Tag Archives: Supreme Court

Supreme Court decisions and arguments

A Year of Patent Cert Denials

by Dennis Crouch

Over the past twelve months, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 36 cases raising patent questions. It granted one, Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., 608 U.S. ___ (2026), which was unanimously reversed in June.

I have been tracking all these cases on ScotusGate. Here is the rough shape:

  • Inter partes review and PTAB practice (7).
  • General civil pProcedure and jurisdiction (7).
  • Rule 36 and the duty to explain (5).
  • Patent eligibility under § 101 (4).
  • The jury's role and appellate review of damages (4).
  • Obviousness and § 112 (3).
  • Remedies, fees, sanctions and misuse (3).
  • PTO prosecution and issuance (2).
  • The patent and trade dress boundary (1).

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Foreseeable Is Not Inducing: Hikma v. Amarin

by Dennis Crouch

The Supreme Court has spent several recent Terms assembling a general law of secondary liability, and on June 4, 2026, it folded patent inducement into that project. In Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., No. 24-889, 608 U.S. ___ (2026), a unanimous Court (Jackson, J.) held that a brand manufacturer cannot state a claim for active inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) merely by alleging that physicians could read a generic competitor's statements as an instruction to infringe. The question, the Court explained, is whether the generic actively encouraged the infringing use, not whether the audience might have heard encouragement in what was said.  Because the Court found the accused conduct at most consistent with infringing substitution, rather than designed to bring it about, the case could not survive Hikma’s motion to dismiss.  This is the only Supreme Court patent case for the 2025-2026 Supreme Court term.

The dispute arises from the skinny-label mechanism that lets a generic enter the market for a drug's unpatented uses while carving out the methods of use that remain under patent. Amarin's Vascepa (icosapent ethyl) is approved both for severe hypertriglyceridemia and for reducing cardiovascular risk in patients who already take statins.  But, in-force patents only cover the cardiovascular risk use.  Hikma's generic carried a label covering only the unpatented severe hypertriglyceridemia indication. But, as everyone expected, the drug was widely prescribed and taken for the much more common patented use. Amarin sued Hikma for actively inducing that infringement -- pointing to Hikma's statements across its label, its patient information leaflet, its website, and its investor press releases.

The District of Delaware dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that it was plausible a physician could read the statements as encouragement.  The Supreme Court took the case and ultimately reversed again -- reinstating the dismissal and finding that the reader-focused inquiry failed to state a claim.

The court also appears to announce here a limited safe harbor:

We decline to put generic manufacturers between a rock and a hard place by turning adherence to the law and industry standards into building blocks for illegal conduct.

The decision is not a formal safe harbor, but it operates as a strong anti-bootstrapping rule: compliance with Hatch-Waxman and ordinary generic marketing conventions cannot themselves become the “active steps” required for inducement.


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The Thin Margin Between “Generic Vascepa” and Active Inducement

by Dennis Crouch

The Supreme Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026 in Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., No. 24-889, the term's only patent case focusing on patent inducement in the pharmaceutical "skinny label" context.  Justice Sotomayor pinned down all counsel to agree that no new doctrine is needed to decide this case. This led to several justices remarking that they should not even be hearing the case because it focused on factual error review rather than legal doctrine. Justice Barrett quoted Justice Alito's earlier-Term observation that "I'm not sure why this case is here except four of my colleagues wanted it to be."

Ultimately, a major § 271(b) pronouncement people braced for after January's cert grant looks somewhat unlikely.  If the generic Hikma wins reversal, I now expect it will be based upon the court's narrowing of the facts rather than rewriting the law.

  • Charles B. Klein (Winston & Strawn LLP) argued first as counsel for generic petitioner Hikma.
  • Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General) argued second on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner.
  • Michael R. Huston (Perkins Coie LLP) came third, arguing for patentee respondent Amarin.

The U.S. Gov't amicus position - most often - the one to watch. I.e., it is the position that the Court is most likely to follow.  Here, although Stewart sided with the accused infringer on many points, he also did some work for the patentee.


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SCOTUS: IP Cases in the Pipeline

by Dennis Crouch

The Supreme Court is hearing argument in Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., No. 24-889 on April 29, 2026 (as I write this). Hikma is the only granted patent case of the term.  But I wanted to step back and take stock of the IP pipeline at the Court. I identified twelve cases are now pending at various stages before the Supreme Court, including several pre-petition applications.

Patent Eligibility (§ 101): The most familiar question on the docket is whether the Court will revisit § 101.  And two cases are pending: (more…)

The Cox Shadow Over Hikma: Three Questions for Wednesday’s Argument

by Dennis Crouch

On Wednesday, April 29, 2026, the Supreme Court will hear argument in Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., No. 24-889.  The Court has not heard a patent inducement case since 2015 (Commil v. Cisco) or a skinny-label case since 2012 (Caraco v. Nova Nordisk).  Here though the key case on point is the one that not briefed: Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, 607 U.S. ___ (2026).

Cox was decided in late March 2026, with the Court narrowly construing contributory copyright infringement once again tying its analysis to the patent act’s statutory approach.  Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, held that secondary liability requires either inducement (active steps to encourage infringement) or tailoring (a service “not capable of substantial or commercially significant non-infringing uses”).  Although copyright does not have a statute on-point, the Court analogized these to the patent law’s 271(b) and (c) respectively.

Ultimately, the Court held mere knowledge that downstream users will infringe, even combined with continued provision of a useful product, is not enough to justify an inducement finding. Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Jackson, urging preservation of a broader material contribution theory.

There are many parallels between Cox and Hikma, and the patentee (Amarin) will need to distinguish the two in order to win.  My own expectation is that Amarin will not be able to distinguish Cox. Although section viii’s interaction with state substitution laws and routine off-label prescribing produces what I have called the skinny-label tinderbox (a structural channel toward the patented indication that operates regardless of generic conduct), inevitability is not the same as encouragement, and Cox makes clear that secondary liability requires the latter.

See, Dennis Crouch, The Tinderbox: Market Structure, Skinny Labels, and Induced Patent Infringement, 73 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse ___ (Forthcoming 2026).

(more…)

Knowledge Isn’t Enough: The Supreme Court Rejects Expansive Theory of Secondary Copyright Liability

by Dennis Crouch

The Supreme Court today reversed the billion-dollar copyright verdict against Cox Communications, holding that an internet service provider (ISP) cannot be held contributorily liable for its users' copyright infringement simply because it knows about the infringement and continues providing service. Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, No. 24-171 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2026).  Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for seven justices; Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Jackson, concurring in the judgment.

Unlike patent law, the copyright statute does not include a particular statutory framework for contributory infringement. For decades, however, the Supreme Court has attempted to treat the two doctrines in parallel - with copyright often borrowing elements from patent's statutory treatment of 35 U.S.C. 271(b) and 271(c).  In Cox, the court continued this approach and solidified contributory copyright liability to just two pathways: inducement and providing a service "tailored to infringement." Because Cox did neither, its continued provision of internet service to subscribers flagged as past and future infringers did not make it an infringer.  This case will now sit along side the court's prior key decisions in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), and Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).

With oral arguments in Hikma Pharmaceuticals v. Amarin Pharma, No. 24-889, set for April 29, the Court's insistence that knowledge of infringement is not enough for secondary liability is a troubling signal for the branded pharmaceutical company trying to hold a generic manufacturer liable for induced patent infringement.


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Where Were You? Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment’s Day in Court

by Dennis Crouch

One of the topics I teach in my internet law course is the steady erosion of the boundary between digital and physical privacy. For years, privacy debates centered on what we do online: how we scroll, what we buy, who we email. But location tracking has collapsed that distinction. Your phone knows where you sleep, which doctor you visit, and whether you attended a protest. And because that data is collected continuously, stored indefinitely, and held by private companies, it is available to law enforcement with the right legal process. The question the Supreme Court will take up in April is just how much process the Fourth Amendment requires.

In Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112, the Court is hearing its first case addressing the constitutionality of geofence warrants. A geofence warrant works differently from a traditional warrant. Instead of identifying a suspect and then seeking evidence, law enforcement identifies a location and a time window and then asks a technology company to hand over data on every device that was nearby. In this case, a detective investigating a 2019 bank robbery in Midlothian, Virginia, obtained a warrant directing Google to search its Sensorvault database, which at the time held continuous location records for over 500 million users of Google's Location History service. The warrant defined a geofence with a 150-meter radius centered on the bank and a one-hour window around the robbery.

Google's initial search returned anonymized location data for 19 devices in the zone. What followed was a three-step process designed by Google. The detective, without returning to a judge, selected nine of the 19 accounts for expanded tracking over a two-hour window with no geographic limits. He then asked Google to de-anonymize three of those accounts, again without judicial approval. One belonged to Okello Chatrie.


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The Tinderbox: A Framework for Skinny-Label Inducement Before the Supreme Court

by Dennis Crouch

In Hikma v. Amarin, No. 24-889, the Supreme Court is focusing on the question of when does a generic manufacturer’s decision to sell a cheaper version of a drug cross the line into actively inducing infringement of the brand’s method-of-use patent? I have posted a new working paper to SSRN that proposes a framework for answering that question. Dennis Crouch, The Tinderbox: Market Structure, Skinny Labels, and Induced Patent Infringement (2026). The essay responds to, and builds on, Professors Jacob Sherkow and Paul Gugliuzza’s recent critique of the Federal Circuit’s approach. Jacob S. Sherkow & Paul R. Gugliuzza, Infringement by Drug Label, 78 Stan. L. Rev. 131 (2026). (more…)

Soak and Pounce: 1920’s Style Submarine Patents

by Dennis Crouch

Long before patent lawyers coined the term “submarine patent,” practitioners had a different name for the same mischief. I was reading through briefing in the old laches case of Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U.S. 126 (1920) where respondent’s counsel Paul Synnestvedt described the practice of letting an application

Soak in the office for years until the trade had  independently developed the invention, when the applicant would come out with a divisional application and pounce upon the unfortunates who had proceeded to build up a business on the invention.

Soak and pounce.  It isn’t clear to me if Synnestvedt was intending “soak” to be in the same hidden-under-water sense as submarining, or if it was more of a marinade. Either way, the complaint is that applicants were using the Patent Office’s procedures to lie in wait while industry invests in technology, then emerging with claims calibrated to capture those investments by others. (more…)

Forthwith, Part II: CIT Orders Refunds for All Importers, Not Just Litigants

by Dennis Crouch

Two weeks after the Supreme Court declared the IEEPA tariffs illegal, and two days after the Federal Circuit issued its mandates returning the case to the trial court, U.S. Customs and Border Protection was still liquidating import entries with the unlawful duties baked in. No refunds had been issued. White House controlled CBP Automated Commercial Environment system kept churning through previously filed entries as if Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), had never happened.

In Atmus Filtration, Inc. v. United States (Ct. Int’l Trade Mar. 4, 2026), Judge Richard Eaton issued an order that goes well beyond the individual case before him. Eaton declared that “all importers of record whose entries were subject to IEEPA duties are entitled to the benefit of the Learning Resources decision” and directed CBP to liquidate all unliquidated entries “without regard to the IEEPA duties.” For entries already liquidated but not yet final, CBP must reliquidate on the same terms. The order applies regardless of whether an importer has filed its own complaint. To hold otherwise, Judge Eaton wrote, “would be to thwart the efficient administration of justice and to deny those importers who have filed suit the efficient resolution of their claims, and to deny entirely importers who have not filed suit the benefit of the Learning Resources decision.” The CIT’s Chief Judge has designated Eaton as the sole judge for all IEEPA refund cases, and Eaton has scheduled a closed conference for March 6 at which the government must present a plan for administering refunds without requiring each of the thousands of affected importers to file individual complaints. (more…)

Forthwith: Federal Circuit Issues Mandates in V.O.S. Selections, Clearing the Way for $175 Billion Refund Reckoning

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit’s role as the appellate court for international trade disputes has thrust it into the center of the most consequential separation-of-powers case in a generation. On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s en banc ruling that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026); Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., 607 U.S. ___ (2026). And today, the Federal Circuit dissolved the stay that had held its mandate in abeyance since August 2025, ordering its mandates to “issue forthwith.” V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, Nos. 2025-1812, -1813 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2026) (en banc per curiam). The case now returns to the Court of International Trade (CIT), which faces the formidable task of overseeing what could be the largest government refund obligation in American history: an estimated $175 billion in IEEPA tariff collections that the nation’s highest court has declared unlawful.

The briefing on the mandate motion offers a window into the pace of potential refunds. Former US Solicitor Neal Katyal (now with Milbank), representing the V.O.S. plaintiffs, filed the motion on February 24, arguing that the Supreme Court’s judgment satisfied the express condition this Court had set for releasing the mandate and that every day of delay inflicted real harm on the small businesses awaiting refunds. The motion quoted Treasury Secretary Bessent’s public statement that refunds would not issue until the CIT ordered them, and President Trump’s suggestion that the question would “get litigated for the next two years.” The government’s opposition, filed by the DOJ Appellate Staff, urged the court to wait at least until the Supreme Court formally sends down its certified judgment (32 days after entry under Supreme Court Rule 45.3), and cross-moved for a 90-day stay to “allow the political branches an opportunity to consider options.” The government invoked Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), where the Supreme Court stayed its own judgment to give Congress time to respond. DOJ also characterized the plaintiffs’ monetary harm as compensable rather than irreparable, and warned that the refund process would be protracted regardless.  Katyal’s reply, filed over this past weekend was pointed: the government “cites nothing” for the proposition that this Court must wait for the Supreme Court’s certified judgment and the government notably did not deny the force of its own stipulations guaranteeing refunds to all similarly situated plaintiffs. (more…)

SCOTUSGate: A New Portal to the Certiorari Pipeline

by Dennis Crouch

For many years, I relied on certpool.com to keep tabs on the Supreme Court’s certiorari docket. When that site went dark, I started building my own tracker in 2024, running it locally on my personal computer and checking it daily for new and interesting cases before the US Supreme Court. That project has now grown into SCOTUSGate.com, which I’m making publicly available for the first time. The site is very much in alpha, a work in progress, but it is functional and I’d welcome feedback from readers as it develops.

SCOTUSGate tracks petitions for certiorari and shadow-docket activity across the full Supreme Court docket. The database (named Cerberus, after the three-headed dog who guards the gates of the underworld) currently shows over 1,000 pending petitions, with structured data on conference scheduling, cert-stage briefing, CVSG invitations, and case dispositions. The site pulls docket information directly from the Court several times per day and I have incorporated both traditional text analysis tools as well as AI to extract questions presented from petition PDFs and assign topic tags for filtering and discovery.

The name works on a few levels. A gate as portal: the site is a point of entry into information about what the Court is considering. A gate as barrier: the certiorari process is itself a gate, with the Court granting review in only a small fraction of cases. And in the Watergate tradition of institutional-accountability naming: a site built on the conviction that the Court’s work should be visible and open to scrutiny, particularly at the cert and shadow-docket stages where transparency is most limited. (more…)

Supreme Court: Still no Patent Cases

by Dennis Crouch

Following up on my September 29 post covering the patent and trademark cases at the Supreme Court's long conference, the Court released its order list on October 6, 2025, and the results are in.  All patent cases denied.

The Court denied certiorari in all four patent cases that were decided:

  • Purdue Pharma v. Accord Healthcare (No. 24-1132) - nexus requirements for objective indicia of non-obviousness
  • Lavery v. Pursuant Health (No. 24-1311) - post-expiration royalty payments under Brulotte and Kimble
  • R.J. Reynolds v. Altria (No. 25-158) - "built-in apportionment" exception to Garretson damages rules
  • USAA v. PNC Bank (No. 25-149) - APA review of PTAB IPR decisions (Justice Alito recused)

Two notable absences: MSN Pharmaceuticals v. Novartis (No. 25-225) The Entresto case focusing on failure to describe after-arising technology; and Gesture Technology v. Apple (Nos. 24-1280, 24-1281) PTAB jurisdiction over expired patents.  These cases were originally scheduled for the Long Conference, but were delayed by the Court's request for response the respondents.  Briefing is ongoing and we'll get a cert decision later this fall.


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Cox v. Sony and the Future of Patent Contributory Liability: How a Copyright Case Could Reshape Patent Law

by Dennis Crouch

The Supreme Court's pending decision in Cox Communications v. Sony Music is a copyright case focused on internet service provider liability, but it also has the potential of reshaping patent law doctrine. Briefing is ongoing in the merits case which will be likely decided in Spring 2026. Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, No. 24-181 (U.S. cert. granted July 1, 2025). The case centers on whether an ISP can be held liable for contributory copyright infringement for continuing to provide internet access to subscribers it knows are repeat infringers, without proof of specific affirmative conduct to promote infringement. Adjudged infringer Cox argues that the Fourth Circuit's approach in the case uses a diluted standard for "material contribution" that threatens to unravel decades of carefully calibrated secondary liability doctrine. The music industry counters that Cox's conduct went beyond passive provision of service - by knowingly maintaining internet access for accounts that received tens of thousands of infringement notices, Cox substantially assisted ongoing piracy and should face liability.

While directly focused on copyright, the case is likely to have direct impact on patent law doctrine as well.  This spillover stems from the recognized "historic kinship" between patent and copyright contributory liability standards.  The two questions presented as:

  1. Whether knowledge plus continued provision suffices for contributory liability; and
  2. Whether willfulness requires awareness that one's own conduct is unlawful (i.e., infringement).

Answers to both questions will almost certainly influence how courts interpret parallel doctrines under under both § 271(b) (inducement) and § 271(c) (contributory infringement) as well as enhanced damages for willful infringement.


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When ‘Patented’ Becomes False Advertising: Crocs Takes Its Dastar Fight to the Supreme Court

by Dennis Crouch

In July 2025, Crocs asked the Supreme Court to decide a seemingly clean legal question: whether the Lanham Act’s false advertising provision, § 43(a)(1)(B), covers misrepresentations about a product’s intangible attributes, such as its patent status. Two new filings complicate the story somewhat. The Accessories Council, in an amicus brief supporting Crocs, urges the Court to take the case to prevent what it sees as a chilling effect on both patent enforcement and routine commercial speech. Dawgs’ brief in opposition reframes the case entirely, insisting that this dispute is about false claims tied to tangible product attributes—not abstract questions about intangibles at all.

The case stems from a protracted legal battle between Crocs and Double Diamond (maker of "Dawgs" shoes) that began in 2006 with design patent infringement litigation. The current dispute centers on Double Diamond's false advertising counterclaim, alleging that Crocs misled consumers by marketing its "Croslite" foam material as "patented," "proprietary," and "exclusive" when the material was neither patented nor unique. Rather it was essentially the same EVA foam used by many competitors.


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Thinking back on Milburn and Secret/Springing Prior Art

by Dennis Crouch

In Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926) [46_S.Ct._324], the Supreme Court established what has expanded into foundational patent law principle: all disclosures in an issued patent (whether claimed or unclaimed)  serve as prior art against later filed patents, effective as of the earlier patent's filing date rather than its issue date. This doctrine of "springing prior art" emerged from a dispute over welding and cutting torch technology, where the Court held that John Whitford's asserted patent (US1028410) for an oxy-acetylene cutting apparatus was invalid because Clifford had, a few months earlier, filed a patent application that fully disclosed the same invention—even though Clifford did not claim the features patented by Whitford.  Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that allowing Whitford to "profit by the delay" of the Patent Office in processing Clifford's application would undermine the fundamental requirement that a patentee must be the "first inventor." I wanted reach back to this old case to highlight how deeply the Milburn doctrine has influenced modern patent prosecution and litigation strategies. The principle of "springing prior art," articulated 99 years ago, now significantly shapes patent law practice.


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Supreme Court Grants Cert in First (and only) IP Case of 2024: Billion-Dollar ISP Copyright Contributory Liability Case

by Dennis Crouch

This week the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, No. 24-171, while denying the competing petition in Sony Music Entertainment v. Cox Communications, No. 24-181. This grant/deny pair follows the Trump Administration’s Solicitor General recommendation and sets up another major Supreme Court battle over the scope of contributory copyright infringement–this one focusing on how internet service providers handle allegations of user piracy.

USDOJ: Contributory Infringement Requires Conscious and Culpable Acts

The case centers on fundamental questions about when companies can be held liable for their users’ copyright infringement—issues that parallel similar debates in patent law regarding inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Patent and copyright cases share common purposes and a core tension of how to hold those who facilitate infringement accountable without stifling innovation or access.

The Sony v. Cox litigation began when a consortium of record companies and music publishers sued Cox Communications, an internet service provider with millions of customers, for copyright infringement based on actions by Cox’s subscribers during 2013-2014. During this period, anti-piracy company MarkMonitor sent Cox over 160,000 automated notices alleging that specific IP addresses on Cox’s network were being used to share particular copyrighted music via peer-to-peer networks like BitTorrent.

Cox had implemented what it called a “graduated response program” under which repeat infringers would receive escalating consequences: email warnings, temporary suspensions, and ultimately possible termination. However, Cox’s application of this policy was admittedly inconsistent. Over the relevant period, Cox terminated only 33 subscribers for copyright violations while terminating over 600,000 for nonpayment. Internal emails showed Cox employees expressing frustration with the volume of infringement notices and resistance to aggressive termination policies that would cost the company subscriber revenue. (more…)

Soto v. US: Will the Court Require Congress to Say the “Magic Words?”

By Dennis Crouch

Although most of our fare is IP related, I have also been keeping an eye on other Federal Circuit cases.  On April 28, 2025, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in  one of those, Soto v. US, a case could significantly impact thousands of combat-disabled veterans seeking retroactive benefits. The Court will decide whether veterans can receive full retroactive Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) payments or are instead limited to six years of backpay under the federal Barring Act.

Background: Marine veteran Simon Soto served in Mortuary Affairs during Operation Iraqi Freedom, where he retrieved fallen service members, often under combat conditions. This obviously stressful assignment led to severe PTSD, resulting in his medical retirement in 2006. In December 2008, the Department of Veterans Affairs rated him 100% disabled due to combat-related PTSD, which qualified him for CRSC under a 2008 program expansion that opened benefits to all medically retired veterans with combat-related disabilities.

However, Soto did not apply for these benefits until 2016, approximately eight years after becoming eligible. While the Navy approved his claim, it only provided retroactive payments dating back six years (to December 2010), citing the six year statute of limitations found in the "Barring Act." 31 U.S.C. § 3702.  Soto argues that the CRSC statute itself (10 U.S.C. § 1413a) contains its own settlement mechanism that displaces the Barring Act's time limitation.  The Barring Act provides "authority to settle claims" against the U.S. Government, and particularly identifies a settlement process with the six-year statute of limitations to be used "except as provided [by] another law."  The question then is whether the CRSC statute does, in fact, provide, alternative settlement authority.  The basic problem is that the CRSC statute does not expressly state that it is providing "settlement" authority and it contains no statute of limitations.  On this second point, Soto suggests that the absence of a SOL is a feature

As I wrote last November, the Federal Circuit split 2-1 in reversing the district court's ruling in favor of Soto. Judge Todd Hughes, writing for the majority, applied a formalist approach requiring specific statutory language. Hughes concluded that nothing in the CRSC statute expressly supersedes the Barring Act, looking for "magic words" such as specific authorization to "settle" claims or an alternative limitations period.  Judge Jimmie Reyna dissented, advocating for a more functional analysis that would benefit the disabled veterans. Reyna argued that the majority's test was unnecessarily rigid, pointing out that over a century ago, the Supreme Court defined "settle" in this context to simply mean making an administrative determination of the amount of money due on a claim. In his view, the CRSC process unquestionably meets that definition. This divide between Hughes and Reyna reflects a broader philosophical tension I've observed across multiple cases, with Hughes typically adopting a text-focused formalist approach and Reyna favoring a more purposive or justice-oriented analysis that considers practical impacts.


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Challenging the Server Test for Image Embedding

by Dennis Crouch

McGucken v. Valnet, Inc., No. 24-1040 (Supreme Court 2025)

Photographer Elliot McGucken has petitioned the Supreme Court to review a Ninth Circuit decision involving what has become known as the "Server Test" in copyright -- law has permitted websites to avoid copyright infringement by embedding images hosted on third-party servers rather than storing and hosting them directly.  Another name for this may be the "Embedding Liability Shield." Embedded images and video can appear seamlessly on a website even though the media is not served by the site's servers.

In McGucken v. Valnet, Inc., the basic setup is that Valnet embedded on its thetravel.com site a number of links to McGucken's Instagram posts.  To be clear, the Instagram posts are authorized by the photographer, but he argues that others should not be permitted to embed his Instagram posts into their sites. The Ninth Circuit sided with Valnet, but McGucken has now petitioned the Supreme Court for review.


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Corporate Shells and Legal Loopholes: The Dewberry Decision’s Trickster Legacy

by Dennis Crouch

In a unanimous decision released today, the Supreme Court has vacated a $43 million trademark infringement award against Dewberry Group, potentially creating a roadmap for corporate structuring to minimize trademark liability. Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc., 604 U.S. ___ (2025). Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, held that when awarding the “defendant’s profits” under the Lanham Act, courts can only include profits “properly ascribable to the defendant itself” – not those of its legally separate, non-party corporate affiliates. While the decision reinforces traditional corporate law principles, it raises serious concerns about the practical enforcement of trademark rights in an era when establishing multiple corporate entities is increasingly simple and commonplace.  23-900_Dewberry Decision.

Mythological trickster figures such as the Coyote or Loki operate at the boundaries of justice — and are known for exploiting gaps between rules and reality in ways that allow for both ambiguity and transformation.  Writing in Carl Jung’s posthumous book, Joseph Henderson gave a harsh rendition of the trickster: “he [the trickster] is cruel, cynical, and unfeeling.”  Man and his Symbols (1964).   I see Dewberry as a trickster opinion – not necessarily good or bad – but one that creates a tension between legal formalism and practical reality, inviting clever structuring that follows the letter of the law while potentially undermining its purpose.  There is always a reckoning after the trickster acts as we come to grips with the gap between what the law says and what justice requires.  For example, the opinion here may ultimately prompt legislative reconsideration of how trademark remedies function in the modern corporate landscape. (more…)