protect-mcp

Local policy enforcement and signed decision receipts for AI agent tool calls.

Developer page · Quickstart · Agent setup · Policy packs · Sample record · Integrations · Documentation · Contribute

Put the gateway between an MCP client and its tool server, or use its hooks in a coding agent. Review a Cedar policy, enable enforcement, and keep a signed record of the decisions. Local evaluation and verification need no ScopeBlind account and send no decision telemetry.

• Enforce at the tool boundary. Cedar denies on missing policies, engine errors or evaluation errors in fail-closed mode. Shadow mode is the default for the MCP wrapper: use --enforce when ready to block.
• Check what was signed. Ed25519 receipts include the decision and policy digest. @veritasacta/verify checks the bytes against the public key you trust.
• Start with existing tools. Use MCP stdio, the HTTP gateway or coding-agent hooks. Optional hosted collaboration has its own permissions and data flows.

A gateway covers calls routed through it. It is not an OS sandbox, and a signed receipt does not establish that an action executed or that no action was omitted. The security policy describes the boundary and reporting process.

A real local run: evaluate two proposed calls, sign the decisions, verify the receipts, then change a signed decision and check it again.

Text walkthrough and reproduction · Captured results

Use Node.js 22 and npm in a new directory. Install the pinned gateway and verifier:

mkdir protect-mcp-demo
cd protect-mcp-demo
npm init -y
npm install --save-exact protect-mcp@0.32.4 @veritasacta/verify@0.11.0

This example evaluates two proposed calls and signs their decisions. It does not execute either tool or run git push. Everything after installation is local.

# Create a starter policy and a private signing key.
npx --no-install protect-mcp init --starter

# A normal read is allowed; a force-push to main is denied (exit 2).
npx --no-install protect-mcp evaluate --policy ./protect.cedar --tool Read --input '{"path":"README.md"}'
npx --no-install protect-mcp evaluate --policy ./protect.cedar --tool Bash --input '{"command":"git push --force origin main"}' || test "$?" -eq 2

# Evaluate again at signing time and record both decisions, in order.
npx --no-install protect-mcp sign --cedar builtin:starter --tool Read --input '{"path":"README.md"}' --key ./protect-mcp.key --receipts ./receipts
npx --no-install protect-mcp sign --cedar builtin:starter --tool Bash --input '{"command":"git push --force origin main"}' --key ./protect-mcp.key --receipts ./receipts

# Take only the public key from the key you generated, not from the receipt.
PROTECT_MCP_PUBLIC_KEY=$(node -p 'JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync("protect-mcp.key", "utf8")).publicKey')
npx --no-install verify --replay-chain ./receipts/receipts.jsonl --key "$PROTECT_MCP_PUBLIC_KEY" --json

# Change the signed deny to allow. The original receipt log stays intact.
node -e 'const fs=require("fs");const r=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync("receipts/receipts.jsonl","utf8").trim().split("\n")[1]);r.payload.decision="allow";fs.writeFileSync("tampered.json",JSON.stringify(r))'
npx --no-install verify tampered.json --key "$PROTECT_MCP_PUBLIC_KEY" --json || test "$?" -eq 1

Expected: allow, then deny; both original receipt signatures and their link verify; the modified receipt reports invalid_signature. Keep protect-mcp.key private. To verify someone else's record, obtain their expected public key through an independent trusted channel.

Verifier exit codes are 0: valid, 1: invalid, 2: not checked/error. An invalid result is not necessarily tampering: the wrong expected key can also fail verification. Chain replay checks the supplied links; it does not establish that you received the entire history.

CI runs this exact example against the packed candidate and the pinned published verifier. See validation and releases.

Choose the integration that matches your host and the coverage you need. Installing guidance skills does not enable enforcement. doctor checks local configuration; confirm the selected route with a real allowed and blocked call.

For the Claude Code plugin, first prepare and start the local gate, then install it in your project (Claude Code 2.1.295 or later):

claude plugin install protect-mcp --marketplace ScopeBlind/scopeblind-gateway --scope project

The plugin blocks routed tool calls while its gate is unavailable. Choose the plugin or standalone project hooks, so the same call is not recorded twice.

Host compatibility and release status separates adapter tests from real-host validation. The Cursor and assistant packages are previews, not public directory listings. The standalone hook-format fixes ship in 0.32.4; its changelog lists what changed for each format. A format flag alone does not establish a working Codex, Gemini or Hermes integration.

For an existing MCP server, initialize its configuration in a separate directory from the example above, then run the wrapper with your server command:

npx --yes protect-mcp@0.32.4 init
npx --yes protect-mcp@0.32.4 --policy ./protect-mcp.json -- node your-mcp-server.js

This starts in shadow mode. Review the observed calls and policy before adding --enforce. wrap prints client configuration and exits; it is not the launch command. Full setup instructions.

Starter shell rules inspect command text. They are useful guardrails, but can miss alternate command spellings and can match harmless quoted text. Review the starter policy's coverage and limits before relying on it.

Sources, versions and check coverage.

0.32.0 closes several ways around the gate. Some of them change how you start it:

• --http listens on 127.0.0.1, and every request except GET /health needs Authorization: Bearer <token>. Set the same PROTECT_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN (at least 32 characters) for the gateway and for the client or ingress that calls it. Use --host only when you mean to expose the port beyond this machine.
• --enforce refuses to start when signing is configured but its key is missing or unreadable, and refuses an allowed call whose receipt cannot be signed.
• --cedar with --policy applies both: a call needs a Cedar permit and must also pass that file's block, require_approval, rate limits and min_tier. Signing and credentials come from that file.
• The dashboard accepts a change only from its own page, which carries a per-launch token.
• Signing keys are written 0600 in a 0700 folder. For a key made by an earlier version, run chmod 600 keys/gateway.json; the gateway warns until you do.
• A once approval at POST /approve names the exact action: the Request ID the gateway prints, tool:payload_hash. The approval nonce is on the gateway's stderr only.

See the changelog for every change.

• Local gateway guide: policies, hooks, dashboard, credentials and receipt compatibility.
• Host compatibility: enforcement versus guidance, supported routes, test scope and release status.
• Receipt and disclosure guide: local records, selective disclosure and optional hosted digest anchoring.
• Command reference.
• Reproducible visual demo: captured results and rendering scripts.
• Integrations and contributions: source links, versions and the scope of published interoperability checks.
• Hosted coordination: separate human approvals, invoice sandbox and repository review workflows.
• Release validation and provenance.
• Changes by version.

Start with a bounded help-wanted task: one real host capture, another clean-package runtime, or one tested policy recipe.

Bug reports, minimal reproductions, documentation fixes and compatibility tests are welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md for setup and checks, and GOVERNANCE.md for maintainership. Report vulnerabilities privately through SECURITY.md, not a public issue.

The shared conformance corpus records compatibility results across receipt producers. A passing corpus is bounded interoperability evidence, not a security certification.

MIT licensed; see LICENSE and the existing patent notice. Maintained by Tom Farley at ScopeBlind. Receipt format: Acta individual Internet-Draft.