Tag Archives: Venue

1400(b) patent venue, TC Heartland, forum shopping

Personal Privilege: Why Improper Venue Did Not Stop the § 101 Dismissal

by Dennis Crouch

AML IP, LLC v. Bath & Body Works Direct, Inc., No. 2025-1280 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 2026).

This was an odd case - particularly because the appellant (represented by Bill Ramey) decided not to appear at oral arguments.  Those arguments began with a joke about how it might be embarrassing for Lance Wyatt (Fish & Richardson), who represented the successful defendants below, if he lost the appeal. He did not lose.

In a precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit that a district court which has just concluded that venue is improper may go on to dismiss the same complaint on the merits -- in this case holding the claims ineligible.  Judge Prost wrote for a unanimous panel affirming E.D.Tex. Judge Jordan's dismissal on two two independent grounds: improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), and failure to state a claim because the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,876,979 are ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

In the appeal, AML did not contest either ruling on the merits. Its entire appeal was about sequencing.  AML argued that the court should have stopped when it found the case was in the wrong forum.  The stakes here are big. Dismissal for lack of venue is generally without prejudice - allowing the patentee to refile the litigation in a proper forum.  The 101 ruling, on the other hand, is with prejudice and likely entirely ends the litigation campaign.


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Fun While It Lasted: Judge Albright to Leave the Bench

by Dennis Crouch

Judge Alan Albright confirmed Tuesday evening that he will resign from the Western District of Texas at the end of August, closing out the most unusual patent-venue experiment of the past decade.  Albright told Bloomberg Law that he misses being a trial lawyer and plans to return to private practice.

The announcement is less consequential than it would have been four years ago. Albright's patent gravity peaked in 2020-21, when roughly one in five U.S. patent cases landed in the Waco Division because he was the division's only district judge. Chief Judge Orlando Garcia ended that arrangement in July 2022 by ordering new Waco patent filings distributed randomly across twelve WDTX judges.  In 2024, Albright gave up Waco and transferred back to to Austin.


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Patent Venue’s Method Claim Problem: How Many Steps Must Occur in the District?

by Dennis Crouch

Comcast is pushing its proper venue argument.  After being denied by the district court and a Federal Circuit panel, it has now petitioned for en banc rehearing.  In re Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, No. 26-104 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2025).

The underlying dispute presents a question the appellate court seemingly has not squarely addressed: whether the “acts of infringement” prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant performed all steps of a claimed method within the judicial district, or whether alleging the performance a subset suffices.

Patent Venue Under § 1400(b): The patent venue statute provides that a civil action for patent infringement "may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). After TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 581 U.S. 258 (2017), a domestic corporation "resides" only in its state of incorporation. For defendants sued outside their home state, plaintiffs must establish both "acts of infringement" and a "regular and established place of business" in the chosen forum.

Post TC Heartland (2017), I think of Section 1400(b) as being quite narrow.  But its 1897 origin was not as a restriction on patent plaintiffs but as an expansion of their options. At the time, the general venue provision limited civil suits to the district where the defendant was an “inhabitant.” Patent holders complained that this forced them to travel across the continent to sue infringers operating businesses in their own backyards. The 1897 statute responded by adding a second venue option: districts where the defendant had committed acts of infringement and maintained a regular and established place of business. This gave patentees meaningful access to forums where infringement was actually occurring.

Since then, however, the general venue statute has expanded greatly so that it now (basically) encompasses any district where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.  What began as a plaintiff-friendly expansion became, through statutory drift, more of a defendant’s shelter.

Docs:

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Dual Sanctions: Courts Can Layer Inherent Power Sanctions on Top of § 285 Awards

by Dennis Crouch

In PS Products, the Federal Circuit has affirmed that district courts may impose deterrence sanctions under their inherent powers even after (or in addition to) awarding attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. PS Prods. Inc. v. Panther Trading Co., No. 2023-1665 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 2024).


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Proposed Changes to Patent Law’s Proper Venue Statute: Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2024

by Dennis Crouch

Law school civil procedure courses spend very little time on proper venue because, in most cases venue is proper so long as the district court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. However, in a quirk of history, Congress created a patent-law specific venue statute in the 1800s that severely limits where a patent case can be filed. See 28 U.S.C. 1404(b). A newly proposed bill, S.4095, sponsored by Republican Senators McConnell, Cotton, and Tillis, would moderately expand the scope of proper venue and resolve some indeterminacy regarding foreign defendants.  Although the proposal does not create a right to immediate appeal, it does set a standard for mandamus that would seem to permit immediate relief of erroneous transfer denials for improper venue. This portion of the bill is entitled


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Guest Post: Where Are the Patent Judge Shoppers Going?

By Paul R. Gugliuzza and J. Jonas Anderson

In the past few weeks, more and more people outside of patent law have learned about ‘judge shopping’—quirks in procedural rules that allow plaintiffs to pick not just a court but the individual judge who will hear their case.

Republican state attorneys general and conservative activists have been exploiting those rules to challenge federal government policies on abortion, immigration, gun control, transgender rights, and more in front of sympathetic, Republican-appointed judges, primarily in Amarillo and Wichita Falls, Texas.

Last month, the Judicial Conference of the United States (a group of judges who oversee the operation of the federal courts) issued a new policy urging courts to adopt case assignment procedures that prevent judge shopping, especially in cases challenging federal law.

Predictably, the beneficiaries of judge shopping—namely, Republicans—decried the new policy as politically motivated and urged district courts to ignore it. Democrats, for their part,


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The Judicial Conference and Its Random Assignment “Policy”

Guest post by Professors Jonas Anderson[1] and Paul Gugliuzza[2]

On Tuesday, March 12, 2024, the Judicial Conference of the United States—the self-governing body of the federal judiciary—held a press conference and issued a press release touting the Conference’s “strengthen[ing of] the policy governing random case assignment, limiting the ability of litigants to effectively choose judges in certain cases by where they file a lawsuit.”

As we’ve explained in a series of articles, in many federal courts throughout the country, all or practically all cases are assigned to a single judge, giving litigants the ability to “judge shop”—that is, to choose their own judge.  Many divisional court houses are associated with a single federal judge, and cases filed in that courthouse are assigned to that predetermined judge.

Judge shopping has been a particularly long-standing problem in patent cases and corporate bankruptcy cases. More recently, Republican state attorneys general have filed numerous challenges to federal government actions on matters such as abortion, gun control, and immigration in single-judge divisions in Texas.

After a few days of confusion about the scope and content of the Judicial Conference’s new policy on case assignment, the Conference subsequently released a three-page document titled Guidance for Civil Case Assignment in District Courts.

The Judicial Conference’s interest in stopping judge shopping is commendable—it’s hard to think of any principled reason why a party should be able to pick the individual judge who hears their case. But we see at least three major flaws in the Judicial Conference’s action.


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