Tag Archives: Written Description

112(a) written description, possession, genus claims, ranges

Jepson and Other Point-of-Novelty Claims in U.S. Patents, 1976–2026

by Dennis Crouch

Point-of-novelty claiming is now rare in U.S. patents. Only about 0.03% of U.S. utility patents issued this year include a claim in Jepson form ("In a widget having A and B, the improvement comprising C"). This is down from about 14% in the early 1980s. The European two-part form ("A widget having A and B, characterized in that C") runs twelve to sixteen times higher, but it is also rare at still well under 1% of issued U.S. patents. In 2025 that came to about 1,200 patents with a two-part claim and 76 with a Jepson claim, out of 325k utility patents.

Line chart, log scale: share of US utility patents and published applications with a Jepson claim versus the European two-part form, 1980-2026

This updates my November 2023 post on Jepson claims (and the 2017 version before it). For this one I used a broader text search that also catches variants such as "the improvement wherein" and dependent claims to "the improvement of claim 1." That raises the early-1980s figures substantially (the 2023 chart peaked near 8%, this one near 14%) but makes almost no difference after 2015, when nearly every remaining Jepson claim uses the literal "improvement comprising" wording.

In re Xencor, Inc., No. 2024-1870 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 2025), held that a Jepson preamble is a limitation that must be supported by the written description, so the applicant bears the burden of showing that what the preamble calls conventional was in fact well known in the art, with the amount of disclosure required scaling with the unpredictability and newness of the field. The upshot is a double burden unique to the form: the preamble counts as an admission of prior art against the applicant yet still has to be described like any other claim element. Ultimately this makes the form even less user-friendly. I wrote about the decision when it came down.


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Provisional Prior Art

by Dennis Crouch

Dental Monitoring SAS v. Align Technology, Inc., No. 2025-1752 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2026)

Patent law cases often turn on timing. In our first-to-file system, the question often boils down to whether the patent at issue was effectively filed before the competing patent application.  This case is about the prior-art date of a patent or published application.  We know that under 102(a)(2), they are back-dated to the date they were "effectively filed," and the case answers when we look-back all the way to the provisional filing date.  Today's decision is important because it overturns USPTO policy implementing the AIA and ultimately, this gives patent owners a new way to knock out references that reach back to a priority filing date.  Although this decision centers on priority to US provisional patent applications, it should also apply to foreign filings.  That makes it a big deal since patents claim priority to one or the other of these.

Section 102(d) spells out the effective prior art date of a patent or published application in some detail but is worded in a clunky fashion:

such patent or application shall be considered to have been effectively filed, with respect to any subject matter described in the patent or application . . . (2) if the patent or application for patent is entitled to claim a right of priority under section 119, 365(a), 365(b), 386(a), or 386(b), or to claim the benefit of an earlier filing date under section 120, 121, 365(c), or 386(c), based upon 1 or more prior filed applications for patent, as of the filing date of the earliest such application that describes the subject matter.

The analysis thus requires both a document and subject matter analysis: was priority properly claimed and does it disclose the right subject matter.  For any given disclosure in the reference, the prior art date is the filing date of the earliest application in the chain that (1) the reference is entitled to claim priority to or benefit from, and (2) itself describes that disclosure.

In the pre-AIA case of Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015), the Federal Circuit held that a reference does not get its provisional's filing date simply by claiming it. The provisional must supply § 112 support for the claims of the reference itself, and the party relying on the reference bears the burden of showing it. Because the rule is a necessary condition, a reference with no supported claim gets no earlier date at all, even where the provisional plainly describes the subject matter being used for the rejection.  But, the USPTO has been following a different and looser rule for post-AIA patents.  The agency reasoned that the new statute specifically states what is required, and that it requires less: the reference need only be "entitled to claim" priority, and the earlier application need only "describe the subject matter" being relied upon. Whether any claim of the reference is actually entitled to the earlier date drops out of the analysis.

Now, in Dental Monitoring, the Federal Circuit has rejected the USPTO's post-AIA approach and held instead that the same Dynamic Drinkware rule carries over to post-AIA prior art dating under 102(d)(2).  The outcome overrules the Board's precedential decision in Penumbra, Inc. v. RapidPulse, Inc., IPR2021-01466 (PTAB Mar. 10, 2023).


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Provisional Typo Spoils Priority Date

by Dennis Crouch

A seeming typo in Enanta's provisional application left the resulting patent invalid. In Enanta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2025-1427 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 2026), the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that the claims of its US11358953 are anticipated by intervening prior art because the priority filing did not sufficiently describe the claimed invention. Enanta's provisional application listed a substituent as NHC(O)-C2-C12-alkyl (showing a two to twelve carbon range). The issued patent listed that same substituent as NHC(O)-C1-C12-alkyl, adding the one-carbon member. That one-carbon version described nirmatrelvir, the protease inhibitor Pfizer disclosed first in April 2021 and later began selling as Paxlovid. Because the provisional never disclosed the one-carbon species, the patent could not claim the provisional's July 2020 priority date, and Pfizer's intervening disclosure anticipated the claims.

Enanta argued that the "C2" in its provisional was an obvious typographical error that should have read "C1," so correcting it added no new matter.  The Federal Circuit focused on the question of written description and priority: did the provisional's two-to-twelve carbon range support, under 35 U.S.C. 112, the one-carbon species the patent later claimed? Does "2" describe "1"? The court answered no, and it applied the written description standard de novo even though the district court had treated the case as one about its power to correct an error.


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Drafting Fixable vs. Amendment Created: A Tale of Two §112 Rejections

I’ve been reading through a lot of office actions lately.  I think these two charts are interesting that show opposite workflow patterns for the two main §112 rejection grounds. For indefiniteness under §112(b), examiners make these more-often-than-not in the first non-final office action. For written description and enablement under §112(a), the pattern flips: final rejection rates exceed first non-final rates.

Section 112(b) indefiniteness rejection rates: first non-final vs final office actions, 2008-2025

Section 112(a) written description and enablement rejection rates: first non-final vs final office actions, 2008-2025

The §112(b) gap is consistent with the standard prosecution workflow. Examiners flag indefiniteness problems on the first office action. Applicants then amend claims to tighten-up the scope, and many of those problems are resolved before the application reaches a final rejection. Indefiniteness is, in this sense, often a “drafting fixable” defect. This is not absolutely true since applicants might add new problems through amendment, or examiners might notice the problem later in time.

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Extra Credit Not Required: Teva v. Lilly and the Limits of Amgen’s Reach

by Dennis Crouch

Since the Supreme Court's 2023 decision in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. 594 (2023), pharmaceutical patentees have been grappling with the heightened disclosure demands for genus claims, particularly in the biologics space where many similar compounds can have similar treatment uses. The Federal Circuit's subsequent application of Amgen in Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 81 F.4th 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023), reinforced the issues -- and left many wondering whether broad antibody claims could survive at all.

Today's decision in Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2024-1094 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 16, 2026), provides an important limiting principle. Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Prost holds that when a patent claims a method of using a well-known genus of compounds rather than claiming the compounds themselves, both the written description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 are evaluated differently. The court reversed a district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) that had overturned a jury verdict of willful infringement and $177 million in damages, reinstating Teva's win in this battle between two migraine drugs: Teva's Ajovy and Lilly's Emgality.

The case has been closely watched on Patently-O since the district court's 2023 JMOL decision. The appeal presented a good vehicle for testing the boundaries of post-Amgen disclosure doctrine because the asserted claims are method-of-treatment claims rather than composition claims. That distinction turns out to be dispositive.


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Two Voices on § 101: Agency Guidance Meets Judicial Skepticism

by Dennis Crouch

In Rideshare Displays, Inc. v. Lyft, Inc., No. 25-1132 (petition filed Mar. 23, 2026), the petitioner asks for clarification on when a court may disregard specific functional claim limitations in conducting the Alice patent eligibility analysis. The petition also raises a procedural question about the Federal Circuit's authority to raise and decide new factual arguments sua sponte on appeal.  Something unusual about the case - USPTO Dir. Vidal intervened at the Federal Circuit to defend the PTAB's eligibility holding, and the court reversed anyway.  I expect that Dir. Squires will be even more supportive. At the Supreme Court, the USPTO brief will be filed by the DOJ's SG, bringing a wider set of interests - and likely a less pro-patentee tone - than the USPTO’s Federal Circuit presentation.


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Federal Circuit’s Top Precedents (2025): Claim Construction Classics and the Procedural Turn

by Dennis Crouch

Which cases does the Federal Circuit cite most frequently? I recently compiled data on the top ten most-cited precedents appearing in Federal Circuit opinions during 2025 (so far). Some of the standards remain frequent: Phillips v. AWH Corp. leads, followed by KSR v. Teleflex. Markman v. Westview also makes the list.  What may surprise some readers is the prominence of procedural cases addressing threshold questions: whether arguments were preserved, what standard of review applies, and whether judicial review is even available.

The list also reflects the court's post-AIA docket. Two cases addressing IPR judicial reviewability appear among the top ten: Cuozzo v. Lee and Thryv v. Click-To-Call.   The oldest on the list is Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, a 1938 labor law decision that defines the boundary of appellate review.

* For this data, I parsed all of the CAFC's 2025 precedential patent decisions through December 15, 2025 to create a master table of authorities. 

1. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 

The Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Phillips remains the undisputed foundation of claim construction doctrine. Twenty years after its issuance, the case continues to lead citation counts because it establishes the framework courts apply in virtually every patent case. Phillips instructs that claim terms carry their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention, with that meaning informed primarily by the intrinsic record: i.e., the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. The decision resolved a long-running tension about the relative weight of intrinsic versus extrinsic evidence with the result of subordinating dictionaries and expert testimony to the patent document itself.


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When Juries Don’t Matter: Written Description Effectively Becomes a Question of Law

by Dennis Crouch

In consecutive weeks, the Federal Circuit has reversed two jury verdicts totaling over $80 million in pharmaceutical patent disputes, holding in both cases that the specifications failed (as a matter of law) to satisfy §112(a)'s disclosure requirements. Seagen Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo Company, Ltd., Nos. 2023-2424 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 2, 2025); Duke University v. Sandoz Inc., No. 2024-1078 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2025).

In my view, these cases represent a significant doctrinal development. I see these as revealing three interconnected trends:

  1. The Federal Circuit's increasing willingness to treat patent specifications as legal texts subject to judicial interpretation of the text rather than factual determinations of its meaning;
  2. The practical (re)convergence of written description and enablement into a unified adequacy inquiry; and
  3. The court's growing confidence in overturning jury verdicts on §112(a) grounds as a matter of law.

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When Good Writing Makes Bad Patents: The Synonym Trap in Claim Construction

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Aortic Innovations LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corporation, No. 2024-1145 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2025) is a bit of a cautionary tale for patent drafters. It is essentially the difference between careful writing and careful patent writing.

Writing vs Patent Writing: When I write a blog post, I try to use varied vocabulary and synonyms to create more engaging and nuanced text.  This is also helpful for rounding out context and characters.  But, that approach is in direct conflict with the precision that is sometimes needed for patent claiming where consistent terminology provides clarity and varied usage can create unintended limitations.  In this case, the court affirmed a claim construction narrowing "outer frame" to mean "self-expanding frame" based on the specification's interchangeable use of these terms.

Aortic Innovations asserted patents are directed to transcatheter aortic valve replacement devices. The patents claimed dual-frame configurations with an "outer frame" and an "inner frame" working together. The district court construed "outer frame" to mean "self-expanding frame" (a frame using shape-memory material that springs back to expanded form) rather than its seemingly broader plain meaning that might encompass both self-expanding and balloon-expandable frames (frames requiring balloon inflation to expand). Based on this construction, the parties stipulated to non-infringement.

The Federal Circuit's analysis turned on whether the specification's use of terminology constituted implicit lexicography that redefined "outer frame" to require self-expansion. Under Federal Circuit precedent, a patentee can act as lexicographer by explicitly defining claim terms in the specification or by an implicit definition.  Although the Federal Circuit describes this standard as quite strict (requiring a definition ‘so clear’ that it equals an explicit one), the Aortic court illustrates how that threshold can be satisfied quite easily in practice.


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Supreme Court on Patents Fall 2025

by Dennis Crouch

The Supreme Court's docket heading into its November and December conferences includes six pending certiorari petitions focusing on patent law and Federal Circuit procedure. I have loosely ranked them here according to some combined score that considers both the importance of the case and its likelihood of being granted certiorari.

The leading contender is Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., No. 24-889, which asks whether a generic drug manufacturer that fully carves patented uses out of its FDA-approved label can nonetheless face induced infringement liability simply by calling its product a "generic version" of the brand-name drug or referencing publicly available information about the branded product's sales. The petition challenges a Federal Circuit decision that permitted inducement claims to proceed even when Hikma's FDA-approved label omitted all direct references to Amarin's patented method of use. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act's framework, generic manufacturers can obtain approval with so-called "skinny labels" that exclude patented indications, allowing them to market their products for unpatented uses only. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).


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Thanks for Your Input: Federal Circuit Ignores USPTO’s §101 Framework (Again)

by Dennis Crouch

In Rideshare Displays, Inc. v. Lyft, Inc., No. 2023-2033 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 2025) (nonprecedential), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB determination that claims directed to vehicle identification systems for ridesharing services were unpatentable for obviousness, but reversed the Board’s grant of Rideshare’s motion to amend substitute claims. Judge Hughes, writing for the panel, held that the substitute claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they merely used technology as a tool to improve user experience rather than improving computer functionality itself.

The patents at issue all share a common specification directed to systems and methods for vehicle identification that allow ridesharing app users to verify they are getting in the correct cars and drivers to confirm they are picking up the correct riders. U.S. Patent Nos. 9,892,637; 10,169,987; 10,395,525; 10,559,199; and 10,748,417.  The systems work by having a driver’s device receive a notification signal that triggers an indicator visible from outside the car, such as a code or icon on a display. Lyft filed five petitions for inter partes review in November 2021, and the Board found all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious or anticipated over the prior art.  Rideshare moved to amend claims in two of the proceedings, and the Board allowed several substitute claims, prompting Lyft’s cross-appeal challenging the amendments on patent eligibility, written description, and obviousness grounds.

In its decision, the court compared the claimed system to “hand-printed cards with names to help identify ride pickups at crowded locations, such as an airport,” finding that invoking computers and mobile devices to streamline human interactions does not transform an abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.

USPTO's Limited Authority Over Substantive Patent Law

The USPTO lacks interpretive authority to construe substantive patent statutes including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112. The agency's internal guidance documents directing how patent examiners and even PTAB judges must apply these provisions receive no deference from reviewing courts. The Federal Circuit independently interprets these statutory provisions de novo, applying its own precedent rather than deferring to administrative interpretations. Here, for example, the court explicitly declined to follow the USPTO's 2019 eligibility guidance framework which I have previously noted tends toward being more pro-eligibility than court precedent.

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Google v. Sonos: Federal Circuit Validates Strategic Patent Continuation Practice (With Limits)

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit has now wiped away Judge William Alsup's dramatic post-trial decision in Sonos v. Google. In a nonprecedential opinion, the court reversed the lower court's finding of prosecution laches, reiterating that laches is an equitable defense reserved for rare cases. Google LLC v. Sonos, Inc., No. 2024-1097 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 2025).

Prosecution laches requires both (1) an unreasonable and unexplained delay in patent prosecution and (2) a showing of prejudice to the accused infringer in the form of intervening rights (e.g. evidence that others "invested in, worked on, or used the claimed technology during the period of delay"). Here, Google failed to present evidence that it (or others) changed their position or made investments in reliance on Sonos's delay and so laches could not apply. At times, egregious delay can trigger laches absent a specific showing of harm. Here, however, the panel emphasized that standard continuation practice, even over more than a decade, is not itself an "egregious misuse" of the system sufficient to trigger laches in the absence of specific prejudice. Prior prosecution laches cases all involved pre-1995 patents and decades of delay and this was the first time prosecution laches had been used to render a post-1995 patent unenforceable in a situation where delays in prosecution automatically delayed patent term as well. The court ultimately reversed Judge Alsup's unenforceability ruling and reinstated the jury's $32 million verdict on the Sonos "zone scenes" patents.

Although Sonos won the appeal, the decision does not provide a full green light to the continuation practice found here - particularly where claims covering competitor activity are first added to the patent family long after the original filing and publication dates. The Federal Circuit's analysis focused heavily on the fact that Sonos's 2007 patent application previously published, well before Google's alleged investments began in 2014-2015. This meant Google could not claim prejudice from incorporating into its products a feature that was already publicly disclosed in a pending patent family.


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Federal Circuit Wrestles with Prosecution Laches in Sonos v. Google

In 2020, Sonos sued Google in the N.D. of California, asserting two “zone scenes”  wireless speaker patents (US 10,848,885 and 10,469,966) that allow for overlapping groups of speakers. A jury found Google liable and awarded $30 million in damages. In an unusual move, District Judge William Alsup threw out the verdict in a 55-page post-trial order. He held the patents unenforceable for prosecution laches and invalid for lack of written description support. Judge Alsup found Sonos had engaged in a “daisy chain” continuation strategy to keep the patent family alive for over 13 years.  Although longer than average, this timeline is not long for a patent family recognized as valuable.  But, one quirk is that the particular “overlapping zone scene” claims  were not presented in claim form until 2019. And, they were added after Google began selling products with that feature. Judge Alsup also concluded that Sonos’s 2019 amendments were directed to new matter not supported by the original 2006–2007 applications -- i.e., lacking written description suport.  Without that priority claim, those earlier filings became anticipatory prior art to the later would-be continuation.

The appeal is now pending, and the Federal Circuit held oral arguments on July 10, 2025.  The case raises fundamental questions about the scope of the "sparingly applied" doctrine of prosecution laches and also about the proper procedure for raising written description/anticipation issues during trial.

I believe that a typical Federal Circuit panel would side with the appellant Sonos. But, the panel in this case is somewhat unique. The combination of Judges Prost and Lourie creates an interesting dynamic given their opposing positions in the 2010 prosecution laches case of Cancer Research. Judge Prost's dissent in that case shows her willingness to apply prosecution laches.  Although Judge Lourie did not find laches in Cancer Research, he is Judge Lourie authorship of Symbol v. Lemelson—the decision that revived prosecution laches in 2005.

In ratings of "patent friendliness" (including one by Google's attorney Dan Bagatel), Judges Prost and Lourie are among the three least patent-friendly judges on the Federal Circuit.  Judge Bumb, sitting by designation from the District of New Jersey, adds unpredictability as she lacks the extensive patent law track record of her colleagues. All three are Republican appointees who generally embrace textualist approaches, but that judicial philosophy matters less here since prosecution laches is an entirely judge-made equitable doctrine with minimal congressional guidance beyond Section 282's broad authorization of equitable defenses.


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Preview: Federal Circuit Oral Argument in Google v. Sonos (July 10, 2025)

by Dennis Crouch

Judge Alsup issued his controversial unenforceability decision in Sonos v. Google back in October 2023, and the appeal has been pending since then.  The Federal Circuit recent scheduled arguments for July 10, 2025.  I wanted to offer a bit of a preview of these upcoming oral arguments.

In 2020, Sonos sued Google for infringing its “zone scenes” patents, which cover techniques for grouping networked speakers into saved scenes (including overlapping groups of speakers). U.S. Patent Nos. 10,848,885 and 10,469,966.  A jury found Google liable and awarded $30 million in damages.  N.D.Cal. Judge William Alsup then took the unusual step of throwing out the verdict. Ruling on post-trial motions, Judge Alsup found the two patents unenforceable due to prosecution laches and invalid for lack of written description support. Sonos promptly appealed, and it is that appeal that is now pending.

Judge Alsup’s Decision: In his 55-page order, Judge Alsup found that Sonos had engaged in a “daisy chain” continuation strategy to keep its patent family alive for over 13 years. Sonos filed an initial provisional application in 2006, but did not present the asserted overlapping-scene claims for examination until 2019.  By then, Google and others had already developed and sold products implementing the overlapping-zone technology.


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The Standard for Conception: Don’t Ask “Will it Work”

by Dennis Crouch

In an interesting decision affecting one of the most high-profile patent disputes in biotechnology, the Federal Circuit has partially vacated and remanded a PTAB decision that awarded priority of invention for CRISPR-Cas9 technology in eukaryotic cells to scientists at the Broad Institute. Regents of the University of California v. Broad Institute, Inc., Nos. 2022-1594, 2022-1653 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2025). The court determined that the PTAB applied an incorrect legal standard for "conception," a fundamental concept in patent law's priority determination under the pre-America Invents Act first-to-invent system.

Understanding Conception Under Patent Law: The court reiterated the classic definition of conception as "the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice." Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab'ys, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The court emphasized that "conception is complete only when the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor's mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or experimentation."

However, conception is not complete invention -- something that also requires construction to practice, either actual or constructive. Notably, it is the process of reduction to practice that truly shows that the invention works.  Backtracking, this means that for conception "an inventor need not know that his invention will work for conception to be complete."


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The Priority Paradox: In re Floyd Highlights the Dual Standards of Written Description and Anticipation

by Dennis Crouch

While a design patent can technically claim priority to a prior utility patent, that approach takes some planning and forethought to ensure that the utility patent's drawings and disclosure sufficiently show possession of the specific ornamental design features that will later be claimed in the design application.  Ideally, the drawings in the utility filing would be identical to those later included in the design application.

This situation is exemplified by the Federal Circuit's recent decision In re Floyd (Fed. Cir. April 22, 2025) (non-precedential).  The claimed design is a cooling blanket -- with the drawings showing a 6x5 array pattern.  The priority filing included a 6x6 array, a 6x4 array, and a statement that the array could include a plurality of array layouts.  But, the priority filing did not specifically and expressly include the 6x5.  The result: priority claim denied for lack of written description.

The case also illustrates the "daylight" between written description and anticipation standards, creating a trap where an applicant's own published application can both fail to provide written description support yet anticipate a later filing.  In this case, although Floyd's prior published application was insufficient as a priority document, the court found it served perfectly well as an anticipatory reference.


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Federal Circuit Redefines Prior Art Requirements Under § 102(e)/102(a)(2): In re Riggs

by Dennis Crouch

In a significant decision, the Federal Circuit has established a more rigorous test for determining when a published patent application claiming priority to a provisional application can be considered prior art as of its provisional filing date.  In re Riggs, Case No. 2022-1945 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 24, 2025).   The case is decided under pre-AIA 102(e), and so it is not entirely clear whether the same law applies post-AIA.

The basic idea behind 102(e)/102(a)(2) is intuitive — the earlier-filed application should be given priority over the later-filed application. But, the actual doctrine has always been controversial because it creates what I call “secret springing prior art.” When an application is filed but not yet published, it exists as a confidential document at the USPTO that no competitor can access. When that application eventually publishes (typically 18 months after filing), it suddenly becomes prior art — backdated to its original filing date. This creates a situation where inventors might develop what they believe is novel technology, only to have an earlier-filed but later-published application “spring forth” as invalidating prior art.

Riggs focuses on reaching back even further – to the provisional application filing date.  The key holding (more…)

Guest Post by Profs. Masur & Ouellette: Patent Disclosure and After-Arising Technologies

Guest post by Professors Jonathan S. Masur (Chicago Law) and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette (Stanford Law).

This blog recently covered the Federal Circuit’s important decision in In re Entresto (Novartis Pharmaceuticals v. Torrent Pharma), 125 F.4th 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2025), which upheld patent claims even though they covered after-arising technology that was not described or enabled in the specification. As Dennis noted, the Federal Circuit appeared to depart from well-established prior law on the subject. But as we explain in our forthcoming article, Disclosure Puzzles in Patent Law, we believe the court should move the law further still from where it stands—and it should correct some of its reasoning along the way.

To review, In re Entresto involved a patent that claimed a pharmaceutical composition of two hypertension drugs, valsartan and sacubitril, “in combination.” When the patent was filed, the only known method of combining these chemicals was in a physical mixture. That is the only combination method disclosed in the specification. In the intervening years, however, scientists have discovered a means of combining the two chemicals in a “complex,” an arrangement in which they are connected by weak chemical bonds. This is the method used to make the accused infringing drug. The patent owner argued successfully that the claim language (“in combination”) was broad enough to cover this mode of combination. But the fact that the use of a complex was after-arising technology—and thus the specification said nothing about it—raised written description and enablement issues.

The Federal Circuit upheld the patent against both challenges for basically the same reason: that the specification demonstrated that the patentee possessed and enabled the full scope of the claims at the time the patent application was filed. In other words, the patent claimed the two chemicals “in combination,” and the specification had indeed described and enabled the two chemicals “in combination.” But the court’s reasoning was peculiar. The court asserted that the after-arising technology—the combination of the two chemicals into a complex—“is not what is claimed.” To argue otherwise, the Federal Circuit declared, would be to “erroneously conflate[] the distinct issues of patentability and infringement.” (more…)

Million-Dollar Mysteries: Recent Complex Patent Cases Lost to Rule 36

by Dennis Crouch

In a recent batch of Rule 36 summary affirmances, the Federal Circuit disposed of several complex patent cases without written opinions. This continues to raise serious questions in my mind about the court’s ongoing reliance on this practice. While some judges defend Rule 36 affirmances as appropriate for easy to see “losers,” an examination of these recent cases reveals sophisticated legal issues involving millions of dollars in dispute. For instance, in Lu v. Hyper Bicycles, the court declined to address important questions the quantum of evidence needed to survive summary judgment in design patent cases, while Wilson v. Corning presented novel issues regarding jury trial rights for hybrid legal-equitable claims under the Seventh Amendment.

I have previously argued that 35 U.S.C. § 144’s “shall issue” language requires the court to issue an opinion in appeals from USPTO proceedings.  But, the court has continued the practice.  In In re Google, the court summarily affirmed the PTAB’s rejection of claims related a system for hot-news detection. This is a case where Google retaining top appellate counsel to challenge the Board’s obviousness analysis. Similarly, in Maxell v. Amperex, the court passed on an opportunity to provide needed on analogous art determinations, a key confusing aspect of obviousness decisions.

While I don’t think these cases are generally clear losers, I have found that they are more likely to involve detailed factual records, particularly in IPR appeals where technical minutiae abound.  So, I can understand why the court may be reticent to delve into the difficult cases — except that is the role of the judges.  And, the court should not permit the PTAB to avoid review via complexity. The Federal Circuit’s handling of Shell v. Scientific Design exemplifies this concern – rather than grappling with important questions about the Board’s ability to fill gaps in petitioner’s obviousness arguments, the court opted for summary affirmance without any opinion. This approach not only deprives the patent community of valuable precedent but also raises questions about whether the court is fully engaging with the challenging factual determinations underlying many patent appeals. For me, the very process of writing often reveals analytical gaps or inconsistencies that were not apparent during my initial consideration of an issue.  Judges need to explicitly connect their reasoning from premise to conclusion, and that can be evaded via summary affirmances. (more…)