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fix(security/unknown/examples/grpc_server): update module golang.org/x/net to v0.60.0 [security] (v1.x) - #6545

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renovate/v1.x-security-examplesgrpc_server-golang.orgxnet
Oct 12, 2026
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AgnesToulet merged 1 commit into
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renovate/v1.x-security-examplesgrpc_server-golang.orgxnet

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 → v0.60.0 age confidence

HTTP/2 server memory exhaustion due to Trailer headers in net/http

CVE-2026-78659 / GO-2026-6603

More information

Details

When "Trailer" headers are sent by a client, the HTTP server internally uses the header values to populate the Request.Trailer map passed to the server handler. Because Request.Trailer is a map, each entry incurs memory overhead. For HTTP/2 servers, a malicious client can exploit this by sending a "Trailer" header that declares a large number of fields, causing the server to allocate a disproportionate amount of memory while bypassing Server.MaxHeaderValueCount and Server.MaxHeaderBytes limits. This exploit is not applicable for HTTP/1 servers, which do not support multiplexing a large number of requests over one TCP connection, and whose Server.MaxHeaderBytes are calculated differently.

Severity

Unknown

References

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).


HTTP/2 transport accepts malformed framing-related headers in net/http

CVE-2026-78660 / GO-2026-6610

More information

Details

Historically, we have been rather lax about malformed framing-related headers in our HTTP/2 implementation, as they cannot interfere with HTTP/2 framing. However, this makes it possible for our HTTP/2 implementation to forward responses containing such headers to an HTTP/1 client when acting as a reverse proxy. If the HTTP/1 client also does not behave strictly enough, this can result in response smuggling.

Severity

Unknown

References

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Excessive CPU consumption from repeated initial window changes in net/http

CVE-2026-78669 / GO-2026-6611

More information

Details

A malicious HTTP/2 peer can cause excessive CPU consumption in the client or server by opening a large number of streams and then sending many small SETTINGS frames containing SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE values.

Severity

Unknown

References

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Double flow control refund on HTTP/2 server streams in net/http

CVE-2026-78663 / GO-2026-6612

More information

Details

The HTTP/2 server can refund connection-level flow control twice for the same data: Once when a client resets a stream (refunding data for any sent-but-unread portion of the stream), and again when a request handler reads the buffered data. A malicious client can exploit this to bypass the configured connection-level flow control limit (MaxReceiveBufferPerConnection). Total buffered data is still limited by the concurrent stream limit and stream-level flow control.

Severity

Unknown

References

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).


HTTP/2 server crash due to HPACK encoder race in net/http

CVE-2026-97032 / GO-2026-6617

More information

Details

HTTP/2 servers could end up crashing due to inadvertently modifying its HPACK encoder concurrently. This happens because the server modifies the HPACK encoder from two goroutines without synchronization: one uses the encoder to encode a HEADERS frame as part of a response sent to a client and the other modifies the encoder's table size when handling a SETTINGS frame containing SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE that a client sends. A malicious client can repeatedly send a request while changing the header table size to crash the server.

Severity

Unknown

References

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).


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…x/net to v0.60.0 [security]

| datasource | package          | from    | to      |
| ---------- | ---------------- | ------- | ------- |
| go         | golang.org/x/net | v0.58.0 | v0.60.0 |


Signed-off-by: renovate-sh-app[bot] <219655108+renovate-sh-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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renovate-sh-app Bot requested a review from a team as a code owner October 9, 2026 06:03
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renovate-sh-app Bot requested review from ankur22 and szkiba and removed request for a team October 9, 2026 06:03
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ℹ️ Artifact update notice

File name: examples/grpc_server/go.mod

In order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the go get command, which resulted in the following additional change(s):

  • 3 additional dependencies were updated
  • The go directive was updated for compatibility reasons

Details:

Package Change
go 1.25.0 -> 1.26.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 -> v0.48.0
golang.org/x/text v0.41.0 -> v0.42.0
google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20260526163538-3dc84a4a5aaa -> v0.0.0-20260803160001-6ac0973c030d

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renovate-sh-app Bot deployed to azure-trusted-signing October 9, 2026 06:08 Active
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renovate-sh-app Bot deployed to azure-trusted-signing October 9, 2026 06:09 Active
@AgnesToulet
AgnesToulet merged commit b14bcf7 into v1.x Oct 12, 2026
55 of 59 checks passed
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AgnesToulet deleted the renovate/v1.x-security-examplesgrpc_server-golang.orgxnet branch October 12, 2026 08:57

This branch was successfully deployed

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azure-trusted-signing — 7c4abd2f Deployed Oct 9, 2026 by renovate-sh-app[bot] via sign-packages #10976
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