard forces that were moved in from Japan later on were not nearly so well trained and equipped, and it was important for the opposing side to time its attacks in terms of what kind of Japanese unit it was facing. COL. FERTIG recalled one particular fire fight, carefully based on the calculation that the enemy's reaction time was somewhere between twelve and fourteen minutes, in which his unit succeeded in killing all the enemy and getting out of the area again within precisely eight minutes.

COL. SHIRLEY, answering a question about the current state of the art with respect to tiny, lightweight transmitters using transistors, explained that such microminiature transmitters have indeed been developed. They are not yet in production on a large scale, but the Signal Corps has them experimentally. No bigger than a man's fist, the smallest version will fit into a helmet, the batteries needed for the transistors are very small, and the over-all performance is comparable to that of the full man-load of radio equipment carried by the British in Malaya. The biggest snag with this highly "miniaturized" gadget is its prohibitive cost.

In principle, COL. SHIRLEY was opposed to the expensive and complicated gadget wherever a cheap, simple, and robust one would meet the essential need; he repeated his plea for the simple voice transmitter without receiver (but with a receiver counterpart for situations demanding a receiving capability) working on a single frequency, possibly combined with an automatic alarm device, wherever the scenario afforded it the necessary range. It would not work across mountains or in rain-forest country unless the tricky HF skywave were used. But in the Mekong Delta, for example, with its relatively flat terrain and a considerable number of central command posts, such a transmitter should be quite adequate for

the range needed to get the signal through to the nearest control center. At a very tentative guess, it would cost no more than \$100, and possibly as little as \$50 if produced in large quantities.

COL. VALERIANO asked to be permitted a few final words on the subject of "gadgets." He had hit almost by chance on the use of the paraffin test, which detects powder residue on a man's hands, and thereafter had made paraffin test kits part of his battalion's regular equipment. After an ambush, when the ambushers seemed to have vanished into thin air, and there was thus reason to suspect that they had simply merged with the people of nearby villages, COL. VALERIANO would enclose an area within a large radius of the ambush site and would subject every male inhabitant within it—or, if this was not feasible, every fifth one in the presence of all others—to the paraffin test. Many were caught in this manner, and the number of ambushes declined markedly. The Philippine army, and also the people at Ft. Bragg, have been skeptical of the test, partly because a positive showing is not scientifically valid proof of guilt. It is true, said COL. VALERIANO, that an enemy commander who tells every man to urinate on his hands before being tested can beat the device, because everyone will show up positive. Even then, however, the test may have some psychological value, for the truly guilty man, on being found positive, is apt to start talking.

Another of COL. VALERIANO's suggestions that the army so far seems reluctant to adopt has been for some kind of light mortar shell, which, when aimed in the direction of a guerrilla force in the woods, will cover everyone in the area with an odorless, colorless dye, quickly detectable under ultraviolet light. (The British apparently did try a similar experiment in Malaya, but COL. SHIRLEY could not recall its outcome.) COL. VALERIANO thought the matter well worth investigating in view of the returns, real and psychological, that such simple, inexpensive, and quickly administered tests could yield.

APRIL 20, 1962, A.M.\*

## BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN KENYA; SELECTION OF PERSONNEL FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY; SPECIAL ROLE OF THE ADVISOR

*Background and Causes of the Emergency in Kenya ~ The Problems and Tasks of a British Officer ~ Developing "Contact" Information from Low-level Intelligence: A Defense of the Principle and a Description of Methods ~ Turning a Mau Mau into a Counterrebel: The Carrot-and-Stick Approach; Trickery and Deception (the "Pseudogang"); Propaganda Techniques in an Illiterate Society; Exploiting the Role of Magic and Superstition ~ Resettlement in Kenya ~ Food Control ~ The Ambush ~ An Appraisal of the Role and Limitations of Aircraft for Bombing, Reconnaissance, and Supply in Kenya ~ The Negligible Value of Minor Tactical Devices and "Gimmicks" against the African Native ~ The Effectiveness of Various Weapons ~ Destruction of the Mau Mau Supply System: The Military Turning Point of the War ~ A Variety of Views on the Task of Choosing Personnel for Counterinsurgent Warfare: The Difficulty of Gauging Aptitude by Conventional Screening Methods; the Chance Factors That May Determine Success or Failure ~ The Unique Role of the Foreign Advisor: The Limitations under Which He Operates, and the Special Background, Attitudes, and Methods Needed for His Task*

MR. HOSMER introduced LT. COL. FRANK KITSON, a British officer with extensive operational experience both in Kenya and in Malaya, and invited him to speak, in particular, about the campaign in Kenya, a theater of counterinsurgency not yet discussed in the Symposium.

COL. KITSON began with an emphatic acknowledgment of the importance of the political and economic factors, and their inseparability from military considerations, before addressing himself to the military problem. He proposed to postu-

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\*Present: Col. Bohannon, Col. Brundage, Mr. Ellis, Col. Fertig, Col. Galula, Mr. Greene, Mr. Hosmer, Col. Kitson, Gen. Lansdale, Mr. Phillips, Brig. Powell-Jones, Mr. Rutkowski, Col. Shirley, Mr. Tanham, Col. Valeriano.

late certain generally applicable principles and then to relate these to the particular case of Kenya.

The most important objective, as he sees it, is to obtain a great deal of information about the enemy and to render it usable. As the guerrilla's aim is not so much to defeat the other side in battle (at least not until the final phase of the war) as to win control of the population (using small numbers of people to get at the larger group), the counterinsurgent, to combat him, must in turn achieve direct contact with the population. To this end he must first *assemble* the background intelligence and then *develop* it to the point where it becomes what the British call "contact information," that is to say, information that permits him to put his troops in contact with small numbers of the enemy. Developing the available information is the main tactical job of the company and battalion commander, aided by the "special forces," with their specialized knowledge and techniques.

The so-called emergency in Kenya differed in several respects from other cases of terrorist warfare. Although the country as a whole occupies a territory of 300 by 400 miles, the rebellion itself was confined to a sector about 100 by 60 miles (extending from Nairobi northward for roughly 80 miles). Within this small section (an area not much larger than Cyprus), the number of terrorists—15,000 at the height of the rebellion—was far greater than the 400 or so on Cyprus, and larger even than the 8000 to 11,000 rebels that operated at various times in Malaya, a country many times the size of the site of the Mau Mau rebellion. Though the war in Kenya was shorter than in Malaya or Cyprus, it was more concentrated and violent; in the less than four years it lasted (1952–1955), 12,000 people are known to have been killed and many more disappeared. Physically, it is high plateau country (5000 feet), with two major mountain ranges—the Aberdares, running north-south and rising up to 15,000 feet, and the circular Mt. Kenya range with elevations as high as 17,000 feet. Heavily wooded slopes and the generally craggy countryside make the terrain as difficult to traverse as the Malayan jungle.

Only one of the twenty tribes in Kenya—the Kikuyu, with a tribal population of two-and-a-half million—was involved in the rebellion; thus, it was essentially a civil war between the loyal and disloyal factions in this tribe, which also involved the European community living on the edge of the tribal area.

With the country divided into provinces, and these in turn into districts, the method of government followed the normal British colonial pattern: a governor at the top, and the provincial and district commissioners below him (the district commissioner, who is comparable to the district officer in Malaya, controlling an area about the size of a large English county).

Security forces were (a) the district commissioner's forces (home guard and tribal police); (b) the regular uniformed police (plus their ununiformed criminal investigation units and the "special branch" intelligence-collecting organization); and (c) the armed forces, consisting of both the East African army (African soldiers with European-British officers) and the British imperial troops (that is, regiments from England).

The main cause of the Mau Mau rebellion, in COL. KITSON's eyes, was the discontent and bitterness of men such as Jomo Kenyatta, who had been educated abroad far beyond the level to which they could hope, at that time, to rise when they returned to the colony. Intensely nationalistic themselves, they incited the people to indignation and revolt over a bogus issue (they asserted, quite falsely, that land had been stolen from the Kikuyu), skillfully interweaving the movement with elements of a spiritualistic cult that appealed strongly to the African natives. The original leaders were picked up by the British early in the emergency, leaving the movement without spiritual guidance and with only an inferior group of men directing the actual fighting.

The active wing of the Mau Mau was the force of actual gangs that were based in the forests (about 10,000 during most of the rebellion, but up to 15,000 at its height, and no more than about 3000 toward the end). Organized into units resembling battalions, companies, and platoons, they tended to live in groups of about 100, which might combine with one another to a strength of 400 or 500 for a particular operation. As the movement lost ground, these groups became more and more fragmented.

Support of the active wing came from what might (inappropriately) be called the "passive wing" organizations: people living in and around the native reserves and towns, and very efficiently organized into committees at the various administrative levels (district, location, and village). These committees, of eight or nine members each, would be responsible for the collection of food, money, arms, and ammunition, and for the general indoctrination of the population on whose ready assistance the gangs were dependent.

The gangs themselves concentrated on putting down resistance among their own people (hence a "civil" war), attacking those among the Kikuyu who were not supporting the movement, that is, mainly the home guard and any individuals or missions that were influencing the populace against taking part in the rebellion. They tended to leave the European farmers alone, and fought only those European troops that they found in very small numbers or became unavoidably entangled with. The security forces fighting the Mau Mau were largely (about 75 per cent)

Kikuyu home guard; there were never more than six British battalions in Kenya at any one time—a situation very different from Malaya, where great numbers of troops were involved.

The Mau Mau depended on the population for money, supplies, and information, and they were prepared from the outset to stage large attacks—two to three hundred Mau Mau might storm a single police station or home-guard post—to kill resisters and acquire arms, often with a tremendous death toll.

Counteraction required, above all, intelligence on the rebels and their followers, and collecting the information was the task of the Police Special Branch, which at the beginning of the emergency consisted of little more than a dozen men (Europeans and a few African inspectors) in the entire country. COL. KITSON was one of the British army officers sent out to join and assist them, and his experiences and methods are illustrative of the problems encountered and the tactics used to meet them.

To start with, COL. KITSON was assigned a district that constituted about a quarter or one-fifth of the total operational area. There, together with the Special Branch officer (who was aided by two African inspectors), and assisted by a European settler's son, he began by collecting only overt intelligence, driving around the area to the sites of any incidents and passing on to the district commissioner all the facts observed or gathered. Talking to prisoners through African interpreters turned out to be quite useless for lack of the background information needed to evaluate the truth of statements and to know what questions to ask. In the next phase, COL. KITSON obtained valuable help from sons of European settlers, nineteen- and twenty-year-olds who went to live in the reserves. Knowing both the language and the Kikuyu themselves so intimately, they were able to talk with the prisoners easily and without an interpreter, and thus obtained a great deal of additional overt intelligence.

In starting to develop contact information from these data, the British were greatly helped by the chance acquisition of documents (including one that had probably belonged to a Mau Mau killed in battle, which gave the minutest details on all the members of one gang, down to their rifle numbers). Thereafter, a prisoner could be trapped in an untruth and broken down by being confronted with the interrogator's knowledge of his identity and history. One Mau Mau prisoner, superstitious as most natives are, concluded that this was magic, and turned into a trusted and invaluable informer. Having obtained information on the main gang, he led a small group of it into an ambush, and then, together with some local Africans and a few British soldiers dressed up as Mau Mau, infiltrated the larger group.

The success of these tactics, which were limited to a single informer and the operations of one gang, pointed the way to the system eventually established. Growing numbers of informers produced the background information, which COL. KITSON and his men, and similar organizations in other areas, then developed and passed on, through the local District Emergency Committee, to whatever troops needed it. Only occasionally would they use the information themselves for direct contact with the enemy.

The typical British battalion or company commander's common complaint that he did not have any information was based, COL. KITSON felt, on his misconception of the nature of obtainable intelligence in a guerrilla situation. He counted on the intelligence staff to hand him precise advance knowledge of enemy movements and strikes—an impossible feat in this type of war. He should, instead, have used whatever data the intelligence organization could furnish him as only a beginning, and then gone on to develop his own, more valuable intelligence from the mass of data fully known or accessible to him. For example, by reviewing past movements and actions of the gangs he was fighting, learning some of their tribal customs, etc., he could have established certain patterns of behavior and operations and, after checking his theories against simple tangible evidence (such as tracks in the forest), could have put his patrols out selectively, rather than send them out at random or have them scour huge forest areas.

For a comprehensive intelligence system in counter guerrilla warfare, then, you must have not only the information collected by the special forces organization, with its few experienced and reliable agents, who might penetrate even the enemy high command, but also the mass of low-level data provided by large numbers of low-grade sources. Many of these will be unreliable, but all of them together can furnish the mosaic in which the patterns of enemy activities become discernible. In building up such a network, speed is of the essence, even at the expense of quality and accuracy of agents and their information; the screening and sorting out can come later. This principle, though still regarded as heresy in some quarters, is gradually being accepted.

COL. FERTIG strongly agreed with COL. KITSON's last statements and cited his own difficulty in convincing military commanders that, in addition to top agents, you need bar girls, cab drivers, and the like to provide the background information. He felt that these methods had never really been accepted by the Americans, though their results were acknowledged.

Turning to specifics, COL. KITSON considered first MR. HOSMER's question as to how he had gone about turning a captured Mau Mau into a counter gangster.

The first step is to find out why the Mau Mau, or for that matter the communist rebel in Malaya and Indochina, has turned guerrilla. In nine out of ten cases, the reason is that his friends are in the movement, or simply that he is young and likes the sport and the loot. Only the tenth man will be the dyed-in-the-wool nationalist or Communist. You have a chance to win over the other nine if you can give them some adventure and perhaps a little loot, if you satisfy their basic needs, and, above all, if you can put them together with some of their friends (it is always much more difficult to win the first man than the fiftieth). Next, you must convince the rebel that you are the power, and that his alternative to co-operation is execution or at least imprisonment. In short, you use the carrot-and-stick method.

Another counterguerrilla technique (as pointed out by MR. HOSMER), which was immensely successful in Kenya, was to build up suspicion among the rebels to the point where no gang trusted the next one for fear that it might be a pseudogang, and the rebels began shooting one another. In one of many similar instances, a small pseudogang succeeded in killing a large number of gangsters they had met simply by pretending to suspect them of being countergangsters and insisting on tying up and searching them for "incriminating" evidence before accepting them as bona fide rebels.

To allow a company commander to be fully effective in these operations, and to exploit the situation he has built up in his area, COL. KITSON believes it is very important not to move him or his unit too soon and too frequently.

BRIG. POWELL-JONES concurred in this statement and re-emphasized the principle, formulated earlier in the discussions, that you should clear up one spot entirely before going on to another. But he pointed out that pressure from the top to produce quick, spectacular successes, or to clear up a given area by a given date as part of a larger program, was often responsible for premature withdrawal.

Psychological warfare techniques (in answer to a question from MR. PHILLIPS) entered into the attempt to turn the Mau Mau against one another, though they were more likely to be called "special operations" and were not handled by the official psychological warfare people. Nor were some of the established psychological warfare methods, such as the distribution of propaganda leaflets, very useful where so many of the people were illiterate. Loudspeakers were effective at times, as when you wanted to tell terrorists who were cornered in a swamp that they were in fact trapped. More successful in getting to the rebels and sowing confusion and suspicion among them was the attempt to ascertain their courier system and inject messages into it. (They had a very efficient network of "letter boxes," which actually consisted of trees, cleft sticks, and similar landmarks where notes could be left.)

In the main, the entire pseudogang approach may be said to have been based largely on trickery, and to some extent on the fact that even in dedicated causes there are always (as BRIG. POWELL-JONES put it) venal men, and that everyone and every secret had a price. Thus, low-grade information could often be tricked away by bribery, though there was not much point in actually posting rewards, as few would have been able to read the posters.

A more successful form of trickery involved extremely elaborate and protracted operations, some of which did not pay off for months. COL. KITSON cited examples: (1) In developing an area, his troops would find out the location of, say, four farms that were supplying the rebels with food, but they would deliberately pick up only three of them, causing the Mau Mau to come to the fourth one more and more often and in growing numbers, to be eventually surrounded and caught. (2) On moving into an area where an elusive gang was known to be operating, the troops pretended to be gangsters themselves and built the entire region up from the Mau Mau point of view. They began by making contact with the passive supporting element, and eventually approached the gang itself. Once trust had been established, the pseudogang persuaded the genuine gang to come to joint meetings, on such pretexts as a conflict over poaching in each other's area. At the end of sometimes several such meetings, when all possible distrust had been allayed and the entire gang was assembled, the troops would close in (a dangerous maneuver, in which identities were sometimes confused and accidents happened).

A phenomenon peculiar to the war in Kenya, as compared to the other guerilla warfare theaters discussed, was the role of magic. To this day, all of tribal Africa is dominated by magic, and the village witch doctor, far from being simply an evil man, is both priest and doctor, with tremendous influence. One of his functions, and a major source of his income, is the administration of oaths, a very effective means of controlling native behavior and approaching a system of justice. A man will not perjure himself under such an oath, for he is convinced that the witch doctor can decree a dreadful fate for him if he does.

To some extent, their primitive superstitions made the Mau Mau highly unpredictable and a more difficult problem for the British than terrorists elsewhere. Whereas you could count on the Malayan Communists, for example, to act logically and according to plan (and you only needed to find out the plan in order to anticipate them), the Mau Mau were inconsistent. If the witch doctor declared that a certain night augured ill for a projected undertaking, it would be abandoned.

Also, the terrorists used the power of the oath very effectively to bind people together in secrecy; or, in a sinister refinement of the method, they would admin-

ister it in ways that were taboo under tribal law, thereby pushing the sworn person outside the society (which was on the side of the government) beyond any chance of return. With time, the oath became a somewhat less powerful weapon, as the Mau Mau, pressed for money, resorted to readministering a single oath for the sake of the revenue. Also, captured prisoners, choosing between the death they feared from violating the oath of secrecy and a similar fate at the hands of the enemy if they did not talk, might decide to spill a secret and then find out that the oath did not kill after all. The counterinsurgents usefully exploited the factor of magic, administering oaths themselves (for example, to establish the authenticity of a pseudogang), and hiring the very able village witch doctors, who were on the side of the authorities and whose services were for sale to any bidder, to do individual jobs, such as persuading a recalcitrant terrorist or villager to talk.

On MR. GREENE's question about ways of isolating the Mau Mau from the population (for example, by putting fences and wire fortifications around villages), COL. KITSON described the methods and the success of what became known in Kenya as "villagisation." The Kikuyu, a family-based tribe where normally members of one clan live in a group of huts that may be miles away from the next group, did not take readily to resettlement in villages, and many district commissioners and other administrators opposed the scheme as certain to drive people into the Mau Mau camp. But it was the only way of preventing food from getting to the terrorists, and, undertaken on a large scale, it proved very efficient. BRIG. POWELL-JONES noted that in Malaya, too, the Chinese initially hated having to live in the reserves, but were quick to realize their advantages, including good schools for their children, and in most cases chose not to leave the reserve after they were free to do so. In Algeria, according to COL. GALULA, the main support for resettlement had come from the women, who enjoyed the more varied social life of these villages.

Apart from putting moats around the villages, no serious attempt was made to "fence in" areas in which the Mau Mau were operating. COL. KITSON recalled the abortive effort to contain the rebels by clearing, at great expense, a half-mile strip around the jungle where they were hiding, with the idea that any terrorist within that strip could be readily spotted and shot. Within a year, instead of the former primal forest, which is not totally impassable, the area had become dense secondary jungle, and only the rebels benefited.

Before the discussion turned to other aspects of the Kenya campaign, GEN. LANSDALE mentioned that COL. VALERIANO used something resembling COL. KITSON's pseudogang technique in the Philippines. He was, in fact, so successful that his methods passed over to the Asian mainland and were now being used

against communist guerrillas by local forces. The participants agreed, however, that "cross-fertilization" of this kind was at best a slow process. Even in Cyprus, COL. KITSON said, with counterguerrilla warfare going on simultaneously in Malaya and in Kenya, those in charge were at first reluctant to adopt the lessons learned in the other two theaters, partly for fear of their political repercussions. BRIG. POWELL-JONES pointed out that the British in Malaya similarly derived little in the way of applicable lessons directly from the earlier experience of the French in Indochina, and instead built up their methods empirically and locally; not until units and commanding officers were brought in who had had experience in earlier counterinsurgency campaigns was there some degree of cross-fertilization.

Asked by MR. HOSMER about the usefulness of aircraft in Kenya, COL. KITSON thought this varied greatly with the purpose of their mission. Of the three main uses (bombing, reconnaissance, and supply), bomb drops, though popular with headquarters, had been wasteful and ineffectual over the jungle. The reaction of people being bombarded from the air was to leave the danger area if possible, but to stay put if all adjacent areas were patrolled. Bombing was very frightening to the terrorists, however, and was effective therefore in areas where there were no ground troops available to fight them. Even then, it had its drawbacks, including the fact that the jungle animals often went berserk with fear. Planes were very useful for aerial reconnaissance, on the other hand, and air photos were a great help in many instances.

Finally, air supply—used in Kenya to a certain extent and sometimes effectively—is a device that COL. KITSON nevertheless believes should be used very sparingly and only where there is no other way of keeping troops alive, for air drops will give positions away. Fitted into a tactical plan, they can be an asset. Moreover (as suggested by BRIG. POWELL-JONES), the availability of planes can do much for troop morale by assuring the men of quick evacuation from the jungle in, say, a medical emergency.

Food control proved an effective weapon in Kenya and was widely used. The guarding of meat stock, in particular, was very rewarding, as the natives' religious conventions prevented them from killing and eating wild animals except in desperation. Grain, the second most important item, was more difficult to keep from the terrorists, as it was not stockpiled or brought in by train but was grown by the farmers for their own consumption. On the other hand, knowing that the terrorists were likely to come to the farms to get it helped the troops in planning ambushes.

MR. HOSMER suggested that COL. KITSON elaborate on methods of ambushing and their success; he wondered whether the Mau Mau's heightened senses after a

period spent in the bush had noticeably complicated the problem for the troops. COL. KITSON's comments: The only way to approach the tremendously difficult job of the ambush is to do it as well as possible, which necessitates unusual training and the ability to remain absolutely still in the face of any disturbance (be it from the enemy or from wild animals). It was not easy in Kenya to select the right people and give them the needed training, as compared, for example, with Malaya, where the British had the advantage of having many regular troops and well-organized special schools. But even given these limitations of the defending forces and the keen sense of the natives, a Mau Mau would walk into a well-laid ambush. On the other hand, when the ambushers failed to take the necessary precautions, including at times such obvious ones as not using soap or hair tonic, the Mau Mau would be immediately alerted.

Tracker dogs as well as patrol dogs were used in connection with the patrols and, surprisingly enough, were occasionally successful. Contrary to the experience of earlier speakers, who in their theaters had found dogs to have a demoralizing effect on the enemy, the Mau Mau were quite indifferent to them, the more so as the dogs remained on the handler's leash.

Cavalry (in answer to a question from COL. GALULA) did not as such exist in Kenya; in the north, the police had some mounted patrols, but even there the horses were not used in battle.

BRIG. POWELL-JONES then questioned COL. KITSON on his experience with some of the minor tactical devices that the British had found useful in Malaya. He mentioned technical aids, such as emitter valves planted on the enemy's radios, which helped in spotting his locations and intercepting his contacts, and the use of laxatives, which, if added to the rebels' rice supplies, could incapacitate them quite effectively. COL. KITSON recalled an abortive attempt to plant an emitter in a walking stick for a terrorist leader (Kemafi) whom the British were eager to capture. He was skeptical of the idea of adulterating the enemy's food; even so relatively harmless a thing as a laxative would quickly be construed as poison, which not only would raise the issue of possible violation of the Geneva Convention but would also be an invitation to the enemy to retaliate in kind (a very undesirable development in Africa, where the natives are unsurpassed in the art of poisoning).

A good deal of research appears to have been done on the practicability of certain other methods and "gimmicks." MR. RUTKOWSKI mentioned the possibility of introducing substances into the enemy's body or environment that would permit his detection without incapacitating him. GEN. LANSDALE spoke of tear gas, with

its very brief life, which requires immediate follow-up action by troops wearing gas masks if it is to be at all useful. The consensus of the participants was that many of the "gimmicks" that had been tried by counterinsurgents in various theaters did not have the hoped-for effect.

Going back to the specific case of Kenya, COL. KITSON described the virtual impossibility of doctoring the terrorists' ammunition, a trick that had been used quite successfully in several other theaters. The aforementioned "committee system" by which ammunition was procured resulted in its coming in in very small quantities and being passed from hand to hand, instead of being stored in quantity in locations to which the counterinsurgents might have hoped to gain access. Ammunition, incidentally, also took the place of currency, with one round equaling about \$1, and thus rarely fell into the defenders' hands, except where it might accidentally have dropped out of a terrorist's pack.

Truth serum—a device that COL. GALULA mentioned as one he would like to have had at his disposal in Algeria—COL. KITSON had found quite ineffectual when used on African natives, whose moral code, being very different from the Judeo-Christian, does not include the Western concept that truth is good and untruth is bad. Asked whether this generalization would apply equally to Africans who are Catholics or Protestants, he pointed out that only one in a hundred of those baptized is a genuine believer, whose moral base is much the same as ours; the ninety-nine nominal Christians, who go to the mission mainly for medical care or schooling, remain quite untouched by the gospel.

In answer to a question from MR. RUTKOWSKI about differences in techniques between day and night operations in Kenya: Generally speaking, jungle operations were undertaken by day, and those inside the reserves and European areas by night. In the jungle the Mau Mau, like regular troops, depended on guides, who could find their way only by daylight. Inside the perimeter the Mau Mau attacked at night, and that was also the time, therefore, for antiterrorist ambushes. The only exceptions occurred in the early period of large Mau Mau concentrations, when occasionally big groups of up to five hundred rebels would come out of the bush and spend two or three days and nights in continuous raiding.

The Mau Mau were, on the whole, poorly equipped with weapons, and about two-thirds of the men in a typical platoon had only the most primitive, homemade guns (sometimes a piece of wood and a length of pipe tied together with a bit of wire, a contraption that might or might not work, but which could kill a man if he were hit at close range and in a vulnerable spot). The real weapons varied greatly, because they were whatever the Mau Mau had managed to steal. And, though the

rebels might have been deadlier had they stuck to their bows and arrows, some of them were good shots with Western guns.

What weapons had COL. KITSON found most effective against the Mau Mau? Best of all was the new (Belgian-made) NATO rifle, the "FN repeater," a high-caliber, high-velocity superweapon. The Sten gun he regarded as less good, for it lacks the velocity that will fell the African who is swathed in blankets and, in any case, can absorb an unbelievable amount of lead without taking notice of it. The Bren gun is too heavy to carry around in the circumstances of jungle warfare. And the submachine gun is insufficient from the point of view of velocity. In Malaya, by contrast, the light machine gun (in answer to BRIG. POWELL-JONES' question) was quite an effective ambush weapon, for the Chinese wore very few clothes, and their reactions to injury and pain, in general, were much more like ours than like those of the African natives. Even in Malaya, however, COL. KITSON's first choice would have been a rifle and, best of all, the five-round shotgun (the American Winchester); in Kenya he himself occasionally used his heavy English double-barreled shotgun.

MR. HOSMER wanted to know when, precisely, the tide turned against the Mau Mau in Kenya, and how the British knew at a given point that they were winning.

COL. KITSON: Politically, the tide turned shortly after the beginning of the emergency, in October 1952, with the arrest of all the intelligent, purposeful leaders, including Jomo Kenyatta. (This feat, carried out by the Special Branch with two or three top agents, was the most efficient operation in the campaign.) Under the second-string leaders who took their place, the movement had neither a formulated aim nor real direction, and was doomed to eventual political failure.

Militarily, the tide turned in April 1954, when, in a single and unique operation, the government forces broke the back of the elaborate committee system that supplied ammunition, recruits, and money for the military organization. Concentrating on the largest district in the south of the Kikuyu reserve (Kimbu, with a population of 350,000) and on the large Kikuyu element in Nairobi, the British began by rounding up the 70,000 Kikuyu in Nairobi and sending them to seashore camps 500 miles away; they then isolated Nairobi from the Kimbu district by surrounding the city with checkpoints at which they intercepted supplies from Kimbu and tried to discover the identities of the committee members who had sent them. This was so successful that for several months no supplies came through at all. When the organization seemed to be building up again, it took only another large pickup like the first to sever the connection permanently. And from June 1954 onward the gangs dwindled in size. They could no longer get the needed

recruits, and thus could not afford the tremendous losses that accompanied their previous large-scale operations; nor did they have the means with which to feed and equip such large numbers. The government retained the offensive until the end of the emergency.

BRIG. POWELL-JONES saw in this account of the successful attack on the supply system in Kenya a perfect proof of the prime importance of food control in breaking a guerrilla movement.

Turning the discussion away from the specific case of Kenya, MR. HOSMER invited the participants' views on the general role of the "advisor" in counterinsurgency. The problem of the organization and training of advisory personnel being one of the most pressing today, he asked: "What criteria would you use, with personnel management people, to be certain of getting just the right type of people for staff or field duty in counter guerrilla warfare?"

COL. FERTIG: When the problem arose at Fort Bragg in the effort to develop a special forces capability, it became apparent that the American service organization provided no method whereby a person's suitability could be ascertained through data on an IBM card. General Collins, as Chief of Staff, directed that all officers with experience in guerrilla or counter guerrilla operations be designated by a letter following their serial number, which cut down greatly on the screening process. This procedure, followed at least through 1954 and possibly thereafter, runs counter to the Army's idea of the use of manpower, which is to eliminate the specialist, to make everyone capable in a wide variety of functions and situations, and to select personnel for their general usefulness rather than any special skill and experience. The British may have had a superior measuring system, to judge by the quality of their selection.

BRIG. POWELL-JONES doubted that the British had a system from which the Americans could profit. They are quick to note a man's special experience and performance and to use him accordingly. But they have no machinery for testing a man's potential in advance of performance—an aim that BRIG. POWELL-JONES regards as the personnel man's civilian-life approach, and one impractical for any army, even a citizen's army. There is always in the British army a voluntary element—a tradition that has produced Lawrence of Arabia and other geniuses. But the run-of-the-mill man is spotted and selected for this kind of work because, at some time in his career, he has found himself, often by chance, in circumstances that afforded him an opportunity to excel and show this special ability.

COL. KITSON mentioned his own case: a Londoner, with no knowledge of the language or the area, and without any previous experience in intelligence opera-

tions, in whom any special aptitude for the task in Kenya would have been impossible to determine from the written record.

COL. GALULA's view: Only field performance, not any written record or advance test, permits you to gauge the value of a man in revolutionary warfare. The qualities needed above all others are imagination and a capacity for organization; discipline is somewhat less important, because higher echelons can impose the necessary limits. Once you find the right man it is essential, though contrary to all military tradition, that he be given responsibility at once. Therefore, the theater commander, whatever his rank, must have a free hand in promoting the men under him. (COL. GALULA himself had frequently, and successfully, placed an able sergeant from among the draftees in charge of a unit, instead of a less suitable officer.) This is the principle followed also by the revolutionaries, and it makes for a very quick and efficient natural selection among them.

GEN. LANSDALE, referring to the particularly difficult task of the American army in having to select from vast numbers of men (first through IBM-machine and other mechanical methods, and thereafter by a personal, close-up screening process), stressed the final and virtually insoluble problem of choosing from a roster of men seemingly equal in experience and aptitude the one possessing what he called the "X-factor"—such intangible qualities as imagination and empathy—which makes him stand out above the others.

The British, BRIG. POWELL-JONES granted, never had a comparable problem, as they worked only on a relatively small scale and in places far apart in time and space. With them, volunteers have always been a major selection factor. In addition, he repeated, there has been the element of chance by which men like Wingate and Bernhard Fergusson revealed their unique qualifications for the command positions they were subsequently given. The man who shows himself as peculiarly suited to leadership in revolutionary warfare, however, frequently presents a problem to the army that chooses him; for he is likely to operate in unorthodox ways, spending money and effort recklessly, ignoring discipline, ill-treating prisoners, and the like.

COL. BOHANNAN quoted an earlier remark of CAPT. JEAPES to the effect that the most suitable person is often "the chap who is slightly mad"—a view he regarded as characteristic of the British and French, and indubitably sound. Unfortunately, however, it was not likely to be shared by Americans, especially the typical "personnel management" person, because America lacks those nations' traditional respect for the eccentric.

As for still other ways of selecting the right man for counter guerrilla warfare,

COL. KITSON said that he would seek the recommendations of those with experience and judgment, though he admitted that the method was "unscientific." COL. GALULA described his own preferred procedure in picking leaders. He would get a group of men together, explain his plans to them, invite a discussion, in the course of which he would soon spot his strongest supporters. From these, he would then choose the man with the most imagination and leadership qualities and put him in command, on the assumption that he, in turn, would pick the right man to work under him. This principle, COL. GALULA believes, is valid and workable at every stage, from theater command down to the task-force level, provided always that you are prepared to remove the man at the top if he does not prove himself.

Given the general agreement on the importance of the unorthodox military approach, BRIG. POWELL-JONES saw here a possible argument to support the contention that the civil and military top command should be centered in one man (as it had been in Malaya under Templer, who was both High Commissioner and head of the military effort). Where this is organizationally not feasible, one will have to make sure that the civilian leadership is as unorthodox as the military. If it is not, the situation affords many opportunities for dangerous friction and disagreement.

Turning from military problems to the discussion of nonmilitary techniques, MR. HOSMER raised the question of what specific advice and indoctrination to give, for example, to Americans now going to South Vietnam. Aside from the aims already mentioned—understanding the needs and wishes of the populace, working with the civilians, and building up trust—what should be the approach, especially in areas where the Western power is not in charge of operations and policy? What is the right kind of advisor, and what training must he be given?

BRIG. POWELL-JONES pointed out that, as soon as you address yourself to the problem in a specific theater, many of the principles and conclusions you may have formulated in general discussions on the art of guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare will have to be modified, and some abandoned. For example, the unorthodoxy just mentioned as efficient and desirable from a military standpoint is apt to alienate the people by some of the highhanded and sometimes crude methods it involves, and thus may run counter to your other major aim, which is to win the populace. Rather than try to reconcile the two objectives from the very first, it might be wise to admit the fact that they conflict and to realize them one at a time, by first establishing your military presence and then going on to win the hearts and minds of the people. In other words, granting that you simply cannot keep everybody happy at all times and still win a war, you may have to begin by impres-

sing on the people, quickly and perhaps rather brutally, the fact that you are the strong side; once you have convinced them that you are going to succeed, you can then start making allowances for local needs, wishes, and prejudices.

On this principle, for example, General Templer devoted his first six months in Malaya to becoming a man feared; thereafter, he could afford to be kind. Much the same approach, said COL. GALULA, was used successfully by General De Lattre, who arrived in Indochina at the height of chaos, and started out by restoring discipline through some very harsh methods before he revealed himself as kind and generous.

This was not, however, strictly applicable to the case of South Vietnam, MR. PHILLIPS pointed out. The Vietnamese will have to conduct their war themselves, and the twofold task of the Americans, in their advisory role, is, first, to determine what the Vietnamese can do to solve their problem, and, next, to find ways of helping them.

COL. VALERIANO considered himself singularly well qualified to speak on the role of the advisor, as his country had the benefit of American advice and assistance for so many years. His conclusions: Before the foreign advisor can become effective in the field, he has to be accepted by the natives, not because he represents an allied country or wears its uniform, but as a friend. Then he must inject his ideas in the form of suggestions and allow them to circulate where they will exert influence on more and more people, so that, gradually, they will penetrate to the higher levels. Also, he must have a faculty for making people work together. (In the Philippines American advisors often mediated between jealous rivals.) In the course of these efforts, he will become increasingly familiar with local conditions and personalities; he will learn, for example, what the various battalion commanders are capable of doing, so that he can direct more of his help to the less able, and encourage the more efficient to help themselves.

This led COL. SHIRLEY to return once more to the question of just how to recognize in advance a man's aptitude for the function just outlined by COL. VALERIANO. He himself favored relying on the knowledge and recommendations of people with experience in the area, whose judgment he trusted—a method preferable to card-index screening for small-scale operations, but one admittedly useless for mass selections or for choosing a few men from a vast reservoir. COL. GALULA stressed again his earlier point that a single good man found in such a way can be expected to recognize, train, and influence others like himself.

COL. FERTIG, on the other hand, had found in his own experience proof that the problem would always remain complicated by the imponderable factor that

makes the seemingly unlikely person emerge as the ablest. When he was left behind in the Philippines with 180 Americans—five officers and the rest enlisted men from the four services—all of whom had refused to surrender, 109 volunteered to stay on as guerrillas. The very mildest among them was captured and mistreated by the Japanese, managed to escape on the night before his hanging, and thereafter became COL. FERTIG's finest small-unit commander—a development quite unforeseeable in terms of his background and basic disposition. COL. FERTIG granted, however, that men who refused to surrender, or who took to the hills after escaping, were already a select group likely to include the potential leaders.

The participants concluded their discussion of the topic with an attempt to list the criteria that each would use were he to select personnel for work in areas such as Vietnam.

COL. VALERIANO thought that the first requirement was a man's willingness to do the job. (There was general agreement that it was well to begin with volunteers.) Next, he would inquire whether the candidate had had experience in guerrilla warfare and, failing that, whether he had been a keen student of the subject. If he had none of those qualifications, COL. VALERIANO would tend to give preference to the man with a good liberal education. In his opinion, the service academies, because of their excellent liberal-arts curriculum, are likely to produce good guerrilla leaders provided they become oriented to that kind of warfare.

COL. FERTIG did not entirely agree with COL. VALERIANO. In the Philippines, he pointed out, the percentage of academy graduates in command positions had been surprisingly small. If he were forced to select a group hurriedly, he would choose men from the mountains of Kentucky, West Virginia, Tennessee, and the far West, or from the back country of Australia. The mountaineer, in his experience, is the natural guerrilla fighter, able to use his wits and never afraid of being lost in the hills, as compared, for example, with boys from the East Coast of the United States, many of whom were terrified of the terrain in the Philippines.\*

To COL. KITSON, the theory about the value of special aptitudes and previous conditioning sounded convincing, but everything in his own experience tended to disprove it. He and most of the men in his regiment had come from London, yet

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\*On reviewing his own and COL. FERTIG's remarks on the background and skills likely to produce the best officers (regular or reserve) for unconventional warfare, COL. VALERIANO had a few additional comments. His own observations during the Huk campaign had convinced him that the capable officer typically had a good liberal education combined with interests and aptitudes that were peculiarly suitable to guerrilla warfare. (Hunting as a peacetime hobby, for example, often proved a valuable asset.) A good general education, therefore, seemed as sound a basic requirement for an officer's commission for unconventional as it was for conventional warfare, provided it was accompanied by the appropriate interests, skills, and, of course, motivation. The initial advantage of the rural over the urban individual was not a decisive one; on the contrary, once acclimated to guerrilla terrain, the man from the city tended to be better material for positions of command and responsibility because of superior intelligence and sense of organization.

many took jungle life in their stride, while some of those raised on farms and in the mountains did not. By and large, he would choose a healthy younger person, with the necessary energy and imagination, over an equally good older man; but he would prefer the older person to a young one that was less able.

BRIG. POWELL-JONES summed up the impossibility of making an omniscient, foolproof choice of personnel by pointing to the accidental factors, not susceptible to scientific categorizing or psychological measurement, on which so much in a man's subsequent career depended. A smooth first patrol, the good luck of having a successful initial contact with the enemy, or the experience of particularly able leadership at the start may be enough to turn him into a good guerrilla fighter. COL. SHIRLEY agreed emphatically, calling this a point of central importance in the entire argument.

APRIL 20, 1962, P.M.\*

## WINNING THE COUNTERGUERRILLA WAR

*When and How Do You Know That You Are Winning a Counter guerrilla War? ~ People's Voluntary Co-operation and Defiance of the Guerrilla as the Most Reliable Indicator of Success ~ The Essential Military and Political Requirements for Victory over a Guerrilla Movement: Several Views and Comments ~ More on the Difficult Task of the Advisor (the Americans in South Vietnam): Outline of a Desirable Empirical Approach ~ How To Prepare for Ultimate Disengagement from a Counter guerrilla Effort in Another Country in the Absence of Decisive Battles and Formal Surrenders ~ Some Further Thoughts on Equipment ~ The Crucial Importance to the Counter-insurgent of a Flexible and Sympathetic Support Organization and an Ample Supply of Money*

MR. HOSMER opened the final meeting of the Symposium with this multiple question, prepared by one of the participants: "How do you measure whether or not you are winning a counter guerrilla struggle? What are the precise factors to be included in a yardstick? What weight would you give, for example, to numbers of casualties or to the incident rate of terrorism and guerrilla attacks? What are the most significant measurements?"

Distinguishing between two kinds of signs, the military and the nonmilitary, COL. GALULA listed as foremost among the military indicators (1) whether the guerrillas are developing to a higher stage of warfare or are going back to a lower one (in Algeria, the legitimate forces knew they were winning when the rebels were forced to go from large guerrilla battles to smaller engagements, and from there back to terrorism); (2) how much strength the guerrillas can muster for a single operation; (3) the chart that shows the number of weapons in the enemy's hands; (4) the number of ambushes directed at convoys—the rebels' prime targets once they have organized the population and go after the defenders' weapons and

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\*Present: Col. Bohannon, Mr. Ellis, Col. Fertig, Col. Galula, Mr. Greene, Mr. Hosmer, Col. Kitson, Mr. Phillips, Brig. Powell-Jones, Mr. Rutkowski, Col. Shirley, and Col. Valeriano.

other supplies; (5) the rate of desertions, both in the guerrillas' ranks and among the population; and (6) the strength needed in order to install safely an isolated unit of your own forces (the fewer men, the better the situation for the counter-insurgent side).

The nonmilitary signs, COL. GALULA thought, were to be sought essentially in the actions and attitudes of the civilian population. The most significant of these were (a) the number of volunteers for the counterinsurgent forces, (b) the amount of information spontaneously offered, and (c) people's readiness to violate the guerrillas' orders (to abstain from smoking, to avoid contact with the counter-insurgents, and similar rules).

COL. VALERIANO's experience in the Philippines confirmed COL. GALULA's observations. In that theater all field units were required to maintain statistics, which were useful for measuring, not only whether or not the government forces were winning, but also whether their individual tactics were effective or in need of modification (for example, they helped in comparing the virtues of small- as against large-unit operations). The most dramatic indicator of over-all success, in COL. VALERIANO's experience, was the spontaneous response of the populace in offering information, and people's active participation in the capture or the disabling of guerrilla contact men who came to the villages for liaison between the inhabitants and the armed insurgents.

Both COL. KITSON and COL. BOHANNAN agreed immediately that the people's voluntary co-operation and their disregard for the guerrillas' orders were important signs of victory, and indeed perhaps the only reliable ones. They had found that such other phenomena as the number of weapons in the enemy's hands and the size of individual engagements often could be explained in other ways; if they were, in fact, indications of weakening enemy strength, their significance might not be immediately apparent. For example, the date COL. KITSON had mentioned as the moment when the tide turned in Kenya, and the military reasons for it, were knowledge gained only by hindsight.

On the basis of the week's discussions as well as of personal experience, several of the participants, at MR. HOSMER's suggestion, set forth their views on the essential (military and political) elements, and the order of their importance, in any attempt to defeat a guerrilla movement.

COL. GALULA listed three: determination at the top level, selection of able leaders, and knowledge of how to conduct a counter guerrilla war. The primacy of "resolution" he regarded as a matter of historical fact; one could not, for example, imagine a guerrilla movement in Russia in the days of Stalin.

COL. VALERIANO agreed in essence, adding that the factors mentioned by COL. GALULA must be present at every level, from top government circles down to the lowest operating groups. As the case of the Philippines shows, motivation and determination on the part of the population are not enough without the outstanding leader. Until the emergence of Magsaysay, the people had a difficult time despite their unquestionable resolution. The appearance of such a leader may be a matter of accident, and one of the problems, therefore, is to recognize such a man's value and then to place him in the position in which he can do the country the most good.

To COL. KITSON, the single most important thing for the counter guerrilla side is to have a political (or "civilian") policy clearly superior to that of the insurgents, so that the people will support the government, not as a result of intimidation and terrorism, but because they are convinced that its victory would be in their interest. Moreover, the military plan must fully accord with the political policy.

COL. SHIRLEY's comment that much of the Communists' success could be ascribed precisely to their consistency in promising the political millennium while pursuing its attainment by military means prompted BRIG. POWELL-JONES to emphasize the importance of a goal to counter and surpass the communist promise of the future. In most cases, he said, it will not do merely to aim for a return to the status quo. (Had that been satisfactory, there probably would not have been a guerrilla movement.) The postwar goal must be a recognizable improvement, in which the cancer in the prewar situation—the cause of the insurgency—has been removed.

As for the element of "resolution," the situation today is a peculiarly complicated one for the Americans, with their problem of how to inject military advice and assistance into the areas they themselves are resolved must be defended. Unless the governments and people of those countries, who will have to do the actual defending, are similarly determined, they may regard some of the measures advocated by the United States as politically unpalatable, and the American purpose may be defeated as a result.

Another important requirement, mentioned by COL. GALULA, is the ability of the counterinsurgent side to sustain a protracted war if necessary, since the guerrillas' interest lies in maintaining a chronic state of warfare, avoiding an acute struggle until such time as they can be certain of winning it.

COL. FERTIG pointed to an organizational and conceptual weakness in the American military organization, in which guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare—two facets of a single problem, in his opinion—are treated as distinct problems and operated by two separate staff sections (one under the Chief of Staff, the other

under Military Government), instead of having the problem in its entirety brought into focus in a single department of counterinsurgency. A more realistic and effective organization would provide, in the area of operations, for a special task group, in which would be concentrated all the assets necessary for the military mission at hand, and which would not be encumbered with policing and similar responsibilities. COL. FERTIG looked on the establishment of the Country Team, with the Ambassador in charge, as a development in the direction he advocated.

The above remarks provoked some disagreement and discussion regarding the desirable degree of specialization; the inseparability of the military from the administrative leadership in the theater of operations; the potential dangers of having the military element the chief authority in a joint controlling body; and the doubtful advantage of separating, in a counterinsurgent campaign, the strictly military tasks from such closely related missions as police work or the feeding, indoctrination, and relocation of the population. Though there was no consensus on the points raised by COL. FERTIG, it was generally agreed that the misunderstanding was semantic rather than substantive.

MR. PHILLIPS elaborated on the special difficulties one faced when operating in an advisory, not a controlling, capacity—the present position of the United States in South Vietnam. His advice: Begin, as you might on a pilot project, by working with a few military commanders and local leaders, evolve ideas and methods with them, allow these to work their way through those men to the top echelons, and thus gradually influence and eventually transform the whole country. Bear in mind always the importance of introducing your recommendations indirectly, and of allowing the direct impetus for changes in techniques, or in the selection of personnel and leaders, to come from the local people, lest your help be construed as interference and your presence resented. Above all, make friends, who will then be predisposed to listen to your advice and to emulate your methods if they prove successful. By initiating operations and building up a system of techniques you will create an opportunity for the emergence of able local leaders, who in turn will eventually build the political base (the national objective) that may have been lacking at the start, and who are capable of coping with dissension and corruption within their country.

MR. PHILLIPS had seen this approach work in South Vietnam, where a few Americans, collaborating with the Vietnamese army in operations and advising a few Vietnamese who were successful and, as a result, became more and more influential, contributed greatly to the change that took place within two years. Whereas in 1954 President Diem was almost entirely surrounded by a disloyal

army and police force, and the country was controlled in part by the Vietminh and in part by various religious sects with armies of their own, by 1956 the government was relatively stable and efficient, and the majority of the people supported it. In MR. PHILLIPS' opinion, the same approach would yield the desired results in other areas today; he had some reservations about the present U.S. policy of sending thousands of Americans to South Vietnam, for he believed that saturating the country with advisors was not necessarily the best answer.

BRIG. POWELL-JONES approved of such an empirical approach, the success of which was apparent in every theater where the British had been involved in helping an indigenous movement to success. Greece alone, he recalled, afforded two such examples: in the days of Byron, and again in the late 1940's and early 1950's, when the Americans, in particular, contributed much to the communist defeat. COL. GALULA, who served as U.N. observer in Greece from 1949 to the end of the war, argued that the problem of outside support there had been a somewhat simpler one than any faced today. The Greeks needed only technical advice, equipment, and training, having themselves from the very beginning the determination, the leadership, and the issue with which to defeat the Communists. The latter, by contrast, had no issue, and their cause was moribund also because of their alliance with the Albanians and Bulgarians, the natural enemies of the Greeks.

COL. BOHANNAN had no doubt that the Diem government, too, was determined to fight communism. He contrasted this with the situation in the Philippines, where during much of the eight-year rebellion the government, though anticommunist, was unwilling to take more than police action against the Huk forces, because many Filipinos did not want to disturb the business-as-usual atmosphere. The scene changed only as a result of the combined initiative of the Seventh Battalion Combat Team (under COL. VALERIANO), which recognized the war as a serious conflict to be fought with every means available, and a new and aggressive Secretary of Defense, who saw the need to defeat the enemy not only militarily but in his struggle for the loyalty and support of the population. The success of the resolute, unorthodox pacification policy under Magsaysay, as carried out by the army's most effective outfit, though widely doubted at the start, was persuasive enough to change attitudes and tactics throughout the armed forces. As for the government, Magsaysay and his advisors managed to commit the less aggressive top politicians to the new policy by seizing on purely rhetorical pronouncements out of Manila and treating them as policy statements to be acted on for a more vigorous pursuit of the war.

The development in the Philippines proved to COL. BOHANNAN the equal

importance, in any war of this kind, of intelligence, a resolute national leadership, and a sound policy toward the civilians combined with effective military action. Comparing the task to a tripod, which must stand on all three legs or fall, he emphasized that this "trinity" concept must apply at every level, from the top of the government down to the individual soldier whose threefold job it is to kill enemy soldiers, obtain information, and win the support of local inhabitants.

A question from MR. RUTKOWSKI led into a lengthy examination of the problems associated with ultimate disengagement. As there will rarely be a formal surrender of the rebel forces (it was agreed that you must avoid giving the other side the stage as a formal enemy), how does a government know that a guerrilla war is over? If the national power is committed to "holding the line" against the insurgents, when and how can it justify disengagement? Where you have set out with a stated national objective, how do you know that you have attained it? (To use the analogy of the toothache, how can you tell whether the fact that the tooth has stopped hurting is proof that it has healed or a sign that it is dead from a general infection that might flare up again in the next tooth?) Assuming that no counter-guerrilla war is ever over until you have dried up the wellsprings of the guerrillas' ideological power, how can this factor be measured? In sum, how can you work out in advance an acceptable condition for disengagement that will prevent a premature withdrawal and at the same time protect you against staying too long and becoming a resident occupying power?

In Greece, COL. GALULA pointed out, the problem was rendered relatively simple by the Communists' withdrawal into Albania, which was tantamount to surrender. In Indochina (BRIG. POWELL-JONES) the French might have stopped the war much sooner had they fastened in time on the simple political objective of handing the country over to the Vietnamese in a reasonably orderly condition. Indeed, MR. RUTKOWSKI thought, the main answer to the problem may lie in the truism that you cannot separate military from political action; it is up to the government to state at the outset the political aim toward which the military leader can then orient himself instead of being forced to improvise. Yet such an objective, said BRIG. POWELL-JONES, can be regarded as adequate only if it foresees a situation in which law and order have been re-established to a degree that precludes a relapse upon the troops' withdrawal. The British achieved this in Cyprus. And they did also in Malaya, where, early in the emergency, they announced a program for their departure on the assumption that order would have been restored at a certain stage (a means of mobilizing public opinion and offering the locals an incentive for supporting the government).

The necessary political stability, MR. PHILLIPS pointed out, will not be attained until the people of the country have a strong government of their own that they are willing to support. There is little danger, in his view, of the defenders' staying beyond the period that they are needed; the local government will probably be quick to suggest their withdrawal. According to COL. BOHANNAN, the reverse is more likely to be the case. American forces are almost invariably withdrawn prematurely in response to political and economic pressures at home (an age-old problem, COL. GALULA commented, which faced the sixth-century Roman commander Belisarius in his North African campaign as it did the French military leaders in Indochina).

As the meeting went into its final hour, MR. HOSMER asked the participants to list some of their suggestions for equipment, additional research, and other desiderata that they had found lacking in their own experience.

COL. KITSON singled out the need for money as the one least recognized and most important in counterinsurgent campaigns; that is to say, for enough ready cash in the pockets of those whose job it is to obtain information. He himself had been compelled to use his private funds until he learned to "steal from the terrorists." His point received strong support from several of the participants. COL. GALULA had had to "steal" from the government in Algiers; COL. FERTIG had "printed his own money." MR. PHILLIPS had observed the need for ample small cash in Vietnam and Laos, not only to buy information, but also to solve local problems involved in carrying out a campaign to win the support of the people. For example, in an area of hostile or unco-operative inhabitants, it might be necessary to hire men or horses for transport; or, in a newly pacified area formerly held by the Vietminh, it would be a psychological factor of great value to be able to buy some of the produce of farmers who had difficulty selling their crops in the market.

COL. FERTIG then described how he met these financial problems in the Philippines. In the early days of the anti-Japanese struggle, when he did not yet have the support of the civilian population, he had indeed printed his own emergency currency. In addition, each battalion received an allowance of 2000 pesos quarterly out of operational funds, for which there was no accounting (COL. FERTIG had obtained in advance a written statement from the Army Finance Office to the effect that he owed nothing to the U.S. government). The troops were under strict orders never to steal from the population, and it was impressed on them that a peso in return for a chicken would make a friend of the farmer. Abuses and violations were severely punished. And eventually, upon repeated request, the U.S. government supplemented the emergency currency, somewhat excessively, with

\$500,000 in Philippine peso bills (the greater part of which COL. FERTIG was able to turn back at the end of the war).

With regard to technical equipment, the group felt that, though some refinements and gadgets heretofore unavailable to them might be helpful in the future, they were not essential needs. Guerrilla warfare, said COL. GALULA, does not, in general, call for elaborate equipment beyond that at hand. Though climate, terrain, and other special factors may create certain special requirements, the unique demands of this kind of warfare are not so much for a new technology as for a novel philosophical approach to its over-all conduct.

MR. PHILLIPS would have welcomed a means to broadcast out of an airplane to people on the ground, such as enemy units who had to be persuaded to give up. But the requested standard public address system never arrived, nor would it or any other existing standard U.S. Army equipment, in his opinion, have been entirely adequate. What was needed was a simple loudspeaker and amplifier that could be installed in a small aircraft with a minimum of difficulty and could be used to broadcast clearly, free of the engine's noise. COL. KITSON, recounting his own successful experience of playing records or making direct voice broadcasts from airplanes, denied that present equipment posed an insurmountable technical problem. But, as MR. PHILLIPS pointed out, it required a person with considerable skill and many pieces of army equipment to devise a workable gadget.

BRIG. POWELL-JONES' idea of a transmitter that could be placed in the enemy's hands and thus give his whereabouts away seemed to MR. PHILLIPS well worth exploring. Also, he recalled the fruitless search of people on the psychological-warfare side for a self-contained tape recorder or amplifier-and-loudspeaker system, battery-run and portable, that could be placed in a camouflaged spot and, running at night, would whisper or imitate spirits and ghosts to frighten local guerrillas and villagers.

COL. SHIRLEY saw a possible answer to some of these problems in the development of a large number of different "modules" that could be assembled to meet varying requirements. He recalled the profound disappointment that followed the arrival of the first (American) voice aircraft in Malaya, when this did not turn out to work immediately, though it was known to have been effective in the Philippines.

COL. FERTIG, who had himself supervised the introduction and adaptation of this plane in Malaya, qualified COL. SHIRLEY's statement. The voice aircraft was not fully developed until the Korean war, where it was used in a program aimed at the surrender of the remaining communist guerrillas in South Vietnam. The voice messages were accompanied by drops of surrender leaflets and four-ounce packages

of rice to the hungry guerrillas, and the effectiveness of the program was shown by the fact that the majority of those who surrendered came in bearing leaflets.

COL. BOHANNAN summed up the preceding discussion with the remark that the most critical need in counterinsurgent warfare is a support organization that is authorized and willing to get the commander in the field whatever he thinks he needs, within reason. COL. KITSON's point about the importance of ready money, in particular, could not be stated too strongly. Yet the Pentagon, though it might accept a field commander's losses in men as inevitable and not to be questioned, would undoubtedly balk at a request for a large sum of money to be spent at the commander's discretion and within a short time on the pacification of a small area.

COL. FERTIG agreed emphatically. The truth of these statements, he added, became doubly apparent as one looked at a single exception to the above generalizations and at the striking results it yielded. At the time that a supply system for the anti-Japanese guerrillas in the Philippines was to be organized in Australia, General MacArthur left behind a signed statement to the effect that anything available in the theater was to be given to Commander Parsons (a Navy officer charged with the procurement and delivery of supplies by submarine to the Philippine guerrillas) if he requested it. As a result, the guerrilla forces received the excellent and ample equipment that accounted in large measure for their success.

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MR. HOSMER concluded the week's meetings by expressing his own and The RAND Corporation's gratitude to the participants for their valuable contribution to the Symposium.



APPENDIX

**PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE  
FOR THE SYMPOSIUM ON COUNTERINSURGENCY  
TO BE HELD AT THE RAND CORPORATION  
WASHINGTON OFFICE, April 16–20, 1962**

*Monday, April 16*

**INTRODUCTION**

Purposes of the symposium; proposed approach during meetings; discussion of draft terms of reference, and an examination of guerrilla warfare terminology

**GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS**

What conditions cause guerrilla movements?

What motivates the individual guerrilla?

What are the major points of difference between communist guerrilla organizations and noncommunist insurgent movements?

**OBJECTIVES OF COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS**

Primary objectives: the elimination, neutralization, and conversion of the guerrilla enemy

Operational objectives: locating and destroying guerrilla units; breaking the guerrilla organization; disrupting guerrilla planning; demoralizing the guerrilla; isolating him from the populace; denying him logistic support and intelligence; increasing friendly resources and capabilities, etc.

**ORGANIZATION FOR COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS**

Mobilization of counter guerrilla forces—military, police, administrative, etc.

Organizational structures for conducting counter guerrilla operations—the problem of coordinating the effort

Identifying priority targets for counter guerrilla operations; the allocation of counter guerrilla forces to these targets

*Tuesday, April 17*

**TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES OF COUNTERGUERRILLA WAR**

**SURFACE TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES**

Defense of fixed installations; patrolling; ambush and counterambush; bait operations; encirclement and sweeping operations; area and route denial; border control; hunter-killer operations; pseudogang operations; coastal and waterway patrol

Surface logistics—backpack, mechanized, pack animals

Composition of forces; types of weapons and equipment; war dogs; characteristics of land vehicles, naval and river craft

#### AIR AND AIR-GROUND TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Routine air logistics; supply of fixed installations; supply of mobile forces; combat troop mobility; reconnaissance; target identification; damage assessment; independent and joint combat strikes

Special air missions (e.g., psychological warfare, show of force, anticrop missions)

Aircraft allocation and control; air-ground tactics

Aircraft characteristics; equipment; ordnance; communications gear

#### *Wednesday, April 18*

##### PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES OF POLITICAL OPERATION, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, AND CIVIC ACTION

Fundamental principles to be followed in political action

Fundamental principles to be followed in psychological warfare—identifying objectives

Tactical psychological warfare and political operations directed against the enemy and his supporters for purposes of accomplishing immediate limited objectives such as the surrender of individuals or groups

Strategic psychological warfare and political operations aimed at establishing a favorable image of and support for the government, demoralizing and discrediting the guerrillas, etc.

Organization and training for the conduct of psychological warfare and political operations

Civic action: concept of civic action; various roles of military and civilian agencies in civic action, organization and training for civic action

#### *Thursday, April 19*

##### TECHNIQUES OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Gaining information: penetration; use of captured personnel and documents; interrogation techniques; population screening; communications monitoring; indications of the presence of guerrillas; aerial photography

Denying information to the enemy: isolation; deception; surprise; counterintelligence

Organization for intelligence

##### TECHNIQUES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL

Networks for communications and control of forces; village and outpost alarm systems; electronic, visual equipment; couriers

#### *Friday, April 20*

##### PROBLEMS OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT UNDER ATTACK AND A FRIENDLY OUTSIDE POWER

The role of the advisor; organization and training of advisory personnel

##### GENERAL STRATEGY IN COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE: A REVIEW AND SUMMARY

##### CONCLUSIONS: SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH ON EQUIPMENT; SUGGESTIONS FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONAL APPLICATIONS

## INDEX

*Entries in this index are understood to apply to counterinsurgency, the counter-insurgent, or guerrilla warfare in general. Entries referring to insurgency or to the enemy guerrilla are so specified.*

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